Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri
078434
CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

078434

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

RMERLY 'THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY' □ NEW SERIES
N 0376-415X
RNAL OF THE PRATAP CENTRE OF PHILOSOPHY, AMALNER
)
ARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY POONA UNIVERSITY, POONA

EDITORS

BARLINGAY, RAJENDRA PRASAD, M. P. MARATHE
UNDARA RAJAN, MRINAL MIRI, S. S. DESHPANDE

XV
1
ary 1988

078434

ersity of Poona

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
ISSN 0376-415X
Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Editors

S. S. Barlingay, (Professor, Emeritus, Poona University), Rajendra Prasad, (Rtd. Professor, Patna), M. P. Marathe (Poona University), R. Sundara Rajan (Poona University), Mrinal Miri (NEHU, Shillong), S. S. Deshpande (Poona University)

Board of Consulting Editors :

G. N. Mathrani (Bombay), Daya Krishna (Rajasthan University) Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta University), K. J. Shah (Karnataka University), R. C. Pandeya (Delhi University), D. P. Chattopadhyay (Jadavpur University), G. N. Joshi (Poona University). D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur University), J de Marneffe (Poona), Dharmedra Kumar (Delhi University), R. C. Gandhi (Delhi), J. Khwaja (Aligarh Muslim University), S. A. Shukla (I.I.T., Kanpur), Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow University), S. K. Saxena (Delhi University), S. V. Bokil (Poona University), R. A. Sinari (I.I.T., Bombay), R. K. Gupta (Delhi University), R. Balasubramaniam (Madras University), S. R. Kawle (Poona University), Ranveer Singh (J. N. University, Imphal), V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi University), Ashok Gangadean (Haverford College, USA).

Articles in this Journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).

Articles for publication, Books for Review, and other communications pertaining to publications, Book-reviews, subscriptions, I. P. Q. Publications, etc. may be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Department of Philosophy, Poona University, Pune 411 007, India.

Subscription to be sent to :

Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly (by Cash or by Cheque)

- Change of Address and/or non-receipt of an issue of the Journal may be intimated within a month of the date of Publication

- **Life Membership :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 300/-(in India) $ 75.00 (outside India)
Institutions	:	Rs. 1500/-(in India) $ 150/-(outside India)

- **Annual Subscriptions :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 30 (Rs. 35/- by cheque) $ 16.00
Institutions	:	Rs. 60 (Rs. 65/- by cheque) $ 22.00
Students and Retired Teachers	:	Rs. 20 (Rs. 25/- by cheque in India only)
Single copy	:	Rs. 15/- $ 5.00

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regen. No. 24248/73

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

F. A. SHAMSI : Victor Brochard on Zeno's Arguments Against Motion ...1

J. W. SMITH : Against Christian Prudery ...19

KAI NIELSEN : On Putting Marx on the Philosophical Agenda .. 37

R. SUNDARA RAJAN : Reversal and Recognition in Plato ...53

A. HAQUE : Privacy and Private Language ...75

S. C. DANIEL : The Nature and Function of Imagination in Hume and Kant .. 85

C. B. OKOLO : The African Person : A Cultural Definition (An Essay in African Philosophy) .. 99

BOOK REVIEW ...109

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

- Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
- The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
- **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
- The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
- Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
- Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining; bold face by wavy underlining.
- The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
- Generally the Edtiors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
- The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations

---

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411 016.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri
Regen. No. 24248/73

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

V. K. BHARADWAJA	:	The Concept of Arthapatti	...113
V. RAJAPAKSE	:	The Ahimsa Precept of the Indian Religious Systems and the Utilitarian Thinking of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill : Notes on Some Points of Contact	...137
REGINTON RAJAPAKSA	:	The Problem of Identity of Objects in Hume's Philosophy	...169
MANGALA R. CHINCHORE	:	Dharmakirti on the Distinction Between Svarthanumana and Pararthanumana	...177
AJAI R. SINGH & SHAKUNTALA A. SINGH	:	The Comparative and the Creative	...189
GAYATRI SINHA	:	Gilbert Ryle's Concept of Philosophy	...209
RAGHUNATH GHOSH	:	Some Reflections on Kalidas Bhattacharya's "The Indian Concept of Freedom"	217
P. K. ROY	:	Language and Reality in Brhadaranyaka - Upnisad and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus - Logico - Philosophicus	...227
G. VEDAPARAYAN	:	J. P. Sartre's Ontology of "Negative Enlightenment"	.. 233
		BOOK REVIEW	.. 249

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

* Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
* The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
* **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
* The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
* Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
* Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining; bold face by wavy underlining.
* The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
* Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
* The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations.

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411 016.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regen. No. 24248/73

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

GEETA MANAKTALA	:	Verifiers and Theory Choice	...255
K. SUNDARESAN	:	Kant's Theory of Culture	...267
V. T. SEBASTIAN	:	The Concept of Self Realization : An Approach to the Upanisadic Theory of Value	.. 279
A. W. J. HARPER	:	Identicalness	...295
TUSHAR KANTI SARKAR	:	Sense–Data and Physical Objects : A Systematization of Moore's View	...303
BIRENDRA KUMAR SINHA	:	Stevenson's Working Models	.. 341
TANDRA PATNAIK	:	Language, Thought and Communication : An Appraisal of Bhartṛhari's Theory of Language	...349
AJAI R. & SHAKUNTALA SINGH	:	Appendix to 'The Comparative and the Creative'	...369
		BOOK REVIEW	...375

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

- Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
- The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
- **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
- The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
- Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
- Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining; bold face by wavy underlining.
- The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
- Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months. which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
- The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations

---

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007
Printed at Rohit Printers, Pune 411 016.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Omkar Kanga Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regen. No. 24248/73

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

R. PRASAD	:	Utilitarianism : A Conceptual Overview	... 387
ASHOK K. GANGADEAN	:	Meditation, Metaphor and Meaning	... 425
A. G. JAVADEKAR	:	Form Humanism to Holism	.. 451
R. K. RAVAL	:	Worringer's Theory of Abstraction and Spetial Form in Turner	... 471
B K. AGARWALA	:	The Distribution of Natural Talents	... 501
S. G KULKARNI	:	Philosophy of Science and Sociology of Science : Towards a Creative Interaction	... 515
P. P. GOKHALE	:	Karma–Doctrine and Freedom	... 529
KOYALI GHOSH-DASTAGIR	:	The Fact–Value Dichotomy	... 545
B. Y. DESHPANDE	:	Hume's Fork Related to Some Logico–Epistemological Distinctions in Philosophy	... 553
S. C. DANIEL	:	A Rejoinder to Rajapaksa	... 563
		BOOK REVIEW	.. 567

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

- Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I.P.Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
- The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
- **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
- The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
- Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
- Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining; bold face by wavy underlining.
- The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
- Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
- The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations

---

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411 016.
CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 1,
January 1988

VICTOR BROCHARD ON ZENO'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST MOTION

"In 1885", says Florian Cajori, 'discussion of Zeno's arguments against motion was opened up in France, which lasted over a decade and in which a large number of writers participated". Cajori continues, "At no other decade and in no other country was the discussion of the topic so persistent and general". ("The History of Zeno's Arguments on Motion", *American Mathematical Monthly*, XXII, 1915, p. 255.) This historian, one feels, should also have said that in no other decade was so much achieved in understanding these ancient arguments or in finding solutions to the difficulties pin–pointed by those arguments.

One of the earliest of these studies was Victor Brochard's paper, "Les arguments de Zenon d' Élée contre le mouvement" (The Arguments of Zeno Against Motion). This had followed three very important studies, namely, those of Paul Tannery, Christian Renouvier, and Francois Evellin. Paul Tannery was perhaps the first to hold that the arguments of Zeno were directed against a certain view of the composition of space and time, namely, the view that spatio–temporal intervals are constituted of an infinitude of magnitudeless points and moments, and that the arguments were valid against that view. Christian Renouvier was perhaps the first to take the four arguments reported by Aristotle — popularly called "Zeno's Paradoxes of Motion" — as constituting a dilemma. Taking it for granted that space and time must either be infinitely divisible or divisible into a finitude

Received : 11-8-86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of indivisible, 'extended' and isometric 'elements', Renouvier endeavoured to show that the first two arguments constituted one horn of the dilemma (space and time cannot be divisible *ad infinitum*) and the last two constituted the other horn (space and time cannot be divisible into a finitude of elements). François Evellin was perhaps the first to hold that Zeno's arguments show that motion is impossible on the hypothesis of infinite divisibility of space and time and that motion was possible only on the suposition of discrete, elemental, character of space and time.

Victor Brochard not only followed Renouvier in taking the four arguments as the two horns of a dilemma but he found in them a curious symmetry : these arguments formed two pairs with regard to a number of alternatives. For example, the first and third consider only a single mobile, and, as such, absolute motion, whereas the second and fourth consider mobiles in the plural, and, as such, relative motion, and, similarly, the first and fourth consider motion and space between prescribed limits whereas the other two consider them without prescribing any limits to them.

Many writers, including Zeller and Renouvier, have held that the Aristotelian enunciation of the *Arrow* requires emendments, in particular that ' or in motion, (**ee kaineitai**) in the statement ' A thing is at rest or in motion when it is in a space equal to itself' should be deleted. Brochard holds that no emendment is required and that the clause ' or in motion ' although it has the appearance of a naivete in actuality it conceals a snare : once the unemended proposition is granted the adversaries' hypothesis (that space and time are consitituted of elements) stands disproved. That is, according to Brochard, from the premises that at any moment (as a temporal element) a body must be in a proper place and that a temporal interval

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is but a collection of a certain (finite) number of moments, the conclusion that the body is at rest during a given interval only follows from the further premiss that at any moment a body must be in motion or at rest. Thus, this proposition is required if the Arrow is to show that motion is impossible. Moreover, an adversary of Zeno may hold, as Evellin had held, that at a moment a body is not necessarily at rest; if so, to oblige him to hold that the body, although in a proper place at a given moment, is in motion and to demolish his hypothesis (the hypothesis of elemental character of space and time) by resort to the argument of the Stadium (which, according to Brochard, shows that if a body is in motion at a moment, then the moment must be divisible), it is obviously necessary that the adversary must first grant that at any moment at which a body is in a proper place it is either at rest or in motion. But, according to Brochard, once this proposition is granted, the Arrow shows that a body is either always at rest, or it is in motion at a moment, and the Stadium shows that if it is in motion at a moment then the moment is, contra hypothesis, divisible. Thus, in the opinion of Brochard, the two arguments of the Arrow and the Stadium show that motion is impossible on the hypothesis that space and time are constituted of indivisible elements.

Victor Brochard was perhaps the first to give to the Stadium the intepretation now generally accepted, viz., as showing that the moment of time must be divisible in order that the element of one mobile set may 'encounter' each element of another mobile set moving with the same speed in an opposite direction. Thus, the last two arguments are seen to be a coherent set of arguments against the view that space and time are constituted of (indivisible) elements. The Arrow argument lays down the general principle that a body is in motion or at rest at a moment (since a body which occupies a proper place during a period of time is admittedly at rest, and a body in motion must

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

occupy a proper place at any moment) and shows that the flying arrow is at rest during the period of its supposed motion if it is taken to be at rest at a moment at which it occupies a proper place, and, the Stadium shows that if it is in motion at a moment then the moment is divisible.

Cajori (op. cit., p. 255) says that Brochard took Zeno to be a sceptic and held that Zeno had really meant to deny motion. But, Brochard clearly says that Zeno's arguments were not directed against the existence of the continuum but only against the view that the continuum was something composite, was a whole. According to Brochard, the Eleatics seem to have nevertheless regarded the One or the continuum as continuous and hence, possibly, as extended. In this connection, Brochard quotes Spinoza as maintaining that if the quantity is considered *qua* substance with the aid of understanding then it would be judged to be infinite, one and indivisible, whereas the quantity is represented by the imagination as finite, divisible and compounded of parts, and holds that this view is closely similar to that of the Eleatics. Brochard further holds that Spinoza did not borrow this view from the Eleatics which shows that such a view can be held, and, hence that Zeno may well have held such a view.

In what follows, we present a translation of Brochard's historically important article, " Les arguments de Zéno d' Élée contre le mouvement "- *Mémoires de l' Académie des sciences morales et politiques,* New Series, vol. XXIX (1885), pp. 555–568.

TRANSLATION

[555] The arguments of Zeno of Elea against motion have been discussed very many times. If this were any reason for not discussing it afresh, what important problem would not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

merit to be abandoned ? But, it is not so much the metaphysical question—although very serious in itself and in its consequences—as the historical question which we propose to discuss. Since ancient times, whence these so-called sophisms have come to trouble and irritate human thought, there is perhaps no philosopher of any consequence who may have resisted being attracted by the problem presented by Eleatic subtilty and who may not have had his say at least on the *Achilles*. But, for the greater part, until our century, they have been more inclined to refute Zeno than to understand him. The task which we have undertaken is to determine as exactly as possible the actual import of these famous arguments in the thought of their creator, and without forestalling ourselves from appreciating their worth to point out with precision the target at which they aim.

(I)

Zeno, they say, shared the idea of Parmenides on the unity of Being; he wished to avenge his master against mockeries directed against him, and to reduce to absurdity the theses with which people opposed him. For that purpose, he made use of two series of arguments, [556] the one against multiplicity, the other against motion; it is only the latter which will concern us here.

While distinguishing between these two series of arguments, it should be recognized that there is a close relationship between the two. Zeno denied motion only because he denies plurality. In fact, motion implies space and time, which are continuous; motion is impossible in these continua because they are not composite, or, as Zeno puts it, are not multiples. Motion, if it is real, divides the place and time in which it is realized; it cannot therefore be produced in a continuum without parts.

If space and time have parts — if the continuum is composite — then either those parts are infinitely divisible or they are indivisible elements. Zeno refutes the first of these suppositions

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by the arguments known as the *Dichotomy* and *Achilles;* the second by the *Arrow* and the *Stadium.* The four arguments thus form a dilemma. This is what M. Renouvier was the first to show in the chapter of *Essais de critique générale*[1] devoted to Zeno of Elea. However, he leaves aside the fourth argument, the Stadium. We shall show on the contrary that this argument which has so greatly embarrassed and scandalised the historian, is intimately connected with the preceding arguments and completes the demonstration.

The four arguments form a system of curious symmetry. The first and the fourth consider the continuum and motion between given limits, the second and the third envisage them without any prescribed limits and as having any magnitudes whatsoever. In the first and the third, a single body is set to realize motion, and it is found that even the commencement of motion is impossible. The second and the fourth, by comparing two [557] bodies in motion and in a way making the absurdity of hypothesis even more palpable, prove that motion connot continue even though begun, and demonstrate the impossibility of relative motion as well as that of absolute motion. The first two establish the impossibility of motion from the nature of space, supposed continuous, without however its being the case that time ceases to be considered as composed in the same manner as space; in the last two, it is the nature of time which serves to prove the impossibility of motion, without however its being the case that space ceases to be considered as also formed of indivisible points. Lastly, the second is but another form of the first, and the fourth rests on the same principle as the third. The first pair of arguments is meant to combat the idea which naturally enough first presents itself to the mind, that of indefinite divisibility of the continuum; the second is directed against the conception which offers itself only when the mind has recognized the diffi-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

culties in the former. The logical order of these arguments entirely conforms to the historical order in which Aristotle has transmitted them to us and which must certainly have been the order adopted by Zeno

Let us briefly summarise these four arguments.

I. It is assumed that space and time are infinitely divisible. Admittedly, the texts do not expressly mention this supposition; but it is clearly implied in language of the first two arguments.

1. The Dichotomy.[2] "There is no motion, for, it is necessary that the mobile should arrive in the middle of its course [558] before reaching the end. And it will have to traverse a half of the half before reaching the middle, and so forth *ad infinitum.*

2. The Achilles. " The slower will never be overtaken by the faster, for it is necessary that the pursuer should first attain the point from which the pursued has departed so that the slower will necessarily remain ever ahead." The swift–footed Achilles will never overtake the tortoise. And if it be impossible to reach a goal, then there is no motion at all.

II. The continuum is assumed as formed of indivisible elements. Aristotle expressly tells us, at least about the third argument, that time is supposed as formed of instants (**Ton chronon psucheistai**)

3. The Arrow. Here a problem of interpretation arises. Edward Zeller and M. Renouvier deem it necessary to emend the text of Aristotle; we, on the contrary, think that the text should be left unaltered. We first translate and explain the text of Aristotle.

" A thing is at rest, or *in motion,* at the time when it is in a space equal to itself. The arrow which flies is always (**ev to neen**) in the instant. It is therefore always motionless. "

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This is how we interpret this text. It is absolutely impossible that the arrow should move in an instant (supposed indivisible), for, if it changes its position, the instant would immediately be divided. Now, the body, in an instant, is either at rest or in motion; as it is not in motion, it is at rest, and as time *ex hypothesi,* is made up only of instants, the body is always at rest.

This enunciation, "a body is always at rest or in motion at the time when it is in a space equal to itself", has appeared incorrect to E. Zeller and to M. Renouvier who propose to delete **ee chineitai.** The proposition that a body is at rest [559] when it is in a space equal to itself, is the very definition of rest according to Mr. Renouvier. This definition of rest is for him, as for Zeller, the essential element of the argument. On the contrary, we think that the nerve of the proof lies in the proposition, 'the arrow is always in the instant'. This means, we saw, that at each division of time, it is not in motion. Does it follow that it is at rest? Yes, it is said, for, it is in a space equal to itself, and this is the definition of rest. It is quite true that a body in motion must occupy several positions in a given period; but in a given instant? That it may be conceived that in an instant the body is not at rest, is exemplified by the case of M. Evellin, who, taking up again the thesis which Zeno attacks, maintains[3] that the arrow is in motion in an instant while occupying a space equal to itself. There is then a subterfuge by which the adversary may escape. It is to shut this that Zeno has begun by laying down the principle that a body is either at rest or in motion at the time when it occupies a place equal to itself. These words, "**ee chineitai**" which M. Renouvier attributes to an unintelligent copyist, have the appearance of a naivete but they conceal a snare.[4]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is also useless to add **Chata to eeson,** as Zeller does, after **to pheromenon en to nun.** The argument drawn from the instant [560] suffices, without adding any consideration of space (although one may urge the same reasoning on the basis of the point just as on the basis of the instant).

4. The Stadium. "The fourth argument is in relation to two equal series of points which move in opposite directions in the Stadium, passing in front of a third and equal series of points, the one departing from the middle of the Stadium and the other from the extremity, with equal speeds; whence Zeno con cludes that the time taken will be equal to the double of itself."

This argument is made clearer by a figure drawn by Zeller to Aristotle's specifications. Let there be a line of points A^1, A^2, $A,^3$ $A,^4$ supposed to be stationary; in addition, let there be two other series, B^4, B^3, B^2, B^1, and, C^1, C^2, C^3, C^4, disposed as in figure 1. (It would be necessary to add, in our view, that all the points are conceived as contiguous without being confounded.)



Fig. 1



Fig. 2

Let us now postulate that the two series of B and C move in opposite directions with the same speed. B^1 and C^1 will arrive at the same time at the opposite extremities of series A (fig.2). In the same time, says Zeno, B^1 will have passed before all the Cs and C^1 before all the Bs, but, on the contrary, B^1 and C^1 will have passed before only the half of As. Now, series A is equal to each of the other two; times are proportional to spaces; the time taken by the Bs and the Cs to traverse, the whole length of the A

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(to traverse) the half of this length, is therefore double of itself'. (Brochard means to say that if t′ be the time taken by series B to traverse scries C, and if t″ be the time taken by series B to traverse a half of seriesA, then since series A and B are equal, it follows that t″ is a half of t′, and since series B traverses the whole of C in the ame time it traverses a half of A, it follows that t′ and t″ are equal; hence, t′ is both equal to t″ and double of t″; hence, t′ is double of itself.)

Nothing more sophistical than this argument if, as [561] Zeller puts it, it consists in supposing that the space traversed by one body equals the lengths of the bodies before which it passes whether or no these bodies be at rest. But this interpretation does not seem to us to be correct.

If, as we have assumed, Zeno argues on the hypothesis of indivisibles, we have to admit that the points A, B and C are in themselves the absolute elements of space, and move in the instant, absolute elment of time in itself. After the first instant, B^1 which was, I suppose, below A^2 in a straight line with it, is found below A^3, supposed immediately contiguous with A^2; C^1 which was at first below A^3 is found below A^2. But, in order that B^1 and C^1 occupy their actual positions, it is absolutely necessary that at one moment they be found in a straight line with one another. However, their motion is effected in an indivisible instant. It is necessary, therefore, that either they should not get across (and in that event there is no motion) or that in an indivisible instant two positions should have been occupied by each of the two mobiles (but in that event the instant is no longer indivisible). In other words, it is impossible to conceive of such an indivisible instant that one not only can conceive of but actualise by a very simple experience, a motion which divides this instatant. (And one could say the same about the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

unit of space, supposed indivisible : a given element would have to enlarge itself to the point of containing at the same instant two elements of the same dimension.) To say that the instant is divided into two equal parts, is, on the present hypothesis, to say that it is the double of itself.

II

[562] What is the value of the four arguments thus interpreted ? Audacious enough to make such an assertion, we do not hesitate to say that they all are irreproachable.

Without inordinately violating the limits of this work, we cannot examine all the refutations and solutions of the difficulty which philosophers and mathematicians have had pleasure to devise. It would suffice to recall to mind, as pointed out by many others, that most criticisms evade the real question, or, at least, do not state it in those terms in which Zeno had stated. For example, when Aristotle, who later retracted this objection, remarks against the Dichotomy and the Achilles that time like space is divisible ad infinitum, and that it is quite possible to pass through an infinitude in an infinite time, and, when Leibnitz declares that an infinitely divisible space is exhausted in an infinitely divisible time, they both are menifestly beside the point. Zeno knew very well, and his very demonstration necessitates, that space and time comport themselves in the same fashion, that they both should be, always and in a paralled manner, infinitely divisible. The question is to know how, in both space and time, this series of divisions, which is inexhaustible by definition, may be exhausted, and [let it be noted], it has to be exhausted in order that motion may occur. It is no answer to say that they are exhausted simultaneously.[6]

The mode of refutation adopted by mathematicians, from Descartes to M. Tannery, in a way excellent, has an analogous

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

defect : it resolves another problem than that which was presented. To show that the sum of $1+{}^1/_2+{}^1/_4\ldots$ is equal to 2 in the case of the Dichotomy, and to calculate in the case of [563] the Achilles the precise moment at which Achilles will have overtaken the tortoise, as has been very well shown by M. Evellin, is to reply to the question, ' when ? ' whereas the question to be answered is ' *how ?* '. If one adopts the hypothesis of infinite divisibility, one will never encounter the limit in the Dichotomy, as is admitted by everybody, and in the other argument, the distance which separates Achilles from the tortoise, ever so decreasing, will never become null. And if one introduces the limit and the discrete, magnitude with the Calculus, then Zeno was aware that these arguments were no longer of any avail. In that case, one is in the presence of another thesis about the composition of the continuum, and this one comes under the mischief of the third and fourth arguments.

The critic who has most recently studied the arguments of Zeno, M. Dunan, contrary to the opinion generally held, deems it necessary to separate the Dichotomy and the Achilles. The former seems to him to be beyond the pale of any objection: the second is a sophistry. The reason he advances is that, if, as the Dichotomy shows it, the fact of movement is impossible in actuality, then the moment one accords movement to Achilles and to the tortoise, "nothing hinders one from supposing that Achilles possesses a speed sufficiently fast to be able, in one attempt, to traverse first the distance which separated him from the tortoise, and then the distance which the tortoise traversed, nay, even a much greater distance, so that, while on his way, he will put his hand on it". (p.22)

But to arrive at this conclusion, M. Dunan has assumed that space, as the argument manifestly implies, is infinitely divisible but time is composed of indivisible instants finite in number.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Now, nothing in the text authorises this supposition. Everything supports the belief that here, as in the Dichotomy, time is divisible the way space is. To affirm that this conception [viz. that of Dunan] is necessitated as soon as one admits the reality of the movement of Achilles, would be, it seems, to take the supposition of Zeno too seriously, to abuse a concession granted provisionally, and to argue if not too harshly [564] at least too strictly. Since Zeno has begun by supposing Achilles and the tortoise in motion, it is quite clear that, in a sense, he debars himself from arriving at a conclusion which denies the possibility of motion. But, he avails himself here of proceeding, or if you like, of an expedient, which is quite permissible. Motion is impossible; the Dichotomy has proved it. Nevertheless we suppose, for a moment, by grace, that it is possible; if so, one arrives at other absurdities. The same arguments which prevent motion from beginning, prevent it from continuing once begun. The second argument completes the first; it is the same idea presented in a more concrete, more piercing. more tragic form, as Aristotle said.

The last two arguments have been less often discussed than the Achilles. They are refuted chiefly with disdain : the people have been only too quick in calling them sophisms. However, if the Arrow is taken in its true sense, it is not easy to see what one could object to. Manifestly, it is not any the easier to explain motion on the hypothesis of indivisibles than to compose a line with points or a duration with instants. Still, there is this difference, wholly to the advantage of Zeno, that the point is not the negation of the line, nor the instant of the duration, as obviously as is rest the negation of motion. Is it possible to refute Zeno ? We would not wish to deny the possibility since M. Evellin has attempted it. This is not the place to discuss his ingenious theory, but the subtle philosopher would not take

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

exception to us if we say that this ingenious theory is not without presenting some difficulty. In any case, if Zeno merits the name of a sophist for having invoked the argument of the Arrow, it would be necessary to give the same name to many other philosophers, including Pascal.

The Stadium remains, which no one has dared to defend except Bayle, who only did so with timidity. If the interpretation we have given to it be correct, it [565] justifies itself. It notifies that with the aid of motion, one can always divide an instant supposed indivisible. At bottom, it is the same argument by which Leibnitz demonstrated that the concept of the fastest possible motion was a controdictory concept. Understood this way, the Stadium is to the Arrow what Achilles is to the Dichotomy: it presents the same idea in a more concrete and tragic form, or, if one so desires, in a more pleasant form. It is this innocent pleasantry, pressed into the service of a profound idea, which has not been comprehended, and which has brought to the argument and its propounder their ill repute. Perhaps, it would never do to joke in metaphysics.

Zeno of Elea had perhaps seen beforehand that his irony would be fatal to him; this can be conjectured from the very appropriate passage in Plato which shows us to what extent Zeno merits the title of a sophist. "You have not perceived", Zeno says to Socrates, "That my work is not pretentious, that it was not composed with the intention that you ascribe, and that I do not make an ado of what it comprises as if that were something extraordinary. But you have rightly remarked that it is a defence of Parmenides against those who attacked him with jeers, claiming that if the Being is one, many ridiculous and contradictory consequences result from it. My book replies to the partisans of multiplicity; it gives to them tit for tat, with interest, and tries to show that it leads to still more ridiculous consequences on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the hypothesis of multiplicity than that of unity, if one examines it attentively. It was for waging this dispute that I had written it in my youth. Someone stole it from me, and I could not deliberate whether or not it should be published. You are wrong then, Socrates, in believing that I did not write this work in my youth for the sake of dispute, but in ambition at an advanced age."

III

[566] It remains to settle a last point. At what did Zeno wish to arrive through all these subtleties? How would his argument come to the support of the thesis of Parmenides?

Historians and critics, who do not regard Zeno as a sophist, are not agreed on this point. As one may expect it, they are inclined to recognize in Zeno their own ideas.

We take up only the most recent works. M. Dunan is inclined to interpret the argumentation of Zeno in an idealistic sense. He declares, as a matter of fact, that "the problem posed by Zeno could not be profitably treated and definitively resolved before the appearance of the *Critique* of Kant (p. 42)". As for Zeno himself, M. Dunan esteemed "that he had a very imperfect notion of the true sense and bearing of his arguments, that he took pretty little account of his own thought." This is being very severe. But the question is not answered: if Zeno did not khow full well what he was saying, how would he come to the aid of Parmenides?

M. Evellin seems to hold that in proving the impossibility of motion in the infinitely divisible continuum, Zeno had wished to prove the necessity of another conception, that of the discrete and that Zeno used to believe in the reality of motion. This is a realistic interpretation: the continuum would be an appearance;

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the real would be the discrete. But this opinion would not be sustainable. The texts actually say that Zeno denied motion without qualification. We have, moreover, shown that the thesis of M. Evellin is precisely the one which Zeno combated in the second half of his argumentation.

According to M. Renouvier, if we have correctly comprehended his thought for Zeno also, the continuum [567] would only be a phenomenon, an illusion; but Zeno did not believe in the reality of the discrete, the indivisible points and instants, either; he opposed each of the two possible conceptions of the continuum and destroyed them both without drawing a line between the two; it is this fact which enables one to link his arguments to the antinomies of Kant. This interpretation by M. Renouvier is an idealistic interpretation, with this exception that according to M. Renouvier Zeno affirms the absolute reality of the One.

However, nothing in the text proves by itself that such was the thought of Zeno. On the contrary, we see that Parmenides declared the Being continuous, and often used to put these two terms together : **en chai xuneches** (Müllach, 62,76–77,81.) Moreover, it seems to us very difficult not to interpret the thesis of the Eleatics in a realistic sense.

To tell the truth, it is not against the existence of the continuum, it is against the composition of the continuum, that the arguments of Zeno are directed. The Being is continuous, but undivided and indivisible. It must not be said that it is a whole, for, it does not have parts : it is essentially One. But this absolute unity does not appear to have prevented the Eleatics from considering the Being as continuous, and, consequently, may be, as extended.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But, may one conceive of the continuum as indivisible, and have we the right to attribute such a conception to a dialectician like Zeno of Elea ? It would have been advisable to hesitate, had we not found an exactly similar thesis in another mighty logician, who, most certainly did not borrow it from Zeno, but whose chance agreement with the Eleatics in this regard is indeed very significant and very instructive. This is how Spinoza expresses himself. (*Ethics.* part I, pr. 15, Schol.) : " If we consider quantity as our imaginations represent it to us, which is the easiest and the most customary proceeding, we shall judge that it is finite, divisible and compounded of parts; but, if we conceive of it with the aid of understanding, if we consider it *qua* substance, something very difficult to do [568] in sooth, it [i.e., quantity] would appear to us, as we have well proved, as infinite, one and indivisible. This will be evident to anyone who is capable of distinguishing between imagination and understanding, especially if one will also note that matter is everywhere the same, and that there is no distinction of parts in it except insofar as one conceives of it [i.e., of matter] as modified in diverse ways, whence it follows that there exists between these parts only a modal and not a real distinction. "

Islamic Research Institute
P. O. Box 1035
ISLAMABAD
(Pakistan)

F. A. SHAMSI

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. *Logique*, vol. I, p. 67.

2. We present these argumeuts as given by Aristotle, *Physics*, VI, 9.239B. Cf. Simplicius, *Phys.* 236.B; Themistius, *Phys.* 55.B. Monsieur Renouvier has shown very rightly that it is not required to attach too great an importance to the expression en peperasmeno chrono which figures in the text of Aristotle [*Physica*, 233a23] and that of Themistius (*Esquisse d'une classification systematique*, vol. I, p. 38).

   [In the original, foot-notes have been numbered page-wise; we have re-numbered them serially, independently of the pages on which they appear in the original or the translation.—Tr.]

3. *Infinie et quantite*, p. 93.

4. This interprestation has the advantage of being in accord with the text of Simplicius (*Phys.*, 236, B) which also carries, pan otan ee chata to eeson ean to ee chineitai ee eerremee as well as with the whole interpretation of this commentator, quite superior, in our view, to that of Themistius. It is true, as Zeller observes, that Simplicius develops the thought of Zeno but nothing warrants the supposition that he did not understand him. And notwithstanding the remarks of Schleiermacher (Zeller, vol. II, p. 79, trans. Boutroux), the fact that Simplicius had with him the work of Zeno does not diminish his authority. M. Dunan has very well elucidated the question of text in what concerns this argument in his study on *Les arguments de Zenon d'Elee contre le mouvement*, Paris : Allcan, 1884, p. 10.

6. One ordinarily translates ogchoi by *masses*, and it is certainly legitimate. However, it seems to us that the idea conveyed by this word is less that of masses than that of *indivisible*, if you like, indivisible and contiguous, masses. That is why we prefer to render it by *points*, although this word may not be altogether satisfactory. The word ogchoi is employed as a synonym for 'atom' by Epicurus (apud Diogenes Laertius, X, 54) and later by Asclepiades, of Bithynie (Sext. Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos*, VIII, 220)

6. On this point, see the brilliant chapter of M. Renouvier, already cited [in Foot-note no. 1]. Cf. *Esquisse d'une systematique des doctrines Philosophique*, vol. I, p. 38.

7. Parmenides, 128, C.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 1
January 1988

AGAINST CHRISTIAN PRUDERY

1. The Christian Legacy

According to the Sixth Edition of the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* of Current English, the word ' prudery ' means extreme propriety in conduct and/or attitudes, especially regarding sexual matters. ' Propriety ' means, according to the same distinguished source, " correctness of behaviour or morals ". Now surely one could oppose " prudery " on moral grounds without inconsistently criticizing correct moral behaviour in sexual matters, so the OED definition must be incorrect. A better term than ' propriety ' is ' strictness ' or ' severity ', if common usage is any judge. Prudery then involves a rigorous strictness or severity in conduct and/or attitudes regarding sexual matters in particular. It is a certain type of prudery which I wish to refute here : the moral attitude taken by the Christian tradition to premarital and non-marital heterosexual sexual intercourse and homosexual intercourse, and their continuing occurrence in non-marital sexual relationships.

The Christian prudery which I wish to consider here involves this claim : *all* acts of premarital and non-marital heterosexual sexual intercourse and homosexual intercourse are moral evils or sins.[1] Here I shall argue that the general arguments given in support of this position are seriously flawed from both a logical and scriptural point of view. Thus it is not inconsistent with *Christian literalism,* to maintain that at *least some* acts of premarital sexual intercourse *and* homosexual sexual intercourse are not morally objectionable. By ' Christianity ' I mean a rationally

Received : 21-5-1986

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

defensible interpretation of the Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible and by 'literalism' I mean that position which regards all cognitive propositions in the scriptures as being true, provided they are given a rationally justifiable interpretation. No scriptural passage which contains a conceptual incoherence can be true, and thus some alternative interpretation must be sought. Note as well that it takes only one counter-example to defeat the Christian prudism outlined here. This by no sound argument shows that "anything goes" by way of sexual conduct and attitudes. All I claim si that *some* acts of premarital sexual intercourse by heterosexuals, and some acts of sexual intercourse by gays, are not immoral. This has been denied by the Church.

Tannahill notes that the Christian tradition is unique in its condemnation of all forms of sexuality,[2] and few traditions can have the pleasure to boast that their leading early thinkers – Tertullian, Jerome, Augustine, Abelard, Chrysostom, Aquinas etc. – viewed all forms of human sexual intercourse as shameful and fundamentally disgusting. Yet the thoughts of the founding fathers, however mad and perverted and even whilst polluting the waters of thought for hundreds of years, need not have an unbreakable grasp upon the minds of their intellectual offspring. Certainly the view of the early Church Fathers and other early Churchmen, that sex is inherently evil, has been challenged since the Reformation. Tere is virtually no scriptural support for this view (including the writings of St. Paul) and much evidence against it. In Proverbs 5:15-19 and the Song of Solomon 2:6 and 8:3, heterosexual intercourse in a monogamous marriage is described as being both the normal way of satisfying human sexual desires, as well as being good in itself. Indeed the Song of Solomon is correctly described as a celebration of marital sexual love and no reference to procreation occurs in it. Even if the Pauline doctrine in 1 Corinthians 7:1-7 is interpreted to mean

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri



that celebacy is a more valuable state than marital sexuality, it hardly follows that marital sexuality is an evil or is in anyway shameful. What is shameful and fundamentally disgusting are the views of the churchmen on this matter. But since their views do not square with the scriptures, their own criterion of ultimate truth, we may dismiss them from further consideration.

Recent Christian writing on sexual morality, such as Herbert Miles' *Sexual Understanding Before Marriage* [3] and John White's *Eros Defiled* [4] present a wholesome view of marital sexuality; indeed these books are not inaccurately described as the modern Christian equivalents of *The Joy of Sex*. Both texts have been strong sellers – *Sexual Understanding Before Marriage* had by September 1975 nearly 100,000 copies in print. Both texts are very liberated about the moral legitimacy of erotic delights in marriage. White for example, whilst regarding orogenital and penile–rectal orgasms as "*sub*–normal sexual practices", [5] nevertheless manages to say this : "If God gives you as a married couple a delight in the sensations provided by orogenital or rectual stimulation, be thankful and receive such pleasures." [6] Such delights, of course, are strictly reserved for the marital bed and both Miles and White believe that socio–psychology and the scriptures support them. I shall argue that these sources do not.

The critique naturally enough falls into two parts First is an examination and critique of Miles' and White's case for the sinfulness of premarital heterosexual activity, and second is an examination and critique of their moral and theological objections to homosexual sexual activity. If it can be shown that there are no sound moral objections to homosexual sexual intercourse from a Christian perspective, then we have immediately established that *not all* acts of non–marital sexual intercourse (of which the set of acts of premarital sexual intercourse is a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

subset), are immoral. This is so because homosexual marriages do not legally exist in most of the Western World and would not in any case be recognized as legitimate by the non-Gay Christian Church. Thus the sexually active homosexual cannot help but to engage in non-marital sexual relationships. If it can be shown that at least some homosexual sexual relationships (and consequently the sexual acts committed in these relationships, provided that these acts are not immoral for non-sexual or independent reasons) are not morally objectionable, then we establish that not all non-marital sexual relationships and their consequent sexual acts, are morally objectionable. However, it is still logically possible that premarital sexual relations are morally unjustified because in the case of such relations, they could have been consummated in marriage. Hence the need now for a consideration of Christian ethics and premarital sexuality.

2. *Premarital Sexuality and Christianity*

The point of departure in our argument must be with the question 'What is marriage from the Christian perspective?' This is not, as it may seem at first glance, an easy question to answer.[7] Is marriage a certain legal relationship involving a contract? This contract we suppose, must be socially recognizable. But for the Christian, what must be said about the actual or merely hypothetical post-world War III Adam and Eve living without social institutions to recognize contracts and living without "total" divine protection after the Fall? Either our Adam and Eve are married, in which case the Christian cannot claim that marriage is essentially a legal relationship requiring social recognition, or they are not married. The hypothesis that our Adam and Eve are not married conflicts with the account of Genesis 4:1 which says that Eve is Adam's wife. Hence marriage cannot be purely a legal relationship. Nothing depends upon the Adam and Eve story in Genesis being *literally* true for this con-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

clusion to follow, just as the social contract theory does not require the state of nature, or the original veil of ignorance to be historical existents.[8]

There is an argument to be found in 1 Corinthians 6:12–20 by St. Paul, which seems to view an act of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman as the constituent factor establishing a marriage. This thesis has been recently discussed and criticzied by B. Ward Powers,[9] and Powers' interpretation of Paul's position has been criticized in turn by Vivian Bounds.[10] This issue, as we shall soon see, is of importance to the issue of the morality of premarital sexual intercourse. Now Paul wrote in 1 Corinthians 6:16–17 that one should not have sexual intercourse with a prostitute because " he who unites himself with a prostitute is one with her in body [?]. For it is said, " The two will become one flesh " [Genesis 2:24] ". Paul takes the body to be the temple of the Holy Spirit, so sexual sins are particularly serious. Paul does not realize, however, that if we accept that marriage involves becoming one flesh (Genesis 2:24; Matthew 19:5, Mark 10:7; Ephesians 5:31), and that in becoming " one body " one becomes " one flesh ", then if two people can become one body through an act of heterosexual sexual intercourse, then the same two people can become married through this act. But if at least these two people are virgins prior to their sex act, then all of their sex acts after the initial marriage–making sex act, are cases of marital sex rather than premarital sex. Hence their sexual relationship is morally justified from a Christian perspective. Yet our couple are " living together in sin " !

Powers objects to the equation of the meaning of ' one body and ' one flesh ' on the grounds that it does not explain why it is wrong to seek union with a prostitute.[11] But no identification of the meaning of ' one flesh ' and ' one body ' occurs in this passage. The claim that " the two will become one flesh " is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

voiced as an explanation as to why one should not become one body with a prostitute. Therefore Paul is claiming that sexual relationships are quite unlike physical relationships for they involve a metaphysical transformation of persons. This explains why Paul went on to say in verses 18–20 of 1 Corinthians that sexual sins are more serious than all other sins because they offend against the body, a " temple of the Holy Spirit ". Thus it is reasonable to agree with Vivian Bounds that Paul did believe that an act of sexual intercourse leads to marriage. If this is so, then my criticism of Christian prudery given in the previous paragraph immediately holds.

There are strong objections which could be made to Paul's position. Counter–examples such as the rapist and his victim becoming one flesh and body, and hence married, could possibly be dealt with by demanding rational choice made on the part of the sexual agents, a condition not satisfied in the example of the rape.[12] But an outstanding problem is this : the prostitute must be " one flesh " with all of her customers, but is any individual customer " one flesh " with any other individual customer ? If so, then two males can be married even if they have never met. If not, then why is it that the relation of *being one flesh* fails to be transitive ? And what about celibate "marriages"–is the concept of a celibate marriage to be taken to be logically contradictory ? The Pauline position seems to be untenable and some more rational position should be sought by the reasonable Christian. But for the many fundamentalist groups who use arguments such as Paul's, they are honoured with justifying " living in sin " for two virgin heterosexuals who meet and have sexual intercourse.

It is not necessary to resolve the issue about the true nature of Christian marriage here, for this issue has served its critical purposes. It is established that it is by no means uncontroversial

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

what the true nature of Christian marriage is, and further, one interpretation of this nature would seem to undermine Christian prudery. Now I shall address the arguments for the immorality of premarital and non-marital sexual relations given by Miles and White, taking 'marriage' itself as an undefined term. But it is intuitively clear who is not married : our two young virgin heterosexuals who meet, fall in love, develop a relationship full of trust, care and a mixture of other virtues and have sex continually are *unmarried* and immoral according to Miles, White and most Christians. Why ?

There are basically two types of arguments that are advanced to show the immorality of the premarital sex of our two lustful but loving virgins. The first type of argument is scriptural based on alleged Biblical evidences. The second type of argument is based upon social and psychological evidences, showing the social and psychological harm which inevitably arises from premarital sexual relations. For the sake of argument I assume that the alleged logical gap between "is" and "ought" can be soundly bridged, so that one can argue from factual premises to evaluative conclusions. I shall try to show in what follows that both types of arguments fail, beginning with the scriptural argument.[13]

1 Corinthians 6 and 7 contains what has been taken by most Christians to be the clearest statement of an objection to premarital sexual relations. But this is mere prejudice. 1 Corinthians 6, which White cites as conclusive evidence for his position, contains as I have shown, a logical problem. It is therefore highly likely that the Pauline view of sexuality is untenable and too uncertain to base any sound reasoning upon. Miles cites 1 Corinthians 7:2 and 1 Thessalonians 4:3-5 also as evidence.[14] He points out that the word 'fornication' (porneia) has three different meanings as used in the New Testament. The word

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

may refer to *all* sexual immorality in general (as in John 8:41; Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; Romans 1:29; 1 Corinthians 5:1; 6:13,18 II Corinthians 12:21; Ephesians 5:3). Miles claims that such a use must also include premarital sexual intercourse, including the case we suppose of our two lustful but loving young virgins But this is little more than a thinly disguised question–begging argument–only because Miles is so confident that all cases of premarital sexual intercourse are morally objectionable does he include it under the heading of general sexual immorality to begin with.

The word 'fornication' is used in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 as a synonym for the word 'adultery', but in four other passages the words 'adultery' and 'fornication' are both used, which indicates in Miles' opinion that a definite distinction between the two words is being drawn. The passages are Matthew 15:19; Mark 7:21, 1 Corinthians 6:9 and Galatians 5:19. Miles concludes : "Since adultery only includes the behavior of married people, the word fornication would have to mean (among other things) sexual intercourse and other sexual abuses of single people. *This is a direct reference to premarital relations.*"[15]

Miles' argument is invalid. If the word 'fornication' includes all forms of sexual immorality, then a distinction can be drawn between the words 'adultery' and 'fornication' without 'fornication' referring at all to "premarital relations". All the term need refer to is any case of sexual immorality, not involving adultery. There are any number of cases of this : fetishes, sadistic activities, human–animal sexual contacts, and so on. Unless we were already convinced that all premarital sexual relationships were objectionable, then we would have no reason at all as Christians to draw Miles' conclusion.

This leaves us with 1 Corinthians 7:2 and 1 Thessalonians 4:3–5 to consider. The above remarks can be repeated for these

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

passages, with no qualification. Paul says in 1 Corinthians 7:2 that "since there is so much immorality, each man should have his own wife, and each woman her own husband". This would seem to be an inescapable reference to premarital sex, for what other sexual immorality could Paul be referring to? The "other" sexual immorality is prostitution, a topic which must have been fresh on Paul's mind after writing 1 Corinthians 6:12–20. Further, we know that in the maritime and commercial city of Corinth, prostitution flourished. According to Hans Licht in *Sexual Life in Ancient Greece*:

> Of the wantonness and licentiousness of life in this metropolis of ancient trade, so wealthy and so favoured by nature, it would be difficult to give an account that would err by exaggeration... What human fancy elsewhere was content merely to imagine in the way of licentiousness, found in Corinth its home and visible exemplification... The priestesses of venal love crowded about the city in incalculable numbers. In the district of the two harbours were swarms of brothels of every degree, and prostitutes without number lounged about the streets. To a certain extent the focus of unmarried love and the high school of the hetairae was formed by the notorious temple of Venus, in which no fewer than a thousand hetairae or *hieroduli* (temple-servants), as they were euphemistically called, practised their profession and were always ready to greet their friends.[16]

It is therefore not unreasonable to take prostitution to be the form of immorality referred to by Paul in 1 Corinthians 7:2.

It is of interest to note that most of the kings of the Old Testament had their *concubines* (e.g. 2 Samuel 15:16; 16:21–22). Now concubine is a woman who cohabits with a man, usually having sexual relations with him, whilst not being his wife. If the king was unmarried, then he engages in allegedly illicit prema-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

rital or non-marital sexual intercourse. If the king was married, then he commits adultery. Strangely enough, whilst the Old Testament contains a description of King David's punishment for adultery with Bathsheba (and the murder of her husband Uriah the Hittite in 2 Samuel 11), there is no condemnation of King David keeping his supply of at least ten concubines (2 Samuel 15:16) who by definition were kept on hand for sexual gratification even if they were not actually used. Is there therefore two moral laws : one for the rich and one for the poor ? If you feel that historical relativity solves this problem (translation : that having concubines is good for David but not for us) then how can you show that historical relativity does not also undermine the Christian's view of the general immorality of homosexuality ?

I turn now to a consideration of the social and psychological objections to premarital sexual relations as stated by Miles.[17] The first objection to premarital sexual intercourse may result in an unplanned or unwanted pregnancy. Whilst advances in contraceptive methods have occurred in recent decades, most teenagers do not have access to effective contraceptives. Hence premarital sexual relations are taken to contribute to a major social problem, and are judged to be morally wrong for that reason (granted we recall, that the is–ought gap can be bridged).

Now the force of this argument can be met in a number of ways, even accepting the severity of the problem of unwanted teenage pregnancies. First, one could take this argument to show that teenagers must have access to effective contraceptives if many social tragedies are to be avoided. Second, Miles' point counts for nothing in the case of our imaginery virgins (1) who may want a child and are prepared to support it, (2) who have effective contraception, even if this involves sterilization or (3) are past the child–bearing age anyway.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A second objection which also has much emotional force is that premarital sexual relations increase the likelihood of one contracting syphilis, gonorrhea, herpes and possibly AIDS. The contraction of these diseases is a threat to those who practice sexual promiscuity, but is no more a problem to our example of the two virgins who decide to live together than it would be to the paradigm case of a christian married couple.

Premarital sexual relations are also said by Miles to have a detrimental effect upon the attitude of youths about the nature of sex. Unsuccessful sexual experiences may shatter the illusions of youth about "perfect sexual fulfilment in their future marriage".[18] Guilt feelings may also be produced which may tend to undermine the couple's relationship, feelings that what has been done is wrong. These feelings arise from a conflict between the couple's sexual action and their own internalized value system. Premarital sexual relations may also promote distrust and suspicion. In reply it may be said that none of these negative consequences may arise. Early sexual experiences if unsuccessful may be looked upon with amusement as a successful learning experience. If the couple did not believe that what they were doing was wrong, and if it was not, then guilt feelings would not be produced. If distrust and suspicion arises in premarital relationships, then perhaps this is more an indication of possessiveness and the desire for ownership of one's love object than an indication of any essential defect in premarital relations in general. In any case we can show that not all premarital sexual relations are morally objectionable on any of these grounds. In the case of our imaginery couple who meet as virgins, without guilt and suspicion and who obtain sexual happiness, Miles cannot voice any objection, except perhaps to deny that there could be any such couple even approximately. Surely

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

though it is a matter of common sense knowledge that actual approximates to my imaginery couple exist.

It follows then from the argument of this section that the mainstream Christian moral position on premarital sexual relationship, is unjustified. That at least some premarital sexual relationships are morally wholesome, has not been excluded by either socio–psychological or Biblical arguments. Thus it is logically possible for one to be a Christian and be involved in a premarital sexual relationship, without being in a state of sin.

3. Homosexuality and Christianity

According to Miles :

> Homosexuality is an abnormal practice that is a sin against God and His purpose for life. It is a sin against the other person involved. It destroys the normal functions of life and erodes and deforms personality development. Reason, intelligence, common sense, and Christian principles should lead any man (or woman) to reject homosexuality as an acceptable means of meeting sexual needs.[19]

As I have already rejected the view that homosexuality is abnormal in chapter 3, I shall address the question here as to whether reason and Christian principles do indeed lead one to reject homosexuality as an acceptable means of meeting sexual needs.

One of the first references to homosexual activity can be found in the Sodom and Gomorrah story in Genesis 19, where the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were taken to be destroyed by God because of "offences against nature". That these offences against nature are homosexual acts is generally taken to be shown by Genesis 19:6–11. These verses describe the Sodomites surrounding Lot's house and calling for lot to surrender his angelic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

visitors for the purpose of sex. The Hebrew word *yādha* means both "to know" and "to have coitus". Indeed "to know" is often used as a metaphor for sexual relations. Some such as John McNeill feel that *yādha* in Genesis 19:5 means "to know" without being a metaphor for sexual relations.[20] This interpretation does not square with Genesis 19:8 where Lot offers to the Sodomites his two virgin daughters and McNeill makes no satisfactory attempt to account for Lot's statement.[21] But even if the Sodomites did want to have sex with the angels, this hardly shows that homosexual practices are morally wrong. If the angels were female would one conclude that heterosexual practices are therefore morally wrong? Genesis 19:6–11 is a story about a group of would–be pack rapists who get to see the light the hard way.[22]

Even tougher stuff is found in Leviticus 18:22–23 and Leviticus 20:13. Homosexual relations are clearly and uncontroversially condemned as being "abominations", punishable by death. If one wishes to accept this as the word of God, then one must also accept the following propositions as being also voiced by God: (1) it is wrong to eat the fat of cattle, sheep and goats (Leviticus 7:23); (2) the rabbit is "unclean" (Leviticus 11:6); (3) emissions of semen involve defilement that requires purification (Leviticus, 15:16–18); (4) one should not plant two different kinds of seeds in one's field (Leviticus 19:19) and (5) one should not wear clothing woven of two different kinds of material (Leviticus, 19:19). These commands seem to us today to be at worse silly, at best irrelevant. Further, God's punishments for sin revolt against the contemporary moral conscience: not only are adultery and homosexuality to be punished by death (Leviticus 20:10; 20:13) but some one who curses his mother or father (Leviticus 20:9, or has sex with a woman during her period must be respectively put to death and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cut off from their people. These considerations erode the credibility of Leviticus as anything more than a record of post-exilic Israelite criminal and legal codes.

Judges 19:22–29 contains a variation of the Lot story of Genesis 19. Only here the owner of the house allows a concubine to be raped and murdered My previous remarks on Genesis 19 can be repeated here.

In the New Testament the three principle references to homosexuality are Romans 1:25–27, 1 Corinthians 6:9 and 1 Timothy 1:9–10. Let us take each of these verses and examine whether these verses lend support to the thesis that all homosexual acts are immoral.

In Romans 1:25–27 Paul describes the "shameful lusts" that all the godless men who have known God, but failed to recognize him and worship him, have been delivered over to. Among such "lusts" are "indecent acts with other men" and these godless men were "inflamed with lust for one another" (Romans 1:27). Now this passage is a condemnation of those who knew God and rejected Him. Their fates were grim and dipressing as the spiritual vaccums in their lives were filled with "shameful lusts". It just so happened that these lusts were predominately of a homosexual orientation. This however shows nothing whatsoever about any alleged moral wrongness of the God–living homosexual Christian who lives without such lust. The theologians will still tell us that Paul has said that the Godless men abandoned "natural" relationships with women to practice homosexual acts, which must therefore be unnatural. But what is being contrasted here is natural relationships with women-marriage, with *lustful* relationships with men, relationships which must be adulterous since if natural relationships with women were abandoned then they must first have existed. Hence what-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ever type of sexual relationship these Godless men would have adopted after "abandoning" their marriges, Paul would have found these relationships morally objectionable (excluding celibacy and possibly masturbation). Hence Romans 1:25–27 lends no support to any scriptural argument for the immorality of homosexual sexual love.

The key Greek words in 1 Corinthians 6:9 and Timothy 1:9–10 are *malakoi arsenokoitai.* The first edition of the Revised Standard version of the Bible translates both terms by use of one word, 'homosexuals'. The New International version of the Bible uses the words 'homosexual offenders' in 1 Corinthians 6:9 and Timothy 1:9-10 contains no explicit reference to homosexuality at all. The King James version of the Bible translates them as 'neither the effeminate nor the abusers of themselves with mankind'. It is obvious that the Christian prude must opt for the RSV as the "correct translation". It is doubtful whether any justification can be given for this. Coleman argues that *malakos,* which literally means 'soft', metaphorically was used by the Greeks to refer to males who played the passive role in homosexual intercourse.[23] McNeill on the other hand points out that *malakos* is usually employed in the scriptures in a moral context signifying moral softness or weakness.[24] It is therefore by no means clear that reference is being made to homosexuality at all in these passages.

Finally there have been arguments given from time to time for the view that Jesus was a homosexual or at least had some homosexual sexual experience.[25] If a case could be made for this proposal then it destroys with look at philosophy internationally. Extreme examples will drain generally point but also make it evident. Philosophy as practiced in Tehran and philosophy as present author shall not pursue this matter here.

Received : 21-12-85

...3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. *Conclusion*

Through an examination of the arguments found in Herbert Miles' *Sexual Understanding Before Marriage* and John White's *Eros Defiled*, an examination and critique of Christian prudery has been conducted. The conclusion reached is that even taking all *prima facie* cognitive parts of the scriptures (translation: the non-poetic stuff that could be either true or false) at face value without any deep historical examination, there is no good reason to believe that the scriptures condemn *all* acts of non-marital sexual intercourse. This is a surprising conclusion to reach from within the confines of the Christian scheme of things, and flies in the face of both the Catholic and Reformed traditions. But tradition may be wrong.

If God has as part of His characterizing essence *goodness*, then given that He can recommend no evil, God's recommendations for morally good sexual relationships cannot differ from the conclusions reached by a correct sexual ethics. Thus in reply to the anguished Christian who feels that the smoking ruins of the received view of sexual morality leaves one in a moral vacuum, we must point him/her in the direction of the theories of sexual ethics discussed by moral philosophers.

Department of Sociology
The Flinders University of
South Australia
BEDFORD PARK, 5042
Australia

JOSEPH WAYNE SMITH

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. I follow L. Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, (Banner of Truth Trust, Edinburgh, 1984), p. 231. There are theological problems involved with this view or alternatively, presented to Christianity because of this view. Consider the story of the fall of Man, told in Genesis 3:1–24. Whether this is taken to be reality or a myth with a moral (like the state of nature of the contract theorists), there is a major problem in taking Eve to have sinned by allegedly disobeying God and "eating" of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. If Eve had "to eat" the fruits of this tree to first become a moral agent (Knowledge of good and evil being a necessary condition for moral agency) then how could she have sinned in eating the fruit? At the time of eating she allegedly lacked knowledge of good and evil, and hence could by no means know that disobeying God was morally wrong. Hence, taking sin to be no more than moral evil, it follows that Eve did not sin. This renders problematic the explanation of the origin of sin given by Birkhof (ibid, p. 221), which sees sin beginning with the misadventures in Eden.

2. R. Tannahill, *Sex in History*, (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1980), pp. 136–161, esp. p. 155.

3. H. J. Miles, *Sexnal Understanding Before Marriage*, (Zondervan Books, Michigan, 1975).

4. J. White, *Eros Defiled*: *The Christian and Sexual Guilt*, (Inter-Varsity Press, Leicester, 1983).

5. *Ibid*, p. 25.

6. *Ibid*, p. 25.

7. Nor in general is an ontology of marriage a non-trivial matter to sketch. cf. S. R. L. Clark, "Sexual Ontology and Group Marriage", *Philosophy*, vol. 58, 1983, pp. 215–227.

8. cf. J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, (Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massaçhusetts, 1971).

9. B. W. Powers, "Paul's Teaching in 1 Corinthians on Sex and Marriage : Some Questions of Interpretation", *Interchange*, no. 31, 1983, pp. 19–32.

10. V. Bounds, "Does an Act of Sexual Intercourse Make You Married?", *Interchange*, no. 34, 1983, pp. 61–63.

11. Powers, *op cit*. note 11, pp. 21–22.

12. cf. St Augustine, *City of God*, translated by J. W. C. Wand, (Oxford University Press Oxford, 1963), pp. 15–16 and pp. 17–18.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Examples
provides s
think they

13. Miles, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 199–206; White, *op. cit.* note 4, pp. 43–74.

14. Miles, *ibid*, p. 205.

15. *Ibid*, p. 205.

16. H. Licht, *Sexual Life in Ancient Greece*, (The Abby Library, London, 1971), pp. 340–341, quoted from Powers, *op. cit.* note 9, p. 20.

Engels were
17. Miles, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 48–59.

moralists. Wit
for starters, tak
mora
standing and appl
view as bases fo
paradoxica
conclusions
have a more adequate
distorted. This is a
mor
view. Miller argues
not in class societies,
which, either is of sha
fundamental revision
from another point of
paradox, as being non–m

18. *Ibid*, p. 52.

19. *Ibid*, p. 144. White, *op. cit.* note 4, p. 113 compares homosexual's desires with "Starving people in besieged cities of the past [who] found their mouths watering for such delicacies as boiled rats".

20. J. J. McNeil, *The Church and the Homosexual*, (Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1977), pp. 48–44.

21. He does follow D. S. Bailey's *Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition*, (Longman, Green and Co., London, 1955) and claims that Lot's offer of his daughters was "simply the most tempting bribe Lot could offer at the spur of the moment to appease a hostile crowd" (*op. cit.* note 20, p. 44, emphasis added). The word "tempting" however gives the game away: tempting for what? A sexual reference is not eliminated, it is restated.

22. For further arguments along these lines cf. L. Scanzoni and V. R. Mollenkott, *Is the Homosexual My Neighbor? Another Christian View*, (SCM Press, London, 1978), pp. 54–61.

23. P. Coleman, *Christian Attitudes to Homosexuality*, (SPCK, London, 1980), p. 95.

24. McNeill, *op. cit.* note 20, pp. 50–53.

Such a way of characte
conflicts theologically not only
toric
cont
To shed its paradoxicality an
careful elucidation and this is
it in the first and second cha
radical critique of morality,
though in importantly different
should be something that anyone

25. A *suggestion* of such an argument although one not explicitly embraced by its authors M. Baigent, R. Leich and H. Lincoln, can be found in M. Baigent, R. Leich and H. Lincoln, *The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail*, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1982), pp. 278–282.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri
Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 1
January 1988

ON PUTTING MARX ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL AGENDA

I

Karl Marx in our dominant Anglo-American philosophical tradition is usually regarded as a marginal figure. Richard Miller in his important *Analyzing Marx* wants to show this to be a mistake. He wants to show how Marx should play a central role in philosophy, including analytic philosophy.[1]

Miller himself, as I do as well, operates in the dominant philosophical sub–culture of analytic philosophy. He makes a point about that sub–culture, a point pushed hard by Richard Rorty, namely that analytical philosophy is not held together by a set of common doctrines but "by common standards of successful practice."[2] (4) Even a superficial understanding of the history of analytical philosophy should make the merits of that claim evident. Still even that claim is an exaggeration. Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap are both analytical philosophers but it is not so clear to me that they have common standards of successful practice. The same thing could be said of Stanley Cavell and Adolf Grunbaum. But behind that exaggeration there is an important truth. Generally, but not invariably, people who are analytical philosophers (particularly your typical philosophy professor) have roughly comparable standards for the successful practice of philosophy at least in determinate areas. This is evident when we compare their practice with the practice of other philosophers particularly when we look at philosophy internationally. Extreme examples will dramatize my point but also make it evident. Philosophy as practiced in Tehran and philosophy as

Received : 21–12–85

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

practiced in Stockholm are rather different as is philosophy practiced in the U. S. A., and philosophy practiced in Bulgaria. What is central to analytical philosophy and what Miller sees as a virtue, as do I, "is a heavy emphasis on clear statements of what one wants people to believe and clear arguments as to why they should believe it, based on premises that would be plausible to many, if not all."(4) Historically British empiricism and logical positivism have set the agenda for analytical philosophy. I suppose no one, not even A. J. Ayer, is a logical positivist anymore. But W. V. Quine dedicated his major work to Carnap and Donald Davidson in turn dedicated one of his major works to Quine. The influence of positivist and empiricist conceptions lie very deep in analytical philosophy.

Miller, like Rorty, wants to pry present philosophical practice away from that influence. Miller thinks that it is particularly disastrous in the philosophy of science.[3] He wants to show "that Marx is best read and best used when the style of analytic philosophy is divorced from positivist substance."[4](4) In doing this he wants to find a space in philosophy for Marx. He wants us to come to treat Marx as we do many other philosophers such as Kant, Hume, Mill or Hobbes. When we do epistemology Hume and Kant are classical figures in that they "represent standard options that a philosopher," doing epistemology, "should consult, interpreting or attacking them, as he or she does philosophy."(4) It doesn't mean that we need at all to agree with Hume or Kant as to their conclusions or even as to their methodology. But they are standard points of departure providing us with serious and nuanced views against which we would have to define ourselves, if we would seriously try to do epistemology. If we were to do ethics, Mill, Kant and Sidgwick would play a similar role. And in the philosophy of mind Wittgenstein, Dennett and Putnam—though contemporary

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

figures—are similarly situated. And in the philosophy of language, the same would be said for Chomsky, Dummett and Davidson. In social philosophy Hobbes and Mill are secure figures on that list. Miller wants to show that Marx should be an equally secure figure in social philosophy and indirectly in ethics in a way that he is not now (1985) in analytic philosophy and generally in English speaking philosophy. He wants to show why it must be the case that anyone who sets out to do social philosophy seriously must come to grips with Marx in a way analogous to the way in which if someone were to do epistemology seriously he would have to come to grips with Kant or if he were to do moral philosophy seriously he would have to come to grips with Sidgwick. Miller will, while doing that, try to show how in an indirect but striking way Marx is vital to moral philosophy and to thinking about morality generally.

Miller realizes that he is swimming against the stream. For as he puts it :

> ... in English–speaking countries, the relation between Marx and philosophy has been almost wholly antagonistic, at least untill very recently. Almost all analytic philosophers, if they did not ignore Marx's writings, tried to show that Marx fell so far short of proper standards of clarity, plausibility, scientific justification of explanatory adequacy that it would be a waste of time to investigate his theories empirically or to derive their philosophical implications. 'Metaphysics' was one of the nicer charges. (4)

Miller maintains that this antagonism should be replaced by cooperation. (5) He belives that Marx's ideas "shed light on leading problems of philosophy, issues that are important not just for Marxists (or anti–Marxists), but for everyone." (5)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Examples here are vital if this is to be at all convincing. Miller provides some and you should reflect on how convincing you think they are.

His first example is Marx on morality. Miller thinks Marx, and Engels as well, are what I have called *anti-moralists*[5] Marx and Engels were, as it were, if Miller is right, the first Marxist anti-moralists. Without elucidation this does not mean much. Miller, for starters, takes it to mean that Marx develops a critique of morality. He criticizes those central categories of moral understanding and appraisal, "justice, equality and the moral point of view, as bases for judging social arrangements." (5) He seeks, paradoxical as this may sound, to *replace* them with other concepts of social appraisal and understanding which he thinks have a more adequate rational warrant and are less ideologically distorted. This is a radical challenge to the very enterprize of moral philosophy. In a political context the moral point of view, Miller argues, does not, and rationally speaking should not in class societies, reign supreme. It is not a point of view which either is or should be always overriding. Rather our fundamental evaluations, in such a context, should be made from another point of view which Miller describes, not without paradox, as being non-moral but still humane.

Such a way of characterizing things is both paradoxical and conflicts radically not only with the views of such leading historical figures as Mill, Kant and Sidgwick but also with such contemporary moral philosophers as Rawls, Baier or Gewirth. To shed its paradoxicality and implausible sound, it will need a careful elucidation and this is exactly what Miller seeks to give it in the first and second chapters of *Analyzing Marx*. Such a radical critique of morality, critique which is also pursued, though in importantly different ways by Nietzsche and Freud, should be something that anyone thinking seriously about mora-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

lity and 'the foundations of morality' very much needs closely to examine, particularly given what we know about contemporary culture, about the indeterminacy of foundational claims in moral philosophy and what we know about the pervasiveness of ideology and the mystification that usually goes with it Marx makes us face what is both a fundamental theoretical question and a question of great human importance for anyone who with integrity wants to be serious about the world in which he lives. Marx forces us, in a radical and non-evasive way, to ask the question : *how should institutions be judged?* In his mature writings, he rejects—or so Miller and some other able Marxists read him—the idea that we should assess these institutions from the moral point of view, though it is also important to recognize that he does this without turning to nihilism or a cynical amoralism

We need, of course, to ask whether Miller has got Marx right here. George Brenkert, for example, gives us a quite differnt picture of Marx.[6] But, beyond that, we also need to ask : suppose he has got Marx right, still is this view—this humane replacement of morality—a coherent view which we ought to accept? It might, we should also remember, be a coherent view and still be coherently rejectable. It might not be a view that we on reflection and with full knowledge would want to accept. The most central question is whether this is the right way of viewing things, the best way of judging institutions, for a thoroughly informed non-evasive person who is also humane. Even if Miller has got Marx wrong here the view itself—taking a challenging strand of Marx—might be the one a non-evasive person should take. There is the possibility that Marx is so indeterminate *on these topics* that there is no getting him wrong or right. Then what would be important is the adequacy *in their own right* of hese projective reconstructions of Marx. Whatever they revea,l

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or fail to reveal, about 'the real Marx', what they say themselves should be thought about on its own. The central point is that such a critique of morality—a possibly adequate re–construction of Marx—should be of vital interest to moral and social philosophers. Such a challenge could not be shrugged off by moral philosophers who are serious about their subject.

Miller gives another example : an example he also wrestles with in *Analyzing Marx*. Marx's historical materialsm (his theory of history or theory of epochal social change) is a significant example of a holistic and systematic empirically grounded social science which, if it hangs together and is empirically adequate, would be both of very considerable theoretical interest and have considerable human import. There are reasons–reasons made familiar by people such as Ralf Dahrendorf, Karl Popper, Peter Winch and Isaiah Berlin—to be skeptical of the very possibility of such a social science, but, for reasons made popular by C. Wright Mills, we are also attracted to such grand theory as well. (It is part of the attraction not only of Marx but of Durkheim, Weber, Pareto and Habermas.) As social philosophers we should, Miller remarks, want to explore and assess such a holistic view. (Are, for example, the Popperian criticisms crippling ?)[7] Beyond that philosophers of science should find Marx' theory of history of particular interest for providing, as Miller puts it, "a model of the kind of legitimate theory that positivist philosophy of science excludes..." (5) The philosophy of science can use such a holistic social science as a model in sketching the logical structure of a "post–positivist but nonrelativist philosophy of science." (5)

II

Besides throwing light on leading problems of philosophy Miller finds Marx's thought important in another way : a way which strikes me, if it really can be pulled off, as even more

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

important than the first way we have just characterized. Miller believes that "philosophers can use Marx's writing to make a positive contribution to the social sciences."(5) A philosopher with say, a severely Rylcian or logical positivist conception of his discipline as exclusively a *second order* activity—as talk about the would—would balk at this. But since Quine on the analytic and synthetic, we ought to be wary of such restrictions. They may not have much of a rationale and they certainly do not square with what many philosophers—including hard-nosed philosophers, e. g. Hobbes, Locke or Mill—actually did and how they actually saw their role. Be that as it may. Miller does not want to accept such a purely underlaborer role for philosophy or accept such academic isolationism. He remarks :

> Social and political philosophers and philosophers of science are now separated from social scientists by frustrating departmental divides. Lacking appropriate training, information or professional rewards, philosophers today, quite unlike their most eminent predecessors, find it hard to contribute to actual debates over the nature of social reality. Yet many social scientists suspect that distinctive possibilities of analysis and explanation are being missed as a result of the easy assumptions and the confusions that philosophical reflection should challenge. As the most powerful explanatory framework outside the mainstream, Marx's social theories often yield such alternatives, if reconstructed with the clarity and conceptual resourcefulness of contemporary analytic philosophy (5)[8]

I feel this academic alienation rather keenly myself and I am sure that others do as well. Still, it is a local and historically contingent academic anomaly that has no good philosophical rationale. Here institutional structures impede work in philosophy and indeed the social sciences as well. But note on Miller's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

account—this broader scope for philosophical analysis also keeps intact analytical philosophy's analytical ideals. Miller speaks here in a manner reminiscent of G. A. Cohen, analytical Marxism's most resourceful practitioner, when he speaks of Marx's social theories having this powerful import "if reconstructed with the clarity and conceptual resourcefulness of contemporary analytic philosophy." (4) It is when this is done, Miller tells us, that Marx's account provides a "powerful explanatory framework" in contemporary social science. Miller takes his own Chapters Three and Four as a paradigm case of such work.

III

I have a very extensive sympathy with what Miller is trying to do here. In fact it is roughly in the same way that I try to proceed in my own work and it is how G. A. Cohen, William Shaw, Robert Paul Wolf, Jon Elster and Max Wartofsky proceed.[9] But, it also should be noted, that there are a number of Marxists and Marxist philosophers who are, in some instances to put it mildly, suspicious of the analytical ideal. Some but not all, of the philosophers around the English journal *Radical Philosophy* have that suspicion. Here Jonathan Ree is the most extreme case.[10] But also set in opposition are the Althusserians, both the French originals (who are largely ignorant of analytical philosophy) and the English Althusserians who are not and who are reacting against it.[11] Similar things should be said for the Frankfurt School Marxists: people like Herbert, Marcuse Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. They are not just indifferent to, as the French Althusserians largely are, but they are thoroughly hostile to analytical philosophy. Later versions of critical theory (Jurgen Habermas, Albrecht Wellmer and Kari-Otto Apel) try, in a rather eclectic fashion, to incorporate it—an unkind critic might say rap it in wool—but they hardly utilize its techniques

CC-0.In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in their work.[12] They do not write with the same clarity, pugency and rigor as do analytical philosophers, including analytical Marxists. (Just read a bit of Miller or Cohen and then a bit of Habermas or Apel and you will see what I Mean.) However, I do not want to say that I think the only virtue in philosophy is rigor and clarity. But it is certainly one important virtue.

I will not explicate or assess these Marxist or neo–Marxist alternatives to analytical Marxism. I will rather stick with analytical Marxism. The phrase 'analytical Marxism', it should be noted, is my lable for an approach like that of Miller's or Cohen's, though it is important to keep in mind, as Miller wishes to stress himself, that his approach is far less positivistic than G. A Cohen's, but when you compare them both with say Adorno and Althusser you can readily see that the lable 'analytical Marxism' fits them both. The way they reconstruct Marx, the way they talk about Marxist issues and general philosophical issues, in spite of their very deep differences, bears the mark of analytical philosophy. (Similar things could be said for the differences between Jon Elster and G. A. Cohen.) Miller does not mention, let alone deal, with these alternatives, as I just remarked, and I shall not pursue them here. But I think it is wise to be aware of these alternatives and take to heart Robert Frost's "Two roads diverged in a yellow wood and sorry I could not take them both and be one traveller." In trying to think about how to proceed in studying philosophy, it is vital to avoid a one–sided diet.

Miller's own way of using Marx's writings to make a positive contribution to the social sciences come in the middle sections of *Analyzing Marx* where he talks about political power. (I refer to chapters 3 and 4.) But he remarks that similar "analysis of Marx's ideas might have a liberating effect in other domains as well. His examples are "breaking the deadlock between

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'formalism' and substantivism?' in economic anthropology, or in determining the scope and limits of economic theory, in a world where equilibrium arguments are increasingly vacuous and the impact of international politics on economic processes is increasingly pervasive."(6)

IV

Miller also contends that analytical philosophy has an important contribution to make to Marx interpretation and to Marxist social theory. (6) In making a case for this Miller starts by remarking that "interpreters of Marx are confronted by two very different kinds of passages; general formulations that are highly condensed, fragmentary or metaphorical, often all three, and discussions of particular phenomena that are richly detailed, often quite plausible and utterly contrary to natural readings of the general formulatios." (6) Faced with this there are two corresponding temptations "and most interpreters succumb to one or the other." Miller describes them in the following manner and then shows how it leads interpreters who have so succumbed into a *cul de sac*.

> One can derive the underlying theories from the general statements, taken in isolation. Or, appreciating the diversity and plausibility of many of the specific discussions, one can dilute Marx into mere common sense. These temptations are especially powerful in the three areas I will examine, morality, political theory and history. Either Marx has one grand general argument to offer against morality, say, that moral ideas are shaped by social interests and hence are ideological. Or he was simply claiming that contemporary moralities placed too great an emphasis on property rights or social harmony. Either he regards politics as a passive reflection of economic necessities. Or he merely warns us to be sensitive to the influence of

CC-0.In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

economic interset groups on political decision making. Either he takes the desire to produce more efficiently as the driving force of history. Or he regards the economic factor as an important and often underrate aspect of large–scale change. The neglect of Marx has partly resulted from a situation in which such choices dominate sympathetic Marx interpretation. Most people, reflecting on the realities of social change, find the grand statements implausible, the modest ones truistic. (6)

Miller does not think that this is just a matter of the state of Marx's texts : that many were not completed or are first drafts or that he was too influenced by Hegel. There is that—or at least some of it—but, more importantly, the difficulties here have something to do, as well, with the nature of social reality, something the positivists missed but some Wittgensteinians, such as Peter Winch or Charles Taylor, have a better feeling for.[13] What Miller has in mind here is the fact that "statements about general kinds of social processes must be vague to be true and must be applied to particular events with unpredictable provisos, specifications and hedges" (7) Miller thinks once we are aware of this we can come to see that "analytic philosophy offers a promising style of interpretation, here, since it demands clarity, tolerates abstraction and complexity, and responds to the impact of contexts on what people mean." (7) He thinks with that technique we can extract "plausible but distinctive theories" from Marx's texts. (7) We need not fall back on either grand but implausible general statements, such as 'all morality is ideology' or on common sense truisms such as economics is important.

Using this style of philosophy, Miller hopes to give both accurate and significant readings for Marx's account of morality, his theory of the state and for his theory of history.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

V

Consider Marx's account of history and Marxist readings of it. Miller, in trying to show how analytical philosophy can do good work in the service of social science, wants to replace one very influential conception of Marx on history with another. (Both of these conceptions occur within analytical Marxism.) He wants to replace what he calls, the 'invisible hand conception'—a conception he thinks is the dominant one with us—with a conception which is more political. The invisible hand conception thinks of the mature Marx as being in "a special but important sense anti-political." By this is meant the following: it is our pursuit of independent economic self-interest that changes and shapes society. (8) Politics, as a quest for power, has, on such a conception, a subordinate role in social change. It is not class struggle but the building up of the productive forces through the efficient pursuit of individual self-interest that is the motor force of history.

Behind this economistic 'invisible hand' reading of Marx lies, Miller claims, some confused conceptions about how Marx was an economic determinist. Miller thinks that in certain ways—that is given a certain understanding of the notion—Marx was an economic determinist, but in other ways—ways that are important for a proper conception of the role of politics in social life—he was not. The way in which it is true and importantly true—Miller expresses as follows:

> ...the most important features of a society are ultimately determined by its mode of production, that is, the relations of control, the modes of cooperation and the technology that govern material production. More specifically, while a society is stable, the system of political and ideological institutions and the climate of respectable ideas are such as

[illegible] Marxists: people like Herbert, Marcuse Max [illegible]rkheimer and Theodor Adorno. They are not just indifferent to, as the French Althusserians largely are, but they are thoroughly hostile to analytical philosophy. Later versions of critical theory (Jurgen Habermas, Albrecht Wellmer and Karl-Otto Apel) try, in a rather eclectic fashion, to incorporate it—an unkind critic might say rap it in wool—but they hardly utilize its techniques

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> to serve the function of maintaining the dominance of the economically dominant social group, the group who mainly extract the surplus from those directly engaged in material production. If radical change comes about through processes internal to a society, it is due to self-destructive tendencies of the mode of production. Because of the nature of the mode of production, processes that initially maintained the old relations of control eventually give a non-dominant group the ability and the motivation to destroy the old system of relations and dominate a new one. In the ensuing struggles, the crucial alliances are determined by people's class situations, their locations in that network of relations of control. (9)

This clearly treats the mode of material production as primary and this is what rationalizes calling Marx an economic determinist. But Miller thinks that to use that term here is misleading. Marx does not believe "that the pursuit of immediate economic self-interest spontaneously produces radical social changes."(9) He does not believe "that political organization with large-scale social goals is unimportant" (9–10) He does not hold the economistic thesis "that economic developments make political revolution superfluous..."(9) He does not think, in typical situations, that deliberations over one's political commitments are pointless. And he does not think "that the pursuit of more efficient production is the basic mechanism for change."(10) These beliefs of Marx all count, Mller maintains, against calling him an economie determinist and the last claim counts against calling him a technological determinist as well.

He thinks a failure to recognize these things stands in the way of appreciating Marx's "insights in moral philosophy and political theory."(10) We should also recognize that systems of

...4

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

control, as in relations of control in the mode of production, are "in a broad sense political as well as economic."(9) The subordination of the political to the economic, if that is the right word for it, is simply, but importantly, this: "The main features of separate political institutions are explained as due to the need of the economically dominant group to maintain their dominance; alliances in revolutionary periods are primarily explained on the basis of class situations."(9)

Miller belives that the correctness of his claim that Marx was not an economic determinist or a technological determinist will be important, if not decisive, for what he wants to say about what he takes to be Marx's criticisms of morality as a basis for social choice. The important of Marx's critique of morality and the replacement he gives for morality in political life cannot be properly understood or its force appreciated if "Marx is supposed to have subordinated conscious political deliberations to the pursuit of immediate economic interests...."(10) Furthermore, the latter itself cannot be understood as having much force, if technological determinism is not assumed. But to assume technological determinism here is to assume that Marx regards "the pursuit of material efficiency as the engine of social change."(10) Against this, it is Miller's fundamental claim that the "more political Marx is more accurate as exegesis, more useful as social science and more illuminating as a resource for philosophy."(11)

Philosophy Department
Faculty of Humanities
The University of Calgary
2500 University Drive N.W.
CALGARY, Alberta Canada.

KAI NIELSEN

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. Richard Miller, *Analyzing Marx* (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press 1984), Page referenees to *Analyzing Marx* will be given in the text. Further relevant works by Miller are : "Marx and Aristotle : A kind of Consequentialism" in *Marx and Morality*, Kai Nielsen and Steven Patten (eds.), (Guelph, ON : Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy 1981), pp. 323–352, "Rights and Reality," *Philosophical Review*, (July 1981), pp. 383–407 and "Rights or Consequences," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. VII (1982). pp. 151–174.

2. Richard Rorty, *Consequences or Pragmatism* (Minneapolis, MN : The University of Minnesota Press 1982), pp. 211–230.

3. This is evident in the third section of his *Analyzing Marx* and in his "Fact and Method in the Social Sciences" in *Changing Social Science*, Daniel R. Sabia, Jr. and Jerald Wallalis (eds.), (Albany, NY : State University of New York Press 1983), pp. 73–101.

4. Here Miller is in clear contrast with another important analytical Marxist, G. A. Cohen. See Cohen's *Karl Marx's Theory of History* (Oxford, England : Clarendon Press 1978) pp. ix–x and his "Reply to Four Critics," *Analyse & Kritik*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1983), pp. 195–222.

5. Anthony Skillen, *Ruling Illusions* (Sussex : Harvester Press 1977) pp. 122–177 and his "Workers' Interests and the Strains of Marxian Anti-Moralism" in *Marx and Morality* and Andrew Collier, "The Production of Moral Ideology," *Radical Philosophy*, No. 9 (1974), his "Scientific Socialism and the Question of Values," *The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, Vol. LVII (1983).

6. George Brenkert, *Marx's Ethics of Freedom*, (London, England : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).

7. Richard Hudelson, "Popper's Critique of Marx," *Philosophical Stndies*, Vol. 37 (1980) and his "Marx's Empiricism," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 32 (1982) and Kai Nielsen, "Cultural Pessimism and the Setting Aside of Marxism," *Analyse & Kritik*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 1985), pp. 75–100.

8. But isn't this still a second-order rule for philosophers? It is Marx's social theories—his social science—which yield the alternatives. Philosophers give us a more cleaned up version to make it more effectively do the work of giving us a powerful explanatory framework for looking at social science. The work of G. A. Cohen and Jon Elster is paradigmatic here.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

9. The work of G. A. Cohen, William Shaw, Robert Paul Wolff, Jon Elster and Max Wartofsky is what is being referred to here.

10. See Jonathan Ree, "Le Marxisme et la Philosophie Analytique," *Critique*. (August-September 1980), pp. 802–817.

11. Timothy O'Hagan, "Althusser : How to be a Marxist in Philosophy" in *Marx and Marxisms*, G. H. R. Parkinson (ed.), (Cambridge, England : Cambridge University Press 1982), pp. 243–264. For a perceptive discussion of Althusser's views see Alex Collinicos, *Althusser's Marxism* (London, England : Pluto Press 1976). Some, though by no means all, of the philosophers writing in *Radical Philosophy* are what I have characterized a English Althusserians.

12. For a brief discussion of both the Frankfurt School and Habermas and the links between them see Tom Bottomore, *The Frankfurt School*. (London, England : Tavistock Publications Ltd. 1984).

13. Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science* (London, England : Routledge and Kegan Paul 1958 and Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in *Interpretive Social Science*, Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (eds.), (Berkeley CA : University of California 1979), pp. 25–71.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 1,
January 1988

REVERSAL AND RECOGNITION IN PLATO

Introduction

It has often been remarked with irony that most of modern writing on Plato approaches Plato's thought from an Aristotelian perspective. This seems to be especially true of the modern discussion of the theory of Forms. While one need not altogether deny the possibility of gaining new insight into Plato which such a procedure may afford us, yet we must also realize that it may create some problems also. The approach to Plato by way of the logical, epistemological and metaphysical principles of Aristotle may erect a serious barrier to the understanding of Plato, all the more so, when such principles are implicitly used as part of one's interpretative framework. But, of course, in thus being cautioned against using Aristotle to cast light upon Plato, one need not, as it were, abjure altogether the use of Aristotelian prisms. Perhaps, if we choose different filters, we may be able to gain a different kind of illumination on certain aspects of Plato's thought. At any rate, in the present essay, I propose to use certain ideas of Aristotle's *Poetics* for the purpose of understanding the nature of Platonic inquiry.[1] While I am only too well aware of the limitations of the procedure that I am recommending, yet I believe that it may prove suggestive in certain respects. First and foremost, the basic ideas of Reversal and Recognition that I shall be using, do not pre–judge, *ab initio,* the epistemological and ontological differences between Plato and Aristotle, adversely to the Platonic point of view. On the contrary, the

Received : 21-8 1986

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

background implications and overtones of Reversal and Recognition seem to be more sympathetically tuned to the Platonic sensibility. Secondly, a framework designed for interpreting Art helping us in understanding a philosophical position is not without its own lesson for us, suggesting, as it does, an inner affinity between art and certain aspects of Platonic thought. Thirdly, and as a further specification of the preceding point, such an approach to Plato by way of the aesthetic theory of Aristotle may help us in appreciating the connections between the discursive, argumentative level and the symbolic expressive level in Plato. Particularly in the context of the theory of Forms, such a connective framework may have its own advantages. The epistemological and methodological presuppositions of the standard approaches too often sunder these two levels, thus projecting the Forms as some kind of symbolic imagery. However, the severance of the discursive and the symbolic levels in Plato's discourse may hinder a proper understanding of the complex texture of the Platonic dialogues.

But of course the intention behind the present attempt is not to substitute a symbolic in the place of the logical understanding of Plato; it is not to minimise the discursive and argumentative level in favour of symbol and expression. On the contrary, it is hoped that the present attempt may allow us to return to the argumentation in Plato from a different point of view.

Since the guiding ideas of the present venture are the Aristotelian principles of Reversal and Recognition, in the first section I shall present the Aristotelian doctrine briefly and also indicate in a general sort of way, how the themes of Reversal and Recognition characterise the nature of philosophical inquiry in Plato.

Reversal and Recognition in Aristotle

In *The Poetics*, chapters XI and XII, Aristotle discusses the parts of tragedy in terms of quality (chapter XI) and quantity

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(chapter XII). Of the parts of tragedy, from the point of view of quality, he mentions two kinds of action which may be represented in art – simple and complex. A simple action, Aristotle tells us, is one in which there is continuity and unity but without reversal or transformation into the opposite, but in a complex action, there is reversal **(peripateia)** and recognition **(anagnorisis)**.[3] The idea of reversal is introduced in the eleventh chapter as a mutation or transformation of action into a contrary condition. But not any kind of change could be described as reversal but it must be a transition which proceeds with either probability or necessity, from what had gone before.[4] There must, in other words, be a principle of direction implicit in the preceding situation. Secondly, a reversal is a change or transformation into the opposite. The examples that Aristotle mentions suggest two kinds of reversals; firstly, there could be reversal in the sense of the contrary kind of action taking place. The example of the messenger in Oedipus, who comes with the intention of relieving Oedipus, but whose action actually results in his condemnation, is an instance of this.[5] But there could also be a reversal of the agent's character when he is presented as being the contrary of what he first appeared to be. Here the reversal is not merely of action but the perception of the agent himself undergoes a transformation.

The function of Reversal is to facilitate Recognition, which Aristotle describes as a change from ignorance to knowledge or into the friendship or hatred of those destined to be prosperous or adverse fortune.[6] With regard to Recognition, Aristotle is more meticulous and distinguishes six kinds of recognition, from the most external kind having to do with the recognition of inanimate or casual things to the recognition of character, which he regards as the noblest.[7] Recognition of character, again, is distinguished into two kinds– recognition of either one person involved in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the situation by the other or mutual recognition of each other. Aristotle also suggests that recognition may take place with or without reversal but holds that the latter, i.e. recognition with reversal, is the perfect form.[8]

Although he does not explicitly say so, it appears that recognition and reversal are modes of understanding that are available to the spectators of the tragedy. The reason for this conjecture is that Aristotle says the recognition excites pity and fear and the excitement of these emotions and their purgation **(catharsis)** takes place in the spectators.[9] If we hold that this is possible for the spectors, then it would follow that recognition is purely a form of audience response. This would make it a purely aesthetic category. If, on the other hand, it is allowable to talk of the excitement of pity and fear in the characters and not merely in the spectators, then recognition has a locus in the characters also. This possibility is vital to the extension of recognition that I am proposing, for if recognition were to be a purely aesthetic phenomeon, then the possibility of extending it to non-aesthetic, i.e., moral contexts, would be ruled out in principle. If on the other hand, it is a mode of understanding that is available to the characters whose actions are imitated in the play, then it is possible for us to extend the use of recognition to real life or existential situations. However, in the present eassy, I shall not directly argue for the permissibility of such an extension. The most that I can do for the present is to suggest that there seems to be nothing in *The Poetics* to forbid such an extension in principle. Hence for the purpose of the present argument I shall presume the possibility of extending both the notions of reversal and recognition to the real contexts of life experiences.

But even granted the logical possibility of such an extension, we still have to show that there is a point in such an extension;

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in other words, we must show that the Aristotelian notions of recognition and reversal are fruitful notions in such extended contexts. For this purpose, I shall first expand the notion of reversal as a generalised description of certain specific situations and then try to show how in that kind of situation, the problem of recognition arises. After thus anchoring both recognition and reversal in the structures of life, I shall comment upon the way the problem of recognition structures Plato's inquiry.

Reversal as a Form of Existence: Thucydides on the Pelopennesian War.

Far removed from the concerns of philosophical theorization, in the context of a historical narrative in Thucydides, we have an example of what may be called 'reversal as a form reality'[10]. The location of this in the history of the Pelopennesian War is significant in two ways: first of all, Thucydides gives us a very clear picture of social life which is a paradigmatic illustration to reversal in both the senses that Aristotle had distinguished– reversal of action and reversal of character. Secondly, the situation of disorder brought about by the Pelopennesian War is also the cultural and moral climate of Plato's philosophical investigations. Thucydides' description not only illustrates the extended use of the category but also presents us with an understanding of the spiritual context of the Platonic problem of Recogonition.

Since no mere summary could ever hope to bring out the appropriateness of the category of reversal to the reality being described, we may cite the text of Thucydides somewhat in full.

"Revolution" writes Thucydides, "thus ran its course from city to city and the places in which it arrived at last, from having heard of what had gone before, carried to still greater excess the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

refinement of their inventions as manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the atrocities of their reprisals. Words had to change their ordinary meanings and to take that which was now given to them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ablity to see all sides of a question inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self–defence. The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent, a man to be suspected. To suceed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot still shrewder, but to provide against having to do either was break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries...thus every form of inequity took root in the Hellenic countries by reason of the troubles. The ancient simplicity in which honour so largely entered was laughed down and disappeared and society became divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow". [11]

The situation described by Thucydides is characterised by a basic perversion of the categories of moral and political judgement. Since all the categories of right and wrong, proper and improper, both for the individual and for societies, were turned upside down, the very meanings of the terms of judgement were perverted. The obliteration of distinctions and their transformation into their opposites, made recognition impossible. In such a situation of reversal, the primary issue becomes : how can one recognise the proper forms or shapes of these criteria of order. It is interesting to note that Thucydides is talking at the semantic level, although the primary object of his concern is social disorder and anomie. This feature of his narrative is important for us to note. However, a proper appreciation of Thucydides' methodology here can be had only if we first reflect

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

upon the proper relationship between language or discourse and reality, particularly, human reality. There are two pictures or models of this relationship that we must avoid.[12] On the one hand, there is the view that language is merely an expression of facts which are antecedently there and that the function of discourse is to reflect or communicate this antecedently given reality. This may be called the copy theory of discourse, according to which the relationship between discourse and reality (here human action) is extrinsic. On the other hand, there is the idealistic view that discourse creates or brings into being the reality of that which it is about. Neither the picture of extrinsic reflection nor that of intrinsic creation is adequate to comprehend the dialectical relationship between language and action. According to the dialectical conception, the categories of discourse constitute the framework of broad principles within which social and political phenomena are to be comprehended. Discourse presents the meaning-giving framework of action such that a disorder or derangement of the categorial principles is felt not merely at the level of thought but also at the level of action. Not only our understanding of our practices but those practices themselves, are distorted. It is to describe this interlocking of language and social reality that in the text Thucydides takes the semantic turn and describes the transvaluation of meanings and the perversion of the connotations of the terms of discourse.

For a proper understanding of the method of Plato, it is important to emphasise this semantic ascent which we find in Thucydides' account. At the most superficial level, it illumines a certain enigmatic feature of the method of Socrates, what may be called the 'intellectualism' of the Socratic way. By probing the meanings of terms and suggested definitions, Socrates claims to be examining souls. The real object of his concern is the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

examination of life and action, but he pursues this aim in a very 'intellectualist' manner by testing definitions and refuting accounts.[13] Later generations have always been somewhat puzzled by this apparent dis–harmony between method and aim in Socrates. The aim, as he himself repeatedly tells us, is the examination of lives but he pursues this aim by means of an examination of words. If we keep in mind the semantic ascent in Thucydides, we may perhaps come to a proper understanding of the Socratic style, for it suggests that a disorder at the level of meanings is constitutive of a disordered existence. In this sense, too, virtue is knowledge.

The concept of reversal also helps us to understand another aspect of the Platonic method. Socrates always asks for examples, whether it is piety as in *Euthyphro*[14] or friendship as in *Lysis*[15] or justice as in *The Republic*.[16] In the course of the inquiry, as one after the other, the proferred instances are examined, found wanting and rejected, we are made to realise that there is a problem of recognition. Even when a suggested instance is not summarily rejected, we are made to feel a certain uneasiness about it. The difficulty in recognising an instance or an example may be felt as due to some kind of trickery on the part of Socrates. Not merely we, the on–lookers, but sometimes even the protagonists get this impression. Meno, for example, likens Socrates to the stinging ray fish that can numb and deaden its prey.[17] In a domain of settled discourse, where the meaning of the basic terms are not in dispute, recognition of an instance or an example does not pose any such threat or problem. But in a situation like the one described by Thucydides, the disorder of discourse paralyses recognition. In this predicament, individual instances and examples do not help; we must turn the axis of our inquiry all the way round from the particular instances to the forms.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Aristotle has said that induction and example may be attributed to Socrates but the turn towards the Forms is distinctively the characteristic of Plato.[18] If we place the Socratic insistence upon examples in the context of what we have called a situation of reversal, we can better appreciate the turn towards the Forms, for in such a situation, recognition of an instance itself becomes problematic; in this manner, the link or continuity between Socrates and Plato becomes clearer.

It may be noted that at this level, we are concerned with the recognition of seperate instances or cases, what in *The Poetics* Aristotle calls the most elementary or simple level of recognition– the recognition of seperate instances. The suggestion is that even at this stage, recognition becomes problem in a situation of reversal and that the resolution of the problem requires a turn to the Forms. At this simple elementary level, it looks that our inquiry takes shape as a search for the Forms, guided by two presupposition. In a situation of disorder, the identification of a thing or an action requires us to look to the Form under which we may recognise it as such and such. The Forms are paradigms under which we recognise instances or cases. But the second presupposition that such recognition only requires separate Forms may have to be given up. On the contrary, we have to grasp, not merely the separate Forms but their inter–relationships. This is because individual actions themselves cannot be properly understood in an isolating and atomistic manner. Rather, just actions or temperate actions, or actions of courage or friendship can be recognized only in terms of the contexts in which they are performed. In the contemporary mode, only against the form of life that we can recognise such actions. It is because of this that the inter–relationships among the Forms becomes crucial; thus in *The Sophist* we are led to the doctrine of the 'communion of Forms.[19]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But for the present, we may assume that recognition only involves separate Forms. (One of the ways in which we shall see the breakdown of this assumption is the paradox of all virtues turning to be one and the same.) With this assumption, we may now consider the question as to why we must turn to the Forms in the first place.

The basic Platonic principle is that it is in the light of Forms or **'eide'** that we recognise particular things. Just as we turned to Thucydides to give us an understanding of the context in which the problem of reversal arises, we may now turn elsewhere for a clue as to why we must invoke the Forms. The clue I am having in mind is provided by the Hippocratic treatises *On Ancient Medicine*[20] and *The Nature of Man.*[21] In recent years scholars like Werner Jaeger have shown the medical–theoretical background of some of the crucial philosophical themes and doctrines in Plato.[22] I am now referring to a particular aspect of this discussion. In the Hippocratic treastises, we are introduced to the problem of recognition of an illness and it is interesting to note that *Ancient Medicine,* in its own way, poses the problem of recognition in a situation of reversal. The specific issue being considered is the identification of proper diet and the text goes on to explain why diet becomes a problem for the medical art. Foods, which are good to one individual may prove injurious to another and similarly, what is beneficial at one time and in one quantity, may prove injurious at another time and quantity and *vice versa.* It is this tendency of going over into the opposite that poses the problem of recognising what is proper diet.[23] But we are told that this question of what is proper food can be answered only on the basis of an understanding of the nature of man in relation to habits, temperament and character as well as in relation to the things of the environment, as well as general factors such as land and climate.[24] In the purely medical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

context also, recognition ultimately broadens out into the problem of grasping inter relationships. But the immediate point that we have to note is that these texts introduce the concept of an **eidos** or form, as something by which we recognise an illness.[25] The idea is that it is by looking to the **eidos** that we recognize a particular state as to what it truly is. The **eide** or the Forms are not simply reduced to specific configuration of observable details (i.e.. the outwadrly manifest symptoms). But yet it is by means of the **eide** that empirical or observable configurations are comprehended. The turn to the Forms is not a turn away from the particulars but it is precisely that by which a deeper understanding of the particular is made possible.

The problem of recognition at this stage seems to have reached an interim solution; we recognise a particular or an instance as what it is in terms of its form **eidos**. It is true that there is already a hint that this formulation cannot be final, for even in this interim formulation, there is implicit the question of the inter-relationships of the forms and the particulars as well as the inter-relationships among the forms themselves. But more important than all these issues of elaboration and formulation, there is the question of the recognition of the Forms themselves. Even if it is correct to say that it is by means of the Forms that we recognise particulars, yet this cannot be the final answer to the problem of recognition; for now, the question would emerge as to how we recognise the Forms themselves. Considering that the problem of recognition arose in the first instance because of the perversity of reversal, the question now becomes, how, in so far as we are still implicated in this situation of anomic disorder, is it possible for us to recognize the Forms themselves.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Reversal and Recognition in Plato

We may perhaps proceed to respond to this final issue in two stages. In the first stage, we may assume that we do have such cognition of Forms and then ask about the presuppositions of having such knowledge. In the second stage, we may ask what should be the nature of the world, if it can be understood only by way of the Forms. In the first stage, we are asking what is the nature of man, if he is to be capable of recognising the Forms and in the second stage, we are asking what is the nature of reality, if such knowledge of Forms is to be possible for man. In Platonic language, we are asking about the faculties of the soul and also about the approriate objects of these faculties.[26] Or in a broader frame of interpretation, we may say that the guiding presupposition of our investigation is that a proper understanding of man and reality mutually implicate each other, in the sense that the question What is man? can be answered only in terms of a certain metaphysics, while the question what is reality, in turn, can be answered only in terms of philosophical anthropology.[27]

But there are two other tasks also that we have to attend to, if we approach the theory of Forms in terms of the principles of reversal and recognition. The first question has to do with the devices of representation of the Forms. Since under conditions of reversal, our intellectual perception is said to be fundamentally disoriented, by what symbolic devices can we represent the forms? The second question has to do with the discipline of character and skills which may be necessary for the recognition of forms. If the first question sends us towards poetry, myth and symbolism in general, the second qnestion sends us towards the moral and the spiritual. But the complication is that these levels of consideration may conflict;[28] the symbolic devices of poetry and art may pervert the powers of recognition and hence may bind us with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

enchanted chains, as it were, to the realm of reversal. It is clear, therefore, that the second level must function as a critique of the first. If, on the contrary, the first level becomes all important and were to dictate the forms of the second, if, in other words, mythos were to govern logos, then this itself would be a profound inner reversal in the soul.

In this critique of the perversions of the symbolic, the necessity of the symbolic itself, is not in question, for in a situation of reversal, recognition of reality has been jeopardized and hence in sofar as such recognition is still possible, it must assume certain indirect and oblique ways. Hence, symbolism becomes essential, but while necessary, such devices have their own hidden dangers and temptations; philosophic recognition has for ever to be alert to the subversions of Rhetoric.[29]

In the earlier dialogues, an aspect of this contrast is emphasised, namely, that we can truly understand something only when we are able to understand what makes it so. Recognition involves giving an account and not merely a simple description. We must see what makes a particular or an instance what it is and in *The Phaedo* this idea of giving an account is expanded as recognition of the cause. Only, as *The Phaedo* itself makes clear, cause here means the form or the **eidos** in the participation or imitation of which an instance becomes what it is.[30] Hence, the recognition of an instance as such and such involves not merely, as it were, looking at it, but looking *beyond* it, to the **eidos** in which it participates By this move, a *vertical* dimension is added to problem of recognition. To recognize a particular, it is not enough if we compare it with other particulars; it is not enough if we compile a list of similar and dissimilar instances. But what is needed is a change in our orientation, a turning of our gaze from the realm of the changing to the relam of the constant

...5

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the immutable, to the Forms. Later on, in *The Republic* this turn about is described as a **periagoge,** not merely a noetic but a fundamental existential re–orientation.[31] But already in the early *Euthyphro* there is a dim foreshadowing of this in the discussion whether an act becomes pious because the gods love it or whether the gods love it because it is pious.[32] In this passage with the sanctimonious Euthyphro, Socrates makes two points. Negatively, we are told that the piety or holiness of an act cannot be recognized by means of merely mythic convictions about the gods which men like Euthyphro pride themselves upon. We must look beyond such fairy tales to recognise true piety and holiness. In our terms, recognition is philosophic understanding and not mythic conviction. But the more subtle point which is being suggested is that there in an inner affinity between the divine and the good. The gods recognize the good and the holy because it is the nature of the divine to be thus attuned to virtue and righteousness. The idea which is germinal in *The Euthyphro* receives its most powerful expression in *The Republic* in the notion of the overflowing or out pouring of the Idea of The Good.

But if the recognition of the perfect Forms is natural to the divine and if the human soul is also capable of such recognition of exemplary Forms, then, there must be something divine about the human soul also. Now, to be divine is to be contrasted with the mortal and hence to be incapable of perishing. There must therefore be something immortal in man; we find that *The Phaedo* actually argues for the immortality of the soul as a condition for the possibility of the knowledge of Forms.[34] The significance of the discussion of the immortality of the soul in *The Phaedo* for us is the underlying motivation, namely, that the knowledge of the Forms requires, as a presupposition, the immortality of the soul. The conceptul framework of recognition

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

now includes the particular changing instances or happenings, the exemplary Forms and the soul.

The status and powers of the soul within this framework are somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, the soul cannot be merely one among the particulars, for, as we have already seen, it is the mark of the particular to be in-constant and go over into its opposite, whereas the soul is constant. (We remember that the argument for the immortality of the soul begins from its constancy.) But on the other hand, the soul cannot also be substantially the same as the Forms. The peculiar status of the soul has an important consequence for the problem of recognition. If the soul were merely and wholly immersed in the domain of phenomena, it would not even be capable of the recognition of essences, but if it were a Form itself, it would have been perfect and since perfection implies completeness, it would not have had any lack. The vision of the Forms would have been its constant possession. It is true that the divine architect or the **demiurgos** in *The Timaeus* too seems to have some such position, but yet the human soul is not to be identified with God, for in the case of God, we are told that he looks to the Forms in creating the phenomenal order, but the human soul is noetic rather than creative. It looks to the Forms for recognition rather than creation.[35]

Once we introduce this distinction between the creative and the noetic souls, then the conceptual world of recognition expands considerably, for now, we have to include the creative intellect on the one hand and the illuminated intellect, on the other. Similarly, we have to include the exemplary Forms on the one hand and the Receptacle on the other, as The *Timaeus suggests.*[36]

We may however break off at this point our consideration of the ontological framework within which the problem of recogni-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tion gets shaped and turn back to some of the epistemic aspects of the problem. For this purpose, we may recur back to the intermediary position of the soul between the phenomenal order and the order of true being or the Forms. This situation structures the epistemic possibilities of the soul in a certain way. It first of all illustrates the point already made that it is only by relating the particular given in experience to the **eide** or forms that even the particulars could be recognized as what they are. But the recognition of the Forms seems to be presupposed in this solution and it is this which becomes problematic in *The Meno*.[37]

Although the problem surfaces in *The Meno*, the shape of the solution also is discernible therein. Since the particulars are to be recognized and identified by way of the Forms, it is clear that the Forms themselves cannot be derived from the experience of the particulars. If that were so, the recognition of particulars would not require the Forms; hence, as far as the noetic situation is concerned, we must distinguish two aspects of the relationship between forms and particulars. Forms are primary in the order of being whereas the particulars are primary in relation to us, in the sense that although experience is not the source of the knowledge of Forms, yet it serves as the occassional cause of knowledge.[38] But the role of perception as the occassional cause of the recognition of Forms has to be understood in a certain dialectical fashion. It is not the case that experience, as it were, directly and straight forwardly, turns our minds to the Forms. Rather, the very instability and unsatisfactoriness of our experience, the tendency of perceptual qualities to pass over into their opposites, in short, their liability for reversals, it is this tension–generating character of our experience that serves as the occasional cause of the turn towards the Forms.[39] But this mutability is not also wholly negative; there is a glimmer, a glimpse, of some perfection beyond, of something

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

more satisfying to the soul, which is given in the midst of the flux of perception itself. This teasing and suggestive and yet frustrating character of our lives in the world provides the stimulation for the soul's turn towards the Forms.

In *The Meno*, it is said that sensory experience provides the occasion for recollection, that on the basis of the fleeting glimpses provided by the phenomena, the soul is reminded of its prior acquaintance with the Forms, a knowledge which had been, as it were, buried but not totally obliterated in the soul. The role of experience is precisely to serve as this kind of reminder.[40]

The forms and stages of this recollective search are more elaborately described in Diotima's speech in *The Symposium* where the mystic prophetess describes how the perception of particular and fleeting beautiful things leads the soul to ascend up the ladder of Forms and how finally the soul is given a rapturous and ecstatic vision of the Form of Beauty itself. When we consider the exaltation which this vision of Beauty is said to give rise in the soul, we can perhaps conjecture that it is the same experience which in *The Republic* and in the *Seventh Letter* is described as the vision of The Good.[41]

But in this long ascent from the frustrations and disappointments of phenomenal encounters to the supremely satisfying and fulfilling vision of The Good, a number of intentionalities and powers of the soul come into play. These various faculties are given a certain orientation by the existential situation of the soul—on the one hand, mired in the world of sense, it experiences a certain lack, a deficiency and also knows that this deficiency is fundamentally a deficiency of being. So, the particular objects of experience cannot remedy this lack, for, as particulars, they themselves are characterized by this deficiency of being—they neither truly are, nor are they wholly non-being; they roll, as it were, unsteadily, between being and non-being and hence

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cannot satisfy the soul's longing for reality and truth. The soul also knows that what it aspires after is something independent of it, for the very experience of deprivation teaches the soul that what could fulfil its most ardent aspiration is however something other then itself. Hence, the dynamism of the soul's search takes the form of a longing and aspiration after that which would fulfil and complete the soul—the search for recognition becomes Eros.[42]

In the classical world, there have been two types of philosophies of love. A. Nygren has called these two shapes Eros and Agape respectively. The first perspective looks upon love as a yearning to possess that which one lacks; it may by said to have an upward orientation. It arises in the context of acutely felt misery and deprivation but it is sustained by a yearning which would complete and confirm the soul. Agape, the other love, is moved not so much by a lack, but by a fullness. Precisely because it is a plenitude, it is self-giving, but in this it suffers no dimunition. Eros, we may say, is an asking love, whereas Agape is a giving one. In Plato, both the movements of love are represented. On the one hand, the yearning eros is aligned with Philosophy.

In *The Symposium* we are told how eros is born in poverty but aspires after plenitude. It is not in possession of felicity but sees itself as ever in pursuit of it. Similarly, philosophy also is not an already existing and achieved wisdom but the pursuit of it. The object of its knowing is its own ignorance, as *The Apology* tells us.[43] But paradoxically enough, precisely this knowledge of one's ignorance functions as a source of strength for the philosopher or lover of knowledge, whereas, it would be unbearable to the sophistic soul. Without eros, the awareness of one's own lack would prove crippling and hence would lead to self-deception. But eros strengthens and sustains the search because, already

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in the very recognition of one's own lack of knowledge, there is an anticipatory awareness of what would remove the deficiency. It is because of this fore-knowledge that one becomes capable of recognising one's own deficiency. In this sense, the recognition of one's own ignorance is itself an assurance that one is on the right track, as it were. Furthermore, this intentionality of eros keeps it immune from solicitatious and vain blandishments of illusory contentment. For, the soul knows what would really satisfy it and with this as a standard, it is capable of fortifying itself against all the allurements of mere opinion.

The experience of integrity in the midst of one's own lack of knowledge—this holding fast to the soul's inmost aspiration, is the peculiar **eudaimonia** of the Platonic eros. But this inner Socratic strength is possible because there is also the other love—the self-giving love of the Good. In *The Republic,* we are told that the perfection and completeness of The Good i such that it, as it were, overflows into and sustains everything else.[44] It is this metaphysical hope that there will be an answering response from reality to the aspiration of the soul that explains the phenomenon of Socrates. But of course, this metaphysical faith is not to be formulated in the form of a doctrine or theory. It is rather exemplified in the form of existence of Socrates himself. Hence, the final issue of Recognition becomes the recognition of the person of Socrates. We might therefore come back to the point that Asistotle makes in *The Poetics* but now, in a very different sense—that the noblest form of Recognition is the Recognition of personality.

Philosophy Department
Poona University
PUNE 411 007

R. SUNDARA RAJAN

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. Aristotle; *The Poetics* (trans) Ingram Bywater, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (ed) Richard McKeon, Random House, N. Y. 1941.
2. *Ibid*, 1452 a 15–25
3. *Ibid*, 1452 a 25–35
4. *Loc cit*
5. *Loc cit*
6. *Loc cit*
7. *Ibid*, 1452b 1–5
8. *Loc cit*
9. *Ibid*, 1453 b 1–15
10. Thucydides, *History of the Pelopennesian War;* (trans) Richard Crawley, *The Great Books of The Western World* (ed) R. M. Hutchins, Britanica Great Books, Vol. 19.
11. *Ibid*, p. 437.
12. Taylor, Charles, "Interpretation and The Sciences of Man" in *Philosophy and the Human Sciences* : *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
13. Plato; *Apology* 29, in *The Dialogues of Plato* vol. 1, (trans) Benjamin Jowett, Sphere Books, London, 1970.
14. Plato: *Euthyphro, The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 2
15. *Ibid. Lysis, The Dialogues of Plato*. Vol. 2
16. *Ibid, The Republic; The Dialogues of Plato*, (ed) Justin D. Kaplan, Washington Square Press, 1957
17. *Ibid, Meno* E 80, (trans) W. K. C. Guthrie, Penguin Classics, 1956
18. Aristotle; *Metaphysics* Bk 6 987 b 1–5 (trans) W. D. Ross *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. Also see Ross *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford, 1924, I, p. xxxiii f.
19. Plato; *The Sophist* 257 a f, 257 e
20. Hippocrates; *On Ancient Medicine* in *Hippocratic Writings*, (trans) Francis Adams The *Great Books of the Western World*, Vol. 10
21. *Ibid, On the Nature of Man.*
22. On the influence of the medical schools on Plato and Aristotle, Werner Jaeger; *Paideia : The Ideals of Greek Culture* vol. II, Bk IV, Chapter I on Greek Medicine as Paideia is particularly stimulating, both for the discussion as well as for its full documentation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

23. Hippocrates; *On Ancient Medicine*. pp. 3–5
24. *Ibid;* p. 7
25. The occurrences of eidos (usually as eide, in the plural) and Idea in the Hippocratic writings have been investigated by A. E. Taylor in *Varia Socratica* 178–267. Eric Voegelin also has noted this similarity of usage in his *Order and History* vol. II, p. 94. Werner Jaeger has pointed out that the medical texts are also concerned with the problem of relationships between the eide. (Warner Jaeger *Paideia : The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. 2 Also his Notes for Chapter I item 53 a).
26. Hintikka; Jakko, "Knowledge and its Object in Plato" in *Patterns in Plato's Thought* (ed) Moravcsik p. 9, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973.
27. On this point see Eric Voegelin *Order and History* vol. II and Werner Jaeger *Paideia : The Ideals of Greek Culture*, Vol. II.
28. This conflict is the basic issue involved in Plato's examination of Art in *The Republic* Bk X 595a–608b.
29. Plato; *The Gorgias* 100 b–e, (trans) Walter Hamilton, Penguin Classics, 1960.
30. *Ibid, Phaedo* 100b–e, (trans) Benjamin Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. I.
31. *Ibid, The Republic* 518d–f.
32. *Ibid, Euthyphro* 10.
33. *Ibid, The Republic* 507a–509c.
34. *Ibid, Phaedo*, pp. 97–98, *The Dialogues of Plato* (ed) Justin D. Kaplan
35. *Ibid, The Timaeus 28, The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 3, (trans) Benjamin Jowett.
36. *Ibid, The Timaeus* 47–51
37. *Ibid, The Meno*
38. *Loc cit*
39. *Ibid, Symposium* P218, *The Dialogues of Plato*, (ed) Justin D. Kaplan.
40. *Ibid, The Republic*, 514a–517c
41. *Ibid, The Seventh Letter*
42. *Ibid, Symposium* P 207, *The Dialogues of Plato*, (ed) Justin D. Kaplan,
43. *Ibid, Apology* 21c–d, *The Dialogues of Plato* Vol. I, (trans) Benjamin Jowett
44. *Ibid, The Republic* 514a–517c.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Poona–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 1
January 1988

PRIVACY AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE

Traditionally, it is considered that the admission of 'private experience' logically entails the problem of 'private language'—the problem that has become the subject of voluminous discussion ever since Wittgenstein's remarks on the topic were published in the *Philosophical Investigations*. My purpose, in this paper, is to examine whether there should be a logical connection between private experience and private language. We shall examine the question by considering four possible combinations, as found in or implied by, the views of different philosophers, between objects and language, namely : (a) public object and public language, (b) private object and private language, (c) public object and private language, and (d) private object and public language. As the first possibility presents no difficulty, it is usual to accept it as *the* theory of linguistic meaning. We shall concentrate on the last three.

I. *Private Object and Private Language*

The philosophical notion of 'privacy' arises from considering questions of knowledge from a self-centred perspective. The Cartesian and the empiricist traditions in philosophy who take this perspective suppose that our knowledge of the mental is, logically speaking, independent of our knowledge of the physical, and that the correlations, if there are any, between them are purely contingent. They find it problematic that one can have knowledge about the external world and other minds, while they take it for granted that clearly a person can have knowledge of

Received : 12–12–86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

his own sensations, feelings and other psychological states that are necessarily private to him and to which he has direct or privileged access. These are called 'private' in the sense that only the person who has them can really know for certain that he has them, and what he has are unsharable and non-transferable. That is, they are called private in two senses of 'privacy' — epistemic privacy and privacy of ownership.

Philosophers of this tradition also take it for granted that our knowledge of our private experiences can be expressed in a language, and that the possibility of this expression does not presuppose any acquaintance with the external world or other minds. They find ordinary language imprecise and vague, and hanker after an ideally precise language This leads philosophers to hold that there must be a 'private language' for each of us to express our experiences, at least to ourselves. So far as the meaning of the words is concerned, the relevant features, it is supposed, must all be private, observable only by the person who has the experiences in question. Wittgenstein characterizes the notion of such a private language thus : "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language" [1].

II. *Public Object and Private Language*

Wittgenstein, as is well-know, attacks the possibility of a private language with a view to denying the notion of a necessarily private object, one the 'owner' of which alone can possibly know about. In this argument he goes openly against the existence of the Cartesian ego. He says, "The idea of the ego inhabiting a body (has) to be abolished" and "If whatever consciousness (there is) spreads over all human bodies, then there won't be any temptation to use the word 'ego'" [2]. But

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Wittgenstein's remarks on the abolition of the ego, instead of being appreciated, have put him into a trap. They lead him to what Strawson describes as the 'no–ownership' or 'no–subject' theory of experiences[3]. Wittgenstein apparently thinks that if we accept the 'ownership' theory of experiences, i.e., the existence of an 'ego', then we have to accept in consequence the possibility of a private language. But, does Wittgenstein's 'no–ownership' theory fare any better than the 'ownership' theory of experiences, so far as the question of the possibility of a private language is concerned ?

It is true that, as Wittgenstein points out, a private language, besides its so many other difficulties, makes communication or the common use of a word altogether immpossible. In fact, if everyone learns the meaning of the word 'pain', for example, only from his own case or from his own experiences through an essentially private process, then this cannot provide for a common use of the word 'pain'[4]. The private object allegedly referred to plays no part at all in the mechanism of communication, and *if it does play any part,* Wittgenstein remarks, communication becomes altogether impossible. But, how is communication made possible in Wittgenstein's 'no–owership' theory of experiences ? How can I understand, on this theory, what one means when he says " I have pain " ?

Hacker explains Wittgenstein's position in the following way[5] : One can construct many different languages in each of which the speaker is the 'centre'. In his language instead of saying " I am in pain ", the centre would say " There is pain ". Since everyone speaks the language of which he alone is the centre, someone *A* would express his pain by saying " *A* behaves as the centre when there is pain "; and when others are in pain this is expressed by saying " They behave as Centre behaves when there is pain ". Wittgenstein argues that such a mono–

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

centred language is intelligible and univocal, and that such a language can have anyone as centre. Moreover, any two such languages are inter–translatable. The proposition in one language that there is pain is equivalent to the proposition in another language that the 'centre' of the former behaves as the 'centre' of the latter behaves when there is pain. In this way, Wittgenstein thinks, our language is composed of 'as many isomorphic, inter–translatable, mono–centred languages as there are speakers'.

But there is a great deal of implausibility with this philosophical account. As Hacker himself has pointed out, there are certain salient commitments of Wittgenstein's theory : Firstly, it is clear that despite appearances to the contrary there is no such thing as a shared public language. Each speaker possesses his own private language, although to be sure, they are conceived of as inter–translatable. Secondly, the assumption of inter–translatability requires psycho–physical parallelism. For, if the proposition in L_1 'There is pain' is to be extensionally equivalent to 'C_1 behaves as C_2 when there is pain' in L_2, there must in general be a uniform correlation between behaviour and primary experience. Thirdly, in ordinary language one never legitimately ascribes a univocal experiential predicate both to oneself and to others. All experiential predicates in normal parlance are ambiguous. Finally, when *A* says 'I am in pain' (in ordinary language) I cannot, strictly speaking, understand his meaning. Rather I must take his utterance as a sign rather than a symbol, a symptom of '*A* is in pain'"[6].

The meaning of the word 'pain', Wittgenstein thinks, logically depends on pain–behaviour rather than on any necessarily private object. Pain, so understood, is a public object. And it is quite natural to suppose that a public object can be expressed only in a public language. But by adopting the position of a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'no-ownership' theorist, Wittgenstein, as we have seen above, seems to fail in achieving the desired goal. The 'no-ownership' theory leads him to think of our public language as being composed of 'as many isomorphic, inter-translatable, mono-centred languages as there are speakers'; and this involves the commitment that each speaker expresses his pain which is, for Wittgenstein, a public object in a language that is basically a private language.

Thus even if we eliminate the 'ego' and accept Wittgenstein's 'no-ownership' theory of experiences, we cannot avoid the question of the possibility of a private language. In other words, the 'no-ownership' theory does not necessarily make inter-subjective communication possible. Wittgenstein's 'no-ownership' theory, in this respect, seems to fare no better than the 'ownership' theory of experiences. The elimination of the 'ownership' theory appears to be pointless, so far as the question of the possibility of a private languare is concerned. That is, the question of the possibility of an ego as the owner of private experiences does not seem to be essentially connected with the question of the possibility of a private language.

III. *Private Object and Public Language*

We have considered above the views of both the supporters and critics of the private language theory. Now we consider a very different theory propounded by Frege. Like a private language theorist, Frege also admits that there are private experiences, such as ideas or mental images, which are, in principle, incommunicable and inalienable. But the belief in the privacy of experiences does not lead him to hold that there should be a private language in order to express them. On the contrary, Frege holds that *the words of public language* have an aspect of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meaning which is wholly *private* and these words can well *mean* our private experiences.

Frege distinguishes two elements in the meaning of a sentence or expression – one of which is called 'sense', and the other, 'tone' ('illumination' and 'colouring')[7]. He explains the difference between the two thus : The sense of a sentence is that part of its meaning which is relevant to determining its truth or falsity; and any feature of its meaning which cannot affect its truth or falsity is its tone. Similarly, the sense of an expression is that part of its meaning which is relevant to the determination of the truth or falsity of a sentence in which it may occur; and any element of its meaning which is not so relevant is part of its tone.

The celebrated example given by Frege is the difference in meaning between the connectives 'and' and 'but'. The replacement of 'and' by 'but' will alter the meaning of a sentence, but it cannot alter the truth or falsity of what is said. The difference in meaning between 'and' and 'but', therefore, belongs to their tone, and not to their sense. Likewise, the word 'dead' and 'deceased' do not differ in sense – substitution of one for the other can change neither the meaningfulness nor the truth–value of any sentence. The same is also true of the words 'sweat' and 'perspiration'. In so far as 'dead' and 'deceased', or 'sweat' and 'perspiration', differ in meaning at all, the difference lies in their tone.

In Frege's account the diffrence between 'sense' and 'tone' is further drawn up by showing that while sense is wholly an objective element of the meaning of a sentence or expression, tone is purely a subjective element of its meaning. Tone, according to Frege, is a matter of the association with a word or expression of certain 'ideas', by which he means mental images.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It consists in a propensity which the use of a word has to call up certain mental images. The mental images, according to Frege, are incommunicable in principle. No two people can ever know that they have the same mental image. The specific character of the mental image a person connects with a word 'red', for example, is unconveyable.[8] It thus follows that tone is a feature of meaning which is, in principle, subjective. I know what I mean by 'red' or 'white' when I use the words in their tone, but no one else can. Ideas or mental images, according to Frege, are not only epistemically private, they are also privately owned. "It seems absurd to us that a pain, a mood, a wish should rove about the world without a bearer, independently. An experience is impossible without an experient. The inner world presupposes the person whose inner world it is"[9]. Hence the ownership of ideas or mental images is strictly private, unsharable and inalienable. No other person has, or can have, my idea. No other person can have my pain. "Someone can have sympathy for me but still my pain always belongs to me and his sympathy to him. He does not have my pain and I do not have his sympathy"[10]. Thus tone as an element of the meaning of a word or expression has both epistemic privacy as well as privacy of ownership.

The sense of a word, on the other hand, has nothing to do with any propensity the word may have to call up mental images in the mind of the hearer, and is something wholly objective. It is identical for all men, awaiting discovery rather than being created. The sense of a word is definite and fixed, and the relation of the sense of one word to that of another word is determined by the laws of logic.

Frege thus finds that in the meaning of every word or expression, there are two elements – one is objective and the other is

...6

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

subjective. In other words, he holds that the words of public languages also have an element of meaning which is purely subjective and incommunicable in principle. Thus Frege's theory is redically different from the private language theories, as well as from the theories of (public) language formulated by others. Private language theorists try to show that a semantical relation between a private word and a private experienee can be established – the word (name) then will *refer to* the experience. Critics of private language theory have tried to show that this is impossible. But Frege holds that the relation between a word of public language and private experience is altogether different from both *reference* and *sense* of the word. Thus a word of public language has (i) reference, (ii) sense, and (iii) tone. Reference of a word, as Dummett has argued, does not constitute its meaning according to Frege, so that only sense and tone are the two elements of meaning – objective and subjective. However, Frege's account of tone as the subjective element of meaning has been severely criticized by Dummett [11].

IV. *Conclusion*

We have seen above that there can be four possible combinations between objects and language. If so, should there be then any logical connection between private experience and private language as supposed traditionally ? It is evident from the above considerations of the possible combinations between objects and language that just as the admission of private experience does not logically imply the possibility of a private language similarly the inadmission of private experience, too, does not logically imply the impossibility of a private language. To put it differently, neither the admission, nor the inadmission, of private experience logically entails anything concerning the possibility of a private language. There is, therefore, no logical connection between

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

private experience and private language. The admission of private experience, on the contrary, seems to be logically independent of the problem of private language.

AMINUL HAQUE

Department of Philosophy,
Burdwan University,
BURDWAN 713 104 (W. B.).

NOTES

1. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1968), sect. 243.
2. L. Wittgenstein, "Wittgenstein's Notes for Lectures on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data'" ed. R. Rhees, *The Philosophical Review*, LXXVII (1968) p. 282.
3. P. F. Strawson, *Individuals* (London : Methuen & Co., 1959), pp. 95ff.
4. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, *op. cit*,, sects, 293, 347.
5. P. M. S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 195.
6. *Ibid*, p. 196.
7. M. Dummett, *Frege : Philosophy of Language* (London : Duckworth, 1973), pp. 2–3, 85ff.
8. G. Frege, *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, eds. P. Geach and M. Black (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1960), p. 79; and *Foundations of Arithmetic*, transl. and ed. J. L. Austin (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1953), p. 36.
9. G. Frege, "The Thought : A Logical Inquiry", trans. by A. M. and M. Quinton, reprint in *Philosophical Logic*, ed. P. F. Strawson (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 27.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
11. M. Dummett, *op. cit.*, pp. 85ff.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharyya's** philosophical thought; and includes his own final formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose, P. K. Srivastava (et al).**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation). **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective' Attitudes as Alternatives : A study of professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's view of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy : Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy : A Critical Study), **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattacaryya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, PUNE 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 1,
January 1988

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF IMAGINATION IN HUME AND KANT

The nature and function of 'imagination' occupy a central place in the philosophies of Hume and Kant, two great minds of all times. Kant makes a clear and very comprehensive distinction between Transcendental or Productive Imagination and Empirical or Reproductive Imagination. He puts this distinction into effective use in his philosophy, especially in his epistemology. Undeniably, he was the first philosopher to have made such a distinction between these two levels of imagination in an unequivocal manner. However, the claim that Hume comes close to drawing the same distinction in his *magnum opus, A Treatise of Human Nature,* and also in the simplified and condensed version of it, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* is not without merit or support. I propose to show that Hume could have made the same distinction if he had so wished, but deliberately refrained from it for reasons that will be made obvious in this paper. I shall endeavour to establish that he did not make a distinction between these two levels of imagination because this would have left him with no choice but to admit that the faculty of imagination is rational. And if he were to admit this, he could never come to the conclusion that he did, that the existence of mind, matter, and so on are 'illegitimate' products of imagination. H. H. Price is aware of this constraint in Hume's philosophy and indicates the need of a closer examination of Hume's writings in this regard. He states :

Received : 29-9-1986 .

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> This doctrine (of Hume) concerning two types or levels of Imaginative process deserves a fuller examination than it has commonly received from Hume's commentators.[1]

This paper does not propose to be an exhaustive examination of Hume's doctrine concerning the imaginative process in his philosophy. However, it will attempt to establish, from an analysis of Hume's writings, that Hume was well aware of the distinction between the levels of Imagination.

In order to understand and appreciate Hume's concepts of 'Transcendental Imagination' and 'Empirical Imagination', it is necessary to be familiar with the Kantian distinction between them. A brief examination of the latter therefore follows.

Kant states that the synthesis of manifold of representations is the result of the power of imagination.

> Synthesis in general..., is the mere result of the power of imagination, a *blind* but *indispensable* function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely conscious. (Italics are mine).*[2]

It becomes very clear from the passage quoted above that, for Kant, knowledge itself is not possible without the synthetic activity of the imagination. Imagination or *Einbildungskraft* has two kinds of functions, namely transcendental and empirical. The former concerns the form only, and not matter, and therefore it is an *a priori* principle. As such, it is independent of all experience, and is without any empirical content. The latter, on the other hand, concerns the appearances or phenomena that are given to us in experience. The transcendental function of the imagination is logically prior to the empirical function of the imagination because the empirical function of the imagination will not be possible without an *a priori* element or foundation,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

namely the tradscendental employment. Imagination represents the appearances in association, and such association in pure synthesis of imagination is grounded *a priori* in pure intuition. It is, therefore, inferred that without the representation of pure intuition, there would be nothing for the imagination to associate with. The synthesis of the manifold in imagination is transcendental, since the manifold is synthesized *a priori.*

The faculty of imagination is not passive, but an active one. When the action of the imagination is directed upon perception, it is called apprehension. Without apprehension, it is not possible for imagination to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image. However, apprehension by itself is incapable of connecting the representations since it depends on the reproductive faculty of imagination to form a whole series of perceptions by arranging them in successive order. But, such a sequence of perceptions will be nothing but accidental collocations, unless it follows a rule.** This subjective ground of reproduction, following specific rules, is called the association of reproduction. There is also an objective ground of all associations of appearances which is termed as affinity of all appearances.[4] Such an affinity, whether near or remote, is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in imagination which is based *a priori* on rules.

Imagination itself is a faculty of *a priori* synthesis. It is, therefore, productive. The sole function of productive imagination is to establish a necessary unity in the synthesis of what is manifold. It is this transcendental function that helps the concept of objects, which, when taken together, forms a unitary experience, by relating these concepts of understanding to sensible intuition. By being the source of images and schemata, imagination is able to mediate between two radically different faculties, one homogeneous, namely sensibility, and the other heterogeneous, namely understanding. The image being particular,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

has an affinity with the manifold of intuition; the schema, being general, has an affinity with the categories of understanding.

The function of imagination is to represent a given object in intuition, and not to combine representations intellectually by means of understanding. Imagination, therefore, belongs to the faculty of sensibility. The synthesis of imagination is spontaneous. It is, therefore, determinative and not merely determinable like sense. Being spontaneous and determinative, the synthetic activity of imagination determines sense *a priori*. When imagination is spontaneous, it is Productive Imagination. The synthesis of Productive Imagination, being independent of all experience, is not subject to any empirical law. It follows from this that this kind of imagination belongs to the realm of transcendental philosophy. The synthesis of Reproductive Imagination, however, is entirely subject to the empirical laws of association; it does not contribute to the possibility of *a priori* knowledge. This kind of imagination therefore belongs to the realm of psychology.

For Kant, Transcendental Imagination is something which makes experience possible. Our consciousness of the phenomenal world consisting of both material objects and empirical selves constitutes experience. We cannot have experience without the synthetic and supplementative activities of Transcendental Imagination. Empirical Imagination, on the other hand, is something within the Empirical Self whose workings can be known only inductively on the basic of experiance. If one accepts these Kantian definitions of Transcendental Imagination and Empirical Imagination, then one may attempt to find out whether Hume also makes such a distinction in his philosophy.

It is possible to establish that Hume does indeed make a distinction between 'Transcendental Imagination' and 'Empirical Imagination'. The primary difficulty in this regard lies in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the fact that though 'imagination' is a key term in the philosophies of both Hume and Kant, Hume does not care to give specific names to the two levels of imagination as does Kant. Kant is meticulous in keeping the two levels of imagination distinct from each other, but Hume tends to be indifferent to their separate identities. For example, Hume writes :

> When I oppose the imagination to the memory, i mean the faculty, by which we form our familiar ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding our demonstrative and probable reasonings. When I oppose it to neither, 'tis *indifferent* whether it be taken in the larger or more limited sense, or at least the context will sufficiently explain the meaning.[5] (Italics mine).

For Hume it is of greater importance to distinguish between imagination and memory on the basis of the dichotomy between impressions and ideas than to separate 'Transcendental Imagination' from 'Empirical Imagination'. This is because the former distinction is crucial to the conclusions that he prefers to reach. Moreover, though he alludes to the distinction between 'Productive Imagination' and 'Reproductive Imagination' and 'the fictions of imagination', this is in keeping with his desire to prove that the concept of matter, mind, and God are nothing but fictions of the imagination.

Hume separates memory and imagination. He says that an impression becomes an idea in two different ways. One is, when the impression appears for the first time it retains a considerable degree of its original vivacity, and lies somewhere between an impression and an idea. The other is, when the impression bereft of its original vivacity becomes a 'perfect' idea. The first concerns the faculty of memory by which our ideas are repeated,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the second concerns the faculty of imagination by which impressions are made 'perfect' ideas. This is obvious when he writes

> It is evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employ'd by the latter. (Imagination) When we remember any past event, idea of it flows in upon the mind in forcible manner, whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid and cannot without difficulty be preceiv'd by the mind steady and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another.[6]

Hume points out another fundamental difference between the faculties of memory and imagination. Imagination is capable of having an idea without a corresponding impression, but memory is incapable of having an idea without a corresponding impression,

Hume conceives two categories of principles in imagination, namely the principles which are permanent, 'irresistible' and universal, and the principles which are changeable, weak and irregular.[7] The first group of principles are obviously the principles of the 'Transcendental or Productive Imagination', and the second group of principles are neither of the 'Productive Imagination' nor of the 'Reproductive Imagination', but of the 'wild' imagination or fancy. This is evident from the following example he uses to illustrate these two groups of principles in imagination :

> One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark, reasons justly and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> naturally; through that conclusion be derived from nothing but custom... But one, who is tormented, he knows not why, with the apprehension of spectres in the dark, may, perhaps, be said to reason, and to reason naturally too; but then it must be in the same sense that a malady is said to be natural.[8]

'Transcendental Imagination' can be considered as an *a priori* faculty in the Humean Scheme of things. Several passages in Hume's writings warrant such an interpretation. Let us consider a few examples.

> Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this *total* scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour'd by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render'd unavoidable.[9]

I am persuaded that in the following passage Hume's reference to 'Transcendental Imagination' is implicit.

> Here, then, is a kind of pre–established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas: and through the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with other works of nature.[10]

When Hume talks about the pre–established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas, I am convinced that he describes 'Transcendental Imagination'. Moreover, when he says that the forces and powers which govern the course of nature are unknown to us, he has in mind the fact that it is meaningless to ask causal questions with regard to 'Transcendental Imagination' since its activities, both synthetic and supplementative, are presupposed.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Consider another instance in his writings :

> As nature taught us the use of limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.[11]

It is obvious that here instinct refers to ' Transcendental Imagination '. Note how Hume repeats the view that the powers and forces on which this ' instinct ' operates remains unknown to us.

Reference to ' Empirical Imagination ' and fictions of imagination abound in both *Treatise* and *Enquiry*. I quote the passages which contain such references in full. These are self-explanatory, and do not require any elaborate explanation.

Consider, first, the following from *Enquiry* :

> Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the *fancy* than any other; and this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related, and which they resemble.[12] (Italics mine)***

> This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason ... It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an object, present to the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose, *floating reveries of the imagination.*[13] (Italics mine).

> We allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere *fictions*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps in some measure, be accounted for. The occurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the (Reproductive) imagination : gives it superior force and vigour... (the italics and parenthesis are mine).[14]

As a great number of views do here occur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the (Reproductive) imagination, beget sentiment which we call *belief,* and give its object the preference above the contrary event, which is not supposed by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future.[15] (Parenthesis mine).

This connexion, therefore, which we *feel* in the mind, this customary transition of the (Reproductive) imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.[16] (Parenthesis mine).

Nothing but that he now *feels* these events to be connected in his (Reproductive) imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other.[17]. (Parenthesis mine).

Now consider the following from *Treatise* :

We only observe the thing itself, and always find that from the constant conjuction the objects aquire an union in the (Reproductive) imagination.[18] (Parenthesis mine).

Experience is a principle, which instructs me with several conjuctions of objects for the past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future and both of them conspiring to operate upon the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

('Reproductive') imagination, make form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same advantages.[19] (Parenthesis mine). Reason can never show us the connexion of our objects with one another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances. When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determined by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the (Reproductive) imagination.[20] (Parenthesis mine).

The general principles which associate ideas and unite them in the (Reproductive) 'Imagination', according to Hume, are resemblance, contiguity and causation. Both Hume and Kant hold parallel views on the laws to which 'Empirical Imagination' is subject. Consider what Kant says :

> In so far as...to distinguish from the *reproductive* imagination, whose synthesis is entirely subject to empirical laws, the laws namely, of association, and which therefore contribute nothing to the explanation of the possibility of *a priori* knowledge.[21]

Hume holds that 'the flights of the imagination' are the main sources of the mistakes committed by philosophers. He writes :

> This deficiency ..proceeds merely from an illusion of the imagination; and the question is, how far we ought to yield to these illusions. This question is very difficult, and reduces to a very dangerous dilemma, which ever way we answer it. For if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy; beside that these suggestions are often contrary to each other; they lead us into such errors, absurdities

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> and obscurities, that we must at least become asham'd of our credulity. Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of the imaglnation, and nothing has been the occasions of more mistakes among philosopher.[22]

Not only Hume but Kant also makes a distinction beetween the Empirical Imagination and the illusions of imagination, as is obvious from Kant's writing :

> From the fact that the existence of outer things is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of the self, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of outer things involves the existence of these things, for their representation can very well be the product merely of the imagination (as in dreams and delusion).[23]

Both Hume and Kant distinguish between not merely two, but three levels of imagination, namely 'Transcendental Imagination', 'Empirical Imagination', and fancy or 'wild' imagination. Kant stresses the synthetic function of the imagination where as Hume emphasises the supplementative function of imagination. The distinction between transcendental function and empirical function of imagination is crucial to Kant's philosophy. Hume is indifferent to such a distinction between 'Transcendental Imagination' and 'Empirical Imagination'. What is central to Hume's philosophy is the distinction between empirical function of imagination and the illusions of imagination. Moreover, he is keen to point out that beliefs in matter, mind, etc. do not have any primary recommendation to imagination. Though he is aware, perhaps not as keenly as Kant, of the distinction between the two radically differnt sorts, of imagination, he does not care to put it to any effective use, because doing that would not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

permit him to arrive at certain concepts that he greatly valued, and which were dear to him.

S. C. DANIEL
Dept. of Philosophy.
North-Eastern Hill University,
Nongthymmai, SHILLONG-793 014.
(Meghalaya)

NOTES

* Both Kant and Hume agree that imagination is a blind function of the soul. The difference is that, for Kant, imagination *per se* is blind in the sense of being empty of content, but its syuthetic and supplemetative activities are not blind as they are performed according to certain rules. For Hume. on the other hand, not only is imagination *per se* blind, so also are its synthetic and supplementative activities. Though both maintain that imagination is indispesnsable, they do so for different reasons. For Kant, experienee is not possible without imagination. Hume categorises imagination as a principle of human nature and thereforc indispensable.

** Kant distinguishes a rule from a law :
The representation of a universal condition according to which a certain manifold can be posited in uniform fashion is called a *rule*, and, when it *must* be so posited, a law.[3]

*** Hume uses the term 'fancy' to signify both 'Reproductive Imagination' and fictions of the imagination. Such imprecise terminology is not uncommon in Hume's writings. In this passage, he uses 'fancy' to refer to 'Reproductive Imagination'.

1. Price, H. H., *Hume's Theory of the External World*, (Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 58.
2. Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. (The Macmillan Press, 1980) A 78, p. 112.
3. *Ibid.*, A 114, p. 140.
4. *Ibid.*, A 113, p. 139.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. Hume, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford University Press), p. 113.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 225–226.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
10. Hume, D., *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford University Press, 1972) pp. 54–55.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 58–59.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 75–76.
18. Hume, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 93.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
21. Kant, I., *Op. cit.*, B. 152, p. 165.
22. Hume, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 267.
23. Kant, I., *Op. cit.*, B. 279, p. 247.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
LIFE MEMBERS

244) Prof. Sachindra Raul
Department of Philosophy
Vikram Deb College
Jeypore
Dist. Koraput
ORISSA 764 001

245) Prof. R. V. Pharatare
Department of Philosophy
Mudhoji College
Phaltan Dist. Satara

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 1
January 1988

THE AFRICAN PERSON : A CULTURAL DEFINITION
(An Essay In African Philosophy)

Man as the object of knowledge has remained a difficult quest practically since the dawn of philosophic reflection. " I can't as yet know myself " was a straightforward confession of Socrates on this question, following his injunction at Delphi. Philosophers ever since have seriously attempted various ways to attain self–knowledege, in fact, to face the most profound and perplexing of all questions, namely, what is man ?; what is his essence in real life ?

Various and oftentimes conflicting answers have emerged. Indeed adequate self–knowledge has been sought in terms of some metaphysical essence, an inborn faculty or instinct. Hence man has variously been defined as a rational, political, religious, sexual, economic, etc. animal. " Rationality ", however, has enjoyed universal appeal over the years, hence, man is commonly defined as a rational animal, a thinking substance.

This definition has its limitations. For man not only thinks, he sings, makes tools, creates language, art, etc. as well. He lives not merely in a physical universe but certainly, as Ernst Cassirer put it, " in a symbolic universe, language, myth, art and religion are parts of this universe. They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience ".[1]

Received : 25–7–87

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

We thus gather that culture is important not just to social scientists but to philosophers as well and is to them an important path to self–knowledge, and to the question, what is man? Culture is also the key to the understanding and definition of " the African " which is what this brief paper is all about.

> " The African " the object of inquiry in this article is the black; African, mainly South of the Sahara unless the context shows otherwise. "

That black Africa shows certain cultural unity is no longer in dispute among anthropologists. As a matter of fact, in his recent study of black Africa, Professor Jacques Maquet clearly shows how analogous existential experiences of life in an isolated and difficult environment have slowly produced a unified African world distinct from and comparable to the Western and Asian worlds. This unity according to him is not racial but cultural.[2] He gives the understanding of culture as " the totality of ways of living, working, and thinking and the totality of what results from these activities (institutions, artifacts, philosophies; etc.) as they are constituted in a given society ".[3] It is also the meaning we give to culture in this article.

The point is that the African has taken the Delphic injunction, " Know Thyself " seriously, particularly since the Second World War. He ardently wishes to become conscious of himself as a being–in–the–African world and to live with that consciousness. Consequently his culture, his being, and total environment have become very significant to him. The late Tom Mboya of Kenya (East Africa) expressed this collective aspiration of the African as " the desire to show the world that Africa has her own culture, her own social structures and her own mannerisms ".[4] In his philosophy of negritude, the African in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

diaspora, Aimé Casaire, a West Indian from Martinique, likewise stated this new significance of cultural roots and values to the African in plane terms :

> We affirmed that we were Negroes and that we were proud of it, and that we thought that Africa was not some sort of blank page in the history of humanity; in sum, we asserted that our negro heritage was worthy of respect... that its values were values that could still make an importtant contribution to the world.[5]

The point is that the African wishes to identify and be identified with his culture and, consequently, it is through culture that his personality is fully defined and, for Ernst Cassirer, the only possible mode to totally and truly understand man.

The Essential African

What is important here is to determine what makes the African who or what he is as a distinct cultural being in a distinct world. For what binds Africans together, what gives them a common soul, so to speak, arises from culture. This is what Professor Jacques Maquet calls " Africanity " which he briefly difines as, " the totality of cultural features common to the hundreds of the societies of sub–Saharan Africa "-[6] He makes up a general list of the contents of this Africanity. " It is made " he says

> of elements belonging to various dimensions of culture : economic organization, family structure, political institutions, philosophical concepts, religious and rituals, graphic and plastic arts, the arts of movement, sound and speech.[7]

To Leopold Sedar Senghor, the late leader of Senegal, West Africa, what determines the soul of the African, his cultural essence are the values of negritude. " Nigritude " he says. " is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the cultural heritage, the values, and above all, the *spirit* of Negro-African civilization". Its ontological dimensions, the affirmation of the African and his world, are strongly stated in his more complete definition of negritude. It is,

> the whole of the values of civilization, cultural, economic, social, political which characterize the black peoples, more exactly the Negro African world. It is essentially instinctive reason, which pervades all these values, because it is reason of the impressions, reason that is " seized ". It is expressed in the emotions, through an abandonment of self in an identification with the object; through the myth, I mean by images, archetypes of the collective soul, especially by the myth primordial accorded to those of the cosmos. In other terms, the sense of communion, the gift of imagination, the gift of rhythm. These are the traits of Negritude that we find like an indelible seal on all the works and activities of the black man.[8]

Thus in this definition, Senghor sees Negritude as the sum total of the cultural roots of black self, those cultural traits which intuitively make the African perceive himself as an African and as belonging to that distinct race. These traits Senghor holds are found like an indelible seal on all the works and activities of the black man and, consequently, make him who or what he is.

As part of this cultural definition, Senghor, we have seen, makes mention of " sense of communion " gift of imagination ", "rhythm", etc. Other scholars identify the African with his artistic and symbolic forms, that is to say, his works of art, sculpture, paintings, masks, wood carving etc. It is in these areas particularly that the African manifests his creative genius. Speaking about African art, for example, Paul Bohannan writes : " Africa

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

has an extensive good art. Its ineffable quality can be widely perceived and it has taken its place in the collections of many art lovers.[9]

The point is that in works of art, paintings, other signs and symbols no less than in music and dancing, the African reveals and identifies himself in his cultural personality. Likewise in cultural arts and symbols, the African reveals his essential world-view as well as his ontological conceptions, his belief in and worship of ancestors, for example. The African believes in living beings beyond the grave, the so called "living dead" and protrays this belief and communications with his ancestors in sings, symbols, through sculpture (statues) and the rituals which usually accompany his many works of art.

Mention has also to be made of another aspect of cultural characteristic of the African, namely, his religious nature and praxis. For one thing, the horizon of the world-view of the African is essentially religious. The African is "notoriously religious", Mbiti says. Other scholars regard him as "incurably religious". Religion permeates his total life; consequently there is nothing like a secular vision of world order. In this important way also, he is poles apart culturally from the western man.

Furthermore many socio-cultural practices also give distinct identity to African personality, for man establishes himself not only through language, art, signs, and symbols but action as well. The first is the idea of family-hood. Extended family-hood characterises the mode of life of the African and shapes his personality and outlook in life. The African sees his nuclear family essentially as an extension of a broader family. Professor Maquet describes this broader family tree thus :

> The African child has only to take a few steps in his village to visit several people who can substitute for his father,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mother, brothers and sisters and they will treat him accordingly. Thus the child has many homes in his village and he is simultaneously giver and receiver of widespread attention. [10]

Indeed this extended family system is one " in which everyboby is linked with all the other members, living or dead, through a complex network of spiritual relationship into a kind " mystical body " [11]. Through cultural upbringing. therefore, the African is not individualistic. There is no question of rugged individualism in outlook and life-style so characteristic of the European or the American. The African is essentially man-in-community. It is the community which makes the individual, not the other way round, a point made by Professor John Mbiti in defining the " becoming " of an individual in African culture in this aphorism, " I am because we are, and since we are therefore I am "[12].

Other than the socialist mentality which characterises the African way of life and which is rooted in the extended family-system practiced by the African, Maquet enumerates other cultural practices which altogether create a distinct African personality. These are " finding one's place among kin ", " depending on lineage ", " Being Rooted in Kinship ", " Going back to the Ancestor " (ancestor worship), " Being in Harmony with Reality ", " Making the lineage Continue " (love for children and family life), etc.[13] This is a brief portrait of the African in his cultural heritage, what gives him a distinctive personality.

African Culture and Self-Realization : Concluding Reflections

In this attempt to define " African personality " through the cultural traits of the African. we come back to the conclusion of Ernst Cassirer that man is indeed " a symbolic animal ", not just

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a rational animal. He is a culture–builder. Emphasis is to be made that the African since independence has regarded self–realisation through building up a viable, dynamic culture as a serious project. " We have for too long been the victims of foreign domination ", Kwame Nkrumah once echoed. " For too long we have had no say in the management of our own affairs or in deciding our own destinies ".[14]

The African wishes now to build a new image, personality altogether different from the " colonial one ". He wants to establish himself as the master of his world and architect of his destiny, which amounts to a re-establishment of self in a self–determined, self–directed, self–controlled continent. He realises he can only accomplish this goal through his culture, hence, the impatient assertion of President Sekou Toure of Guinea is easily understandable :

> We insist for our part on the cultural rehabilitation of Africa and it is with this in mind, that for us, financial backing, however a burden it may be, remains a means at the service of an eternal cause, that of the affirmation of Africa's dignity, [15]

" We are doing everything to revive our culture ", Nkrumah assured the National Assembly in Accra in 1965. The point is that culture–building is not just a mere theoretical affirmation on the part of the African. It has remained with him since independence a top practical pursuit. The various festivals of arts and culture held in many African countries bear this out as well as the pursuit of in many African countries bear this out as well as the pursuit of indigenous technology, indigenous political systems as *Ujamaa* Experiment in Tanzania, initiated by that nation's former leader, Julius K. Nyerere [16], the promotion of indigenous music, paintings, religion, fashion, education for self–

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reliance, etc. All these efforts of cultural revival and survival prove the point Aimé Cesaire made earlier on, namely, that "Africa [is] not some sort of blank page in the history of "humanity" and [can] "still make an important contribution to the world". But, above all, they point to the fact that the African has his own distinct, hence, identifiable cultural personality.

Department of Philosophy
University of Nigeria
Nsukka
WEST AFRICA

CHUKWUDUM BARNABAS OKOLO

NOTES

1. Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay On Man* (New York : Bantam Books, 1970), p. 27.
2. Jacques Maquet *Africanity* : *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa* tr. Joan K. Rayfield, New York : Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 4.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.
4. Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After* (London : Andre Deutsch, 1963), p. 227.
5. Aime Casaire, *Discourse On Colonialism* tr. Joan Pinkham, (New York : Monthly Review Press, 1972). p. 76.
6. Jacques Macquet, *Op. Cit.*, p. 54.
7. *Ibid.*
8. L. S. Senghor, "Discuours pronounde a I' universitate d' Oxford" 26 October, 1961 quoted by Prof. E. A. Ruch and Dr. K. C. Anyanwu, *African Philosophy* ... (Rome : Catholic Book Agency, 1981), p. 206.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

11. Prof. E. A. Ruch and Dr. K. C. Anyanwu, *African Philosophy : An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa* (Roma : Catholic Book Agency, 1981), p. 328.
12. John Mbiti, *African Religion and Philosophy* (Heinemann, 1969), p. 108.
13. Jacques Maquet, " The contents of Africanity ", *Op. Cit.*, pp. 54–101.
14. Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, quoted by Gideon Cyrus M. Mutiso and S. W. Rohio (eds.) *Readings in African Political Thought* (London : Heinemann, 1975), p. 61.
15. Sekou Toure, " Negritude Versus Pan-Africanism ", *New Horizon* (March–April, 1976), p. 13.
16. See Julius K. Nyerere *Ujamaa : Essays On Socialism* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1968).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BOOKS RECEIVED

1) Nandy Ashis : *Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias : Essays in the Politics of Awareness:* Delhi; Oxford University Press, 1987, Price Rs. 120/-

2) Sundara Rajan, R. ; *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reason,* Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1987; Price Rs. 85/-

3) Soyam Lokendrajit Singh ; *The Problem of Freedom and Necessity in Human Action,* Mittal Publications, Delhi, 110 035, 1987, Rs. 120/-

4) Lakshmithathachar M. A. (Ed.) ; *Viśiṣṭādvaita Kośa* Vol 1 The Academy of Sankrit Research. Melkote-571 431; 1983.

5) Lakshmithathachar M. A. (Ed.) ; *Śrībhāṣyam* (Work of Bhagawān Rāmānuja) Critical Edition Vol. 1 The Academy of Sanskrit Research, Melkote–571 431; 1986.

6) Edited by Research Scholars of the Academy ; *Kenopaniṣad,* Critical Edition, The Academy of Sanskrit Research, Melkote–571 431; 1986.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 1
January 1988

BOOK – REVIEW

Nandy, Ashis; *Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awarness*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987, pp. 168; Price Rs. 120/–

From the prolific pen of Ashis Nandy comes yet another study in the field of political culture labelled *Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias*. The presentation not merely takes to the conclusion, the arguments preferred in his earlier book *The Intimate Enemy* but also raises the fundamental issues of the civilizational/cultural pre-conditions essential for the basic question of survival coming under the onslaught of differing idealogies of capitalism, socialism and technocratism. Yet, the seminal contribution of Ashis is not free from a small sin which is discernible even to the naked eye mostly accustomed to the larger macro–vision that the work offers. But more of that in the end.

It is essential to point out the content and the context of the present work which is an excellent bunching process of ideas that Ashis presented in various forums, seminars and conferences. "Evaluating Utopias" and "Towards a Third World Uptopias" are of 1978–81 vintage, while "The Tradition of Technology" originating as a brief note in 1977 at Kathmandu saw its final version in 1984. "Reconstructing Childhood" developed out of a conference–paper in Japan in 1981, with a brief journalistic version in *The Times of India* in 1982, and the present version was originally published for *Alternatives* in 1984. "Science, Authoritarianism and Culture" is the outcome of M. N. Roy

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Memorial Lecture at the Gandhi Peace Foundation in 1980, which was published in *Seminar* in 1981, and "From Outside the Imperium" was presented in a conference in Lisbon in 1980, with a "crude early version" in *Alternatives* in 1981, and its framework was discussed in a meeting organised by the Lokayan Group at Delhi in 1982 with extracts published elsewhere from 1983 onwards. Historically each piece has been presented and published in one form or the other on more than one occasion, and it is evident that Ashis had no idea of converting the six divergent efforts into the present format of a book – a realization which may have dawned on him much later in the process of what he calles "a self–exploration while working in two overtly unrelated areas : political psychology and culture of science".

Ashis' sophistication on polarizing the psychology of politics from politics of psychology, as well as a culture of science from culture in Science can be well used to understand the nuances of power at all levels of application – be it nation state or an individual pursuing well defined goals and objectives. In the first set of polarization, Ashis pleads passionately for a viable concept of freedom which must take into consideration the civilizational and cultural preconditions of those who even in their defeat and incognimity dared to reject the physical and technocratic overbearance of the victors "to protect and nurture, however clumsily, alternative concepts of compassion, freedom, justice and dissent". Roger Garaudy, in his forward, hence, notes candidly that "the central and the vital debate of our times is the one outlined by Nandy : that between "alternative perspective" and "modern oppression". Stretching it a little further it is not impossible to determine why Ashis dedicated this book to "those who dare defy the given models of defiance".

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Equally evident is the flow of arguments emanating from the second set of polarization : culture of science from culture in science. Ashis observes that no technology is neutral and the dictum that " all that is techincally possible is necessary and desirable " cannot be permitted to be super-imposed over the civilizational and cultural preconditons. Ashis' re-reading of Gandhi is not merely an academic routine but to show that for the Mahatma, to change India it was neither essential to strive to copy the West nor dogmatically effect a return to an ancient tradition. Ashis shows clearly that the choice is not between a traditional technique and a modern technique : it is between different traditions of technology. Towards this end, he observes, the attempts by Eastern Scientists and their works to enumerate an alternative philosophy of technology are directed. Hence, for him J. C. Bose, Rabindranath Tagore, Kakuzo Okakura and Aurobindo became " mythopoetic figures in a section of the West ". Nevertheless, Ghandhi's fundamental theoretical contribution " not to refuse social change, but not to confound social change with Westernization ", remains of seminal importance in Ashis' new reading of the Mahatma. Equally inportant is his observation on Gandhi by Winston Churchill and George Bernard Shaw where both identified the attempt by Gandhi to attack the basic elements of the culture which held together the modern West. Thus, the section " From outside the Imperium " represents a critical appreciation of the Mahatma, his time and his political culture.

To sum up, one must confess the wide spectrum in which Ashis has played about. At the outset it may give a disjointed appearence if one goes by the label of each essey. However, what comes out unerringly is the necessity of a new world cultural order devoid of the vested interests pursued by the proponents who consider the necessity of maintaining a Western

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

hegemony. To a desernible reader such a proposition may be much too close to achieving an ultimate utopia for the humankind. Despite Ashis' elaborate attempt to disect and evaluate utopias, the cardinal question still remains unanswared : Is it essential to achieve utopia and if not, then to what level will it be practical ? The other question is, how can we incorporate utopias in the modern day political culture ? Perhaps, this will lead to opening a pandora's box in social enquiry. The sin that Ashis has committed, as I mentioned in the beginning, is that he has technically tried to take hostage all those who "dared" to participate in the meetings at which the papers were presented and other friends who may have "commented" making them responsible for the faults which still persist in the present writing. Is he trying to reverse the Vālmikī episode to bring about a new culture in writing ? Perhaps, he has written the sentence in the same lighter vein as I am doing so now. Ashis remains, as always, provocative, daring and an intellectual who never minces his words.

GAUTAM SEN

Dept. of Defence &
Strategic Studies
University of Poona
POONA 411 007

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 2
April 1988

101410
गुरुकुल कांगड़ी विश्वविद्यालय
हरिद्वार

THE CONCEPT OF ARTHAPATTI

The concept of *arthāpatti* has been employed as a criterion of knowledge or *pramāṇa* in both Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā [1] and the Uttara-Mīmāṁsā (e. g., the Advaita Vedānta [2]) traditions of Hindu logic and methodology. In the history, two major views have been projected : *One, arthāpatti* is a *pramāṇa*, either primitively [3] or derivatively. [4] The Mīmāṁsakas held the former position, while the Naiyāyikas maintained the latter. *Two, arthāpatti* is a logical concept such that one can exhibit its formal structure and apply all the relevant criteria of logical evaluation to it. Th. Stcherbatsky, [5] D. M. Datta, [6] and S. S. Barlingay [7] are some of the noted philosophers who have maintained this view. I have shown in this paper that both these views lack solid foundation, and misconstrue the concept. On my account, *arthāpatti* is neither an epistemological nor a logical concept but it consists of interpretation and/or explanation largely of the Vedas which have been regarded by the Mīmāṁsakas as setting limits to human rationality with respect to the knowledge of *dharma* and *mokṣa.* The procedure I have adopted is as follows : I begin with analysis of seven typical examples of *arthāpatti,* make certain observations by way of the results of my analysis and then conclude my paper with a discussion on the major views about *arthāpatti* mentioned above.

I proceed by reflecting upon a few examples of *arthāpatti.* This will enable me to clarify its meaning and to outline its structure. Consider Example A.

Received : 16-1-1986

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Example A[8] :

a) Caitra is not in the house.

(a) is a true statement. Given a context, however, it may lead one to query 'where is he then? Is he dead or alive?' The query is answered by asserting

b) He is alive : but

c) he has gone out.

Any other questions after (b) and (c) are asserted need not be asked. Asking them may be meddling with the personal or private affairs of Caitra's life. Traditionally, (b) and (c) are said to constitute *arthāpatti*.[9] for they, taken together, set at rest the query generated by the isolated assertion of (a). (a) is given; but (b) and (c) are constructed by considering the context in which (a) is shown to be a true statement. It can be argued validly that linguistically, the expression "being not in" is synonymous with the expression "being out" such that (c) in fact does not say anything different from what is said by (a). The statement (c) is a patently stylistic variant of (a); for "being not in" has the same meaning as 'being out". If this is so, then *arthāpatti* cannot be said to constitute knowledge or a criterion of knowledge, that is, a *pramāṇa* in both of its senses, namely *arthasya āpatti, kalpanā*[10] and *arthasya āpatti, kalpanā, yasmāt*.[11] This argument is sufficient to show that both *Pūrva* and *Uttara Mīmāṁsakas* who have their foundations in the Vedas and who accept *arthāpatti* as a *pramāṇa*, in either of the two senses of "*pramāṇa*," do not have a sound justification for their claim that *arthāpatti* is a *pramāṇa*.[12]

Perhaps, I am mistaken A different construal of the relation between (a), (b) and (c) is possible. It is possible to say that the two statements (b) and (c) constitute the backdrop or the context against which (a) is interpreted as true; for being alive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which is asserted by (b) is a necessary presupposition of the truth of (a) and of (c). This construal makes (b) and (c) an interpretation of (a) and thus *arthāpatti* a kind of interpretation relative to a given context. I would therefore substitute the word "interpretation" and/or "explanation" for *arthāpatti* whenever there is a need to do this; for, after all what *arthāpatti* does is to explain[13] the apparent, though trivial unclarity of (a) which is a true statement. However, the use of the word "interpretation" in an attempt to analyse the concept of *arthāpatti* is illuminating when we keep in mind that a large part of the life of both the *Pūrva* and *Uttara Mīmāṁsakas* was spent in interpreting, or arguing for the consistency and/or meaningfulness of the *Veda-vākyas*, and often in showing that a given linguistic expression was syntactically complete and meaningful in the context in which it occurred.

Consider Example B.

Example B[14] :

a) Devadatta is growing fat.

b) He does not eat food during the day.

The conjuction of (a) and (b), both of which are true statements, is apparantly inconsistant; its inconsistency is removed by (c)

c) He must be eating food during the night, other things being equal.

which explains that (a) and (b) taken together are not inconsistent after all. Here the expression "not eating during the day" is not synonymous with the expression "eating during the night." This feature of Example B differentiates it from Example A. The statement (c), however, is part of the context in which the conjunction of (a) and (b) is explained. What we have done is we have made explicit the context in (c) and thus removed the apparent inconsistency of (a) and (b). The statement (c) is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

said to constitute *arthāpatti*,- in my sense, an explanation or that which explains. [15] Example B exhibits another interesting feature of *arthāpatti*, namely, that in it, the context in which a certain statement is asserted to be true has an important bearing on the question of the truth-value and/or acceptability of the statement; for it is only when (c), which is a part of the presupposed context, is made explicit that the conjuction of (a) and (b) is explained and becomes acceptable. In this example as in Example B, *arthāpatti* is no more than an interpretation and/or explanation of (a) and (b) against the backdrop of the context in which they are asserted to be true.

Consider another example [16]

Example C :

(a) This is silver.

(b) This is not silver.

The conjunction of (a) and (b) turns out to be patently inconsistent unless there is an interpretation of (a) or of (b) or of (a) and (b) together to explain this obvious inconsistency. The statements (a) and (b) are inconsistent; for the predicate " being silver " cannot be both affirmed and denied of one and the same subject simultaneously. Both (a) and (b) cannot be true together, nor can they be false together; one of them either (a) or (b) must be true and the other false. The Mīmāṁsaka sees clearly the point of an inconsistent statement, namely, that it frustrates the standard purpose of speech which is to communicate knowledge [17] ; and this state of affairs is not acceptable to him. He, therefore, interprets the " is " of (a) as " appears " and constructs (c)

(c) This appears silver.

Now substitute (c) wherever (a) occurs and the resultant conjunction (c) and (b) is consistent; for " This appears silver"

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which is (c) is perfectly consistent with "This is not silver." which is (b). Notice that the expression "is silver" is not synonymous with the expression "appears silver"; they perform two different linguistic and logical functions Linguistically, they communicate different information; logically, "This is silver" can be said to be true or false depending upon how the states of affairs are; whereas "This appears silver" can only be true and never false.[18] Notice also that the distinction between "is" and "appears" is not part of the quotidian context of our ordinary language. The distinction between "appearance" and "reality", "is" and "appears" is part of the Mīmāṁsakas', e.g. some of the Advaita Vedāntins', conceptual framework which they operate to show that *jagat* is *mithyā*; *brahman* alone is *sat* and *jīva* is not different from *brahman*.[19] Example B differs from Example C in respect of its context. In Example B it is the quotidian context of our ordinary language that is presupposed and made explicit: the statement (c) which makes the context explicit and thus removes the apparent inconsistency between (a) and (b) by explainig it constitutes *arthāpatti*. In Example C it is the theoretical context which is brought in to interpret (a) as (c): here the resultant pair which is constituted of (c) and (b) is *arthāpatti*. In all the three examples however, what we are doing in the name of *arthāpatti* is interpreting, and/or explaining a given set of statements by placing them in their relevant context; in no wise are we making inferences and/or deducing implications from a given set of true or false statements. If I am right in this thinking, then, I am afraid, several well-known theories of *arthāpatti* developed and accepted during the past several centuries stand rejected as mistaken construals of *arthāpatti*. Worst of all, the Mīmāṁsakas' own thesis that *arthāpatti* is a *pramāṇa* turns out to be substantively vacuous. I will show this as we go along. Let me, in the meanwhile, consider a couple of more exemples of *arthāpatti*.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Consider Example D.[30]

Example D :

(a) He who knows the self crosses sorrow.

Standing alone the sentence (a) sounds more like a poetic statement; taken literally, it is puzzling; and hence not acceptable as such. It is not the case that we do not understand the language of (a) : but it needs explaining i.e. *arthāpatti* as to how an individual by knowing the self is free from sorrow. The Vedānta Mīmāṁsaka interprets (a) utilising his theory about the reality and/or appearance of human bondage *(bandha)*. It is a basic constitutive principle of his theory that

(b) All human bondage is *mithya*.[31]

The principle (b) provides the theoretical context in which (a) is to be interpreted and understood. Now the statements (a) and (b) when taken together are no longer puzzling to the Vedānta Mīmāṁsakas (I agree with my friends that this whole business of the *Mithyātva* of human bondage sounds puzzling to us; but to the Vedānta Mīmāṁsaka it isn't. He believes firmly that all the Vedic statements are true no matter what. Where he finds them–one or many taken in conjunction with other statements–inconsistant in any sense whatever, he seeks to understand them by *arthāpatti* i.e., interpreting and / or reconstructing them in order to explain their sense and / or to show their truth.) In Example D, the principle (b) interprets and explains (a), and thus it consitutes *arthāpatti*. Given that (b) is acceptable the sentence (a) would then read as (c)

(c) He who knows the self knows that so row is not real and thus he is not affected by it

The preceding two examples bring to light an important feature of *arthāpatti*, namely that in the course of interpreting a given set of sentences and / or statements as in Examples C and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

D, the proposed interpretation and/or explanation may turn out to be quite a different thing from what is said in the statement. This feature becomes the most eloquent in the case of (a) in Example C : The locution "This is silver" is quite different from the *arthāpatti* – resultant locution, namely "This appears silver". Similarly, when the statement (a) in Example D is transformed into (c) as a consequence of interpretation – I mean *arthāpatti* – it ceases to have any identifiable characteristics of itself. This feature of *arthāpatti*, perhaps, accounts for the fact that given different theoretical frameworks, one and the same Vedic statement becomes vulnerable to different interpretations which are frequently found at variance with one another. For instance, observe the phenomenon of mushroom growth of philosophical theories all claiming allegiance to the venerable Vedas but among themselves at variance with one another.[22]

The following three examples come from the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā tradition in Hindu methodology.

Consider Evample E.

Example E [23]

(a) He who desires heaven is to perform sacrifice called *jyotiṣṭoma.*

The sentence (a) is well-syntaxed; its meaning also is quite clear; but the trouble with this Vedic prescription *(vidhi–vākya)* is this : It says that if I performed the sacrifice I shall go to heaven. I perform the sacrifice, but I do not go to heaven. This means that I do something but I do not get its results immediately. So, either (a) is not true or it needs interpretation and/or explanation. That a *vidhi–vākya* is not true is not acceptable to the Mīmāṁsaka; so he adopts the second alternative. Performing the sacrifice produces immediately the causal condition called *apūrva*, which in time becomes effective to take me to heaven after my death. In other words, performing the sacrifice

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is the same as booking my passage to heaven after my death. In this example *arthāpatti* consists in the interpretation of (a) in terms of *apūrva:* it involves no inference, no deduction, and no implicacation of any kind whatever.

Consider Example F.[24]

Example F :

(a) He is to perform the sacrifice called *viśvajit.*

The sentence (a) does not specify 'who is to perform the sacrifice ?' but it is interpreted by taking into account the Vedic context in which it occurs. On this basis, the expression "He" in (a) is restricted in its application to one who desires heaven. In this case, *arthāpatti* consists in clarifying i. e , explaining the use of "He" as standing for "One who desires heaven" : and the resultant sentence is (b)

(b) He who desires heaven should perform the sacrifice called *viśvajit.*

There appears to be no logical or even epistemological connection between (a) and (b). What the Mīmāṁsaka does is to reformulate (a) as (b) on the basis of the context in which (a) occurs such that any ambiguity and/or unclarity of (a) is removed in its formulation as (b).

Consider Example G.[24]

Example G :

In this example, the syntax is clarified by placing it in the context in which it may occur :

(a) The door, the door

Looking at the context in which (a) occurs, its syntax is clarified and completed by reformulating it as :

(b) Close the door.

The syntax of (a) thus becomes clear in (b). One could have given (a) a different interpretation as in (c) :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(c) Open the door

and *arthāpatti* consists in doing what we did in (b) or in (c), though in both cases the context of the occurrence is taken into account to justify a given interpretation of (a).

The above analysis of *arthāpatti* in Examples A to G leads me to the following observations :

1) *Arthāpatti* is employed where there is some apparent inconsistency, logical or factual, unclarity or incompleteness in a given set of linguistic expressions.

2) The aim is to remove the inconsistency or unclarity and to show that the given expression has a good syntax, is meaningful, true, and acceptable.

3) We achieve this aim by *arthāpatti*, i.e., by interpreting and/or understanding the given expression relative to its context.

4) *Arthāpatti* presupposes that the language we are concerned with is the natural, context–dependent, ordinary language which often carries into it apparent inconsistencies, and lingustic unclarities which require explanation and/or interpretation. It is immaterial to my thesis whether the language in question is the language of the human mortals as *laukika* Sanskrit is, or it is the language of the gods as the Vedic Sanskrit is claimed to be.[25]

5) In a given case of *arthāpatti*, it is possible that the expression being interpreted may turn out be at variance with the expression claimed to be interpreting it. This variance may be in point of syntax, meaning, truth–value or it may just be a question of acceptability of a given interpretation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

6) As our analysis of the given examples shows, it is difficult, if not impossible, to envisage the existence of formal, logical relations in the case of *arthāpatti*. This feature suggests that seeking out inference structures, and implicational or entailment patterns in the case of *arthāpatti* is a wild goose chase.

7) *Arthāpatti* being interpretation and/or explanation only may not be said to be a criterion of knowledge, i.e., a *pramāṇa* in the sense in which *pratyakṣa* is. It does not matter whether that knowledge is commonsense, scientific, or it concerns *dharma* and/or *niḥśreyas*.[26]

8) The preceding analysis of *arthāpatti* examples and my observations are applicable in general to all the varieties of *arthāpatti* available in the literature cited in this paper.

A lot has been written on *arthāpatti* as a *pramāṇa*. It is not possible for me to discuss each and every position held in the history of Indian logic and methodology. I choose for consider only three here : (1) The Nyāya–Mīmāṁsaka controversy whether *arthāpatti* is an independent *pramāṇa* or not.[27] (2) The type of analyses of *arthāpatti* as are available in the works like *The Six Ways of Knowing* of D. M. Datta.[8] (3) S. S. Barlingay's thesis that *arthāpatti* is "semantic implication,"[29]

(1) The Nyāya–Mīmāṁsaka controversy about *arthāpatti* runs as follows : The Naiyāyikas in general regard *arthāpatti* as a form[30] of *anumāna*, in particular, *kevala-vyatireki anumāna*[31], the aim of which is to differentiate one substance *(dravya)* from another by pointing out its unique characteristic. For example, earth is different from other substances in virtue of its distinctive feature, viz., odour.[32] For this reason, the Naiyāyikas do not accept *arthāpatti* as an independent criterion of knowledge.[33] The Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, hold in general the thesis

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that *arthāpatti* is an independent *pramāṇa*[34] and that it is not a form of *anumāna*.[35] Their plea is that *kevala-vyatireki* really is not *anumāna* at all, so it couldn't be a form of *anumāna*;[36] that the Naiyāyikas are mistaken in treating it as *anumāna*;[37] and that *arthāpatti* as an indpendent *pramāṇa* takes good care of all that the Naiyāyikas wish to achieve by *kevala–vyatirek*.[38]

The argument in the controversy is very involved; but it centers around the possibility of *vyāpti* i.e., a law-like generalisation : the Naiyāyikas claiming that in any given case a relevant *vyāpti* is possible,[39] while the Mīmāṁsakas denying this in the case of *arthāpatti*[40] and at the same time rejecting the thesis that *kevala–vyatireki* could possibly be called a form of *vyāpti*.[41] The trouble with this controversy is that in both the Nyāya and the Mīmāṁsaka traditions the two terms "*vyāpti*" and "*anumāna*" are being used in so many different senses that one feels lost in the jungle of words and their shifting meanings. In the Nyāya literature in general "*vyāpti*" is used sometimes as an empirical generalisation as in the case of *anvaya–vytireki:*[42] sometimes as an oxiomatic truth as in the case of *kevalānvayī*;[43] and sometimes as a statement of definition as in the case o, *kevala–vyatireki*.[44] Both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas however, employ *vyāpti* often in the sense of an analytic truth derived mainly from the linguistic resources.[45] Similarly there is the worst conceptual confusion in the use of the word "*anumāna*". In the literature on logic and methodology which is available in Sanskrit the world "*anumāna*" is employed sometimes as inference of different varieties,[46] sometimes as explanation,[47] and sometimes as prediction.[48] Two remarks, however, are in order. *One*, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas have radical differences in philosophical enterprise and in the resultant philosophical theories. Both employ the same words like "*anumāna*", "*vyāpti*" and "*pratyakṣa*"[49] but when they define and illustrate them they give them radically different content.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Both however maintain that *vyāpti* i.e., a law-like generalization or an analytic truth is a necessary condition of inference. *Two*, irrespective of the fact whether they regard *arthāpatti* as a form of *anumāna* or an independent criterion of knowledge i.e., a *pramāṇa*, both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas grant the presupposition that *arthāpatti* does give us knowledge, either independently or derivatively.

As regards the *first* remark, the Naiyāyikas have tried [50] their best to formulate *vyāptis* in case of the examples cited above but with no satisfactory results. In Examples A and B, for instance, they would formulate *vyāptis* as follows:

(A) He who being alive is not in his house must be out at some other place, e.g. myself. [51]

(B) He who being fat, does not eat during the day must be eating food during the night, e.g., Yajnadatta. [52]

Supposing that (a) and (b) *vyāptis* are acceptable, [53] how about other examples? Are *vyāptis* possible in their case? The answer is 'No'; for the simple reason that they are not the type of examples which admit of a *vyāpti;* or to which the concept of *vyāpti* is relevant. This is shown fairly enough in my analysis of examples above. Further, in case of *anumāna* – at least that type of *anumāna* which is neither explanation nor prediction, but which moves from a given set of inferendum to an inference – the inferendum is known to be true; or else the question of inference does not arise. In *arthāpatti* this necessary condition of inference fails to be satisfied; for by definition, *arthāpatti* is employed only where the subject involves some apparent inconsistency or it gives rise to the questions of its syntax, meaningfulness, truth-value, or acceptability. It follows that *arthāpatti* cannot be said to be a form of inference i.e. *anumāna.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As regards the second remark, I maintain that *arthāpatti* cannot be said to be a criterion of knowledge in the same sense in which *pratyakṣa* is. In the examples analyzed above *arthāpatti* is used to complete the syntax and to interpret and explain a given set of linguistic expressions so that their meaningfulness, truth, and acceptability are made plain within a specified contextual framework. In it, the explanandum – the expression to be interpreted and/or explained is already assumed to be true : the explanation only clarifies it. In this sense *arthāpatti* does not constitute a *pramāṇa* or a criterion of knowledge as the Mīmāṁsakas think it is.

The Mīmāṁsakas sometimes differentiate *arthāpatti* from *anumāna* on the ground that in each one of them a different *vyavasāya* or procedure is involved.[54] In the case of *anūmāna*, it is '*anuminomi*' i.e., 'I infer'; but in the case of *arthāpatti*, it is '*anena idam kalpayāmi*' i.e., 'because of this I interpret it thus'; for, it is not otherwise intelligible in the absense of interpretation, construction or explanation ('*idam anena vinānupapannam*').[55] I agree that these are two distinct procedures of going about one's business in one and the same or different epistemological situations; but from this it does not follow that if one is *pramāṇa*, the other too must be. In a given epistemic situation, the two procedures may be carried out at different levels of analysis. For instance, we may accept, on the support of the Vedic authority, the principle namely : If a given statement *S* is a *Veda-vākya* then *S* is true, i.e., a *pramāṇa*. Having accepted the truth of *S*, we may have questions about the understanding, interpretation, or explanation of *S*. This second inquiry is at a different level ; and it will follow different criteria. These criteria will be applicable only on condition that *S* is true; they won't function as criteria of knowledge or of truth or of acceptability of *S*, other things being equal. To my mind, *arthāpatti*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

operates at the second level of inquiry and not at the first level. It follows that both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas are mistaken in assuming that *arthāpatti* in this or that form constitutes knowledge in the same way as *pratyakṣa* does.

(2) Dhīrendra Mohan Datta suggests two interesting analogues of *arthāpatti, one* in terms of the concept of hypothesis,[56] and the *other* in terms of Kant's model of 'transcendental proof'.[57] I had entertained the idea of both of these analogues when I embarked upon writing this paper; but on subsequent consideration I gave them up; for the logical features of these two analogues are not shared by *arthāpatti.* Consider an hypothesis H which is entertained to explain some specific phenomenon. I shall call H an explanatory hypothesis. Suppose also that H is confirmed and acceptable. To understand the logic of explanation[58] let us divide an *explanation* into its two major components : the *explanandum* and the *explanans.* By the former, we mean " the sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained (not that phenomemon itself)[59] "; by the latter, " the class of those sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon." Again, the explanans is constituted of sentences C_1, C_2, ... C_k which describe the initial conditions; and also those sentences which are either laws or law–like generalization or explanatory hypotheses H_1, H_2, ..., H_r.[60] The form of this type of explanation may be shown as follows :[61]

Explanans	a) Statement of initial conditions b) Statement of relevant law–like generalizations or explanatory hypotheses.
Explanandum	c) Statement describing the phenomenon to be explained.

For the explanation to be sound or adequate both logically and empirically, we require (1) that (a) and (b) which constitute explanans must be empirically true and also (ii) that the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

explanandum must logically follow from the explanans. In the case of *arthāpatti* neither of the two conditions (i) and (ii) is satisfied. Besides, structure of explanation requires that the explanans are true and known to be true and also there is no doubt or methodological difficulty about them. In the case of *arthāpatti,* however, the essential structure of explanation is wanting. Also, the motivation for *arthāpatti* i.e., interpretation presupposes a certain felt difficulty, like inconsistency for example, in what is given.[62] Furthermore, there are questions about the legitimacy of *vyāptis* like (A) and (B) stated above.[63] For these reasons, I dismiss the suggestion that the idea of *arthāpatti* could be identified or even shown to be similar to the idea of an explanatory hypothesis.

Datta's second suggestion that " Kant's 'trantcendental proof' can be regarded as an instance of *arthāpatti* "[64] is a bold claim based upon little understanding of both the concepts of 'transcendental proof' and of *arthāpatti.* I have already discussed fairly enough about the logical and methodological behaviour of the concept of *arthāpatti.* As regards the 'transcendental proof' I would rather use the expression " transcendental argument ". This choice will keep the discussion away from the issue whether or not there is 'proof' in philosophy. In Kant, "transcendental" means 'concerning the necessary conditions of the possibility of knowledge.'[65] An argument from the necessary conditions of the possibility of knowledge is thus called 'transcendental argument'. An example not actually Kant's of an argument in the transcendental style is as follows :

Thesis : There are physical things. *(T)*

Reasoning : If there were no physical things,

natural science won't have been possible. *(R)*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(The cotext *C* in which R moves, or which *R* presupposes is that natural science is possible; for we do in fact have natural science.)

In this argument, *R* supports *T* as any presupposed necessary condition does; given *T* we argue for it in *R*. *R* is not a truth-functional 'if–then–' conditional such that if the if–clause is true and the then–clause false, the conditional would be false. In fact, *R* is a contrafactual conditional of the form 'If *X* were the case, then *Y* would have been the case,'[66] a conditional in the subjunctive mood in which what is said in the if–clause is contrary to facts. Further, *R* does not imply *T;* for the reason that being a contrafactual conditional *R* couldn't be said to be a statement which is true or false. A statement S_1 is said to imply another statement S_2 if and only if it is impossible for S_1 to be true and S_2 false; or S_1 implies S_2 if and only if the conditional formed of S_1 and S_2 is valid, that is, logically necessary. However, reasoning in this transcendental argument is fully acceptaple; the thesis is well argued for; and the support impeccable. Now if we look at *arthāpatti* in the light of the transcendental type of arguments, none of the conditions of the latter obtain in the case of *arthāpatti*. The formal structure of a transcendental argument is quite at variance with the *arthāpatti* structure. In a transcendental argument we move logically from one given statement, *T* for example, to a statement of the necessary conditions of the possibility of *T*. This type of reasoning enables us to understand and analyze the underlying structure of thought. But not so with *arthāpatti*. In *arthāpatti* we do indeed take into account the relevant context; but our main job is interpretative and explanatory in the same sense in which we seek to understand the linguistic behaviour of a given expression by placing it in the context in which it occurs. The core of a transcendental type of argument, namely,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reasoning for the truth and/or acceptability of *T* from the necessary conditions of the possibility of *T* is altogether missing in *arthāpatti*. If I am right in this thinking, it follows then that Datta's claim that "transcendental proof' can be regarded as an instance of *arthāpatti*"[67] is simply senseless.

(3) In his classical work *A Modern Introduction to India Logic*,[68] Barlingay proposes an analysis of *arthāpatti* which is at once both original and interesting. He writes : "Despite the Nyāya argument, it can be asserted that *arthāpatti* is a case where two basic truthfunctions, implication and disjuction, are combined for drawing an inference".[69] He agrees that "*arthāpatti*" is not entirely formal. The implication that the *arthāpatti* gives is based on the meaning".[70] For this reason, he proposes that "*arthāpatti*" should be regarded as semantic implication".[71] He adds : "However, I think that in a sense *arthāpatti* too can be reduced to a formal structure" as follows :[72]

$$(p.\ (p \supset (q \vee r).\sim q) \supset r$$

where '*p*' abbreviates "Devadatta is fat"; '*q*', "He must be eating by day time", and '*r*' "He is eating by night time'. Barlingay quite plainly construes *arthāpatti* as inference of the deductive type in which if the premisses are true and the argument valid, the conclusion must be true. I have shown above that *arhtāpatti* is not an inference at all; it follows that it cannot be deductive or any other type of inference. Again, Barlingay regards *arthāpatti* as "semantic implication" – I hope, in the same style as "John is a father of Jane" implies by virtue of the meaning of the linguistic expression "being a father of" that "Jane is a child of John".[73] I am afraid, Barlingay bungles here. For *one* thing, it is not clear what prompts him to regard *arthāpatti* both as inference and as semantic implication. The terms "inference" and "implication" are highly technical;

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and I wonder if the pre-analytical notion of *arthāpatti* can be characterized as inference or implication, particularly when the ordinary criteria of inference and of implication fail to apply to it. Further, won't it land us in utter confusion if ignoring the logical differences between inference and implication we jump to the conclusion that *arthāpatti* is both implication and inference also? In inference we assert the premisses true and if the premisses imply the conclusion we assert the conclusion true also. The concept of inference thus is more complex than the concept of implication : for if the inference in question is of the deductive type it includes implication also. And Barlingay certainly means by "inference" the deductive type of inference.[14]*

Indian Institute of Advanced Study V. K. BHARADWAJA
SHIMLA-171 005
(H.P.)

NOTES

* I am deeply indebted to Dr. Rekha Jhanji for her valuable comments and criticism on an earlier draft of this paper. However, I alone am responsible for any mistakes in it.

1. Ganganatha Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in its Sources* (Varanasi : The Banaras Hindu University, 1942, 1964 (Second edition); pp. 139-142 : Narayana Bhatta, *Mānameyodaya : An Elementary Treatise on the Mīmāṁsā*. Edited with an English translation by C. Kunhan Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras : The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1933, 1975 (Second edition); pp. 120-133.
2. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* of Dharmaraja Adhvarin. Edited with an English translation by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras : The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1942, 1971); pp. 89-95.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Maṇikaṇa : A Navyu-nyāya Manual.* Edited with an English translation by E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma (Madras : The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1960, 1977); pp. 44-45.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* Volumes 1 & 2 (New York : Dover Publications, 1962; First published by the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R., Leningrad, circa 1930). Stcherbatsky calls *arthāpatti* " the method of Necessary Implication ". (Vol. 2, p. 116).

6. D. M. Datta: *The Six Ways of Knowing* (Calcutta : University of Calcutta, 1960 (second revised edition); first published in 1932 in Great Britain); pp. 235–246.

7. S. S. Barlingay, *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic* (New Delhi : National Publishing House, 1965; 1976 (second edition); pp. 19–21.

8. *Mānameyodaya, op. cit.*, pp. 120–133. Example A is very artificial and it fails to bring out the point of *arthāpatti*. Ordinarily, if you are told that John is not in, you do not start asking whether he is dead or alive or insist on an answer to the question ' Where is he ?'. It is possible, however, to think of a context in which this sort of example appeared to make sense, as for instance in the situation of a civil war when everybody is running for his life and you go and knock at John's door to find out what's what.

9. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā, op. cit.*, p. 89.

10. *Ibid.* (Translation : " *āpatti*, i. e., postulation of something (*artha*)", p. 90.

11. *Ibid.* (Translation : " That because of which there is *āpatti*, i. e., postulation, of something (*artha*) ", p. 90).

12. *Ibid*, p. 90.

13. As in (8) and (9) above.

14. *Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annambhatta. Edited by Y. V. Athalye and M. R. Bodas (Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1963 (second edition); first published in 1897); pp. 55, 349–350

15. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā, op. cit.*, p. 90.

16. *Ibid, p.* 91

17. P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory* (London : Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1952); pp. 2–12.

18. G. E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*. (London 1953).

19. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā, op. cit.* Translation : ' This world is other than real and the unreal; *Brahman* is real; and the individual is not different from *Brahman* '.

20. *Ibid*, p. 91.

21. *Ibid*, p. 91. The statement (b) ean be represented as (b) Man appears bound but really he is free, (b) and (b) have the same meaning; but (b)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

clarifies the meaning of "*mithyātva*" occurring in (b). The word "*mithyātva*" means the idea of being apparent and not real.

22. One example is the controversy between the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedānta-Mīmāṁsakas over the interpretation of the descriptive and prescriptive sentences of the Vedas. (See Śaṁkara's Commentary on the *Brahma-Sutra-I. i. 4*) *Another* example is growth of the dualistic and non-dualistic Vedantic theories based upon different interpretations of the Vedas.

23. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

24. *Ibid*, p. 92

25. *Mānameyodaya, op. cit.* p. 131

26. The Naiyayikas are concerned largely with knowledge of facts, while knowledge of *dharma* (moral and/or religious duty) and *mokṣa*, i.e. spiritual welfare are the chief concerns of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsakas' and the Vedānta Mīmāṁsakas' respectively. cf. *atha' to dharma jijñāsa* of the *Jaimini's Sūtras* and *athā' to brahma jijñāsā* of the *Brahma Sūtras*.

27.. *Mānameyodaya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–133; *Vedānta-paribhāsā*, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–95; *Maṇikaṇa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–45; *Tarka-Saṁgraha* of Annambhatta, *op. cit.*, pp. 235–246; S. C. Chatterjee, *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge* (Calcutta : University of Calcutta, 1939); pp. 361–367.

28. Datta, *op. cit.*

29. Barlingay, *op. cit.*

30. *Maṇikaṇa, op. cit. Vedānta-paribhāṣā, op. cit.* "*Anumāna*" is ordinarily translated as inference. It means sometimes explanation and sometimes prediction also. See (47) below.

31. *Maṇikaṇa, op. cit.*, pp. 42–43; *Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annambhatta, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–43, 257, 287–285. "*Kevala vyatireki*" means 'exclusively differentiative'. This type of *nyāya* has, for example, the following structure :

1. Earth differs from other things	*(pratijñā)*
2. because it has odour	*(hetu)*
3. that which does not so differ has no odour as water	*(udāharaṇa)*
4. this is not like it	*(upanaya)*
5. hence it is not so.	*(nigamana)*

In this type of *nyāya*, it is impossible to find a confirming instance (*sapakṣa dṛṣṭānta*) of something which has both odour and also differs from other things. Notice also that *pṛthivi* is characterised (*defined*) as that which has odour : such that you do not go about showing the truth of the statement of definition by *anumāna* : you only accept or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reject this definition by using the criteria of adequacy of definition designed for a specific purpose. Besides, we have the question whether we know the *dravyas* (substances) by *anumāna* or by definition; and what sense does "knowing by definition" make? The Naiyayikas seem to be pretty muddled in their methodology here.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Maṇikaṇa, op. cit.*, pp. 44–45, 120; Datta, *op. cit.*; Chatterjee, *op. cit.*

34. *Mānameyodya, op. cit.*; *Vedānta-paribhāṣā, op. cit.*

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā, op. cit.*

39. As in (33) above.

40. As in (34) above.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Maṇikaṇa, op cit; Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annambhatta, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–43; 281–289. *anvaya-vyatireki vyāpti* is a generalisation like 'where there is smoke there is fire'. It is possible in this type of *vyāpti* to give an empirically observable instance *(dṛṣṭānta)*.

43. *Ibid. Kevala-anvayi vyāpti* – e. g., 'A pot is nameable because it is knowable like a piece of cloth'. It is impossible to find a counterinstance *(vipakṣa dṛṣṭānta)* in this case; we cannot say e. g. if something is not nameable then it is not knowable either. This type of *vyāpti* states a constitutive principle of one's conceptual framework. It is a sort of constitutional legislation. It is not even a matter of definition either; for no differentia is stated as it is done in the case of definition of "earth" for example. Knowability and nameability are not related as earth and odour one.

44. As in (31) above.

45. Strawson *op. cit.* pp. 205–210; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in *From a Logical Point of View.* (Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1953, 1961).

46. *Maṇikaṇa, op. cit.*

47. *The Nyāva Sūtras of Gotama;* translated by S. C. Vidyabhusana (New Delhi : Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975 (second edition); first published in 1913 by Panini Office, Allahabad); 1. 1. 5., p. 3. (Translation " Inference is knowledge which is preceded by perception and is of three kinds, viz., *a priori* (e. g., one seeing elouds infers that there will be rain) *a posteriori* (e. g., one seeing a river swollen infer

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that there was rain), and commonly seen (e.g., one seeing a beast possessing horns, infers that it possesses also a tail, or one seeing smoke on a hill infers that there is fire on it).

48. *Ibid.*

49. Compare the Nyāya-Vaiseṣika characterization of '*pratyakṣa*' as '*indriyārtha sannikarṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam*' (*Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annambhatta, *op. cit.;* pp. 29–31) with the Vedānta Mīmāṁsā characterization of '*pratyakṣa*' as '*sākṣād-aparokṣa*' and '*akhanda-sākṣātkāra*' *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, *op. cit.*, pp. xv–xviii; 7–51.

50. *Mānameyodaya*, *op. cit.*, p. 123

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annambhatta, *op. cit.*, pp. 349–350.

53. Chatterjee, *op. cit.* In the contex of the (A) and (B) *vyāptis*, Chatterjee observes: "these propositions are not cases of real *vyāpti* or induction" (p. 366).

54. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–95.

55. *Ibid.*

56. Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 244–245.

57. *Ibid.*

58. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation', *Philosophy of Science*, XV, 135–75 (1945); reprinted in Baruch A. Brody (ed.) *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc: 1970); pp. 7–27.

59. *Ibid*, pp. 10–11.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.* This type of explanation is known as the covering law model of explanation. There can be other types of explanation in science. (See Brody, *op. cit.*, pp 1–180.)

62. *Mānameyodaya*, op. cit.

63. Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 366.

64. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

65. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason;* translated by N. Kemp-Smith (London, 1929).

66. R. S. Walters, 'Contrary-to-fact Conditionals', *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. inc. & The Free Press, 1967), Volumes 1 & 2; pp. 212–216.

67. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

68. Barlingay, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

69. *Ibid*, p. 20.

70. *Ibid.* p. 21.

71. *Ibid*, p. 21.

72. *Ibid*, p. 21. The symbolic sentence is paraphrased into English as follows : 'If Devadatta is fat and if Davadatta is fat he must be eating by day time or by night time and he is not eating by day time then he is eating by night time '.

73. Strawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 205–210.

74. V. K. Bharadwaja. 'Logic of the *Nyāya Anumāna*', in *Philosophy : Theory and Action : Essays in honour of Professor S. S. Barlingay.* (Poona 1983); pp. 61–69.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Poona–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 2
April 1988

THE *AHIMSĀ* PRECEPT OF THE INDIAN RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS AND THE UTILITARIAN THINKING OF JEREMY BENTHAM, JAMES MILL AND JOHN STUART MILL : NOTES ON SOME POINTS OF CONTACT

I

The sanctity of life and its inviolability are underscored in one way or another in the principal religious systems which originated in India, namely, Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. The call to refrain from injuring or harming living beings (*ahiṁsā*[1]) is consequently echoed in all of them, though Jainism on the whole tends to give it a far stricter interpretation than either of the other two systems.[2] Indeed, a famous Sanskrit aphorism projects the view that *ahiṁsā* is the cardinal precept of morality.[3] Now, it would be appropriate to indicate at the outset that this precept has inspired quite a range of ethical attitudes, and some of them, to be sure, have served as influential determinants of public policy in India in particular time and again through the centuries. The renunciation of war, pacifism and the eschewing of violence as political weapon are especially noteworthy in this connection, for famous figures in Indian history (like the emperor Asoka and Mahatma Gandhi) have espoused them with great distinction and effect.[4] But *ahiṁsā* has also helped to nurture a highly distinctive attitude towards the non-human sentient world, in a word, the animals. Indeed, the belief that every creature born into this world has a right to live out its life without let or hindrance, and the concomitant moral prescription that humans ought, as a matter of duty, to ref-

Received : 28-10-85

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

rain from hurting or destroying living beings, are often seen as unique aspects of the complex body of attitudes that have their roots in *ahiṁsā*.[5] And both, significantly, are by and large alien to the dominant trends of Western thought and belief. The Judeo-Christian tradition, it should be noted, lends weight to the view that animals exist for the most part to subserve human ends, and that man's moral obligations, in any event, are owed exclusively to his "neighbours", in other words, to those who belong to the human race.[6] Again, influential Western philosophical opinions (like those rooted in Cartesian thought which depicted animals as unfeeling automata) actually serve to reinforce a diminished regard for animals or at least to distance them from man's primary moral concerns.[7]

Now because, no doubt, of its evident contrariety to certain settled European perceptions, the attitude to animals which is inculcated by the *ahiṁsā* precept actually became the focus of a few rather striking Western philosophic comments in the 18th and 19th centuries. Those associated with the British utilitarian philosophers, I believe, are especially notworthy. The fleeting and very inchoate nature of these comments, and the fact that they were made well before Oriental scholarship had clarified the real basis of Indian religious standpoints cannot, I think, be valid reasons for overlooking them. Indeed, the *ahiṁsā* precept is perhaps the most notable ethical principle associated with Indian religious systems to attract any kind of response from major British philosophers of the last two centuries. Both leading figures of the English utilitarian movement—Jeremy Bentham and James Mill—showed an awareness of this precept in famous contexts of their writing. John Stuart Mill, admittedly, did not follow their example in specifically referring to it. Yet in defending Bentham's arguments on behalf of "animal rights", and again in the course of his own wider reflections on animals and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

our duties towards them, he sometimes came close to articulating views which have an inner affinity with aspects of the attitudinal background in question and inspires the *ahiṁsā* precept—especially, I think, as the background in question tended to be clarified in Jaina and Buddhist thought. Thus while the relevant references of Bentham and James Mill are historically noteworthy as evidences of East–West philosophic contacts John Stuart Mill's reflections on certain moral and psychological issues that touch on animals afford a good deal of scope for the pursuit of an instructive comparative effort.

Neither aspect of this rather complex subject, however, seems to have attracted serious notice so far. Recent writers have justly highlighted Bentham's poineering role in bringing the claims of animals to the threshold of Western philosophy as a distinct moral issue.[8] Yet his important, even if veiled, remark relating to *ahiṁsā* (which preceded his observation about the capacity of animals to suffer[9]) generally tends to be overlooked. Again, even while it is acknowledged that the debate on the moral status of animals "must range more widely if it is to do justice to the variety of questions and considerations that arise in this field",[10] contemporary Western inquirers who engage themselves in it rarely, if ever, pause to look beyond their immediate cultural boundaries.[11] This tendency, however, is somewhat unfortunate For much of what is permanently at stake in the above debate can be illuminatingly linked to ancient wisdom—both philosophical and psychological — that surrounds the Indian precept of *ahiṁsā*. Some of John Stuart Mill's 19th century views, I think, form a good basis for bringing this to the fore. It is indeed noteworthy that quite a few of the basic attitudes and perceptions that are associated with the traditional clarifications relating to *ahiṁsā* tend, at times, to be echoed in secular Western arguments that seek to justify a sympathetic consideration of animals and their welfare.[12]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In what follows, I propose, then, to relate the *ahiṁsā* precept of the Indian religious systems to aspects of the thinking of the principal utilitarian philosophers of the last two centuries — Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill. Though the facts highlighted and the reflections offered here should be of primary interest to the historian and the comparativist in the field of philosophical ideas, ethicists in particular who evince an inclination to probe into the moral status of animals within a truly broad philosophical framework might, I trust, also find much to hold their attention in this discussion. For its focus, to be sure, is on the ideas, beliefs and values in terms of which two influential—but very unlike—traditions have endeavoured to view what is after all a singularly compelling presence in our individual and collective lives : the non-human species, animals.

II

It would be appropriate to begin this inquiry by clarifying Bentham's inchoate remark about Indian attitudes to the animal world. It is set forth in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789).[13] Animals attracted his attention here somewhat in passing, in the course of an inquiry into a matter central to the above work as whole, namely the limits between private ethics and the art of legislation.[14] What agents under the influence of man's direction, Bentham asked, are susceptible of happiness ? Other human beings and animals, he answered, are two sorts of such agents And commenting on the latter, he noted pointedly that " on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensitivity of ancient jurists ", animals indeed " stand degraded to the class of things ". And in dwelling further on this theme Bentham gave expression to a series of some striking observations, the underlying principles of which, as will be seen shortly, were subsequently upheld and defended by John Stuart Mill.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Bentham sought to view the non-human animal species on the basis of a norm which stressed their capacity to suffer; its appeal obviously was thus to our feelings of compassion.[15] Not surprisingly, it was in proposing this norm (which present-day advocates of animal rights find "forward looking"[16]) that he had occasion to actually refer to the status of animals in non-Western societies. "Under the Gentoo and Mohammedan religions", he said, "the interests of the rest of animal creation seems to have met with some attention". Of course it would be wrong to assume that the attitude to animals which Islam enunciates is any different to that in other religions of the Judeo-Christian tradition generally. What he wanted to highlight in making the above statement was perhaps the notable consideration given to animals within the civilization that had developed in India;[17] and this we know was entirely the consequence of the common inculcation of the *ahiṁsā* precept by its three principal indegenous religious traditions. In any event, Bentham deplored the absence of a universal sensitivity to the claims that animals have to our sympathy and consideration. His further thoughts on this subject (which were prompted by the situation in the West) included some incisive arguments, and hence deserve brief notice.

Bentham protested against the infliction of torments on animals.[18] Being totally unprotected, the legal position of animals in contemporary western society, he maintained, was comparable to that of slaves sometime ago. Yet he entertained the hope that "the rest of animal creation" will some day "acquire those rights which could never have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny". The moral grounds for such an extension of rights to animals, he argued, are solid and persuasive. Animals in common with humans, have the capacity to suffer: and this, he insisted, was the most important thing that needs to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be taken into account in shaping our attitudes towards animals. Bentham, significantly, was not prepared to concede that anatomical differences, not for that matter, the absence of reasoning powers, can be a valid basis for denyiag lower animals their rights. [19]

One cannot be sure of the extent of Bentham's understanding of *ahiṁsā* which fostered a consideration for animals in India. It is evident, however, that he did not regard that consideration itself to be odd or misplaced. On the contrary, the elaboration of his own plea on behalf of animal rights after a reference to the status of animals under Hinduism in particular indeed suggests that he was at least prepared to take a cue from the famous precept associated with Indian religions.

Now, in the course of his long discussion of Hinduism in *The History of British India* (1818)[20] James Mill also identified the " sacredness which it imprints on the life of animals " as a distinctive feature of Hinduism. Among other things, he highlighted in this connection Hinduism's proclivity for vegetarianism, and noted pointedly that according to its teachings " to deprive any sensitive creature of life, is a heinous transgression of religious duty ". Significantly enough, James Mill (unlike Bentham) did not, however, give the slightest hint that there was anything to learn from the way Hindus treated animals. The Hindu concern for sentient life was to James Mill just a " superstition ": it had, in his view, nothing to do with a " sensitivity to the feelings of animated creatures ".[21] All in all, James Mill did not hesitate to affirm that " to renounce the benefits which inferior animals are fitted by nature to render to man is not humanity, any more than swinging before an idol by an iron hook ", for example, is the " virtue of self command ".

This notably negative evaluation of the beliefs and behaviour associated with *ahiṁsā* was of course a part of a larger critique

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of Hinduism which James Mill set forth in his famous work.[22] Needless to say, admirers of Indian religion are not likely to consider the interpretations projected in the above evaluation to be tenable. As will be seen in the sequel, attempts were made in certain religious texts to justify *ahiṁsā* by a species of argumentation : James Mill's claim that it is just a religiously inculcated prohibition can be, therefore, challenged. On the other hand, it would be well to remember that a basic thrust of his thinking has come to be echoed by certain recent investigators. Ludwig Alsdorf, for example, has indeed advanced the view that *ahiṁsā* originally had more to do with a magical-ritualistic taboo against taking life rather than an ethical duty as now understood.[23]

Clearly, then, Bentham's and James Mill's inchoate comments on the attitudes Hindus adopt towards animals can be indeed the basis for divergent assessments of not only the *ahiṁsā* precept itself, but also perhaps of the larger moral question relating to man's relationship to the non-human sentient world. In turning next to John Stuart Mill's thinking on animals, I propose initially to highlight the extent to which the positions he takes on this subject sometimes parallel those of Buddhism and Jainism in particular, and then pass on to a brief consideration of the differences that nevertheless separate them. For Mill, after all, was a secular philosopher with firm roots in Western culture.

III

Some of John Stuart Mill's most striking reflections on animals and their claims to our consideration emerged in the course of a spirited defence of Bentham's views on these subjects against an attack made on them by a contemporary critic, William Whewell.[24] It was Whewell's contention, Mill observed, that Bentham's "greatest happiness principle" was susceptible to a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

crushing *reductio ad absurdum* because Bentham had actually sought to consider the " pleasures and pain of animals as those of human beings. "[25] In rejecting this contention, Mill affirmed, on the contrary, that Bentham's thinking on animals was a " noble anticipation " of a better morality.[26] And echoing Bentham's own views, he drew attention in this connection to the existence of a parallelism between Whewell's attitude to animals and the ways in which certain races and classes were (or are) regarded by those who remain strangers to liberal, egalitarian ideas. Mill noted :

> Nothing is more natural to human beings, nor, up to a certain point in cultivation, more universal, than to estimate the pleasures and pains of others as deserving of regard exactly in proportion to their likeness to ourselves. These superstitions of selfishness had the characteristics by which Dr. Whewell recognizes his moral rules; and his opinion on the rights of animals shows that in this case at least he is consistent. We are perfectly willing to stake the whole question on this issue. Granted that any practice causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man; is that practice moral or immoral ? And if, exactly in proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness, they do not with one voice answer "immoral", let the morality of the principle of utility be for ever condemned.[27]

Thus, to Mill's way of thinking, the exclusion of animals from our moral concerns was unwarrented. He indeed projects the view that it could be only justified on the basis of a myopic interpretation of rights such as is sustained by a coldly insensitive outlook. It is interesting to note that in his essay on " Bentham "[28] Mill remarked with evident admiration that what this seminal figure in the history of utilitarianism had before his

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mind's eye was "the happiness of the whole sentient world.". Significantly enough, Mill himself proceeded to define his own ethical perspectives on similar lines. In his most important treatise on ethics[29] he maintained that the pleasures and pains of animals must be counted for purposes of utilitarian calculation (albeit with the proviso, "so far as the nature of things allows").

Now on occasion Mill tended to refer to animals as creatures without reason[30] and the irrationality of animals, it must be remembered, has always been a classic basis for not only subordinating them to the interests of man, but also, frequently, of overlooking them altogether. Still Mill, in any event, does not appear to have sought to derive any conclusions regarding the treatment of animals from the above characterization. On the contrary, in "Utilitarianism" itself he drew attention to an affinity that exists between human beings and other species. And he saw this in their tendency to counter harm done and again in their common capacity to feel sympathy. Mill did not set out to discuss the origin of this sentiment; however he maintained that :

> Whether it be an instinct or a result of intelligence, it is, we know common to all animal nature; for every animal tries to hurt those who have hurt, or it thinks are about to hurt itself or its young. Human beings, on this point, only differ from other animals in two particulars. First in being capable of sympathizing, not solely with their offspring, or, like some of the more noble animals, with some superior animal who is kind to them, but with all human, and even with all sentient, beings. Secondly, in having a more developed intelligence, which gives a wider range to

...3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> the whole of their sentiments, whether selfregarding or sympathetic.[31]

Before proceeding to a clarification of some other facets of Mill's thinking on animals, it might be instructive to pause here and find out how the above views compare with the attitudes that are associated with *ahiṁsā*.[32] Now as indicated at the outset, this precept is sustained in the last analysis by the belief that the living community is a unity. Evidently, Mill's moral philosophy seems to be informed by something similar : in several contexts Mill tends to emphasize that the focus of a truly enlarged moral consciousness indeed ought to be not just mankind, but all living creatures.[33] In any event, Mill's perception of feeling, suffering and sympathy as common bonds uniting man and beast is again central to the thinking behind *ahiṁsā*. This point, among others, is strikingly underscored in two stanzas of the inflnential Buddhsit work, the *Dhammapada* :

> All tremble at punishment. All fear death; comparing others to oneself one should neither kill nor cause to kill.
>
> All tremble punishment. Life is dear to all; comparing others to oneself, one should neither kill nor cause to kill.[34]

The Jaina texts of old indeed make the same point : " all beings are fond of life, like pleasure, hate pain, shun destruction, like life, long to live. To all life is dear."[35] And the moral injunction which was predicated on the above was again similar : " all breathing, existing, living, sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor driven away ".[36] The wide endorsement given to these views and arguments as well as the precept built upon them in the Indian cultural milieu as a whole is strikingly borne out by some of the aphorisms of the *Hitopadeśa*. Not only is *ahiṁsā* (as noted at

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the ontset of this inquiry) held forth here as the cardinal precept of morality, but it is also emphasized likewise that :

> As life is dear to oneself, so it is to other creatures. The good show pity to creatures by comparing (them) to themselves.[37]

A further observation made in the *Hitopadeśa* highlights a circumstance central to the *ahiṁsā* precept as it relates to animals in particular :

> When one eats the flesh of another, mark the difference between the two—the one enjoys momentary pleasure, while the other loses his life.[38]

These citations are particularly noteworthy because they bring to the fore the rationale—the logico-philosophical basis, so to say—of the case against injuring and killing as it manifests itself in the setting of Indian thought. Evidently, *ahiṁsā*, far from being a mere prohibition against the taking of life, was conceived rather as a psychologically sound and morally arguable position. The repeated call to witness the shared feelings and to liken other creatures to oneself deserves especial notice in this connection. Reasoning of a sort is involved here; but perhaps more significant, this reasoning is informed by insights of a psychological nature. It appears that what has been identified recently as the "Principle of Psychological Continuity"[39] is indeed both assumed and invoked in several ancient Indian writings. Baldly put, the principle in question states that there is no fundamental breach between the psychological acts, states and functions of man and those of the lower animals; the idea that the feelings of lower animals in some ways model those of man is a notable consequence of this principle.[40] And it is possible to argue that the latter idea is one of the main underpinnings of *ahiṁsā*—or at least *ahiṁsā* as it tends to be inculcated

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in certain notable expositions of Indian beliefs and thought. Equally important, Mill's thinking in the contexts highlighted above also appears to proceed from a tacit acceptance of the same idea : clearly, his concern for animals flowed in the final analysis from a firm belief that their capacities to feel and suffer are analogous to those of the human kind.

Now since it means non–injury, *ahiṁsā* as viewed from an etymological standpoint admittedly has negative connotations. And it has been rather unfairly deprecated on this account by at least one Western commentator. Thus, focusing on the negative implications of *ahiṁsā*, Schweitzer,[41] for example, has maintained that the compassion taught by the Indian religious systems " calls only for refraining from evil, not acting for good which a natural feeling for what was right would inspire ". However, this I think is an unfortunate misreading of the actual import of *ahiṁsā*.[42] For this precept has been traditionally held to involve commitments of a positive kind as well [43] In Jaina thought, for example, (where *ahiṁsā* is elevated to a central place), its observance has been always taken to entail not only abstention from inflicting injury and harm to the living, but also kind and compassionate actions leading to the alleviation of pain and suffering.[44] Buddhism can be said to concur with its sister religion here especially when it links non–injury *(avihiṁsā)* to the complementary virtues of compassion *(karuṇā)* and loving kindness *(mettā)*.[45] The former virtue, significantly, is identified as the desire to remove the pains and sorrows of one's fellow beings while the latter is represented as the active interest in sreking their welfare.[46] In any event, it would be instructive to mention in passing that the caring attitude to animals forstered by *ahiṁsā* clearly had an impact on state policy and law in ancient times, especially under Buddhist and Jaina rulers. Thus, animals enjoyed legal protection in the reign of the celebrated Indian

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

emperor Asoka.[47] And *Culavamsa,* a Buddhsit chronicle of ancient Sri Lanka reports of a king there who took pride in in curing sick animals as a part of royal duly.[48]

To turn again to Mill, one indeed finds that this "positive" side of *ahiṁsā* was often an especial focus of his thinking on animals as well. Mill saw animal suffering as a sad fact of experience in the world of nature and sought on occasion to sensitively highlight it. But more important, he also stressed on occasion the need to remove the sufferings which man wantonly and callously wrought on animals. Now, the former idea is very much in evidence in his essay on "Nature". The plight of animals, "tormenting and devouring" each other, and "prey to a thousand ills" was, in his view, a blot on the beauty of the natural order; and he indeed argued here that this circumstance militated against the (deistic) proof of a benevolent creator.[49] Even while he registered an ethical and metaphysical "protest" against the sufferings that sadly burden animals in nature, Mill tacitly recognized, however, that human concern and compassion can have no impact on removing or alleviating them. But, on the other hand, he was perceptive enough to realize that these sentiments could be meaningfully brought to bear in improving the lot of animals under human custody. Thus, in the course of his examination of the grounds and the limits of the non–interference principle *(laissez–faire)* in the *Principles of Political Economy*[50] Mill referred pointedly to the propriety of governmental intervention in order to prevent cruelty to animals. He considered the reasons for legal action in this area to be much like those urged in respect of children. "Lower animals" he declared, are the "unfortunate slaves and victims of the most brutal part of mankind": Mill wanted them protected against such abuse.[51]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Evidently, the principal ideas and sentiments that are drawn into the discussions in the above context are again consonant with the spirit of *ahiṁsā*. The reality of the pains of the animals is duly upheld in them, as is a feeling of pity for their plight. Humane treatment of animals, it is suggested, is a requirment of justice and morality and hence needs enforcement. All in all, considering, further more, the other resemblances previously highlighted, one may then say that Mill's insight into animal psychology, and his thinking on animal rights and ancillary themes contain much that is in harmony with the moral and philosophical attitudes that underpin the Indian religious precept of *ahiṁsā*. Yet a comparativist who is attentive to the numerous secondary details relating to the two sides must needs recognize that Mill's thinking also incorporates standpoints which cannot be accomodated within the framework of attitudes that sustain *ahiṁsā*.

I like next to dwell briefly on this matter; it also deserves some notice in our examination of Mill's thinking on animals. The clarifications which emerge might, I think, go some way towards underscoring the rather notable fact that even some of the closest Western philosophical " approximations " to the *ahiṁsā* teachings finally fall short of them. And it will be seen that this is so in the main for two reasons. Firstly because the emphases of Indian religious systems are not retained in exactly the same sense in Mill's thinking, and secondly because in some of his writings Mill actually tends to identify a distinctive basis for justifying a concern for animals. The basis in question may be loosely designated as the conservationist motive[62] : and unlike the religiously inspired *ahiṁsā* precept, it is entirely secular, being sustained in the last analysis by a pragmatic scientific humanism sometimes touched by an aesthetic sensitivity. Let me explain each of these points in turn.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

To begin with, it should be recalled that *ahiṁsā* strictly interpreted requires the condemnation of deliberate killing or injuring as an ethical absolute. Mill did no such thing. He does not appear to have entertained any scruples with regard to the killing of animals in order to satisfy human needs, especially food. It is significant, for example, that Mill's early as well as late comments on the game laws of contemporary England proceed in the main on the assumption that hunting (and hence the killing and injuring entailed) are morally unobjectionable.[53] Furthermore, the sanctity of life which *ahiṁsā* upholds implies, among other things, that the individual creature—irrespective of its scale of evolution—must be treated as an end never as a means.[54] Now once again, it is very doubtful whether Mill would have subscribed to this without reservation even in theory.[55] Its virtual repudiation in practical contexts (as in discussions relating to the economic management of resources), however, is amply borne out, for Mill acknowledged without any hint of disapproval man's systematic appropriation of other species in order to meet his own needs. In fact, in one instance he identified acquatic life, for example, baldly as a consumable natural resource on par with coal and ores mined from the earth.[56] All in all, in regard to living creatures used or consumed by man (like river fish stocks, whales), what disturbed Mill, it appears, was not their use or consumption but rather, doing so imprudently—or as he put it "without restraint".[57] Needless to say, this opposition to the unchecked exploitation of living things was largely dictated by economic reasons which ultimately resolve themselves into considerations of man's own long term self interest.

Thus, not *ahiṁsā* but an entirely different perception of man's relationship to the non-human species seems to be projected in the above thinking. What finally are its roots? Though Mill was a secular philosopher, still, one might not be perhaps

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

far off the mark if one were to link this perception to something ingrained in Western culture–namely, the Biblical representation of man as the lord of the earth with dominion over its creatures (which entailed the right to use them as well).

In any event, yet another set of ideas also played a part in determining Mill's attitudes towards the non–human world. His commitment to them was attested time and again in several writings, many of which reflect the considered thinking of his mature years. And these ideas, to be sure, are traceable to a conservationist motive—the interest, that is, in preserving life in its wild or natural state and in allowing such life free scope to exist with the least possible amount of human control or interference.[58] Now as indicated earlier, conservationism as thus understood can be broadly linked to humanism which is in some ways both scientific and pragmatic[59] (though Mill's articulations on the subject contain some aesthetic overtones as well[60]). Perhaps one of his most notable pleas on behalf of conservationism comes to the fore in the course of the rambling observations on the "Stationary State" set forth in the *Principles of Political Economy*. It is indeed striking that he took some pains to emphasize here that usefulness to man must not be the sole criterion in terms of which one should approach the non–human world. Hard–nosed pursuit of increased production in order to meet the needs of an expanding human population, he recognized, commonly entailed the extirpation of wild animals and plants. But this, he insisted, was not a good thing. Indeed, there is little satisfaction, Mill confessed, in

> ...contemplating the world with nothing left to the spontaneous activity of nature; with every rood of land brought into cultivation, which is capable of growing food for human beings; every flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds which are not do-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> mesticated for man's use exterminated as his rivals for food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower could grow without being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved agriculture.[61]

Similar views were expressed elsewhere.[62] But it might be instructive to reiterate that though the beliefs which inform the thinking in all these contexts certainly entail some recognition of the value of non-human life, this recognition, nonetheless, springs from considerations which are essentially naturalistic.

IV

Our foregoing juxtaposition of utilitarian thinking and Indian religio-philosophical standpoints on the complex issues of animals and man's obligations towards them brings to the fore some interesting facts concerning Eastern and Western perception on a subject of growing contemporary relevance.[63] Though a sensitivity to the rights of animals and a caring attitude towards them have been sometimes dismissed as a peculiar emphasis of Indian religious reflection,[63] both, it seems, were justified and defended by two of the West's most practically minded philosophers, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Of course, there are differences : the utilitarian approaches did not in particular involve an acceptance of the metaphysical beliefs that lay behind the *ahiṁsā* precept of the Indian religious systems. How do the positions adopted by the two sides relate to each other ? What are the critical insights that stem from the comparative process in this contexts ? I think it would be perhaps appropriate to end the present inquiry by addressing to these very pertinent questions. The answers that emerge will, I trust, not only serve to recapitulate our central conclusions, but perhaps illuminate them as well.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Through its *ahiṁsā* precept Indian religious systems stress man's nearness — at the level of feeling in particular — to the rest of the animated world. Viewing the nearness in question almost as an incontestable fact of experience,[65] these systems enjoin compassion and sympathy towards all forms of sentient existence. It indeed appears that the basic insights — psychological and moral[66] ... which underlie these positions were not alien to the thinkIng of Bentham and John Stuart Mill.[67] Yet their thinking also involved a tacit recognition of man's actual lordship over animated creatures, and more important still, his need to use such creatures for his own ends. Now James Mill, for one, seems to have been persuaded that the dictates of this practical situation must be simply relied upon to provide the rules of conduct that ought to regulate main's relationship to the lesser creatures Needless to say, a stance such as this serves, to all intents and purposes, to remove animals from the sphere of our moral concerns. And, significantly, Bentham and John Stuart Mil. refused to adopt it : in stressing that the feelings of animals count, and again in pointing out that the lower species have rights, these thinkers tended in effect to highlight the fact that the treatment of animals is subject to moral evaluation. Nevertheless, in their eyes, animals finally mattered less than man. Unlike the Indian practitioners of *ahimsā* they did not, to be sure, elevate non- injury to the level of an absolute, inviolable principle.

Perhaps many are likely to feel that by taking the above stand, Bentham and John Stuart Mill place themselves squarely on the side of reason and practical common sense. For what community can wholly divest itself of the need to kill or hurt living organisms ? Such necessary concerns of ordinary life of producing food, fighting disease, ensuring security and even caring for the environment[68] all too frequently entail the injury or the destruction of countless lives. Indeed, it is almost a truism that in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

world order as we know it, humnn well being is in good measure purchased at the cost of tremendous animal suffering; and there can be no overlooking of the fact that much of this suffering is deliberately planned by human agents. Then again, though it is hardly recognized by the Indian systems, paradoxically enough, the killing of animals sometimes proceeds from the best of intentions and can be a most humane act : consider the case for destroying maimed, diseased or starving creatures who are beyond help or redemption.[69]

On the other hand critical insights of an altogether different sort can be gained by attending to the deeper implications of the *ahiṁsā* precept. And such insights, I think, are particularly useful in overcoming " speciesism " – the partial, man biased stances from which human beings, for the most part, are wont to view animals and their concerns. In this connection it is above all the sanctity of all life as proclaimed by *ahiṁsā* that one must bear in mind, for this can be a fruitful basis for restructuring ingrained habits of thought. Besides helping to validate the ethical demand to give serious consideration to the interests of animals as of people,[70] this belief can also provide a wider basis for a sensitive, enlightened attitude to our fellow creatures.[71] And respect for life, one must recognize, is not misplaced, for man's control over it is limited : we can only destroy, but not create life. In view of this circumstance in particular it is perhaps appropriate to approach living things with a sense of awe. In any event, there is room to wonder whether an interest in conservation and ecology or a commitment to the preservation of the natural environment can really generate or instil a deep seated inner feeling of respect for non-human life. Such a feeling is in many ways supra-biological, and Indian thinkers at least were persuaded that it must emerge from a context of reflection which is touched by religion

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in one of its best and highest senses. The injuction not to harm or kill living beings is finally a corollary to this religiously inculcated attitude to life itself. True, as indicated above, one is at a loss to understand how a human community–anywhere, anytime–could heed to this call strictly and sincerely. But then *ahiṁsā*, as has been sometimes argued, perhaps has its classic application in the individual rather than the social plane.[12] A society or a community might not be in a position to separate itself from the need to injure or kill animals, but *an individual* can : even in a collective milieu, where respect for non-human life is absent, the individual man or woman can cultivate it, cherish it. This, to be sure, accords well with the ingrained esoterism of Indian religious systems.

35950 Timberlane Drive
Solon, Ohio 44139
(U. S. A.)

V. RAJAPAKSE

NOTES

1. Negative in its formation, the Sanskrit word *ahiṁsā* (and its Pali equivalent, *avihiṁsā*) literally means non-injury, the eschewing of deliberate cruelty. Its wider connotations include the renunciation of the will to harm, hurt or kill living creatures aud the practice instead of mercy, humanity, and friendliness and love towards them. Cf. W. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1899; T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, *Pali–English Dictionary*, London, 1979. As will be seen below, Indian religious systems frequently represent *ahiṁsā* as a moral precept, and the dispositional traits that develop upon its practice were especially esteemed because the traits in question were, among other things, deemed to be iudispensable in the striving for spiritual perfection (which the consensus of traditional religious opinion in India has always held forth as life's highest goal). Cf. *Yoga Sutra* 5:35 Viewed from a larger perspective *ahiṁsā* strikes one as an eminently civilized basis for

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

harmoniously relating the individual to his or her fellow beings, both human and non-human. Hence it can, ideally, inform moral behaviour at several levels, though the main focus of this paper is on the attitude to the non-human animal species which it inspires and sustains.

2. Several classical Hindu texts refer to *ahiṁsā;* many tend to suggest that the development of a well rounded moral and spiritual personality involves the practice of *ahiṁsā*. See, for example, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. 17. 4; *Bhagavad Gītā*, X. 5, XIII. 7, XVI. 2; *Yoga Sūtra* 5. 30; *Manudharmasāstra*, 2. 177, 10. 63. Unfortunately, none of these sources delve into its background, basis or range in ways that would satisfy the modern critical inquirer. Indeed, certain recent commentators have drawn pointed attention to the reticence of these texts on this matter. Cf. W. Norman Brown, *Man in the Universe*, Berkeley, 1966, pp. 53, 65; F. Edgerton, *The Bhagavad Gītā*, Cambridge, Mass. 1972, pp. 185–186. Yet as R. C. Zaehner (*Hinduism*, London, 1962, pp. 156ff., 232) has indicated in passing in the course of his discussion of the concept of moral law (*dharma*) in particular, some of the dilemmas and the difficulties encountered in practising *ahiṁsā* tend to be sensitively addressed in other Hindu contexts like the *Mahābhārata* or again in Gandhi's thought. Moreover, the aphoristic wisdom of mainly Hindu inspiration such as is set forth in in the famous Sanskrit "Book of Good Counsel", the *Hitopadesa* (see note 3 below, also section III of this arlicle) both enjoins and defends *ahiṁsā* in an unmistakable manner. Abstinence from taking life is of course a fundamental requirement of both Buddhist and Jaina ethics, even though the sacred writings associated with these systems (compiled mainly in Prakritic tongues) do not always use the Sanskrit word *ahiṁsā*. This, as will be evident later, is especially true of Buddhsim. In any event, the above requirement figures most prominently in Buddhist rules of moral conduct (*pañca sīla, dasa sīla*) and Jaina vows of discipline (*mahā vrata, aṇu vrata*). And its basis and implications are on occasion interestingly clarified within these two systems. Hurting or injury (*hiṁsā*) whether by thought, word or deed is looked upon by the Jainas in particular as the basic evil to be overcome; their stress on *ahiṁsā* both as a precept as well as a virtue is largely conditioned by this view. Anyone seeking to gain an insight into classical Indian thinking on *ahiṁsā* must therefore pay close attention to both Buddhism and Jainism.

3. This aphorism, *ahiṁsā paramo dhammaḥ* receives classic expression in the *Hitopadesa* where it is indeed pointed out that although the religious scriptures (of India, that is) disagree on other matters, they are nevertheless at one in upholding the primacy of *ahiṁsā*. See, *Hitopadesa of Nārāyaṇa*, text with trans. by M. R. Kale, New Delhi, 1980,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

p. 16. Clearly, the aphorism in question can be fairly invoked by Hindus, Jainas an Buddhists alike, notwithstanding the divergent ways in which they tend to interpret its scope and practical application.

4. Cf. Vincent Smith, *Asoka*, Oxford, 1920; G. Iyer, *The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi*, Oxford, 1978.

5. The characterization of *ahiṁsā* as a precept must not blind one to the extramoral considerations that surround it and give it meaning. According to one interpretation, Gandhi, for example, was inclined to view *ahiṁsā* as an "ethical absolute based upon metaphysical beliefs and issuing in a religious conviction requiring an act of faith". G. Iyer, *op. cit.* p. 196. Indian belief in rebirth (as determined by the moral agency of *karma*) needs to be especially remembered in thinking about the metaphysical underpinnings of *ahiṁsā*. One might have according to this belief, seen life in an animal state in the past and could return to it in the future : not only is an ontological relationship between man and beast thus presupposed, but it is also emphasized that it is in man's self interest to treat animals kindly, for harm done to them can (given the operations of *karma* the other crucial postulate of Indian thinking) rebound on the doer. This latter point, significantly enough, is frequently brought out in Buddhist and Jaina moralistic tales. In the Matakabhatta Jātaka, for instance, the fate of the slain animal is held to await its human slayer. See, *The Jātaka or Stories of the Buddha's Former Births* trans. ed. by E. B. Cowell, London, 1973 vol. I, p. 51 ff.

6. Cf. Genesis 1 : 26–30; Matthew 19 : 19; Luke 10 : 19–37 Also, Paul Tillich, *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions*, New York, 1963, pp. 69–70. As Tillich himself has hinted here, Christianity does not of course wholly exclude a compassionate concern for animals. The "Canticle of the Creatures" of St. Francis of Assissi, for example, is suffused with sentiments which anyone practising *ahiṁsā* must needs admire. The same is true of Albert Schweitzer's principle of "reverence for life", although as will be seen subsequently, the latter entertained a somewhat negative impression of *ahiṁsā*. See, Schweitzer, *The Teaching of Reverence for Life*, trans. by Richard and Clara Winston, New York, 1965.

7. Cf. Descartes' *Discourse on Method*, Part V. Certain finding of Western science, as, for example, those about predator – prey relationships in nature or again food chains (not to mention the outlook that fathers practical innovations in biotechnology and genetic engineering) obviously have a similar effect. It would be well to reiterate that *ahiṁsā* is finally the ethical consequence of a very different view of the universe, one that regards life as a unity, since all living beings (as several Indian

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

texts discussed below indeed emphasize), are always bound by a common antipathy towards pain and an equally common urge to preserve their existence. Among the great Western philosophers only Spinoza appears to have come somewhere close to this viewpoint through his notion of "conatus" (*Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 7). The striving to preserve and persist in being was held forth here as a characteristic of being itself. However, it is important to observe that no clear ethical consequence analogous to *ahiṁsā* was drawn from it by Spinoza.

8 Cf. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation : Toward an End to Man's Inhumanity to Animals*, London, 1978, p. 28.

9. The context will be identified in section II of this article.

10. See Editorial, *Philosophy*, vol. 53 (1978), p. 433.

11. The perceptive reader is likely to notice this in practically all recent discussions which focus on the moral status of animals. Those presented in the above journal are especially noteworthy in this connection.

12. Not only the specific arguments that are brought forth to justify animal rights (cf. Peter Singer, *op. cit.*) but also the views broached in the course of recent philosophical reflections on man's relationship to the animal world need to be recalled here. For example, the idea of "fellow creature" as developed by Cora Diamond ("Eating Meat and Eating People", *Philosophy*, vol. 53, 1978, p. 474 ff.) encompasses, I think, perceptions that are interestingly redolent of deep seated Indian beliefs regarding the unity of sentient existence tied to the transitoriness and the perils of *saṁsāra*.

13. See *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, ed. by J. Bowring (Edinburgh, 1843) vol. I, pp. 142n to 143n. The quotations that follow are taken from this long foot note and the sentences in the text to which it refers.

14. *Ibid.* Chap. XVII, sec. I.

15. As will be indicated below in discussing John Stuart Mill's view, Bentham's thinking here indeed retains a basic thrust of the Indian atitudes to animals as emphasized in Buddhist and Jaina teachings in particular.

16. Cf. Peter Singer, *op. cit.* p. 28.

17. It would be useful to note in this connection that Westerners writing even in the early part of the 19th century were of the diversity of religious systems that had flourished in India. This is well exemplified

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by James Mill's discussions in *The History of British-India* (1818), the most widely consulted work on Indian history and culture at the time. These discussions give the impression that Indian civilization was influenced by just two religions, Hinduism and Islam.

18. It might be relevant to observe that Bentham did not object to the killing of animals for food; early in the passage under review here he justified this by claiming that the "death they suffer in our hands commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which would await them in the inevitable course of nature". Interestingly enough, Singer (*op. cit.* p. 213) has pointed out that Bentham has here "lowered" his own standards of argument.

19. Though Bentham's argument does serve to break down the great metaphysical divide that has traditionally separated man and beast in the West, and is indeed retained and developed in a variety of recent discussions (cf. Peter Singer, *op. cit.*; S. R. L. Clark, *The Moral Status of Animals*, Oxford, 1977), it is by no means unimpugnable. Certain writers have pointed out that animal pain, for aught we know, may be of a different order and that any effort we make to identify ourselves with the feelings of animals could accordingly be a product of fantasy. Cf. Leslie Pickering Francis and Richard Norman, "Some Animals are More Equal than Others", *Philosophy*, vol. 53, 1978.

20. See 5th ed. (with notes and continuation by H. H. Wilson), London, 1858, vol. I, chap. VI. James Mill's comments relating to *ahimsā* are set forth in pp. 296–297. The quotations in the present paragraph are taken from this context.

21. It is interesting to observe that James Mill was led to this very debatable conclusion apparently by a consideration of the small provision made in Indian society for the practical alleviation of suffering, both animal and human. Relying (as is usual with him) on travellers' reports and other second hand accounts, he alluded in this connection to the cruel treatment of beasts of burden and the paucity of hospitals to care for the sick among the human population.

22. The tendentious character of this critique was recognized in the 19th century itself. The incorporation of H. H. Wilson's notes into most of the later editions of *The History of British India* was indeed prompted by the need to counteract James Mill's frequently harsh, sometimes polemical judgements regarding India's cultural heritage.

23. See, L. Alsdorf, "Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegitarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien" *Abhandlungen der Geistes und Sozial-wissenschaftlichen Klassen*, Nr. 6, 1961, p. 517 (Akadamie der

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Main). According to this writer, "Sie (*Ahiṁsā*) hat ursprünglich mit Ethik in unserem Sinne nichts zu tun, sondern ist ein magisch-ritualistische Tabu auf das Leben, das in keiner seiner Formen zertort werden darf". However, this again is perhaps just a conjectural opinion. As I. B. Horner (*Early Buddhism and the Taking of Life*, Kandy, 1967, p. 3) has rightly pointed out, "the emergence in India of the notion of *ahiṁsā*, non-harming, non-injury is historically speaking not clear. Its origin cannot be attributed to a definite date or to any particular teacher, social reformer or law giver. The problem of the idea of non-injury is indeed as obscure as that of 'leaving the world', of forsaking home for homelessness".

24. See "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", in *Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society*, (*Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, Toronto, 1963, vol. X). Hereafter identified as CW, the volumes in this series (published at various times between 1963 and 1985) will be used throughout our subsequent references to John Stuart Mill's writings. Whewell, it should be added, was a 19th century Cambridge don who gained considerable prominence as a contributor to philosophic discussion. In the above piece Mill reviewed two of his books, namely, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England* (1852) and *Elements of Morality* (1845).

25. Mill, *op. cit.* p. 185. John Stuart Mill will be referred to simply as Mill in the rest of this section.

26. *Ibid.* Whewell admitted a universal tie of humanity which binds mankind together; but animals, he said, cannot be brought under it.

27. *Ibid.* pp. 186–187.

28. *Ibid.* p. 96.

29. "Utilitarianism" *ibid.* p. 214.

30. See *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, CW IX, p. 84. It is perhaps noteworthy that in the discussion on the concept of classification in *A System of Logic* (CW VII, 118–122) men and beasts were identified on conventional lines as members of the same genus though belonging to different species. Cf. "Grotes' Aristotle", *Essays on Philosophy and the Classics*, CW XI, pp. 503–504. Mill's logical theory, however, offers no room to regard rationality as an essence on scholastic lines.

31. "Utilitarianism", CW X, p. 247.

32. As indicated in section II of this article, *ahiṁsā* it might be in place to repeat, does not of course just spell out an attitude to animals, but

...4

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

rather to all forms of setient life, including man. However, for purposes of the following discussion the implications of *ahiṁsā* as it relates to the non-human species alone are considered. In a word, this precept is treated in the sequel as one which articulates a specific attitude to animals.

33. It might be in place to observe here that Mill's reference to "the whole of sentient creation" (CW X, p. 214) can be fairly juxtaposed with the compassionate focus of the Buddhists and Jains, "all beings" (sabbe satta of Buddhist texts). However, the realm of the living according to Buddhism, for example, comprehends not only humans and animals, but also divinities and spirits. Cf. E. Conze, *Buddhism, Its Essence and Development*, New York, 1959, pp. 50–51. Both Hindu and Jaina philosophies tend to agree with Buddhism on this score.

34. *Dhammapada*, X : 129–130 (The Wisdom of the East Series, trans. by Narada Thera, London, 1959 p. 43) Buddhist opposition to the destruction of animal life comes to the fore more sharply in another place in this work. X : 270 where it is stated, "He is not therefore an Ariya in that he harms living being; through his harmlessness towards all living being he is called an Ariya" (p. 67). These words, significantly, are traced to the Buddha's own efforts to wean away a fisherman from his calling which entailed the taking of life. (p. xi),

35. See *Jaina Sūtras*, trans. by Hermann Jacobi, Oxford, 1884, Part I, p. 19 Cf. p. 50.: "As it would be unto thee, so it is with him whom thou intendest to kill. As it would be unto to thee, so it is with him whom thou intendest to tyrannise over. As it would be unto thee, so it is with him whom thou intendest to torment. In the same way (it is with him) whom thou intendest to punish, and to drive away. The righteous man who lives up to these sentiments, does therefore neither kill nor cause others to kill (living beings). He should not intentionally cause the same punishment for himself".

36. *Ibid.* p. 36 Much like the *Dhammapada* (cited above) the *Jaina Sūtras* also emphasize that one should not "cause others to kill nor consent to the killing of others". (p. 31) However, it is a peculiarity of Jainism that it held plant also to be worthy of kind treatment, and hence enjoined the extension of *ahiṁsā* toward negetative life as well. Cf. *ibid.* d. 10.

37. *Hitopadesa of Nārāyaṇa*, Kale ed. p. 8 (trans) Likewise it is pointed out here that "in refusing and giving, in pleasure and pain, and in things (or acts) agreeable and disagreeable, a man knows the standard by self-comparison". (*ibid.*) The veritable absorption of *ahiṁsā* into the overall value system of classical India is notably reflected in yet

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

another aphoristic statement which provides a list of preferred duties and objects : " What is man's true duty in this world ? Compassion to creatures. What is real happiness ? Freedom from disease. What is affection ? Good feeling. And what is wisdom ? Decision. " (*ibid.* p. 28) Cf. p. 8 : " He who looks upon another's wife as a mother, another's wealth as a clod of earth, and upon all creatures as his own self, is a truly wise man ".

38. *Ibid.* p. 16. The agony that attends dying, it is also noted here, is too intense to be guessed or known: and *ahiṁsā* it is added, has its reward : " Those man, who are averse to all sorts of killing, who bear all things and who are the refuge to all go to heaven. "

39. For an overview of this principle see, Gareth B. Matthews. " Animals and the Unity of Psychology ", *Philosophy*, vol. 53 (1978), p. 438 ff. The findings of contemporary psychology often serve to strengthen the basis of the principle. Cf. D. O. Hebb, " Emotion in Man and Animals " *Psychological Review*, 53, 1946.

40. Cf. Gareth B. Matthews, *op. cit.* p. 439 It is interesting to observe that in a notable Buddhist context (*Anumāna Sutta, Majjima Nikāya* I, 95 ff.) the principle that one should not do others anything one does not wish to be done to oneself is represented as a datum of inferential knowledge, What is disliked or unsought by oneself, it is argued, is apt to be similarly regarded by other living beings. Cf. K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London, 1963, p. 442.

41 *Op. cit.* p. 13.

42. And it is all the more so because Schweitzer's own call for " reverence for life ", as I shall indicate in section IV of this article, is very close to the spirit of *ahiṁsā*.

43. Cf. G. B. Gokhale, *Indian Thought the Ages, A Study of Some Dominant Concepts*, New York, 1961, p. 175 ff.; S. Radhakrishnan *Indian Philosophy*, London, 1948, vol. I, p. 325 ff.

44. See, C. Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1966, p, 66; cf. W. Norman Brown, *op. cit.* p. 44 ff. Jaina believers were perhaps among the first people in history to organize and maintain shelters, refuges and hospitals for the welfare of animals.

45. Cf. Narada Thera, *The Buddha and his Teachings*, Colombo, 1980, p. 325 ff,

46. See definitions of these terms in the *Pali-English Dictionary* cited in note 1, above.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

47. See E. Hultzsch, ed. *Corpus Inscriptorum Indicurum : I Inscriptions of Asoka*, Oxford, 1925; Vincent Smith, *op. sit.* It might be relevant to note that as E. Conze (Dharma as a Spiritual, Social and Cosmic Force", in *The Concept of Order*, ed. by P. G. Kuntz, Seattle, 1968, pp. 244–245) has pointed out, Asoka's conversion to Buddhism was in an important sense a conversion to the *ahiṁsā* precept which was of course very much a part of the Buddhist notion of *dhamma*. Interestingly enough, a recent discussion allows one to assume that both human rights and animal rights are finally justified in Buddhism on the basis of a common framework of ideas. See, Kenneth K. India, "The Buddhist Perspective of Human Rights" (in *Human Rights in Religious Traditions*, ed. by Arlene Swidler, New York, 1982).

48. See the account on the King Buddhadasa in *Cullavaṁsa*, trans. W. Ceiger and C. M. Rickmers, New York, 1973, p. 9 ff.

49. CW X, p. 399. Mill was inclined to invoke "instinct" to account for the predatorprey relationship and the attendant sufferings; those who adopt the perspectives of the Indian systems will no doubt place *karman* behind instinct itself and emphasize that the sufferings in question are in large measure pre-ordained. Though these metaphysical notions cannot be accomodated within Mill's philosophy, his thinking nevertheless tends to support the view that the sufferings animals undergo in nature are by and large irremediable.

50. CW III, p. 952.

51. Mill argued : "It is by the grossest misunderstanding of the principles of liberty, that the infliction of exemplary punishment on ruffianism practised towards these defenceless creatures, has been treated as a meddling by government with things beyond is province; an interference with domestic life. The domestic life of domestic tyrants is one of the things which it is imperative on the law to interfere with: and it is to be regretted that metaphysical scruples respecting the nature and source of the authority of government, should induce many warm supporters of laws against cruelty to animals, to seek for a justification of such laws in the incidental consequences of the indulgence of habits to human beings, rather than in the intrinsic merits of the case itself. What it would be the duty of a human being possessed of the requisite physical strength, to prevent by force if attempted in his presence, it cannot be less incumbent on society generally to repress. The existing laws of England on the subject are chiefly defective in the trifling, often almost nominal, maximum, to which the penalty even in the worst cases in limited". (*ibid.*)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

52. Mill's practical interest in conservationist causes has been clearly established; in this connection see, for example, Anna J. Mill, "JSM, Conservationist" (*The Mill News Letter*, vol. X, 1975). As will be evident in the sequel, the conservationist stance was principally applied to animals (and plants) in "wild" or "natural" conditions.

53. See, "The Game Laws" (1826) *Essays on England, Ireland and the Empire*, CW VI; letter to Lewis Sergeant (1872) *Later Letters*, CW XVII. Some hints of commisseration for the hunted, however, are not entirely lacking even in "The Game Laws"; in any event, in a later article, "The Claims of Labour" (1845) Mill spoke out against the wanton destruction of animal life by the rich for sport. See, Essays on *Economics and Society*, CW IV, p. 384.

54. Indian systems, I think, would agree with Schweitzer (*op. cit.* p. 47) in maintaining that humans are in no privileged position to fathom the importance other organisms have in themselves or in terms of the larger scheme of things in the universe.

55. It should be recalled that in our foregoing discussion of Mill's ethical stance in the "Utilitarianism" (CW X, p. 214) it was shown that he chose to take the pleasures and pains of animals into account for purposes of utilitarian calculation only "so far as the nature of things allows".

56. See, *Principles of Political Economy*, (I), CW II, pp. 30–31; cf. *Ibid.* (II), CW III, pp. 493–494. Similarly in "The Game Laws" (CW VI p. 111) he characterized game as "an article the price of which is not regulated by the cost of production".

57. *Principles of Political Economy*, (I), CW II, p. 31.

58. I do not mean to suggest here that conservationist stances and the Biblical view adumbrated above are mutually exclusive. It is no doubt possible to argue that man's position at the helm of God's creation indeed entails obligations and responsibilities as well, and that the latter when duly recognized could provide a basis for developing a caring, humane attitude towards animals. The point to be noted, on the other hand, is that conservationism as Mill articulated it does not seem to have had its roots in the above line of thought.

59. Though the theoretical considerations which underlie the conservationsist view-point are outside the purview of this article, it would be nevertheless relevant to observe that those considerations have little to do with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the overt emphases of traditional religions. One central acceptance that inspires conservationist efforts is the view that mankind form only a part of the living world, and that prudential consideration (quite apart from those rooted in ethics) make it important for us to ensure the continued existence of other creatures. The ethical (or perhaps evolutionary-ethical) argument that could be invoked here centers around the idea that the dominant, most highly evolved species (Homo Sapiens) has both a duty and a responsibility to care for the lesser species (apparently on the principle *noblesse oblige*). The positions Mill takes on conservation frequently have their roots in both these theoretical notion. Cf. Mill to Chapman *Later Letters* (CW XVI, pp. 1136-1137).

60. Mill's attraction to nature and natural beauty is often borne out by statements in his *Autobiography*. Cf. E. August, "Mill's Autobiography as Philosophic Commedia", *Victorian Poetry*, vol. 11, 1973. Following his celebrated mental crisis he actually came to stress the value of cultivating one's aesthetic sensibilities. Indeed, Mill noted in his *Autobiography* (CW I, p. 57) that "nothing contributes more to nourish elevation of sentiments in a people, than the large and free character of their habitations".

61. *Principles of Political Economy*, CW III, p. 756.

62. Mill's letters in particular bear witness to his solicitude for the preservation of as much of what wild and untamed nature holds. See Mill to Andrew Reid, *Late Letters*, CW XVII, p. 1651. It should be also observed that 19th century groups that agitated for environmentalist causes enjoyed Mill's support and patronage. Thus writing to Arthur Lankester of the noted : "I have all my life been strongly impressed with the importance of preserving as much as possible of such free space for healthful exercise and for the enjoyment of natural beauty as the growth of population and cultivation has left to us", And reiterating a thought broached in the *Principles of Political Economy* (quoted above), he added : "The desire to engross the whole surface of the earth in the mere production of the greatest possible quantity of food and materials of manufacture, I consider to be founded on a mischievously narrow conception of the requirements of human nature". *Later Letters*, CW XVI, pp. 1140-1141.

63. The theoretical interest in sorting out the moral and philosophical questions relating to animals which has become increasingly prominent recently and the no less evident activism of animal rights campaigners need to be borne in mind here.

64. Not only James Mill but also the attitudes to compassion fostered by Nietzsche are worthy of recall in this connection.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

65. Whether animals feel pain in the same sense and intensity as man, however, is a moot point. There is always a place for philosophical scepticism here; but doubts can be especially raised with regard to creatures with simple nervous structures, hibernating animals and those which are cold blooded. However, it would be a mistake to think that Indian religio-philosophical antipathy towards killing and injuring is simply predicated on a psychological insight or some biological considerations. Offences against *ahiṁsā* are condemned finally because they tend to thwart the life process, in other words, interferes, in effect, with every living being's rightful desire to be, to live out its existence. There is moreover, something else to be reckoned with : given the operations of *karma* (and the reality of rebirth), killing and injuring in the eyes of the Indian believer was also fraught with untoward consequences.

66. Namely, that animal pain is real, and that it is undesired (and hence to be avoided).

67. It might be useful to reiterate that the metaphysical ideas which support *ahiṁsā* (*karma* and rebirth in particular) were of course never entertained by these secular philosophers.

68. The " thinning " of heards and the artificial control of animal populations might be cited as examples in this connection.

69. Cf. T. Goodrich, " Morality of Killing " *Philosophy*, vol. 44, 1969.

70. The demand, in question, it must be observed, looms large in recent discussions relating to our duties to animals. Cf. P. Singer. *op. cit.*

71. Soul searching and self recrimination concerning the way man treats animals is not unknown even in circles where *ahiṁsā* or anything like it is virtually unknown. In this connection see, for example, Upton Sinclair's poignant reflections on animal suffering that accompany his harrowing account of slaughter house scenes in *The Jungle*. Indeed, the desire to see animals dealt with kindly and fairly is just as widespread as the feeling of pity for their suffering. The strong plea of " reverence for life " made by Schweitzer, a Westerner notably committed to Christian values again points to the fact that the attitudes which sustain *ahiṁsā* have an appeal and a relevance outside the milieu where they first took root. Schweitzer (*op. cit.* pp. 31–41) has observed perceptively that reverence for life arises when " intelligence operates on the will for life " and has located " all the components of ethics " within this central principle. Indeed, " to the truly ethical man ", he insisted, " all life is sacred, including forms of life that from the human point

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of view may seem lower than ours". Bemoaning the scant attention paid to animals by most of the West's traditional thinkers, he has also stressed, it is worth noting, that "it is incumbent upon each and every one of us to do all possible good to non-human life". (*ibid.*, pp. 47–49).

72. Cf. B. G. Gokhale, *op. cit.* p. 175. However, this must not detract one from recognizing the fact that Indian rulers like Asoka (as indicated above, section III) indeed sought to enforce the observance of *ahiṁsā* socially. Still, as I. B. Horner (*op. cit.*) has indicated, killing of animals never ceased in India, although those involved in it (hunters, butchers, trappers and the like) never won much social acceptance there.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 2
April 1988

THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY OF OBJECTS IN HUME'S PHILOSOPHY

An attempt is made by D. C. Daniel to make out the instructiveness of Humean arguments as regards the problem of identity of objects in the *Indian Philosophical Quraterly*, Vol. XII, No. 2, April 1985. He says in his paper, ignoring the defects of Hume's view, "I would like to make an attempt to bring out the instructiveness of Humean arguments as regards the problem of identity of objects".[1] But when one reads Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*, it can be understood that it is not instructive account of identity; it is only a destructive one. In this article, I attempt to show the defects of Hume's understanding of the concept of identity.

Hume not only discusses the problem of identity of objects but also the problems of personal identity. So his discussion of the former cannot be isolated from the latter; for this reason the analysis in this article is related to both the aspects. Let us try to explain the problem of identity of objects in philosophical discussion. The concept of identity of objects assumes the possibility of identifying an object when referred to under one description, say as the object possessing the feature F, as the same object as is referred to under another description, say as the object possessing the feature G, and most important the possibility of identifying an object referred to as possessing the feature F at time t as the same object as the object referred to as possessing the feature G at the time $t + n$. For example, it

Received : 8-10-86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

assumes the possibility of identifying an object existing through a period of time and as the same object although with changing characteristics. In other words, in terms of P. F. Strawson ..... identifying (a particular) involves thinking that something is the same (particular): that the particular copy I see in the speaker's hand is the same particular as that to which he is referring; that the copy in his hand is the same particular as the copy I bought yesterday.[3] According to Bernard Williams "The standard form of an identity question is "Is this x the same x as that x which..... ?".[4] For Sydney Shoemaker: "As it is normally used in discussion of personal identity, and as I shall use here, the term "identity" implies persistence i.e, the existence of one and the same thing at different times[5] The above formulations of the problem clearly clarify that the philosophical question which arises is that of the logical status of this assumption as to what constitutes the continuing identity of the object. In other words, in the more formal mode, what is the criterion which logically constitutes the identity of objects David Wiggins describes it in the following way: "By a criterion of identity for the fs I mean something logically constitutive of the identity of fs, and potentially analytical of what it is to be an f. A criterion C only qualifies as the criterion for 'f' if the satisfaction of C logically implies the satisfaction of a transitive, symmetrical and reflexive relations, even though the empirical tests for the satisfaction of C need only preserve "de facto" this equivalence property of "f".[6] If Hume's view is an instructive one, he should provide a criterion for the identity of objects, which assumes the possibility of identifying an object existing through a period of time and as the same object although with changing characteristics. Now let us see how Daniel attempts to analyse Hume's view. following the simple explanation of the problem of identity: "Hume tries to explain the identity of objects with the aid of a single sentence, namely 'an object is the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

same with itself'. "We may observe (Hume says) that the view of any one object is not sufficient to convey the idea of identity. For in that proposition, an object is the same with itself, if the idea expressed by the word, "object" were no ways distinguished from that meant by itself; we should mean nothing, nor would the proposition contain a predicate and a subject, which however are implied in this affirmation. One single object conveys the idea of unity, not that of identity." His arguments run as follows: the proposition, 'an object is the same with itself', is meaningless and it does not contain a subject and a predicate. One single object conveys only the idea of unity, but not the idea of identity. Multiplicity of resembling objects too cannot convey the idea of identity since the mind considers the resembling objects to be entirely distinct and independent of one another whatever the number of objects may be. Since both unity and number cannot convey the notion of identity, this notion must be something which is neither of them. But since these cannot be any medium between unity and number, the principle of identity has to be either the notion of unity or the notion of number".[7]

The above view of Hume, as clearly grasped by Daniel, is mainly based on the doctrine of empiricism. On the grounds of this doctrine Hume denies the concept of identity, as a fiction or an invention. Daniel, too admits it: "I think that Hume regards identity of objects as a fiction because he regards continuity as a fiction."[8] If it is so, such a view cannot be an instructive one to solve the problem of identity.

Let us examine how Hume derives such a view. For him a necessary condition of something being one and the same thing is its being unchanged. In other words, the term identity is the same term as "sameness", and when taken strictly can only mean persistence without change. Hume upholding this meaning

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

says that we make a mistake identifying an object as the same through time in spite of its changes. He thinks of identity of objects as a paradoxical notion because it postulates an unchanged changing object. However, Hume says, what we call a thing is changing, but the change is small in proportion to the unchanging part of the mixture and occurs insensibly. As a result of this we are deceived into calling the thing the same in spite of its change. Hume says, "What will suffice to prove this hypothesis to the satisfaction of every fair enquirer, is to show how from daily experience and observation, that the objects, which are variable, or interrupted, and yet are supposed to continue the same, are such only as consist of a succession of parts connected together by resemblance, contiguity or causation. For as such a succession answers evidently to our notion of diversity, it can only by mistake we ascribe to it an identity: and as the relation of parts, which leads us into this mistake, is really nothing but a quality, which produces an association of ideas, and an easy transition of the imagination from one to another, it can only be from the resemblance, which this act of the mind bears to that, by which we contemplate one continued object, that the error arises."[9] Hume's view on identity of objects appears as an instructive one to those who share the view of the classical empiricist philosophers.

If we follow Hume's view, then we have to deny the causal connection of the objects. Daniel correctly regards that Hume's analysis of identity of objects is based on empiricism. "I think that Hume regards identity of objects as a fiction because he regards continuity as a fiction. I would like to conclude that Hume's analysis of identity of objects is in accordance with his meaning-empiricism according to which meaning is a quasi sensory episode."[10] If Hume's view is instructive according to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Daniel it implies that he too is following A. J. Ayer's view that "all significant sentences are strictly empirically verifiable." [11]

"I must explain that for the application of certain concepts it is necessary to structure the very experience in the same terms in which verification, as a theory of meaning, is formulated. Thus, I can only apply verification, in a world in which I can describe my observation, and I can only describe my observations if I can bring my experience within the concept of an observable objective world. The concept of my objective world is the concept of a world of spacial objects whose relationships in time is fully integrated by causal laws. So I cannot accept the empirical theory of meaning, nor need I deny the existence of real causal connection as the basis of it." [12]

According to the above account, an object is nothing but a succession of constantly changing sets of impressions and ideas. Hume comes to this conclusion on the basis of his famous doctrine that what is distinguishable is separable and what is separable exists separately in so far as experience consists of distinguishable perceptions or impressions. It can be nothing other than a succession of such essentially separable but contingently related states of mind. But this leaves him, as he acknowledges, in a paradoxical position; for he cannot explain what relation could hold between such states adequate to explain our logical inability to treat it as not a "real" connexion, such that I am logically unable to be in doubt whether an impression belongs to my biography or someone else's or no-one's. His suggested relations of contiguity, resemblance and causation, if taken as relations between actually separate "existence", then they patently fail to do this job. Hume did not touch upon this problem except to recognise it in his "appendix" to the *Treatise*. There he says, "In short there are two principles which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

them viz., that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existence." [13]

For Hume a metaphysical substance is maintained to explain the continuity of object. He regards this postulation is a fiction or invention to solve the paradox in the notion of identity of objects : " In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some new and unintelligible principle that connects the objects together, and prevents their interruption or variation. Thus, we feign continued existence of the perceptions of our sense, to remove the interruption and run into the notion of a soul and self and substance to disguise the variation.[14]

Can we regard the above view of Hume instructive? Our answer is negative and he himself recognises in his " appendix" to the " Treatise " that the account of identity of objects as well as personal identity to which it commits him is an impossible and incoherent one. But he confesses that he has no alternative to replace it.

There is also a reason why we should not adopt it as an instructive one. If we seriously did so, language and thought become impossible. The only item conceivably capable of answering to Hume's demands for identity (continuous persistence unchanged) would be momentary sense–impressions, logically private objects; but no rules of identifications could apply to such objects. Wittgenstein's discussion of the possibility of a logically private language at least shows this; and no language could be based on references to them.[15]

At the more superficial level of the effect of Hume's criterion on our thought of person, it could of course deprive us of all possibility of personal relations. For instance, " Can Sitā love Rama? And it so, for how long?" Language, thought and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

personal relations are based on the presupposition of the continuity of a person no less in the person of the thinker than in that of the person thought about

When we clarify Hume's view of personal identity, it makes clear the difficulties inherent in the problem of unity of individual consciousness from verification point of view. It also exposes the incoherence of accepting the natural candidate for criterion of strict identity, that "same object" should be "object perceived uninterruptedly as unvarying."

Let us summarize why we regard that Hume's view is destructive. He says that the continuity of an object is a fiction and one object is not sufficient to convey the idea of identity. It is our opinion that he is committed to such a destructive implication since he follows the empirical theory of meaning. This made him to convince himself that his explanation of identity of objects is an incoherent one.

Department of Philosophy
and Psychology
University of Paradeniya
Paradenia (SHRI LANKA)

REGINTON RAJAPAKSA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. See S. C. Daniel : "The Problem of Identity of Objects in Hume's Philosophy", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 2, April 1985, p. 191.
2. David Hume: *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, University Press.
3. P F. Strawson : *Individuals*, Methuen, London 1971, pp. 31–32.
4. Bernard Williams : *Problems of the Self*, Cambridge University, p. 3.
5. Sydney Shoemaker : *Self Knowledge and Self Identity*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1963, p. 2.
6. David Wiggins : *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1971, p. 43.
7. S. C. Daniel, *Ibid.* p. 191.
8. S. C. Daniel, *Ibid.* p. 196.
9. David Hume, *Ibid.* p. 255,
10. S. C. Daniel, *Ibid.* p. 196.
11. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, Penguin Books. 1971, (see Preface to the second edition).
12. Reginton Rajapaksa, "Buddhism as Religion and Philosophy" in *Religion*, Lancaster, 1986, 16, p. 52.
13. David Hume; *Ibid.* p. 636.
14. David Hume; *Ibid.* p. 254.
15. Ludwig Wittgenstein; *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, 1933, see paragraphs 185–280.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 2, April 1988

DHARMAKIRTI ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SVARTHANUMANA AND PARARTHANUMANA

In this paper, we intend to point out that *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* are not two different species of *Anumāna*, as it seems to be claimed by *Naiyāyikas*. Rather, the claim of the Buddhists that it is an aspectival distinction of *Anumāna* seems to be more respectable. The Buddhists seem, further, to be right in holding a view that *Svārthānumāna* alone could be considered to be epistemic condition of *Anumāna*.

Although number of interesting problems arise with reference to the distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna*, I wish to deal only with three of them in what follows :

In the first section, we deal with the question of the need and necessity of making the distinction under consideration. The second section discusses briefly the manner in which the distinction should be made, while the last section hopes to give a clue to understand the implications of the distinction. An exercise of this kind, we hope, would enable us to interpret and understand the distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* appropriately.

Section I : A Need to Distinguish :

Very often one is misled by the view that *Svārthānumāna — Parārthānumāna* classification of *Anumāna* is based on the genuinely distinct kinds of it. For, it is argued that, prima facie, *Svārthānumāna* means inference for oneself, whereas *Parār-*

Received : 17-2-87

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

thānumāna means inference for others.[1] In other words, here *Anumāna* is sought to be classified depending upon the person for whose convenience it is employed. However, there seems to be another aspect also connected with the classification under consideration. It is held that when some inference is put before me by someone else, the cognition or comprehension I get through it is qualitatively different from the one I get on the basis of my own inference. The difference between the two cognitions arises because in one case I am myself involved in the process of inferring, whereas in the other the inferential process is carried out by someone else and a full-fledged argument is put before me which enables me to comprehend.[2] Thus, the distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* seems to be embeded in the distinction between two kinds of cognitions – direct and indirect – held to be made available inferentially, and this seems to be something analogous to a claim with regard to *Pratyakṣa* through which perceptual cognition becomes available either via *Sannikarṣa* or *Pratyāsatti* (i.e. according as whether the perception involved is *Laukika* or *Alaukika*).[3]

Secondly, the difference between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthanumāna* is sought to be explained differently saying whereas the latter is expressed in language, the former is not. That is, whereas in the former, cognition is without communication, in the latter, it is mediated with linguistic modes of communication, although in both communicability of the cognition under consideration should not be sacrificed or ruled out. In that case, while in *Svārthānumāna* the cognition, although communicable would be uncommunicated, in *Parārthānumāna* it would be communicated.[4] Further, holding *Parārthānumāna* to be primary and emphasising communicative aspect of it, it is held that *Svārthānumāna* is an abstraction from *Parārthnumāna*,[5] and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

hence is secondary to it. Emphasising the communicative aspect of *Auumāna Naiyāyikas* seem to put forth another basis of distinguishing between the two.

Before we start critically evaluating these claims it is essential to point out that on the Buddhist side the distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* is made quite clearly by Dharmakīrti, perhaps, for the first time. Though Diṅnāga in his *pramāṇa–samuccaya* seems to have pioneered the distinction and has devoted two separate chapters to their treatment, yet on deeper analysis one can find that the difference between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* was not perhaps sufficiently clear to him. For, by *Svārthānumāna* he means an *Anumāna* without *Vyāpti,* while *Parārthānumāna* is the one with *Vyāpti.* However, one finds it extremely hard to understand how *Anumāna* could be classified into those which have and which do not have *vyāpti.* This classification of *Anumāna* seems to be as unacceptable as Aristotle's classification of living beings into those which have and which do not have blood in their body is unacceptable. The moral to be learnt is that mere dichotomousness of classification does not in itself make it acceptable. Further, what precisely is supposed to be the *Vyāpti*? Is it an *Avayava* of *Anumāna,* something substitutable for *Pakṣadharmāta* or an independent regulative principle of *Anumāna ?* In addition, what sort of *Anumāna* would it be if it lacks *Vyāpti ?* Both *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* are acknowledged to be determiners of inferential cognition, and hence one being replaced by another is out of question. The moment one begins to consider such questions seriously, it is noticed that Diṅnāga's treatment of *Anumāna* does not seem to be backed by appropriate methodological perspective. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, appears to be more clear with regard to such questions. Engagement with nuances of Diṅnāga – Dharmakīrti controversy and its

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

consequences not being our present concern, leaving it aside, we briefly state Dharmakīrti's views regarding *Anumāna*.

Further, it needs to be kept in mind that *Svārthānumāna – Parārthānumāna* classification of *Anumāna* seems to have been adopted by *Naiyāyikas* at a very late chronological stage of their thought. Leaving that aside for the moment, while understanding these two terms, people generally confuse between their meanings and interpretations given to them by adherents of different schools of philosophical thought, and ignoring differences between them they seem to argue that what they mean is the same.[6] This sort of attitude seems to make confusion further worse confounded.

Given the two – above mentioned contentions of *Naiyāyikas*, they need perhaps to be looked into little more critically. In so doing, we may be in a position to unearth some confusion *Naiyāyikas* perhaps were labouring under. They seem to have not paid enough attention to the distinction between conditions which need to be satisfied if *Anumāna* is to stand at all, and those which need to be fulfilled for its being communicated. Further, if *Anumāna* is to be understood as a different mode of cognition than that of perception, then the differential sorts of epistemic conditions which need to be satisfied would have also to be carefully looked into. Instead of this, excessive, if not exclusive, concentration upon communicative aspect of *Anumāna* is likely to distract us from our principal epistemic concern.

According to Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, it is essential to tackle issues and problems connected with *Anumāna* in the framework of *Auumāna* alone. For their treatment and resolution, according to him, appropriate methodological considerations cannot be ignored to be looked into. He seems to be right in holding that while dealing with certain problems, it is necessary

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to pay attention to the context in which they arise, so that we do not treat them wrongly. On this background, as we shall see later, it should not be difficult to understand the way he distinguishes between. *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna.* Prior to it, however, let us critically evaluate the two contentions, mentioned earlier, of *Naiyāyikas.* In this we shall take up the second contention first.

Even Dharmakīrti should have no compunction to accept that while *Parārthānumāna* is verbalised, *Svārthānumāna* is not verbalised.[7] However, merely on this ground he would not accept classification of *Anumāna* based on this. For, both are equally important epistemologically, and they give rise to the same kind of cognition. The inferential cognition. thus, they give rise to being the same, it becomes redundant to consider whether it is verbalised or not. The general nature and form of the cognition under consideration being the same it is purposeless to classify it.[8] Rather, a classification of *Anumāna* upon such a basis would, according to him, be more confusing. Moreover, it does not seem to be backed by any appropriate methodological perspective, as it is seen to be revolving merely around verbalization or non–verbalization issue. Hence, to claim that *Anumāna* has two aspects, non–verbalised and verbalised, is one thing, while to hold that they are two distinct kinds of *Anumāna* is quite another. Two aspects of *Anumānn* could not be said to be presenting two distinct kinds of it. Thus, aspectival view of *Anumāna* would not supply its classificatory foundation.

If not on the basis of verbalised – non–verbalised consideration, yet, it may be argued that *Anumāna* could perhaps be classified properly depending either upon the person for whom it is meant[9] or else upon the differential kinds of cognitions it is alleged to give rise to. On the former count it could perhaps be held that when I derive cognition from my own inference it is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

direct, while the one I derive from an inference communicated to me by someone else is indirect. But according to Dharmakīrti this is erroneous. For, cognition derived from *Anumāna* is always *Parokṣa* (indirect) and never *Aparokṣa* (direct).[10] Hence to claim that *Svārthānumāna–Parārthānumāna* distinction is based on two distinct kinds of cognitions involved must be held to be untenable according to him. There is no way to classify inferential cognition into direct and indirect and accordingly cannot be made basis of any viable classification of *Anumāna*. Additionally, such a move has in it two further inherent consequences : one, it will lead to *Pramāṇa–Saṁplava* which is unacceptable to Buddhists. And two, it would force us to give up consideration of simplicity, not to talk of our embracing a philosophically pseudo classification. Likewise, it seems equally erroneous to classify *Anumāna* depending upon for whom it is employed. For, the only difference that happens to be made is that if I employ *Anumāna* for myself it remains unverbalised, while if I communicate it to someone else it has to be verbalised. But this neither gives rise to differential cognition nor does it supply any methodologically viable basis for classification of *Anumāna*. [11]

Thus, the distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna*, whichever way it is understood, according to Dharmakīrti, does not supply any viable basis of classification of *Anumāna* though it does bring forth two aspects of *Anumāna*. *Anumāna*, whether *Svārthānumāna* or *Parārthānumāna*, would raise the same kind of cognitive or certificatory issues, as the principal kind of cognition involved would be the same.

Instead of making aspects of *Anumāna* the basis of its classification, as *Naiyāyikas* seem to do, Dharmakīrti rightly seems to look for classification of *Anumāna* elsewhere. Thus, for him *Anumāna* is not simple and hence unclassifiable. But at the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

same time it is not aspectivally classifiable, as *Naiyāyikas* seem to think. For appropriate classification of *Anumāna*, according to Dharmakīrti, one has to look to the differential kinds of forms of it rather than to different aspects of it. His classification of *Anumāna* into *Svabhāvānumāna*, *Kāryānumāna* and *Anupalabdhyanumāna* seems to be classification of it in the proper sense of the term.[12] It is beyond the scope of this paper to probe further into it.

Granted that *Svārthānumāna-Parārthānumāna* distinction of *Anumāna* is classificatorily sterile, has this distinction no purpose to serve? As we shall point out below it brings forth an aspectival distinction concerning *Anumāna* which has important implications, although none of them can be basis of any methodologically viable classification of *Anumāna*.

Section II – The Distinction Itself :

Anumāna as a distinct mode of cognition, as compared with perception, has a significant epistemological role to play. Though the kind of cognition it leads to, generally, is the same, the aspects of *Anumāna* are not the same. Further, a certain kind of epistemic priority could be discerned with reference to aspects of *Anumāna* and if it is not properly understood then our understanding of it is more likely to be philosophically misleading. The distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* needs to be understood aspectivally, according to Dharmakīrti, from this point of view. Earlier we saw that while the former of them does not involve communication, the latter does. Now, since the kind of cognition they make available is essentially the same, communicative garb of it in *Parārthānumāna* could not be said to be determinative of the cognitive role of *Svārthānumāna*. In fact, what is comprehended independently of actual communication, although indirectly, could be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sought to be communicated. Hence, epistemological considerations being primarily important, *Svārthānumāna* alone becomes primary. It could be said to be the epistemic condition of *Anumāna*. In addition, constitutive conditions of *Anumāna* like *Pakṣa*, *Sādhya* and *Hetu*, or regulative conditions of *Anumāna* like *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* would have to be fulfilled if it is to stand at all, although bare fulfilment of the latter would not lead to any cognition.[13] The distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* could perhaps be clarified saying that while the former is *Anumāna* fashioned and formulated, the latter is *Anumāna* that is articulated. That is, in the former *Anumāna* is entertained, on the ground of the fulfilment of the legitimate conditions of its entertainment, while in the latter it (i.e., an already entertained argument) is presented in a linguistic garb.[14] The distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* thus understood, may perhaps be clarified along an analogy of a healthy young child in a natural condition on the one hand and the same child dressed up on the other.

Even if the role of *Anumāna* is sought to be understood not merely cognitively but with a view to certifying knowledge-claim on its basis, then too primordiality of *Svārthānumāna* over *Parārthānumāna* does not vanish. For, it is not mere linguistic garb that makes inferential cognition certificatorily viable, but rather its being well-founded, and its being so well-founded must be satisfied on the level of *Svārthānumāna* itself. Thus, even certification would necessarily presuppose cognition and without cognition certificatory effort would be blind. Further, while cognition without justification is possible, justification without cognition is not feasible, and in the case of *Anumāna* or inferential cognition too these two aspects need to be distinguished, which in turn seem to focus on primordiality of *Svārthānumāna*.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Secondly, epistemic aspect is predominant in *Svārthānumāna* while communicative aspect in *Parārthānumāna*. Without language we cannot communicate, although without it we can cognise. But what we communicate needs to be cognised first *Svārthānumāna* gets priority in order of knowing as compared to *Parārthānumāna*. For communicability is a pre–condition of communication and not of cognition. Likewise, cognition does not seem to require satisfaction of the condition of communication as a precondition of it, although what we cognise can never be communicated unless it is communicable.

Thirdly while for *Svārthānumāna* a single individual is, enough, there is no question of resorting to *Parārthānumāna* unless there are at least two persons. Thus, while for *Parārthānumāna* communicative or dialoguical situation is a pre–condition for *Svārthāuumāna, Anumāna* being epistemically able to stand at all is the requisite pre–condition that is required to be satisfied and not its being communicated. The dialoguical and non–dialoguical contexts symbolised by *Parārthānumāna* and *Svārthānumāna* respectively bring forth different aspects of *Anumāna*, though not different kinds of it. This shows that entertainment of *Anumāna* in a non–dialoguical context is perfectly legitimate and hence dialoguical context cannot, as understood by *Naiyāyikas*, be held to be pre–condition of both communication and entertainment of *Anumāna*. *Naiyāyikas* seem to model conditions of entertainment of *Anumāna* upon those of its communication, and they being different, the two aspects of *Anumāna* which prompt it need to be distinguished. Hence, inference need not necessarily imply fulfilment of the condition of dialoguical and debating situation, and so to hold *Parārthanuman* to be primary seems to be a move that is methodogically difficult to sustain.

Incidentally, it is interesting and worthwhile to note that *Svārthānumāna – Parārthānumāna* distinction of *Anumāna* is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

parallel to the *Nirvikalpa – Savikalpa* distinction of *Pratyakṣa*. Considered from the point of view of the minimum conditions which are required to be fulfilled, *Svārthānumāna* in case of *Anumāna* and *Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa* in case of *Pratyakṣa* seem to be epistemologically primary in their respective domains in a similar way.

It is important to look into the implications of this distinction for that would enable us to understand its philosophical worth. It is to the consideration of it that we turn.

Section III : Implications

Without bringing to the light, the pros and cons of the distinction under consideration, the significance of it cannot be judged and acknowledged. Granting that the distinction is backed by methodological and epistemic considerations, its important implications need to be brought to the foreground. Though there are number of implications of it, we will concentrate on some important of them by way of a sample. For, to understand the importance of anything, it is not necessary to focus on each and every point, and it would be enough even if some important of them are considered.

To start with, this distinction enables us to understand and acknowledge the epistemic and methodological considerations involved in the process of inferential cognition. Independently of it we are likely to confuse between these two aspects of *Anumāna*.

Secondly, it teaches us that aspectival distinction need not necessarily supply us a warrantable classificatory clue, and that for legitimate classificatian of *Anumāna* we may have to look elsewhere. This insight of Dharmakīrti is important both epistemologically as well as methodologically.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Thirdly, it teaches us that to bring in the distinction between direct and indirect cognition within the fold of *Anumāna* destroys the very basis of the distinction between perceptual and inferential cognition. The retention of aspectival distinction between them, at the same time, saves us from falling a prey to the doctrine of *Pramāṇa-Saṁplava*, a weak point with *Nyāya* philosophers.

Fourthly, it teaches us that although inferential cognition would have to satisfy the condition of communicability, communicability in itself does not demand fulfilment of the condition of dialogical situation for an argument being entertained at all.

Lastly, it seems to invite us to make two important distinctions with reference to *Anumāna* — (a) its epistemic conditions and (b) its constitutive and regulative conditions, and that it seems to seek us to guard ourselves from a temptation to confuse between them.[15]

Department of Philosophy
University of Poona
PUNE 411 007.

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE

NOTES

1. Anumānam dvividham, svārtham-parārtham ca / *Tarka-samaraha;* Annambhatta; Athalye and Bodas (ed.) Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute: Poona, 1974, Section 45, p. 37 (See also *Tarka-dipikā* and *Nyāya-bodhini* on it.)
   See also,
   Pakṣadharamatā pratipādanena tasyopayogah parārthānumāne / Svārthānumāne tu... saṁbandheti / Udayanācārya, *N. V. T. T. Pariśuddhi*, I. i. 5.
2. Yathā parasamavatānumitikaranam ... yasmād iti vyutpattirdrṣtavyā/ *Nyāya-kosa*, p. 477, or, Anumānam dvividham / Svārtham parārtham/ Svasyaivārthah prayojanam (anumitih) yasmāttat svārtham parasya.. yasmāttat parārtham / *Nyāya-Kosa;* Jhalakikar B. (ed.), Bhāndārkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1978, p. 30.
   See also,
   Athamā bhūvan parapratipādakāh, svapratipādaka...svārthān pratipādayantah / Vācaspati Misra, *Nyāya-Vārtika – Tātparya-Tikā*, I. i. 32

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

3. Svārthānumitim darśayati l ... sannikarṣātkatham vyāptigrahah..... tatparāthānumānamiti tatcchabdenānvayah / *Tarka-dipikā* on *Tarka-saṁgraha*, p. 38

   See also,

   Tad dvividham...yogipratyakṣam, a-yogipratyakṣam ceti / Bhāsarvajña, *Nyāya-Sāra* and *Nyāya-Bhūṣaṇa* on it – Tadevam pratyakṣasya..... sthūlārthagrāhakamiti / pp. 100-104.

4. Tathāhi svayameva bhūyo darśanena...pancāvayavavākyam prayunkte tatparārthānumānam...pratipadyate / *Tarka-saṁgraha*, p. 37
   See also,
   Tat punardvividham – svārtham parārtham ceti / ..... paropadeśastu pancāvayavavākyam / Bhāsarvajna, *Nyāya-Sāra* and *Nyāya*-Bhūṣaṇa on it :
   Anye tu bruvate...parārthānumānam bhavatiti / pp. 272-273.

5. Tatra paropadesānapekṣam...parārthānumanam bhavatiti / *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa;* Bhāsarvajna, yogindrānanda Swami (ed.) Sad-darśana-prakāsana – pratiṣthāna, Varanasi, 1968, p. 273.

6. *History of Indian Logic*, Vidyabhūṣana, Satischandra, p. 359. or *Buddhist Logic*, Th. Stcherbatsky, Vol. I, p. 293.

7. Athānumanalakṣaṇe vaktavye...lakṣanamasti / *Nyāya-bindu-tika;* Dharmottara; Shastri, C. S. (ed.); Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Banaras, 1954, Ch. II, p. 21.

8. Tallinge ca vipratipattayah.....vyāpto heturboddhavyah / *Pramāna-vārtika*, Dharmakirti, Swami, Dwarikadas Shastri (ed.). Bauddha Bharati Series, Varanasi, 1968, p. 257 (See also Manorathanandi's *vrtti* on it).

9. Tatastayoh...prākprakārabhedah kathyata iti / *Nyāya-bindu-tikā*, p. 21.

10. Tatra svārtham...tadanumānam / *Nyāya-bindu*, Dharmakirti, Shastri, D. S. (ed.) (with *Nyāya-bindu-tikā*) p. 21.

11. Tatra tayoh svārthaparārthānumānayormadhye...tat svārthānumāna-miti / *Nyāya-bindu-tikā*, p. 21.

12. Tat trirūpatvam, tridhaivasah / *Pramāṇa-vārtika* with Manoratha-nandi's *vrtti*, p. 257.

13. Anumānasya dve ange / Vyāpti-pakṣadharmatāsca iti / *Hetu-bindu*, Dharmakirti; Malavaniya, Dalsukhbhai (ed.) Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda, 1948, pp. 1-2. (See also *tikā* and *Aloka* on it).

14. Trirūpalingākhyānamiti.....iti paramārthah / *Nyāya-bindu-tikā*, Ch. III, p. 46.

   and

   Trirūpalingākhyānam.... prāguktam / *Nyāya-bindu*, Ch. III, p. 67. (See also *tikā* on it.)

15. I am grateful to Dr. M. P. Marathe for his important suggestions.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 2
April 1988

THE COMPARATIVE AND THE CREATIVE

I

I. 1 Every style or school of thought, including philosophy, has its guidelines and goals, its framework and points of reference. Even amongst the various branches of philosophy itself, this is equally applicable. We may wish to know, then, how to compare and contrast the worth of different approaches–besides, of course, deciding whether such an exercise is legitimate in the first place.

A wish such as this is not easy to fulfil. And we shall not endeavour to do so here. Our attempt, if at all, will be to suggest pointers and evaluate the propriety of a particular philosophical approach being considered superior or inferior to another. We consider such an exercise worthwhile because some thinkers are prone to deplore 'comparative' or 'synthesis – oriented' literature as 'inferior' research (or the concern of 'inferior' thinkers). They expound, instead, 'creative' or 'exhaustive one–text oriented' study. In what is to follow, our concern will be to examine, in some detail, how tenable is this argument.

I. 2 We are tempted to psychologize here. The basic skills needed for a comparative work are perseverance, studiousness and some amount of pedagogy. One can do without presenting anything refreshingly new. In fact the major effort involved here is in compilation of what others have written and juxtaposing one idea against another. Whatever chance for genius

Received : 26–10–87

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

exists, thus, is only in how efficiently this is done and whether a significant trend or an important correlation can be pointed out. Obviously, therefore, mediocrity of various levels is very well suited for this type of work. It is essentially a matter of compilation, categorization, working over data already supplied by others. It can easily become a matter of basking in other's sunshine, a case of reflected glory.

The creative thinker, on the other hand, can be a good scholar, or may not. His ability lies in seeking something new and original, in himself and others. Anything pedantic or compilatory, however scholarly, cannot appeal to him if it lacks a thorough going originality or individuality. He is the planner, the policy–maker, the trend–setter; the boss with new ideas, the thinker with vision.

Thus, if the comparative worker is likened to the librarian, the creative worker is the writer of the books he categorizes. If the comparative worker is the efficient head clerk, secretary or accountant who keeps papers and records straight, the creative worker supplies the matter for these papers or records.

This is a ripe situation for the development of hierarchies or the hierarchical attitude of categorizing people. The visionary, the trend–setter considers himself superior to those who follow the vision or the trend. The boss considers himself one–up on his secretary or clerk. And the writer on the librarian.

We believe this simplified analogy can help understand why the so called creative worker considers his work and approach superior to the comparative or synthesis oriented one. To supply this formulation is not to attempt its justification, however. As we shall see presently, there is more to this issue than meets the psychologizing eye.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I. 3 We consider conducting a discussion of this nature important because such an attitude prevails amongst philosophical thinkers of all levels. Some are sceptical of the worth and relevance of comparisons and feel it is easy to be obsessed with it, seeking points of comparison where none may indeed exist. The joy of working out such commonality is a heady wine with which even the best of minds get dangerously intoxicated, something that results in blunting of critical faculties and an inevitable dementia of the intellect. This is indeed a potent argument. It must alert us to the pitfalls of tenuous comparisons, or the dangers of being enamoured of this approach. To that extent, it is valid for obsession with any trend of thought, desirable or otherwise.

I. 4 We shall briefly touch upon this argument later on. Our main concern will be, however, with one of the other trends of thought which is in a similar vein. It concerns those who find reverence for the old, or attempts as synthesis of thought (of the East and the West, for example) anathema to a proper creative attitude, implying thereby it is the latter which should be made one's goal; and the former not be allowed to act as a hindrance. A quotation from one of our thinkers will illustrate this point :

> "Those who argue for synthesis (of approaches) seem to forget that achieving synthesis is *parasitic* on some one else's having produced the materials to be synthesised. Primary creativity consists in generating new ideas, initiating new methods of thinking etc. If synthesising some ideas given by some important Eastern or Western traditions, is to be called creative, it would be creative only in a secondary or *watered down* sense".[1]

We must take up this argument for a closer scrutiny and see if it withstands a battery of questions No one can doubt that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"generating new ideas", and "initiating new methods" are absolutely necessary for creativity. On the face of it, this is indisputable. Our concern will be with the ramifications of this creative attitude, especially those which may not be that desirable, to which we shall not direct our attention.

1.5 What makes us suppose that in every endeavour our major (if not sole) concern should be with searching, presenting or dealing with new ideas or methods? Because, if that be so, what happens to the existing ideas and methods, even those that the 'creative' person himself has used uptil now? Should he go on discarding the old and seeking the new all the time? Or, does he go for the new but still keep some of the old? And if he does so, will it not involve for him a personal synthesis of thought and approaches that will be as important to further his search for the new, as to prevent destabilization and disintegration of his thinking faculties? Because a disjointed personal ideology can be present, but must also lead to fragmentation of thinking. And one wonders whether creativity of any worth can be the product of a fragmented intellect.

No doubt the creative mind needs, at times, to make departures that are radically different from the old, departures that may shake him, and others, from their very foundation by the force of their appeal or relevance. But that need not make us lament the worth of synthesis or comparison. Because even what has been created has to be ultimately incorporated, synthesised and compared; if not with, or for, others, at least for oneself.

In creativity of any worth, it is not new-ness or novelty which should be the major concern. That is only a reflection of attraction for the novel which is the major ploy and weakness of mediocrity. The concern, rather, should be with originality, of which novelty is but one attribute. It involves not just the presentation of ideas and concepts in a different light, but one which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

affords a keener perspective and a better evaluation, understanding or analysis of well recognised works, theories or concepts. Only occasionally does it involve a totally different and radical departure. But it almost always involves the unfettered ability to get rid of the frills and fringes of an issue and concentrate on its basics or essentials – to get to the heart of the issue at stake. Thus, critical acumen of a high calibre becomes an essential attribute and this ability is constantly exercised in the context of others, works, whether in published form or for self-understanding. It must indeed be the rare originality which can function in pure isolation.

I.6 We must also consider another argument. If each thinker plans to give something new and 'creative' all the time, how will there be–or, rather, why should there be any point of communication between him and others? What you say may he new according to you, but my creative urge pursuades me to be interested in what is new according to me. And this is exactly the breeding ground for isolated 'ivory–tower' philosophising that we must attempt to eschew. If we lament the fact that there is poor communication or understanding of works between contemporaries in India, especially amongst philosophers,[2, 3] probably each thinker's obsession with giving something 'new' or 'created' by him all the time, is at its root. This isolated world–viewing is individuality in thinking carried to the extreme. And, if improperly implemented, it can retard rather than help development–and creativity itself.

Our argument, remember, is based on the pursuit of creativity which can cause alienation. We do not mean, thereby, that it must occur in every case. We are sure the creatively inclined can fruitfully combine with others of their kind, share notes, and further this important approach. However, they may, as a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

group, also look down upon the comparative, dismissing them as being concerned only with old, out–moded concepts. While the former attitude is desirable, the latter is equally deplorable. Unfortunately, the two attitudes are not uncommonly present in the same thinker. A case of poor synthesis, perhaps ?

I. 7 Let us proceed further with our earlier quotation. We may accept that there indeed may be a 'primary' and a 'secondary' creativity, wherein the primary is something totally new and secondary that which is based on the old. Atleast secondary creative status is granted to a good comparative or synthesis-oriented work thereby. But why call it 'parasitism' or a 'watered–down' creativity ? Why should anything that is not totally new be automatically considered watered–down ? Or parasitic ? Parasites, we thought, fed on the host source and *debilitated* it. Could we not think in terms of a *symbiotic* relationship in which the creative genius of one needs the exploration of another to help it flower ? This, rather than being parasitic, may be the very manner in which the genius of both is made available to those who would otherwise have been deprived of it. The original thinker is important. But this need not detract from the value of the commentator or translator, or one who works out his worth in the context of others. And to consider him parasitic or watered–down would amount to grave injustice to say the least.

Classics do not get written every day. In fact, writers of classics are as well inspired by the works of others. Even they wish, besides presenting their original thoughts, to recapture the ideas of their preceptors, or earlier thinkers in the field. What should motivate us to consider such works, though secondarily creative, as watered–down ? We can refer here to Plato's *Dialogues,* the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Tulsidās or Kamban, the *Jñaneśvarī* of Santa Jñāneśvara, the philosophical commentaries of Śaṅkara,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Madhva and Rāmānuja, the *Nyāya-Bhaṣya* of Vātsyāyana or the *Nyaya-mañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. These works are not primarily creative. They are secondary in the sense of being based on another, primary, source. But we dare anyone to consider them watered–down just because they are secondary. Or, "parasitic on some one else's having pfoduced the materials" they have elaborated.

In stating certain thoughts, we may over–emphasize some points to make them more striking and, therefore, clear. The need to further creativity in thought, a laudable and worthy concept in itself, may make a writer acclaim it to the rejection/ exclusion of another. But to prove oneself right, it is not always necessary to prove another wrong. And any overdoing of this nature not only causes confusion; it can inculcate, as a fall–out, improper attitudes amongst others who may, consciously or otherwise, get impressed thereby and decide to adopt it as their approach.

I. 8 All said and done, we must concede the distinct possibility that whereas one's mediocrity can be concealed in a comparative study, it is easily revealed in a creative one. The moment anyone seeks a creative status, he makes himself liable to all sorts of probings, searchings and expectations. And mediocrity cannot withstand any of these. But, remember, mediocrity is also an expert at camouflage; and the mediocre thinker has no qualms about masquerading as a creative one by efficiently garbing old, inane thoughts in new attractive phraseology. Mediocrity sometimes also achieves this status by playing the inscrutable : it then becomes the eternal question of who will call the emperor naked.

Such second–rate work may be inadvertently granted the tatus of a genuinely creative one. And the work of a genius

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

may be passed over purely because it is of a comparative or synthesizing nature. We need to guard against the dangers of indulging in either.

Our concern is genuine research and thinking needs to be somewhat better organised. The mind which is allowed to wander freely in pursuit of creativity may chance upon a spring of nectar or an invaluable treasure allright. But it has more chances than not of being lost in a maze. The intellect needs some framework to work in, it needs a freedom that is restrained as well, which knows and works according to its limitations and its strengths. But more of that later.

Under such conditions, it is improper to blame or reject approaches. What we need to do is identify the proper and the improper in them, their strengths and shortcomings. And we need to do this about their followers and propounders too. Our intellectual task should, if at all, be limited to either a genuine appraisal or a faithful articulation. Intelligence does not permit the licence of intolerance.

II

II. 1 Let us proceed further by starting with another remark :

> "(K. C.) Bhattacharya seems to have great fascination for synthesis, and his own philosophising exhibits his very serious and sincere efforts to achieve it in respect of some classical Indian, mainly Vedāntic, and some Western, philosophical, viewpoints, particularly metaphysical. But my feeling is that had (sic) he proceeded in a freer manner, without having been so impressed with the ideal of synthesis, his creativity would have soared to greater heights. Perhaps he would also have become a little more intelligi-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ble. An undue regard for the ideal of synthesis has hindered some other, very competent and thorough scholars, like D. M. Datta and P. T. Raju, who had the necessary equipment, from making any significantly new departure in their philosophising. It is still one of the major causes of the lack of, or low creativity in, modern Indian philosophy. It is also responsible, when it becomes the obsescion of poorer thinkers, for the prevalance of what is called comparative philosophy."[4]

There is a hidden assumption (and a lament) here that both synthesis–oriented work and its later 'degeneration' – comparative philosophy – tends to warp the potential of even great minds (And by potential we mean creative potential and assume that that alone is of any worth).

II. 2 We must admire the concern and appreciate its genuineness. But we shall now come to this whole business of synthesis–oriented or comparative work being effort less worthy of accomplishment. Do we consider a person's "Creativity which soars to greater heights", or, "the ability to make significantly new departures in philosophising", the only proper concern of philosophers of any standing? Why do we expect every worthwhile philosopher to engage himself in creating something new alone? Why can he not also remodel or reevaluate the old in the light of the present, reorient us to classics, critically appraise us of contemporary currents in thinking, and compare them with each other? Why should he consider it below his caliber to do so? Why this prudish priggery, this snobbery that stifles objectivity?

We must reiterate that there indeed are many poorer thinkers who do "what is called comparative philosophy". But that does not mean there aren't equally poor thinkers who may wish others

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(and themselves) to believe that they in fact do creative or original philosophy. And the poorer thinker anywhere has to be exposed for whatever is his worth. To castigate the need or worth of a particular approach because of the incompetance of some of its propounders cannot ever be a worthy exercise. Further, if we feel something has become the major domain of poorer thinkers, that is all the more reason better ones associate with it and weed out the decomposed and the decrepit.

II. 3 We must get certain perspectives straight. In a branch of thought where resolute and basic enquiries are our concern - and we wish to believe philosophy can still qualify for this status–we must not involve ourselves in a holier–than–thou attitude. Our concern, if at all, should be with following honestly whichever approach best suits our understanding and articulation, effectively brings to the fore the potentiality in each one of us, for individual and/or collective benefit, with the qualification that our approach does not automatically negate the worth of, or render inferior, all other similar or dissimilar approaches to the same or other issues (ofcourse provided we qualify this statement with the remark that the approach is pursued honestly). We have no need to despair that K. C. Bhattacharya, D. M. Datta and P. T. Raju (or, for that matter, Radhakrishnan, S. C. Chatterjee and M. Hiriyanna) followed a particular approach. Their genius lay in doing that well. Their genius probably would never have flowered doing anything radically new or creative. And we need regard them no less for not being able to do so.

II. 4 The *avant-garde* wholly new thinker is a dream. You have one in an age. But every age can definitely produce many worthwhile thinkers who know their capabilities as well as their limitations and try to give the best possible realising this. It is no use trying to fly with one's hands as one's wings. A man

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

born with wings would be a freak of nature, and such freaks may never be born. And a winged horse exists only in fables. But it is definitely possible for each one to know the span and grasp of his arms. And if we wish to soar high, we need either an aircraft or the skills of a hand-glider. Neither of these can be developed in isolation. They need, besides basic capability and a will to fly, the necessary training and the appliances. Only a proper study of others' works, in which context lies the value of synthesis-oriented and comparative works, can supply both the necessary equipment and the expertise.

When we talk of a certain approach warping somebody's potential and lament its occurence, we assume it to be creative potential that is non-existant or suppressed, and this situation we consider unfortunate. No doubt creativity is worthwhile. But not to the exclusion of other potentials. And to most we may grant sufficient intelligence to be able to realise how much potential of which nature they have, and to be honest in its pursuit and expression Further, the creative potential itself can find expression in various forms, not necessarily original writing or theorizing. Creativity of a high calibre can be as much expressed in a genuine comparative as a genuine original work. And we shall see later how.

II. 5 To lay down limitations does not necessarily mean to limit endeavours (in the meaning of hampering them). Any proper appraisal of effort must involve the former without involving the latter. When the champion weightlifter attempts a record weight, he decides to try one that is more than others allright, but knows fully well how much he can lift and how far he should go. He does not limit himself thereby : all that he does is knowing his limitations, he tries to reach his maximum possible limit The moment he wishfully attempts to cross his limitations, not only does he make a fool of himself, he is also

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

liable to hurt himself badly in the bargain. And what applies to physical weight need not be inappropriate, in the present context, to the weight of ideas and concepts. After all, both deal with human endeavours and peak achievements.

We must lay down realistic limitations to our ambitions. To lay down limitations, properly done, means to be realistic in expectations, to set proper goals of achievement. Attempting to soar in creativity because of the ambition of heights can be disastrous without the capacity to sustain it. And one can be rudely jarred by the resultant fall. This can cause more personal hurt than the ridicule or scorn of others–it can result in disenchantment with long held convictions, in reaction formation, intellectual dispair and, worse, ideological death.

II. 6 We must indeed understand that every style of thinking has a worth. And a limited goal and scope. This is applicable both to creative as well as comparative thinking much though the creative thinker may like to convince himself otherwise. Let us here present what basically is this worth :

i) The person who creates seeks freedom of expression and hence experiments with various modes of articulation. Temporal correlation and consistency may be the hallmark (and the pursuit) of synthesis–oriented and tradition–bound work but it cannot act as a limiting factor to creativity. And yet, even for the creative there is a framework which he decides on, atleast for a particular point in time and in a particular context. He may consider himself free to reject it later, or to reaccept what he may have earlier rejected. But, at every point in time something akin to a framework must exist. This framework is wider, more elastic compared to others, and sometimes appears boundless. Agreed. However, in every case it cannot but exist.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Wherever it doesn't, there can only be, at best, a florid chaos.

ii) The comparative thinker, on the other hand, uses his capacities for the benefit of others. He mixes the water in the flour and prepares the dough; he separates the chaff from the grain and renders known what is ingestible: he makes intelligible that which is the pleasurable and that which is of the nature of noxious cocktail (without allowing us to spoil our taste: and sometimes he is even able to remove the noxious element and make the cocktail not only potable but refreshingly pleasurable.) His expertise rests in the ability to know proportions and mix or sift accordingly. His accomplishment is as much in the beauty of parallel concepts sufficiently juxtaposed as the clarity with which each thought is expounded. And the ability to be unswayed by personal or geographic leanings, by emotive or ethnic appeal, or by the misplaced esteem of an authority. To be as ungrudging in the exposition of strong points of linkage as the weaker ones; and to avoid both a benign tolerance and an aggressive or blind fervour. To expound, atleast in some measure, the undercurrent without over or underplaying the overt. And in all circumstances keeping a clear perspective of how far the comparison is data based and when it becomes speculative, as well as when this speculation is justified and when not so; and being enamoured of neither. Such tight–rope walking needs as much the level–headedness of a governor as the supple hands of a sculptor. Herein lies the unending possibilities of discovering unearthed nuggets. It would be a poor exercise, indeed, to prevent oneself the enjoyment that can result from genuine appreciation of a good critical and comparative work. And we really connot but lament

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the fate of the thinker who does not have the ability, or denies himself the opportunity, to carry this out.

III

III. 1 We shall now take up another refrain In its essentials, it asserts that a genuine philosophical work of any worth can result from the study of others' texts; but, rather than think of comparison or synthesis, one should concern oneself, more appropriately, with the indepth study of any one text. Thus, a true and proper approach would result which is holistic. One would be able to avoid a patchwork or partial study of different ideologies that can otherwise occur in a comparative work. Comparison of parts, without consideration for the whole, results in distortion and inaccuracy.

III. 2 There is no doubt that, in competent hands, an indepth study of any one text can give rise to a scholarly work in its own right. But we see no reason to suppose that for this one should take it for granted that an indepth study of only *one* text is possible, or necessary. One may consider the indepth study of more than one text (as needed for genuinely comparative purposes) practically impossible, and therefore improper. But why should it be impossible in the first place? What may not be possible for one with a particular orientation may be perfectly possible for another with another. There are not a few who have been discouraged, or have discouraged others, from taking up comparative analysis of certain works precisely because of the fear that it may be impossible to carry out in an indepth manner Their argument is that to do justice to even one major text requires a life-time; where, then, is the question of taking up more than one, or comparing and contrasting, which can only follow after indepth study of both? Whatever is impossible for one self is immediately considered applicable to others.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

What is probably meant, thereby, is, if he had to do it (or, better still, if the person, as understood by him, had to do it), this state of affairs would prevail. But then, this judgement may be inaccurate. In fact, disuaders have been proved wrong time and again by the potential and genius of human endeavour which can break most barriers in the field of achievement if it sets its heart upon it. When we call something impossible, and therefore improper, we lay a judgement of impropriety based on an evaluation of possibility. And if our evaluation be proved wrong, our judgement automatically stands to question. The claim may appear ambitious when we say both an indepth study, and later a comparison, is possible for more than one major text at the same time. But ambitious are there precisely because achievement can follow. Realistic appraisal need not necessarily be sceptical.

We may, therefore, agree, for the present, that an indepth study of more than one text is possible and a comparative study so based on them can be an acceptable proposition.

III. 3 Let us now turn to one of the other arguments. This concerns those types of comparative studies which may not be the result of an indepth study. Here, one is less likely to have a holistic approach. Thus, one may be unable to evaluate the particular idea or concept one wishes to discuss or compare in the total perspective in which it is expressed. This can lead to inaccuracy in thinking and articulation.

The argument as to what is important, the whole or the part, has had a long and chequered (some would prefer to call it ignominous) career in the history of philosophical thought. And one can still feel its reverberations in the social sciences, in psychology, psychiatry and other branches of medicine as well.[5] By itself, there is no doubt that a holistic approach to any

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

problem gives us the best chance of judging it properly. But we must concern ourselves, as well, with the problem that arises when it is used in every situation, as a dogma or a creed. If one considers that for gaining proper knowledge, everything should always be viewed holistically, we may land ourselves in error beside losing the power to appreciate the worth or beauty of parts. And even a work which lays no pretensions of trying to conduct an indepth study can sometimes yield a brilliant appraisal or comparison of the beauty or powers of its parts. The least we can do is not shut our perceptive apparatus to the possibility of this happening, whatever may be our inclinations as to probabilities.

In an exclusive concern with the holistic approach, there can, further, be the danger of being unable to appreciate smaller merits that may be mixed with larger demerits, or *vice versa*. The crippled walk may make one lose the ability to observe the beauty of the accompanying face. One can even go to the extent of saying that a vicious scar on the forehead should not prevent us from appreciating the beautiful proportion of a finely chiselled nose or delicately formed lips. The holistically inclined can definitely dispute the contention whether a person who is crippled can ever be considered beautiful even if she has a beautiful face because, when one says beautiful one means beautiful as a whole. But should our concern with here also being a cripple prevent us from observing the beauty of her other features, oven in the feace of the fact that she may be a cripple? At times, therefore, the ability to perceive *parts as parts*, and as distinct from the whole, is specially important. And this is the worth that any genuine comparative work, even though lacking an indepth study, can attempt to further. This is also the skill any such researcher must develop if he wishes to prove worthwhile. In fact, the ability to perceive parts as parts

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

may be central to a good comparative philosophical approach (which also explains why such an approach may be anathema, conceptually, to the holistically inclined).

III. 4 We shall carry this discussion a little further. Many a times, extreme importance to the whole can lead to a total or partial neglect of the subtleties and nuances of the parts and the unique features of their inter–relationships. We are free to consider this irrelevant if we wish; but we will not gain a proper perspective of the issue if we do so. Now, we may say here that we have listed above what may be described as improper holistic, the danger of applying it in every situation or, citing of exceptions to disprove a rule. We can very well say that a properly oriented holistic approach, to once again go back to our old example, should make us say, 'Here goes a cripple. But see how beautiful is her face'. Or, 'Here is a person with a beautiful face; but look, alas, she is also a cripple!' In a similar vein, there can be an improper emphasis on parts, for example, when we say, 'So what! she has beautiful features: can you not see she is basically a cripple?' Or, 'So what if she is a cripple. I can only see her face and that is beautiful.'

We would much wish the remark, 'Here goes a cripple with beautiful features', accurate as far as the meaning goes, not make us derogate the beauty of the features because of the crippled walk. This need not, but very well can, happen. And we would also wish appreciation of the beauty of particular features not limit the ability to perceive the crippled nature of the walk. Thus, in our opproach, we have to guard against improper holistic as well as improper partial approaches.

III. 5 Having said this, however, we must qualify that at certain times, our focus of attention and genuine ability to appreciate may be based on our ability to de–link the part from

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the whole and perceive it as such. The joy of contemplating the beauty of a face need not be marred by the despair of sympathising with the crippled walk. It may not be factually incorrect if we do so, but we wonder if it would be proper because we limit, thereby, our ability to appreciate the subtleties and nuances of the part as a part. And it would be specially improper where the ability to appreciate the beauty of a face has to be carried out in comparison with other beautiful faces. In such a situation, not only is it irrelevant to consider that such-and-such a beautiful face belongs to a cripple, it is improper and likely to bias judgement. One may find it difficult to avoid getting positively or negatively inclined toward the individual as a cripple and this would warp one's judgement about her as a beauty. In any comparative situation, therefore, the ability to appreciate the part as a part, to de-link it from other parts, as well as the whole, may not only be advisable : it may be positively essential. And our example from aesthetics need not be irrelevant to epistemology, or for that matter any other branch of philosophy. A judicious sense of proportion and beauty of juxtaposition are highly relevant to any proper comparative of synthesis-oriented situation in any branch of thought, philosophical or otherwise.

IV

IV. 1 Both creative and comparative works can be mediocre as they can be good. There is no reason to accept a mediocre so-called creative work as anything better than a good comparative one just as there is no need to consider a good creative work more important than a good comparative one or *vice-versa*. Both approaches have their frames of reference and their goals. Within their framework, they are equally important and relevant. Each approach, further, has its worth and its limitations. And none need be considered wholly proper or improper. They have their points of relevance, as their points of irrelevance. Our task

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

needs to be to differentiate between them and to understand these points of relevance and irrelevance. Anything in the nature of which approach is superior and which inferior is not only an essay in futility, it results in mud–slinging and banter, and reeks of chauvinism, to say the least. In its more extreme forms, it results in intellectual racism and apartheid. Advocation of the creative or the 'one–text indepth study' approach rather than the 'comparative' or 'synthesis oriented one' (or *vice–versa*) may be all right at the personal level, if it suits the individual thinker's style or allows him a proper articulation. But that need not prevent him from realising that there can be other, and equally worthwhile, approaches to a genuine understanding. Any attempt to project one approach to the exclusion of the other leads to regimentation of thought which is contrary to proper philosophizing, and creativity itself.

IV. 2 Further, there is as much scope for the comparative and synthesis oriented approach in creative work as the need for the creative in a comparison or synthesis oriented one. Comparative philosophy can, as well, be creative. And creative philosophy has nothing to lose by being comparative.

And this is no cliché.[6]

141, Shivakripa,
Opposite St. Mary's Convent,
Nahur Road, Mulund (West)
BOMBAY–400 080.

AJAI R. SINGH
and
SHAKUNTALA A. SINGH

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. Rajendra Prasad; "Svaraj, Reverence and Creativity" *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct. 1984, p. 509. Emphasis and parenthesis added.

2. Rajendra Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 503 : "To ignore the work of contemporaries, to complain of their uncreativity without discussing their views, is a delightful pastime of modern Indians, particularly philosophers."

3. "Only rarely do we in India ever take other's work any more seriously than passing amusement . . ." Dharmendra Goel, "K. C. Bhattacharya's Svaraj in Ideas : Some Reflection", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct. 1984, p. 423.

4. Rajendra Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 509, Parenthesis added.

5. Note how the Structuralism of Wilhelm Wundt was attacked by the holistic approach of Max Wertheimer and wolfgang Kohler's Gesjalt Psychology and still finds its echoes in the Gestalt Approach of Frederick Perls and his followers, the approaches of Andras Angyal (Holistic-dynamic), Abraham Maslow (Expanded Psychology) and Gardner Murphy (Eclecticism with a difference). How also the partially oriented approaches of John Dewey and James Angell (Functionalism), and John Watson and other's (Behaviourism) attack both Structuralism and the Gestalt Approaches. And each one of them is, atleast partially, on the right track.

   Note also how in Psychiatry, the Psychobiologic approach of Meyer and Bio-psycho-social model of Engel – both proponents of holistic approaches–find themselves at logger heads with the biological, the behaviourist and the psychodynamic schools – all of which, though partially oriented, have a lot of worth. In fact, it is the latter schools which, at the present time, not only have greater number of followers and proponents but have led to significant contribution in understanding abnormal human behaviour. While the first part is more a comment on their popularity rather than basic worth, the latter part can hardly be dismissed as of no consequence.

6. Paper presented to the 16st Annual Session of he Indian Philosophical Congress held at Jadavpur University, Calcutta-700 032 in Oct. 1986.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 2, April 1988

GILBERT RYLE'S CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

Ryle's significant contribution to philosophy is his work *The Concept of Mind*. His thoughts were initially not appreciated by some of the philosophers. Some critics held that there is no central theme in his work and it is only a destructive one. However, these objections are baseless. Ryle's main target of *The Concept of Mind* was undoubtedly the cartesion dualism, but, at the same time, he also attempts to analyse the problem of knowledge, the concept of philosophy and provides a fresh thinking about philosophical problems. William Lyon correctly states Ryle's position when he says, 'Ryle was very much preoccupied in his early work with a single problem viz., the nature of philosophy, and in his later years mainly with applying what he thought to be the correct method of philosophising to one very definite target, cartesion dualism.' Some philosophers thought that the first task of philosophers is to define the nature of philosophy. As Wittgenstein pointed out that if philosophy is not a natural science then it should be defined philosophically. According to Ryle, lot of confusions can be removed only by defining the concept of philosophy. He tries to explain the concept of philosophy in his own manner. For Ryle philosophical statements are not principally lexicographical like 'Bachelor is an unmarried man'. They are also not like mathematical propositions like $2+2=4$, but they are second–order statements. About philosophical statements Ryle writes that philosophical statements "are condemned to be uninformative

Received : 12-11-86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

about the world and yet able, in some important way, to be clarificatory of those propositions that are informative about the world, reporting no matters of fact yet correcting our mishandlings of reported matters of fact."[2] The task of philosophy is to teach us the correct use of ordinary language, as Wittgenstein holds that it is not to ask for a meaning but to ask for use. Philosophy is a method of revising misuges of ordinary language and theories in which false conclusion is derived from the surface structure or logic and the surface meaning of ordinary language. Ryle says that philosophical problems are not of an ordinary sort but they are problems of a special sort. Philosophy, therefore, for him is the replacement of category–habits by category-disciplines. The problem of philosophy is to reduce the surface grammar or surface logical structure of ordinary language and its apparent meanings to its fundamental grammar or its '*true logical form*. He first attempted to clear some previously held false arguments from the field of philosophy. Like Wittgenstein he says that the task of philosophy is not to make theories but it is an activity of clarifying the meaning of ordinary language and correcting misuse of it. Whereas for Wittgenstein the task of philosophy is to free a fly from the fly bottle, for Ryle the task of philosophy is to free them from conceptual traffic jams Both Ryle and Wittgenstein agree that the task of philosophy is therapeutic by which we can cure muddled thinking. Both say that the business of philosophy is not to discover new empirical truths but to rearrange our language and analyse it in a correct way. P. F. Strawson also accepts this positions. He says, "if there are no new truths to be discovered, there are old truths to be rediscovered."[3] According to Ryle the task of philosophers is not to say any thing about unknown objects, but to say some–thing clearly about that which is not clear in import. For him, "Philosophers do not make known matters of fact which were unknown before. The sense in which they throw

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

light is that they make clear what was unclear before, or make obvious things which were previously in a muddle. And the downing of this desiderated obviousness occurs in the finding of a logically rigorous philosophical argument."[4]

In order to establish this point Ryle says that the false statements and incorrect arguments lead us to misunderstandings concerning correct meanings and contradictions. Without knowing the inner structure of the propositions and the correct meaning of the words the correct conclusion cannot be drawn. And that is the reason why some philosophers falsely belive in incorrect arguments as correct arguments and make philosophy more complicated and puzzeled. Ryle tries to replace these arguments and misunderstandings with good arguments and proper understanding.

If philosophy is a genuine branch of knowledge, its meaning should be clear and apparent. For Ryle the role of philosophy is not only clarifying ordinary language propositions, but to properly categorise them. He writes, "The philosopher may, perhaps, bring by wondering about the categories constituting the frame work of a single theory or discipline, but he cannot stop there. He must try to co-ordinate the categories of all theories and disciplines"[5] Thus philosophy is not a scientific induction; neither is it the business of philosophy to search facts. Philosophical arguments are also not deductive. It is not deduction of theorems from axioms or postulates like geometry. Philosophical statements are also not lexicographical and mathematical. The question is, if philosophy is an activity then what type of activity is it? Ryle says that if there is any philosophical statement, it must be placed in other category. Philosophers test statements or theories not by observation or experiment, nor by analysing facts, but by showing that they contain latent contradictions or entail infinite regress. Thus, the main purpose of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

philosophy, according to Ryle, is to take first of all a proposition and consider it within the frame–work of some discipline or other and then examine it whether its meaning and real logical form can be grasped or not. Philosophers seek whether propositions and their meaning or concepts 'lead directly to logically intolerable result or not.' In case meaning and theories are not grasped properly then they are certainly paradoxical and pseudo–propositions and give us absurd conclusion. Theories and concepts are logically sound if they fit in with well–established concepts and theories with which they are connected. Ryle writes, "like a geographical survey, a philosophical survey is necessarily synoptic. Philosophical problems cannot be posed or solved piecemeal."[6] This is why Ryle's philosophical view is known as mapping the logical geography of concepts.

For Ryle philosophers work on two stages. In the first stage, they scrutinise and test a theory or concept to see whether it leads to logically intolerable results or not. In the second stage it is to make sure that in seeking out the correct logical from of the propositions or logical powers of concepts, one should not be misguided by grammar or the surface logical structure of ordinary language. In Ryle's words, "concepts and propositions carry with them no signal to indicate the logical types to which they belong. Expressions of the same grammatical patterns are used to express thoughts of multifarious logical sorts."[7] For example, from the verb 'exist' one may deduce wrong conclusions. There are three sentences where the verb 'exist' (or is) is used: 'There exists a cathedral in oxford', 'There is a three engined, bomber', and 'There is a square nu mber between 9 and 25'. There are three existences to which they respectively refer: a building, a brand of aircraft, and a number; but only the bulding exists in the sense of an observable material object in the world while the other two exist only is concepts

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As observed earlier for Ryle the philosophical statements are neither lexicographical nor analytical like mathematical statements. They are rather statements about sentences which are not known by observations, but known by reference to the logical properties of concepts and the proposition expressed in the sentences. Ryle illustrates this by giving an example. A form of a paradigm philosophical statements is, for example, 'The sentence S is misleading is that its grammar suggests that the phrase X which is in S, is an expression of logical type when it is not' Let us take a complicated sentence 'Jones hates the thought of going to hospital.' It is a sentence which misguides because of its grammatical structure. There is another sentence 'Jones hates Smith.' The phrase 'the thought of going to hospital' of the first sentence is a referring expression like the expression 'Smith' in the second sentence, but as a matter of fact it is not. In the typical philosophical statement the sentence 'Jones hates the thought of going to hospital,' should be analysed as 'whenever Jones thinks of going hospital he is distressed.' This restatement is the correct logical form of it. Thus Ryle advocates that a paradigm philosophical statements always restates the grammatical form of a statement and makes clear its actual logical form and correct logical category.

The paradigm philosophical statements are comments about the logical form of sentences and are *apriori* according to Ryle. Therefore, the paradigm philosophical statements are not statements about the world, but are statements about statements about the world, or we may say that philosophy is talk about the world. Hence, philosophical statements are second order enterprise.

For Ryle to remove contradictions and misunderstandings of the logical form of the statements and restate the logical forms by giving logical arguments is not the only task of paradigm

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

philosophical statements. Apart from this, these paradigm philosophical statements restate and describe the logic of concepts. Therefore, the activity of philosophy is mapping the logical geography of concepts and show their relations with other concepts in connection with the basic one.

Thus philosophy does not only deal with propositions or concepts and their logical froms but it is also searching the way of correctly handling of ordinary language which leads thinkers to believe in the entities which do not exist. In other words, ordinary language leads to incorrect ontological beliefs, and it is the task of philosophy to show dangers inherent in such beliefs.

Regarding Ryle's view about the concept of philosophy one may ask a question : Is it a descriptive thesis which shows how philosophy has been carried out ? Or is it a normative thesis which tells us not what philosophers in the past have done and now we are doing but rather the way philosophy should be done. For Ryle, as observed earlier, it is not the task of philosophy to describe. In the past Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz told that the task of philosophy is to search out the selfevident first principles from which a certain conclusion could be deduced. Locke and Hume based philosophy exclusively on empirical grounds and according to them the task of philosophy was to know the limit of human mind and its powers of knowing and perceiving the empirical objects. In the contemporary period most of the analytic philosophes believe that the task of philosophy is to describe. Phenomenologists say that the task of philosophy is to describe the phenomena. Existentialists, on the other hand, say that philosophy is neither descriptive nor analytic, but it is humanistic. According to them the task of philosophers is to know the human existence and personality through one's choice, committments, emotions, anxiety and dread etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Ryle says that the descriptive enterprises are not for philosophers. For him philosophy is normative. Presently many philosophers are trying to restate the thoughts of the past philosophers. This is done more in Rylean fashion in the sens that such attempts are directed at searching out conceptual frameworks of the concerned philosophers and articulatring directions of their doing philosophy. This kind of exercise may bring forth new questions and novel directions of looking at them. As Ryle himself pointed out. " Genius shows itself not so much in the discovery of new answers as in the discovery of new questions. It influences its age not by solving its problems but by opening eyes to previously unconsidered problems. So the new ideas released by genius are those which give a new direction to enquiry, often amounting to a new method of thinking " [8]

GAYATRI SINHA

Philosophy Department
Rani Durgavati University
Jabalpur-482 001. (M. P.)

NOTES

1. William Lyons, *Gilbert Ryle : An Introduction to his Philosophy*, p. XI.
2. Gilbert Ryle, (ed) *The Revolution in Philosophy*, p. 5.
3. P. F. Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 9.
4. *Collected Papers*, Vol. 2, p. 166.
5. *Gilbert Ryle*, *Collected Papers*, Vol. 2, p. 195.
6. Gilbert Ryle, *Collected Papers*, Vol. 2, p. 202.
7. *Ibid*, p. 400.
8. Gilbert Ryle, *Collected Papers*, Vol. 2, p. 21(

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharyya's** philosophical thought; and includes his own final formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose, P. K. Srivastava (et al).**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation). **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective' Attitudes as Alternatives : A study of professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's view of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy : Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy : A Critical Study), **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattacaryya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, PUNE 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri
Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 2
April 1988

SOME REFLECTIONS ON KALIDAS BHATTACHARYA'S "THE INDIAN CONCEPT OF FREEDOM."

The purpose of this paper is to take a critical and explanatory notice of the late Professor Kalidas Bhattacharya's views on 'The Indian Concept of Freedom.' This topic constituted a part of his Hirendranath Datta Memorial Lecture at the Jadavpur University published in the *Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture,* September, 1971. Now it is published in a book form by the Jadavpur University, Calcutta.

Dr. Bhattacharya's account opens with a classification of various types of freedom, such as freedom as Transcendence, Moral freedom, etc. In connection with the discussion on the concept of freedom as transcendence, he poins out that: "... a real free agent who chooses not to submit to empirical pressure—whether it be from outside circumstances, or from another person or persons, or from the agent's own inclination and passions and bodily disturbances" (p. 351 of the Bulletin)*. This, he says, is freedom in negative sense. "Whenever man transcends Nature he is so far negatively free, and as and when he positively constructs something, by way of reorganization or not he is free positively." *(Ibid,* p. 351)

It is true that in the negative freedom there is freedom which can never be exercised, while, the positive freedom can be exercised. That is to say, in positive freedom we can do something or simply act. The action following from positive freedom for him, means 're–arranging things of Nature.' It is not

Received : 6-10-86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mentioned whether positive freedom can be exercised in this transmigratory state or after transcending this state. In the case of the former, it is not possible by an ordinary human being living in the midst of the transmigratory state of this world *(Saṁsāradaśā)* [1].

That is why, the positve freedom is, I think, not a real freedom, but only apparent in the sense that each and every action done by an individual being in the transmigratory stage is predetermined by his merits and demerits of this life or of the previous life. So, it is better to call the positive freedom as a *pseudo–freedom.*

This point may be substantiated by another argument. When a man does something by way of reorganising Nature, he is not really free, since his inclinations are or may be due to his passions, desire etc. If it is said that an individual performs an action out of his emotion, the emotion will be the cause of his bondage leading to the non–attainment of freedom. But in the case of the latter one may exercise his own freedom as a *Jīvanmukta* which is elucidated in the concluding part of this paper.

But so far as the negative freedom is concerned, it is, I think, the real freedom which may, otherwise, be called Absolute Freedom. As an individual transcends Nature, he becomes free from any empirical pressure, agent's own ,inclination, passion etc

Further, Dr. Bhattacharya remarks that "A course of action cannot be judged right or good because it is freely accepted." *(Ibid,* p. 353).

This remark may thus be clarified. It has been stated earlier that no action is done freely since the agent acts always under empirical pressure etc. Now, let us reconsider the earlier thesis

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and see whether there is any course of action which can be accepted freely or not. In favour of this view I am tempted to say that the indifferent actions can be described as free-actions. Such a type of action has been taken note of by the Grammarians as an '*Udāsīna Karma*'. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣit has given a good example of *Udāsīna Karma*. It goes like this : *Grāmaṁ gacchanstṛṇaṁ spṛśati* (while going towards village he treads on grass).[1] We may cite more examples : while going through the forest, he tears the leaves, or while talking he is putting a piece of grass in his mouth etc. These courses of actions are freely accepted as no desire or purpose is involved there. It should be borne in mind that as desire is involved in accepting and rejecting an action, it cannot be freely accepted or rejected. Other than these indifferent actions, no empirical act is, I think, free.

In the context of his discussion of Determinism and the concept of freedom Dr. Bhattacharya accepts the view that " All our activities and behaviours, whether in daily life or in rational enquiries, are based on assurance that all events are causally determined " (*Ibid* p. 354). But there may arise problem as to how this assurance is to prevail in future. So far as the present cases are concerned, this view may be taken for granted. But it cannot be foretold that this causal relation will hold good in future. In response to such a retort Dr. Bhattacharya says, " it is an assurance derived inductively from repeated observation that events have been so determined, supplemented by the absence of the knowledge of any event to the contrary " (*Ibid* p. 355). This argument is hardly adequate, as this line of thinking has been avowed by a section of Indian Philosophers such as the Older Naiyāyikas, Advaita Vedāntins etc., but not by the Cārvākas and Navya Naiyāyikas. The Cārvākas hold that the said causal relation can at best afford us probable (but no certain) knowledge of furure.[2] The ' repeated observation' is not considered an

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

absolute condition for determining the causal relation between two objects by the Navya Naiyāyikas. According to them, the causal relation may sometimes be ascertained by a single observation of the co-existence between two objects, supplemented by the absence of the knowledge of deviation [4] As for example "It has this colour, because it has this taste" *(Etadrūpavān etādṛśāt)* and "It has sound, as it is ether." In these arguments the causal relations between 'This taste' and 'This Colour' and between being ether and sound have been ascertained from a single observation of their co-existence, which, of course, should be supplemented by the absence of the knowledge of deviation. Thus Dr. Bhattacharya's notion of causality is not propounded by all Indian philosophers.

While discussing the case of freedom through detachment and practice, Dr. Bhattacharya says: "Detachment is primarily my free refusal to submit to the causal determinats Detachment and practice are on the bridgeway between natural and overnatural—they are constituted of the *Sāttvika* elements of Nature which alone . are capable of ... even successfully leading to the autonomy of the overnatural" (*Ibid*, p. 35)

The abovementioned view may thus be highlighted from the Advaita standpoint. No one can enter into the region of overnatural ignoring the nature or *Prakṛti* or *Māyā*, but one can enter into it after going through *Māyā* or *Prakṛti*. One cannot have any knowledge of the overnatural unless one goes through scriptures, Advaita texts etc. That is why, some of the Advaitins describe all scriptures, individual's reason, mind, sense organs as superimposed, illusory or *Māyā*, through which an individual can transcend this Nature and enter into the world of the overnatural.[5]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It has also been pointed out that our detachment or *Vairāgya* depends on the prominence of the *Sāttvika* element of nature. But how *Sāttvika* element becomes prominent or dominates over *Rājasika* and *Tāmasika* elements of Nature is left untreated and hence, there is a sort of vagueness in the argument. The following clarification may be given in order to remove it The *Sāttvika* element of an individual becomes prominent as a result of having his devotion to God. It may be argued that it is not free from circularity. For, the devotion to God (i.e. an overnatural phenomenon) is the cause of the prominence of the *Sāttvika* element of Nature through which one can reach the world of overnatural. This is not true, for, devotion to God is not an overnatural phenomenon, but it comes under *Prakṛti* or *Māyā* as at this stage there is epistemological duality. But in the world of over–natural there is no duality, as one becomes identified with *Brahman.*

It has been stated that the practice of *Vairāgya* may begin with inspiring an individual 'to deal with Nature again — this time in a free attitude — for the welfare of others; and this welfare of others cannot be a consideration unless it starts with selflessness, unless, in other words, it is *Niṣkāma* from the beginning..." (*Ibid,* p. 358).

In connection with this point, I prefer to adopt an easier method for the welfare of others. As it is very difficult to start with selflessness or *Niṣkāmatā* it is, I think, better to advise an individual to start with his self and to extend the attitude to others. In this way he can cover *all* i. e. *God* as Bhattacharya points out. This extension of Self will serve the purpose of selflessness. In the root of self–extension or selflessness there is 'dedication to God,' God being only another name for all .. (*Ibid.* p. 358). Though the extension of self serves the purpose of selflessness, its prescription has got a social value, as it helps

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to give rise to the Upanisadic idea– 'Self in All' or 'All in Self,' [6] which alone can bind *all* through the thread of brotherlihood and it will be a real social and spiritual welfare of others. It cannot be argued that to bind all through the thread of Self is the result of attachment. For, it becomes possible for a man as he is detached from the worldly affairs, which alone can afford him a real freedom. Moreover, the attachment towards the individual property or worldly affair is stated to be harmful for a man as it binds him, but attachment to *all* i. e. Self is not the cause of his bondage, but becomes the cause of Absolute Freedom. As 'all' has been included in one's Self, there is left out nothing that does not come under *'all'* or *Self* or *Subject* and hence, there is nothing which, being an object, can bind him. So, an individual will attain Absolute Freedom (i. e the real freedom), 'all' being the subject.

In the concluding part of the lecture Dr. Bhattacharya has contended that "(– the Adṛṣṭas –) have to be eliminated through *Bhoga* in succeeding cycles of life ... As for *Jāti*, it means the situation, the set up, in which *one* is born in the next life, and *Āyuṣ* means the span of that life. Why the Indian Philosophers speak only of these three aspects I do not know" (*Ibid*, p 360).

We may try here to give a justification of speaking these three aspects from Indian standpoint in the following way. Dr. Bhattacharya has tried to show that many actions have been excluded from the purview of the concept of *Bhoga*, which means that the *Bhoga* of an individual is predetermined by his *Adṛṣṭas*. He may perform many actions which will not be treated as his *Bhoga* and the result of which will be considered as an additional experience not generated by the *Adṛṣṭas* of the previous life. If all actions are treated as *Bhoga* there will arise a defect called *Akṛtābhyāgama* (when a *Bhoga* is related to a person who is not entitled for this, for not having any merit or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

demerit, it is called *Akṛtābhyāgama)*. In order to avoid this defect, two criteria the *Jāti* and *Āyuṣ* have been put forward so that the *bhoga* is possible in accordance with the *Adṛṣtas* of an individual being of the previous life. *Bhoga* will depend on the duration of life *(Āyuṣ)* also. If a man goes on experiencing suffering or pleasure for a considerable period of time, the burden of experience will be too much, and if he experiences for a shorter period of time, the experience will be too less. Thus, the adequate experience is possible if a particular span of life is mentioned after keeping this requirement in view and hence, it is mentioned specifically. So is the case with *Jāti* or situation in which a man is born and hence, it also deserves a mention separately. But it should be clearly borne in mind that within this specified span of life and situation there may be many actions (other than *bhoga)*, which, not being included in *Bhoga*, generate new *Adṛṣtas*.

The foregoing critical points have been advanced from the so called orthodox point of views, which Dr. Bhattacharya appears to represent and explicate This claim, if true, should create a confusion in the minds of those who are trained in the orthodox fashion. For example, the distinction that he has made between negative and positive freedoms is not usually done in the context of Indian philosophy. Again, there is no one concept of freedom, held in common between the six different schools of thought. What shall we understand by 'freedom'? *Nirvāṇa? Mokṣa*? *Kaivalya* or *Mukti?* All these are fteedoms, yet they are so very different from one another with different presuppositions. It is true that all of them presuppose *Vairāgya* It seems that Dr. Bhattacharya has taken *freedom* in the sense of *Vairāgya*. Because only in the case of *Vairāgya* one can talk about *Vairāgya* from and *Vairāgya* to. Dr. Bhattacharya seems to ignore all these different presuppositions.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The distinction between negative and positive freedom is taken over, so far as I know, from Kant, and Dr. Bhattacharya seeks to apply this distinction to the Indian context. I have some doubts if this could be done in fairness to Indian systems, without ignoring their different motivations and persuppositions. To the best of my knowledge, I shall suggest that the *Hīnayāna* notion of *arhat,* i. e., one who eliminated all passions and suffering, is a sort of negative freedom, while the *Mahāyāna* ideal of *Bodhisattva* or of attaining complete Buddhahood and of non-egoistic striving for the salvation of all beings may be taken to illustrate the notion of positive freedom.

A man whose mind becomes purified through the performance of disinterested actions and who, after realising the whole universe as his own self, becomes self-restraint, can do work for the welfare of the world or propitiation of mankind (*Lokasaṁgraha)* and becomes unattached to it.[7] Such types of action may be considered as the exertion of the freedom i.e. positive freedom. The *summum bonum* of life is not merely the attainment of spirituality and *mukti* for oneself, but service to all *Jīvas* so that they may also enjoy the bliss of Divine life. A free man (*Jīvanmukta*) in his *vyāvahārika* state, works for the welfare of others and his chief characteristic is *Jīvakāraṇya* and *lokasaṁgraha,* which are the positive gains of freedom. Other than these stages there are no other things where they can exert their positive freedom. This phenomenon has been accepted by some schools of Indian philosophy like Vedānta, Mahāyāna Buddhism etc., but not by all. So I have my doubts if the distinction could be made within the domain of other orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy.

RAGHUNATH GHOSH
Department of Philosophy
University of North Bengal
DARJEELING (W. B.) – 734430

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

* Page numbers of the original paper of Prof. Bhattacharya are taken from the *Bulletin*

1. *Tarkasaṁgraha*, p. 27.

2. Commentary on Pāṇini Sūtra–Tathā yuktāṇcānipsitaṁ 1. 4. 50.

3. "Tadetanmanorājyavijṛṁbhaṇaṁ.... dhūmādijñānānantaramagnyā – dijñāne pravṛttiḥ pratyakṣāmūlatayā bhrāntyā vā yujyate kvacit phalapratilaṁbhastu manimantrāuṣadhivad yādṛcchikaḥ" *Sarvadarśanasaṁgrahah*, Cārvākadarśana, p. 2–4.

4. "Bhūyodarśanaṁ tu ma kāraṇaṁ Vyabhicārāsphuratau sakṛddarśane'pi kvacidvyāptigrahāt." *Siddhāntamuktāvali* on Verse no. 137.

5. "Tametamavidyākhyamātmānātmanoritaretarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikāvaidikāśca pravṛttāḥ sarvāṇi śāstrāṇi vidhi–pratiṣedha mokṣaparāṇi".... Śankara; *Brahmasūtrabhāsya;* Adhyāsabhāṣya, p. 50.

6. Yastu sarvāni bhūtāni ātmanyevānupaśyati sarvabhūteṣu cātmānaṁ tato na vijugupsate. *Iśopaniṣad*, 6.

7. Yogayukto viśuddhātmā vijitātmā jitendriyaḥ / Sarvabhūtātmabhutātmā kurvannapi na lipyate" *Śrimadbhagavadgitā*, 5–9.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

GLORY OF INDIA

A Quarterly on Indology

Articles appearing in Volume VIII, Numbers 1–4

David Atkinson	Tagore And Gandhi : The Poet And The Pragmatist
David Frawley	The Image of The Ocean In The Ṛg Veda
R. D. Hegde	The Infidel
S. C. Mathur	The Need For The God-Oriented Concentration
Thaneswar Sarmah	Bhārdvāja(s) In The Ṛg Veda

Plus Book Reviews, Reseach in Progress and other regular features.

Subscriptions	Annual	Single copy	Life
India	Rs. 40	Rs. 12	Rs. 400
Foreign (Air mail)	US $ 22	$ 6	$ 220

Contact :

The Editor,
Glory of India
Motilal Banarsidas, Bunglow Road,
Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 2
April 1988

LANGUAGE AND REALITY IN *BRHADARANYAKA-UPNISAD* AND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S *TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS*

This paper attempts to explicate and compare some ideas about language and reality expressed in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (later to be abbreviated *BAU*) and *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* (later to be abbreviated as *TLP*) in order to show that there is some similarity of approach adopted in two texts.

1. *Substance without form : BAU* holds that the world existed in the beginning in an amorphous condition (*avyākṛta*). It can be conceived as some kind of primordial matter without form. As a result of *Nāma-Rūpa* (i e., a principle of individualization and differentiation) individual and diverse beings and things were created, (*BAU* paragraph 7). *TLP* holds "Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case". (*TLP* 2.024). "What is the case — a fact is the existence of state of affairs" (*TLP* 2). "A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things) (*TLP* 2.10). "Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent" (*TLP* 2.0271). So objects are the subsistents, hence the substance. It is the combination of objects through their forms — "Space, time and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects" (*TLP* 2 0251) — that produces a state of affairs.

The comparison between the preceding ideas given in *BAU* and *TLP* shows that both believe that prior to the individuation and differentiation of things there was substance without form. Wittgenstein holds that such a substance only subsists, whereas no such distinction is made in the *BAU*.

Received: 4-9-86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2. *Process of Individualization and Differentiation :* According to *BAU* it is through the process of individualization and differentiation that things come out from the form less matter. Everything is individualized through *Nāma–Rūpa* i. e. the Name and the Form, " .. Name together with form is a factor of differentiation" (*BAU* paragraph 7). When the primordial matter received particular form it also assumed at the same time name corresponding to it. The nature of such a link is essential. ".. the link which unites the name with the object it denotes is, neither as something conventional nor a social product but something which is indissoluble and which exists by itself and forever." (*BAU* paragraph 7). *TLP* holds that the objects only subsist before their configuration through which they receive their form. "Configurations of objects produce state of affairs (*TLP* 2.0272). "In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another" (*TLP* 2.031). "The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the the state of affairs" (*TLP* 2.032). "Form is the possibility of structure" (*TLP* 2.033). So the configuration of objects provide individualization to objects by providing them with a structure (i.e., a determinate form) : it also provides individualization to a state of affairs.

The comparison shows that according to *BAU* individualization and differentiation of objects becomes possible both by a material and a linguistic process : when the formless matter received a particular form, at the same time it assumed a name corresponding to it. Does language play any role in the process of individualization and differentiation in *TLP* as it does in *BAU*. In the first instance one may say 'no' because it is only the configuration of objects that gives individualization and differentiation to an object and a state of affairs. But that is not true. A proposition does seem to play a role because the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

relationship of a proposition with its corresponding state of affairs is not conventional but essential *(TLP* 4.03), a proposition being a picture of a state of affairs. The internal relation of depicting that holds between the language and the reality *(TLP* 4. 014), also holds between a proposition and its corresponding state of of affairs.

3. *Individualization through the analysis of language :* According to *BAU* since there is an indissoluble i.e., essential relationship of correspondence between the language and the reality because of the rule or the principle of *Nāma-Rūpa,* etymological analysis of language can help towards individualization of things : "The word expresses in itself through its elements (sound, syllables) the innermost and authentic nature of the thing which it designates. Therefore an appropriate etymological analysis of the word allows us to know what it truely means, to discover the essence of the object which it denotes."[1] Furthermore Ãtman divides itself into *Prāṇans : "Prṇāṇas* are those which become manifest; the perceptible reality composed by the individual and *Ātman* is their essence".[2] Each individual is represented by 'I.' Wittgenstein in the *TLP* also holds that there is an essential relationship of correspondence between the language and the reality (the world) because of the principle of representation. The reality that is beyond the world (totality of facts) is the mystical because it is not representable through the logic of language that is the language of facts. "The totality of propositions is language" *(TLP* 4.001). "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" *(TLP* 1. 1). Thus the analysis of the language can give us the totality of propositions : the totality of propositions can tell us about the totality of facts they represent.

In *BAU,* individualization and differentiation of things, through the analysis of language, is all comprehensive. It gives us the analysis of the reality as a whole i.e., both the perceptual and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the non-perceptual. Wittgenstein's analysis of the language in the *TLP* is limited only to the perceptual. However, he extends the scope of language in *Philosophical Investigation* (later abbreviated as PI) : any language does not essentially have the clear and firm structure of the fotmulae in logical calculus. There are various forms of language. "To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life." (*PI* p. 19)

4. *Analysis of Language :*

4.1 As mentioned in the preceding section *BAU*'s analysis of language is etymological i. e, etymological analysis of a word through its elements (sound, syllable etc.) expresses the innermost and authentic (essential) nature of the thing it designates. What is a word? A word can be complex like *satya* and simple like *sat* since *sat* is not further analysable. A complex word can be considered as a sentence because in ancient Indian texts written in Sanskrit such a sentence is merely an order of words. However, words are not there as separate units but are obtained by analysing the sentence or a complex word. It is done through dissecting (or analysing) the sounds and syllables in a sentence. In *TLP* the suggested language is logical. 'Logical analysis of the language gives us the totality of propositions. A complex proposition like p v q is analysable into truth-fuctions and elementary propositions. It is only an elementary proposition that represents a state of affairs and truth functions do not represent anything in the world. An elementary proposition is a combination of simple names. However a proposition is not a blend of words — (Just as theme in music is not a blend of notes). "A proposition is articulate" (*TLP* 3.141) "It is only in so far as a proposition is logically articulated that it is a picture of a situation. (Even the proposi-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tion 'Ambulo' is composit : for its stem with a different ending yields different sense, and so does its ending with a different stem) (*TLP* 4.032). Furthermore, according to *TLP* "a propositional sign provides us with logical coordinate that is the logical place". (*TLP* 3.41). "In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility : something can exist in it," (*TLP* 3.411). So in whatever way we analyse 'Ambulo' and with whatever name we fill the logical place in the propositional sign, it will represent the situation from that angle.

In comparison we can say that according to both *BAU* and *TLP* a word (in Wittgensteinian sense a propositional sign) can be so analysed that it provides us with logical co-ordinates which represent reality.

4.2 According to *BAU* each word or name inseparably denotes or designates its corresponding form (of an object) because of the principle of *Nāma-Rūpa*. If it is a complex word or a name, it designates or denotes a complex form (of an object), while a simple word designates a simple form. It also follows from the principle of *Nāma-Rūpa* that a name must designate or denote one form (of an object). In *TLP* according to the theory of representation, a simple name in a proposition must represent or stand for an abject in a state of affairs (or situation) and that a proposition must represent a state of affairs and that there is one to one correspondence between a name and the object it represents, and a proposition and state-of-affairs it represents.

In conclution we can say that the principle of *Nāma-Rūpa* in *BAU* is a principle of representation. There seems to be a great

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

similarity between this on the one hand, and Wittgenstein's whole theory of language and reality in the *TLP* on the other.

Philosophy Department
University of Calabar
CALABAR, CR (NIGERIA)

P. K ROY

NOTES

1. Fernado Tola "Archaic Elements in three Conceptions of the Atman in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad" in the *Journal of Religious Studies* (Patiala), India. Vol. xii, 2, 1984, p. 63.

2. *Ibid.* p. 72.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 2,
April 1988

J. P. SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY OF "NEGATIVE ENLIGHTENMENT"

The whole of Sartre's philosophical thought can be divided into three phases. The first phase comprises of his phenomenological psychology as expounded in his works, *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1936); *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory* (1939); and *The Psychology of Imagination* (1940). The second constitutes his contribution to phenomenological ontology of human existence as expressed in his *magnum opus, Being and Nothingness* (1943); and *Existentialism and Humanism* (1946). And the third is marked by his marxist sociology as delineated in his 'epic,' *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960). This paper deals with Sartre's second phase. Its aim is to show how Sartre 'enlightens' the readers with the idealistic [1] atheism of his phenomenological ontology.

The paper is a detailed account of the illuminative atheism of Sartre's ontology. It consists of five parts: The first part introduces Sartre's atheism with the declaration that man's passion to be God is useless. The second substantiates the atheism with an illustrative description of the impossibility of the union of the for–itself with the in–itself. The third deals with Sartre's ontological affirmation of the fact that human existence is doomed to despair. The fourth is a brief account of the charges levelled against Sartre's ontology. And the fifth is devoted to the defence of Sartre's ontology. In it, it is argued that Sartre's ontology, though criticised as being incorrigibly atheistic and anti–idealistic,

Received : 17-6-86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

enlightens man on his condition here and now by making him absolutely free and responsible for what he is and for what the world is.

I

Sartre, like a religious thinker, admits that man is ontologically a being who intends to become God. The very 'nature' or 'essence' of man is to attain the status of God. Man's very being is oriented with the desire to be God. Man possesses an inborn and inalienable comprehension of the being of God. God is *sensible to the heart of man*. God is man's supreme value. Sartre says, "To be man means to reach toward being God. Or if you prefer, man fundamentally is the desire to be God." [2] But Sartre, at the same time and unlike a religious thinker, contends that it is impossible for man to become God. He concludes his principal text *Being and Nothingness* with a tragic note that man's passion to be God is useless. He maintains that human reality is by 'nature' unhappy. It is impossible for man to surpass his unhappiness by metamorphosing himself into an "in-itself-for itself" which Sartre calls God. For Sartre, God is a Utopian union of the being-for itself (man) with the being–in–itself (thing).[3] God implies a being who isw hat he is and at the same time who is not what he is and is what he is not. Such a being is impossible, for it presupposes the combination of the two incompatible characteristics in one being –the translucency of the being-for–itself and coincidence with itself of the being–in–itself. Sartre declares, "Each human reality is at the same time a direct project to metamorphose its own for-itself into an In–itself-for itself... Every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found being tne *Ens causa sui*, which religions call God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a usless passion." [4]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

Sartre describes in detail the nature of the totality– "for–itself–in–itself" – and shows in clear terms why it is impossible for the for–itself to become the in-itself. He says that the nature of the "for–itself–in–itself" is such that it is not 'relative' to consciousness. It is neither an object of consciousness nor posited through consciousness. It is neither prior to nor posterior to consciousness. Consciousness is not conscious 'of' this totality as it is conscious of an inkwell. It can't have an apprehension of this totality as it can have of a pencil. It can be conscious of it only as it is conscious of itself, for it haunts the non–thetic self-consciousness itself. Therefore, the totality is not 'given.' It is in no way different from consciousness. It is only a coincidence of consciousness with itself. It is consciousness itself as the lacked–in–itself. "The being toward which human reality surpasses itself is not a transcendent God; it is at the heart of the human reality; it is only human reality itself as totality."[5]

Consciousness derives its meaning as consciousness from this being. Consciousness ceases to be consciousness without this totality. The totality exists as long as consciousness enjoys being a consciousness of being. But the contradiction is that it exists as the not–being of consciousness. This is what Sartre means when he says that the totality is perpetually present and perpetually absent and that the totality 'is' in not being itself and consciousness is this totality in 'not' being it. As it is already said, neither consciousness nor the totality is prior to the other. The totality comes into being along with consciousness. They are simultaneous and co–extensive to each other. Nither can exist independent of the other. The totality and consciousness *form a dyad*.[6] It is self-evident that consciousness exists only as 'engaged' in this totality and can never be free from it. In fact, this totality manifests itself in all the movements of consciousness. Or consciousness in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

all its movemens manifests itself as this totality. This totality surrounds consciousness on all sides and paralyses it with its phantom presence. But the irreducible fact is that this totality is not separate from consciousness. This being is consciousness itself which consciousness cannot be (as an inkwell is an inkwell). Sartre says, "It is consciousnees itself, as an absence, an unrealizable. Its nature is to enclose its own contradiction within itself, its relation to the for-itself is a total immanence which is achieved in total transcendence".[7]

Sartre substantiates the futile pursuit of the for-itself by putting it in a situation, by giving it concrete characteristics. Here he takes the feeling of suffering as an example. He says that the norm of consciousness is to experience the feeling of suffering as a totality which would be what 'is'. But consciousness can never succeed. The total feeling of suffering remains always as a lack 'suffered' in the very heart of suffering. The suffering consciousness feels, can never be complete due to the fact that consciousness nihilates itself as consciousness of suffering. The feeling of suffering is not 'given'. It is only consciousness as the lack of total suffering. Therefore, it exists in and through consciousness. Consciousness is its foundation. Suffering is not independent of consciousness. Suffering is simply consciousness-of-suffering. Consciousness makes its own suffering and raises suffering into existence in its free spontaneity. Consciousness is responsible for its suffering. Therefore, consciousness can never be the suffering-in-itself. The suffering-in-itself can only be spoken about but can never be felt. The in-itself-of-suffering, the suffering which has 'being', can only be seen on the faces of others, in portraits and statues. Such an objective suffering exists as a compact and an objective whole, for it does not depend on us for its being 'there'. Whereas the suffering we feel exists in and through us. It is perpetually being sup-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ported by the consciousness-of-suffering. Therefore consciousness can never attain the status of the statue-in-itself of suffering, since it presupposes the annihilation of consciousness, the reduction of consciousness to the status of in-itself. The statue-in-itself of suffering can exist only through and for others. The suffering of consciousness is never full but always loquacious. The suffering of the statue has 'being'. The statue 'suffers'. Whereas the suffering of consciousness lacks 'being'. Consciousness suffers from not suffering enough. Therefore, consciousness exists (its) suffering "only as consciousness (of) not being enough suffering in the presence of that full and absent suffering".[8]

To put it still more concretely, Sartre illustrates it by taking the case of a beaten man who in vain attempts at attaining a statue-in-itself of his suffering. The beaten man moans, wails, cries and wrings his hands in order to realize the suffering in totality. He makes sounds and gestures ridden by the suffering-in-itself which he is not. As Sartre puts it, "Each groan, each facial expression of the man who suffers aims at sculpturing a statue-in-itself of suffering."[9] But the fact is that he can never realize it, since his suffering is not independent of him. The suffering exists only in and through him. It is he who brings it about. He feels his suffering as being its foundation. He plays without respite the drama of suffering in order to realize it. Therefore the beaten man cannot grasp his suffering in its totality. His inalienable desire to be his suffering and at the same time to conquer it removes the possibility of feeling his suffering in its copacity.

The beaten man may look for others as one who 'suffers'. His suffering with its lowered head and veiled face without speaking may resemble the silence of the statue. We may take him as if he is totally seized, flooded and devasted by suffering like a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

storm. But the fact is that he is never an in–itself of suffering. It is only 'for others' that he looks like the suffering–in–itself in all the expressions of his suffering. But in himself the beaten man chatters incessantly. That is, he still aims at becoming the in–itself of suffering. The words of his 'inner' language are like the outlines of the 'self' of suffering which he can't be. Sartre says, "It is for my eyes that he is "crushed" by suffering, in himself he feels himself responsible for that grief which he wills even while not wishing it and which he does not wish even while willing it, that grief which is haunted by a perpectual absence–the absence of the motionless, mute suffering which is the "self", the concrete, out–of–reach totality of the for–itself which suffers, the 'for' of Human Reality in suffering".[10]

The suffering–in–itself is the "for–itself–in–itself" in concrete. Since consciousness can never be the in–itself of suffering, it can never be the in–itself of any kind. The suffering of consciousness suffers from being what it is not and from not being what it is. So also the "for–itself–in–itself" of consciousness suffers from being what it is not and from not being what it is. It remains for ever 'a realizable unrealized.' Therefore consciousness can never become one with itself. Consciousness, in all its movements, escapes from being one with itself, for it is ever being separated from itself, from its being one with itself by a 'reflective fissure' which Sartre calls nothingness. The fissure of nothingness is again not 'given.' It does not come from outside. It is not different from consciousness. Consciousness itself is the foundation of this nothingness. Consciousness creates this nothingness in all its activities including the act of overcoming the gap of nothingness. Hence consciousness can neither get rid of its ideal "self," the "for–itself–in–itself" nor merge with it. Therefore, the ideal "self," the ultimate value of consciousness remains forever beyond its reach. "At the point of being made

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

one with itself, it escapes, separated from itself by nothing, by that nothingness of which it is itself the foundation".[11]

III

It is worth noting that whole of Sartre's dialectical description of the impossible union of the for–itself with the in–itself is a strong proof against the existence of God, and an extensive and energetic ontological affirmation of his atheism. It involves directly or indirectly the principle that man lives in vain with the constant ideal of achieving the synthesis of the "for–itself–in–itself" projected in the form of God. Sartre makes the point clearer by showing that the movement of consciousness is always horizontal but never vertical. Though consciousness is by ontological necessity directed towards the attainment of Godhood and appears to be progressing towards the status of 'being,' it is in reality condemned for ever to a 'down–to–earth' existence. Just as the vertical attraction the moon excercises on the ocean results in the horizontal movement of water which is the tide, so also, the perpetual haunting the "for–itself–in–itself" exercises on the for–itself results only in the flat movement of consciousness.[12] It is impossible for consciousness to progress toward the dignity of the *causa sui*. Consciousness can never be different from what it is ontologically. Consciousness by its very 'nature' is a constant project to be God and any attempt to transcend the project is necessarily a failure. Nothing can disuade it from its project to be God. But Sartre at the same time says that consciousness comes into being only in and as the pursuit of God. Consciousness reveals itself as the world only in its vain effort to attain the ideal synthesis. Consciousness and the world cease to be what they are in the absence of the ever missing totality. Sartre says "Everything happens as if the world, man and man–in–the–world succeed in realizing only a missing God. Everything happens therefore as if the in–itself and the for–itself

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

were presented in a state of disintegration in relation to an ideal synthesis." [13]

By showing that man can never become God, Sartre shows that life is tragic and man is doomed for ever to exist as an unhappy being. Ontologically, man is condemned to despair without remedy because he is constantly haunted by the phantom totality, because he is never free from the totality, because he is totality without being able to 'be' it and finally because the Godhood is always indicated without being realized. He also holds that since every human activity is basically a failure to be God, it matters little whether one is a drunkard or a ruler of a nation. The basic ontological position of every human act is the same — a source of despair. There is therefore no single act that is superior to the other. He says, "Men are condemned to despair, for they discover at the same time that all human activities are equivalent for they all tend to sacrifice man in order that self-cause may arise and that all are in principle doomed to failure. Thus it amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or a leader of nations". [11]

IV

It is on this account that Sartre's ontology has been criticised as lacking in the spiritual dimension and as being nihilistic. It has been criticised as being merely an unhappy reaction of France to German occupation and post-war distress. It is held that Sartre's ontology emphasizes the extreme need for the Absolute without however conceding its existence. In it, man is merely pictured as having an irremediable nostalgia for the Absolute. Man is shown as a being which desires to be God and at the same time it is shown that the saturation of man by the 'divine' is impossible. It is also held that there is nothing positive that Sartre could give to humanity through his ontology.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Instead, what he could successfully give man is the extreme sense of the negative side of human existence. What pervades all through his ontology is despair, anguish and nausea. It is also held that Sartre's ontology is contaminated by a strong sense of subjectivism and as being one-sided and incomplete. Its conclusions are foregone and not discovered after an objective examination of the 'what is' of human existence. Sartre is said to have made his choice well already in the beginning of his inquiry. His choice was the dread of human existence and the absence of happiness. What he has done in his *Being and Nothingness* is nothing but the description of his uncompromising atheism to which he was committed beforehand. To quote Desan, "The aim in many cases is to confirm an idea of existence which the author has made up for himself at the start, a different initial conception of existence could have been proved similarily strenghtened by different descriptions. The result is that descriptions, instead of affirming a proof, become mere illustrations of what was planned and wanted".[15]

It is also disputed that Sartre's ontology is applicable universally. It is maintained that it stands a testimony to Sartre's own personal psychology but not to humankind as a whole. Therefore Sartre cannot be regarded as a law giver in ontology, and it is preposterous to say that his ontology is *the* ontology man can rely upon. After all, in the history of philosophy, Sartre's ontology is one more movement which fails to stand the test of time, since it fails to fulfil the task of revealing to man human existence as it 'really' is.

V

But Sartre's ontology has to be judged within its frame-work. It should not be assessed taking the issues which it does not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

take into consideration. One is not justified in criticising it for the concepts which it does not include into its frame–work. The important fact one cannot afford to ignore is that Sartre never intended his ontology to be treated as metaphysics.[16] His aim was to give a philosophy of man but not that of God. One has to keep in mind the fact that Sartre's ontology limits itself to the description of the "known" and does not attempt at unravelling the 'unknown'. Sartre was of the view that a strictly human and all encompassing philosophy of man is possible only in the absence of God. He did not wish to conceive a metaphysical ending to the tragic finale of human existence. Being honest to his ontology, which is phenomenological in nature, Sartre was constrained to refrain himself from a possible attempt at reconciling the for–itself with the in–itself. The question of the divine does not belong to the province of his ontology. Its only concern is the study of the 'what is', the 'known' as it appears to be or as it presents itself to itself. Sartre says, "Ontology abandons us here; it has merely enabled us to determine the ultimate ends of human reality, its fundamental possibilities and the value which haunts it".[17]

The fact that Sartre wanted his ontology to be strictly 'human' and 'wordly' should not be lost sight of. He never intended it to be supernatural or transcendental or mystical. He did not like to bring the notions like "ideal being" "self–fulfilment", "supreme happiness" into its frame–work. On the contrary, he wanted it to be entirely unorthodox and anti-speculative to the core. Indeed, Sartre's ontology is a consistent presentation of the primacy of the world of human experience to the world of the so called contemplative experience. For Sartre, the only reality that matters is the reality of human subjectivity. For him, "There is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity".[18]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It must be admitted that the inability to understand human existence in purely non–metaphysical terms is a grave impediment to the correct estimate of Sartre's ontology The task of Sartre's ontology is to understand human predicament in purlely 'human' terms without postulating a God. It is to tell man that his life is not tied to any pre-ordained "soul" or "being" which is believed to dictate terms of his conduct It is to set man free from the cage–like existence of his inauthentic self of bad–faith and give him the place given to God by Descartes. It is to make man truly reflective and fully conscious of himself and to give him the lost dignity. "In replacing God with man, Sartre is careful to define what kind of man is necessary; for Sartre, it is man of good faith, one who is reflective, conscious, aware of self and his identity. This man is free. The man of bad–faith, on the contrary, is half–conscious and deceptive; he fails to reflect about himself and his role in the world. He lives sluggishly in the swam depths of self–deception; he may accept what he should reject or he may reject what he should accept".[19]

What the orthodox critics fail to see is that Sartre's ontology is highly insightful within its frame–work. The instructive insight it gives is that there is no God and man is absolutely free and responsible for what he is and for what the world is. The missionary spirit of Sartre's stark atheistic ontology is to enable man to live life directly and deeply without escaping into believing in God and "spirit of seriousness."[20] Its sincere intention is to help man face the reality of existence without hiding it behind the protean disguises of bad–faith which necessarily blur the sharp edge of existence. For Sartre, true life begins on the far side of despair. That is, it is only when life is apprehended in complete freedom that one can 'exist' it. His aim in rejecting God and describing life as tragic is not to depress his readers but to enrich them to live life authentically and devoid of all

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

authority, to teach that each man is an authority for himself and man's subjectivity is the only absolute that is there in the world. His atheism does not lead to despair. It does not preach the life of licentiousness and irresoponsibility. Instead, it is pregnant with moral implications in that it sets a high premium on man's honesty with himself. It reveals the fact that man's resoponsibility in a world without God is overwhelming. Freedom–responsibility surrounds man always and everywhere. Everything in this world is 'human.' Man is the only being through whom the world comes into existence. There is no non–human situation in the world. Man is the incontestable author of every event in the world. Even the event like justice or war is 'human' through and through. Sartre has very well substantiated this theme in his play *The Flies*, the epitome of his athesim. The hero of the play Orestes says, " Justice is a matter between man and man, and I need no God to teach me it ".[11] Speaking about war, Sartre says that man is not ' destined ' to fight wars. War is neither a divine compulsion nor a geographical tempest. Contrary to it, war is entirely ' human '. It is man who brings about war. Therefore he is free either to fight or avert it. War is never an accident but a matter of man's choice. There are no innocent victims in war. We have the war we deserve. Sartre says, " If I am mobilized in a war, this war is ' my ' war; it is in my image and I deserve it. I deserve it because I could always get out of it by suicide or by desertion ".[12]

Above all, Sartre's ontology teaches man that he is 'alone' in this world. He is the only savior of himself and the world. He has to shoulder the entire responsibility without shifting it to the fictitious idea of God which he has fabricated in his own image. To stress the point further, Sartre goes to the extent of saying that the very belief in God is evil, for it is harmful to human freedom. t acts as a restrictive force on man's freedom to be good

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

unconditionally. For Sartre, evil is that which is harmful to freedom and good is that which is useful to it Belief in God holds man as not being free whereas disbelief sets him free. For Sartre, the disbeliever is more free to be authentic than the believer. He contends that the ralation between two disbelievers is more sincere than that of the two believers, for the disbelievers are more free than the believers in the quest for the good.[23]

To conclude, Sartre's ontology, though attacked as being nihilistic, commands our reverence. Though atheistic and anti-idealistic, it is highly instructive and optimistic. Its very failure to offer an idealistic solution to human predicament is its success In the absence of God and absolute values, it 'enlightens' man on his condition here and now. In making man atheistic, it makes him authentic and self-reliant It enables him to disentangle himself from every vestige of belief in God and re-build his life and the world. It declares in clear and categorical terms that man is irremediably and absolutely free and responsible and therefore condemned to transvaluate the existing values and create new values for and by himself. Thus Sartre's ontology can as well be called an ontology of "negative enlightenment" and it is impertinent to denigrate it as having no significance.

Department of Philosophy
Sri Venkateswara University
TIRUPATI-517502 (A P.)

G. VEDAPARAYAN

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. Sartre's atheism is of two kinds : 1) Idealistic, 2) Materialistic. The atheism as we see in the second phase of his philosophical career is idealistic whereas the atheism of his third phase is materialistic. Sartre changed his idealistic atheism into materialistic one when he converted his thought radically from existential and phenomenologieal ontology into marxist sociology.

2. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Trans. Hazel, E. Barnes, 9th Printing, Washington Square Press, New York, 1977, p. 724.

3. Sartre uses the term "being-for-itself" to represent the reality of man. For him, the terms "man", "human reality", "consciousness", "freedom" and "nothingness" are synonymous and can be used inter-changeably. As against it, he uses the term "being-in-itself" to represent the reality of things which are unconscious and determined. Just because the two realities are qualitatively opposed to each other, the reduction of the one to the other or their union is out of the question.

4. Ibid., p. 784.

5. Ibid., p. 139.

6. Ibid., p. 141.

7. Ibid., p. 141.

8. Ibid., p. 143.

9. Ibid., p. 142.

10. Ibid., p. 143.

11. Ibid., p. 143.

12. Ibid., p. 789.

13. Ibid., p. 792.

14. Ibid., p. 797.

15. Wilfrea Desan, *The Tragic Finale – An Essay on the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p. 187.

16. Sartre clearly differentiates between ontology and metaphysics. For him, ontology concerns itself with the study of Being which is non-supernatural. It confines itself to the study of "the structures of being of the existent taken as a totality" and the conditions by which "there is" a world and human reality. It only deals with the questions like "how" and "what" of human existence. Whereas metaphysics concerns itself with the problem of "why" concrete existents are as they

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are. It indulges in speculative and explanatory hypotheses in its attempt at answering the question "why there is anything rather than nothing"? Sartre says that metaphysics is to ontology as history is to sociology. See, *Being and Nothingness*, p 395.

17. J. P. Sartre, Op. cit. p. 784.

18. J. P. Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, Trans. Philip Mairet, 9th Printing, Methuen, London, 1970, p. 55.

19. Frederick R. Karl and Leo Hamalian (Eds.) *The Existential Imagination from de Sade to Sartre*, Pan Books Limited, London 1963, p. 17.

20. The "spirit of seriousness" is the view that man is an object of and subordinate to the world. It is also the view that values have an absolute existence independent of man. It considers values as transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity. Sartre repudiates "spirit of seriousnəss" through his technique of existential psychoanalysis. See, *Being and Nothingness*, p, 796.

21. J. P. Sartre, *Altona, Men Without Shadows, The Flies*, Penguin Books, London, p. 293.

22. J. P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 708.

23. Simone de Beauvoir, *Adieux – A Farewell to Sartre*, Trans. Patrick O' Brain, Penguin Books, Guillimard, 1981, p. 432.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BOOKS RECEIVED

1) *The Theory of Concepts*
M. M. Agrawal ; Philosophy and Social Action, M-120 Greater Kailash–1, New Delhi-110 048, First Edition 1980, pp 104.

2) *Philosophical Enquiries*
Margaret Chatterjee; Motilal Banarasidass. Delhi, First Edition 1988, pp. x + 204; Rs. 90

3) *Vādanyāya : The Nyāya–Buddhist Controversy*
Mangala R. Chinchore; Sri Satguru Publications, 40/5, Shakti Nagar, Delhi–110 007, First Edition 1988, pp xix + 213; Rs. 150.

4) *Philosophy of Social Science*
M. R. Nandan; The Bangalore Philosophy Forum, Maharani's Arts College, Bangalore, First Edition 1987; pp. xvi + 267. Rs. 80.

5) *Śabda Pramāṇa : An Epistemological Analysis*
R. I. Ingalalli; Sri Satguru Publications, 40/5 Shakti Nagar, Delhi–110 007, First Edition 1988; pp. xii + 160; Rs 140

6) *Original Sin in Augustine's Confessions*
Paul Rigby; University Otawa Press, Canada; First Editon 1988; pp. xxx-137; $ 17.95 (Can.)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 2
April 1988

BOOK–REVIEW

DAS, G. P. ; *VEDĀNTA – PARIBHĀSĀ : AN ANALYTICAL STUDY;* Anu Books, Meerut (1986), pp. 8 + 175, Price Rs. 90–00 (Hard Cover.).

The book under review is a scholarly attempt of re-interpreting and re–constructing Advaita–Vedāntic philosophy in such a way that Advaita Vedānta as presented by Dharmarājādhvarīndra in the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* is made to appear as pure philosophy in a contemporary sense of the term. A primary question with regard to any such interpretation and reconstruction is whether the interpreter claims that his interpretation and reconstruction is nothing but putting the same content in a different idiom and different form, or he does not advance any such claim. G. P. Das seems to claim that he is presenting Dharmarājā's original position in the current ideom of philosophical analysis in order that the position becomes intelligible to the modern reader. The truth of his claim is doubtful.

In the view of the author *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is a specimen of pure philosophy in the sense of 'logical analysis of language' or 'descriptive metaphysics.' But if *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has to be a specimen of logical analysis of language and not of revisionary metaphysics, ontology or epistemology then it should not contain statements about things, facts or knowledge but only about statements of facts and knowledge–claims. However, Dharmarājā in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* all the while talks about knowledge and objects of knowledge. He talks about language mainly while discussing *āgama* as a *pramāṇa*. It is interesting to see how in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

spite of such fundamental difficulties the author has tried to project his deviant interpretation on the text.

In order to present and defend his interpretation the author seems to have read too much between the lines and words of the text. This has given rise to many oddities and inconsistencies. Only a few are being cited here.

The author treats *āgama* to be the special method of establishing philosophical knowledge and hence interprets it as 'logical analysis of language.' This interpretation is odd for at least two reasons. The definition of *āgama* given by Dharmarājā does not say that a sentence is *pramāṇa* only if it establishes knowledge by way of logical *analysis*. It is one thing to say that Dharmarājā provides us with a logical analysis of language while explaining *āgama-pramāṇa* and quite another to say that *āgama* itself means logical analysis of language. Secondly, the explanation and illustrations of *āgama* given by Dharmarājā nowhere exclude the possibility of *āgama* being a source of the knowledge of extra–linguistic facts.

The author translates *caitanya* as pure cognition (p. 28). But his translations of *viṣaya-caitanya, pramāṇa–caitanya* and *pramātṛcaitanya* are not consistent with it. For example, sometimes *viṣayacaitanya* is translated as 'idea of object' (p. 28), while sometimes else as 'object of knowledge' (p. 31). Dharmarājā himself defines *viṣayacaitanya* as *ghaṭādyavacchinna caitanya* which neither means *idea* of a pot nor pot as an *object of knowledge*.

The author identifies subject–object dichotomy (the dichotomy of *viṣayin* and *viṣaya*) as discussed by Śaṁkara with subject-predicate dichotomy as discussed by P. F. Strawson. This identification is made without giving any explanation or justification. The author treats after Strawson (after Śaṁkara too?)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'this' and 'I' as the limits of factual knowledge and claims that *Brahman* means the whole of knowledgeable existence which exceeds these limits. The author also identifies 'the whole of knowledgeable existence,' 'existence as such' and 'knowledge as such.' This claim for identification is as obscure as any metaphysical claim. But the author would not accept this charge. On the contrary, he claims that the Advaitic conception of ultimate reality is not metaphysical but philosophical–logical.

G. P. Das's deviant interpretation of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* exhibits a self–consistent network of philosophical–logical considerations and an ontology closely linked with them. The reader may find the network interesting and illuminating if he can think and imagine with the author. But such a deviant interpretation of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* arouses a more serious expectation from the author that he should try to substantiate this interpretation with a literal translation of the text. Otherwise any cautious reader is likely to feel that the author might have conveniently omitted phrases and lines from the text inconsistent with the attempted interpretation and filled in the gaps with his own ideas or ideas borrowed from some other source. Bad indology seems to have resulted in the course of attempting a good philosophy.

Philosophy Department
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

PRADEEP P. GOKHALE

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
INDIVIDUAL LIFE - MEMBERS

246) Smt. Brinda Sen
3/2 A, Broad Street,
Calcutta–700 019.

247) Prof. S. S. D. Pandey,
109, R. R. M. R. Hostel
Banaras Hindu University,
Varanasi -221 005.

248) Dr. N. P. Tiwari
E/52 A, Reserve Bank Staff Quarters,
Rajendra Nager,
Patna–800 016.

249) Shri. Neelamani Sahu
Philosophy Department,
Science College,
Hinjilicut–761 102,
Dist. Ganjam, (Orissa)

250) Dr. Filita Bharucha
Churchgate Mansion,
Flat 10, First Floor,
A Road, Churchgate,
Bombay–400 020.

251) Dr. Pabitra Kumar Roy,
Philosophy Department,
North Bengal University,
Darjeeling–734 430 (W. B.)

253) Dr. Ranjan K. Ghosh
17/A/52, W. E. A.
Karol Bagh
New Delhi–110 005.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Statement about Ownership and Other Particulars about Newspaper *INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY*

FORM IV (RULE 8)

1.	Place of Publication	... Philosophy Department, University of Poona, Pune -- 411 007.
2.	Periodicity of its Publication.	... Quarterly.
3.	Printer's Name and Address	... Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay. Philosophy Department, University of Poona, Pune – 411 007
	Whether Citizen of India	... Yes.
4.	Publisher's Name and Address	... Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, Philosophy Department, University of Poona, Pune – 411 007.
	Whether Citizen of India	... Yes.
5.	Editor' Names and	... (i) Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Pune – 411 007. (ii) Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Opposit Stadium main gate Premchand path Rajendra Nagar Patna – 800 016.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(iii) Dr. M. P. Marathe
Philosophy Department
Poona University,
Pune – 411 007.

(iv) Dr. Mrinal Miri
Philosophy Department
N. E. H. U.,
Shillong – 793 003

(v) Dr. R. Sundara Rajan
Philosophy Department
Poona University,
Pune – 411 007

(vi) Dr. S. S. Deshpande
Philosophy Department
Poona University,
Pune – 411 007

Whether Citizens of India ... Yes.

6. Names and Address of Individuals/Institutions which own the newspaper ... Department of Philosophy
Poona University,
Pune - 411 007.
And its
Pratap Centre of Philosophy
Amalner – 425 401

I, Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sd/- Surendra Sheodas Barlingay.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 3,
July, 1988

157786

VERIFIERS AND THEORY CHOICE

All discussions of scientific method after Kuhn's work can afford to ignore the problem of theory choice and Kuhn's negative views concerning theory–neutral verificatoin of rationality of theory choice. In this paper I shall examine some of the issues involved in Kuhn's central thesis of the distinction of normal science as against scientific revolutions, the latter being marked by apervasive crisis of loss of paradigm. The notion of paradigm shift is according to Kuhn outside normal scientific heuristics and methodology. Kuhn's central contention shall be examined in detail in this paper and I would sustain my position against Kuhn's view, that there is only a logic of intra–paradigm discourse and its unity. Our contention in brief is that the concept of science would be subverted if an extreme interpretation of paradigm shift as advocated by Kuhn is literally and seriously taken. As such, after examining the arguments that Prof. Kuhn and his followers have given for the position of incommensurability of paradigms, I would attempt to make a plea for the recognition of the role paradigm free verifiers in most of our scientific inquiry. Kuhn's project was to give an account of the nature of the scientific enterprise and the reasons for its special success–an account which would fit the history and practice of science better than what he claims are the obviously inadequate accounts standardly found in science text–books and in many discussions in the philosophy of science. Kuhn proposed a fundamental change in our perception and evaluation of a familiar episode from the

Received : 2-3-86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

history and practice of science–normal science consists for the most part of a very important kind of puzzle solving in which the nature of the puzzle and the terms set for its solution are not themselves regarded critically subjected to test by scientists in any significant way. Normal science takes place within 'holistic paradigms'–extremely broad theoretical, metaphysical and methodological models of nature and some of them lead to the discovery of her secrets. Kuhn argues that the theories which are part of scientific paradigms are not refutable by observations at all. This is because, on Kuhn's view, sensory experience is not fixed and neutral and theories are not simply–man made interpretations of given data, " what occurs during a scientific revolution is not fully reducible to a reinterpretation of individual and stable data–paradigms are not corrigible by normal science at all ". Instead, it seems that the paradigmatic theories in fact define what is to count as a relevant observation, they define the ' world ' within which the scientist works, so a theory is not refuted by experience but instead simply abandoned when there are a large number of problems with it and when possible more fruitful way of perceiving the world is at hand.

To Kuhn " reasons constitute values to be used in making choices rather than rules of choice " and that such values can be differently applied, individually aud collectively by men who concur in honouring them.

Theories are constructed in science with a view to ascertaining the possible structure of underlying reality as seen through a specific set of observable phenomena. On the basis of a set of observable data, scientists try to construct a model that best represents the structure of reality. It is also accepted that sometimes a model which is taken to be the representative model of the structure of reality at one time is rejected as redundant or untenable. I have shown that the analysis of Kuhn for all its

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

surplus concern for details of actual history of scientific theories has shown a degree of lack of understanding of the veriegated functions at " theory ", " hypotheses " and the propostions that any on going scientific enterpritra employs. My first criticism is on his unperceptive use of the term ' theroy ' on the part of Kuhn and his devotees to designate a hypotheses, a rule or definition and axiom which do not have the same function within the structure of scientific enterprise. For example, the rule of uniformity of nature or seeking a simple explanation does not figure in the course of testing my set of alternative empirical hypotheses concerning a precise area, but are heuristic assumptions of all cognition which cannot therefore be subject to any adhoc decisions on the part of investigators to fragment the procedure of empirical confirmation of the hypothesis under question. [3]

Analysis of Verifiers and Theory-Choice :

The most decisive method of testing or evaluating a theory[3] would seem to consist in seeking an answer to the following set of questions :–

a) Whether or not it either implies or suggests a certain model of the growth of scientific knowledge;

b) Whether the statement of the model is a self-consistant one i.e., it does not imply denial of the possibility of the growth of scientific knowledge;

c) Whether the model is a useful one i.e., the model has the useful consequence of rendering the growth of knowledge measurable and evaluable. " The worth and contribution of a knowledge[4] claim of whatever level or of a new idea, or of a theory must be tested and evaluated in terms of its consequences rather than in terms of its generating sources whatever." [5]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

According to an important conception of the growth of scientific knowledge which Scheffler has developed in some detail "underlying historical changes of theory, there is a constancy of method, which comprises not merely the canons of formal deductions but also those criteria by which hypotheses are confronted with the test of experience and subjected to comparative evaluation."[6] Proponents of this view admit that "We do not have explicit and general formulations of such criteria at the present time" but they insist that the criteria "are embodied clearly enough in scientific practice to enable communication and agreement in a wide variety of history of science and that such communication and such consensus indicate that there is a codifiable technique of rational theory choice".[7]

The key idea here is that just as logic provides us with a way of determining the merits of arguments, evaluative criteria of theory choice provide us with a way of determining the merits of scientific theories.[8] These evaluative criteria which may be recommended on the grounds that they are conducive to the goals of science ideally provide the means for adjudicating scientific disputes concerning feasibility of alternative scientific theories.

It should not be thought that this approach to theory choice is incompatible with equivocal comparisons of the merits of theories. As Scheffler observes "the existence of evaluative criteria is compatible with borderline regions in which these criteria can yield no clear decisions and even the objective availability of clear decisions is consistent with honest differences of judgement, not to mention plain misunderstandings". However, we should expect carefully informed scientists to adopt similar views and not to persist in espousing different theories over long periods of time.

If such a conception of rational theory choice is correct, a scientist's resistance to a new scientific enterprise of theories can

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be rational only in the event of an "honest difference of judgement" or a "plain mis–understanding in borderline; fully informed scientists should not adopt any theory, while in clear cut cases they should not continue to defend an older view when the majority of scientists have adopted a newer one". Moreover, if the failure to conform to the objective criteria of assessment characteristics of good scientific practice signals the presence of extra–scientific, subjective influences citing such factors to explain the choices of resisting theories will not only be appropriate but necessary. As the view is maintained that the resistance should be explained in this way is relatively common.

But Kuhn holds an opposite conception of theory–choice According to this view "what scientists share is not sufficient to command uniform assent about such matters as the choice between competing theories and "every individual choice between competing theories, depends on a mixture of objective and subjective factors", although the choices that scientists should make are constrained to a certain extent". In these matters there is no such a thing as "proof", theory choice depending in part on "personality, education, and —— prior pattern of professional research". Characteristic of such permissive accounts is that they recognize the possibility of divergent approach and, hence the possibility of scientists rationally resisting a new scientific ideas. Scientist's personality and education might prevent him or her acting in a "high risk way".

Concerning the scientific knowledge the account of theory choice is one of the most striking features of science. When one considers science as a whole it is difficult to overlook that scientific doctrine constitutes a vast and highly ramified system of observation statements, experimental results, hypotheses, theories and methodological and metaphysical principles to which scientists have varying and limited access. Although scientists can reason

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

nably hope to acquire understanding of a small part of the system and a rough and ready appreciation of how the parts fit together, they cannot reasonabley hope to achieve more than this. In the normal course of events, they have to rely on the results and methods of area with which they are relatively unfamiliar and they are typically unaware of either the bearings of their work being done in these areas of their own.

This general conception of theory–choice can be developed in many ways. According to Landen scientists should " choose the theory with the highest problem solving adequacy ".[9] Though it is common to talk about problem solving among the scientists and philosophers, not much agreement has been found as to what is taken as a problem, what kinds of problems there are and what constitutes a solution to a problem. To Landen there is a difference between an empirical problem and a conceptual problem. A theory solves an empirical problem when it entails, alongwith appropriate initial and boundary conditions, a statement of the problem; a theory solves or eliminates a conceptual problem when it does not fail to exhibit a conceptual difficulty of its predecessor. It is important to note that on this account, many different theories may solve the same empirical and conceptual problem. The worth of the theory world depend on how many problems it solves. Unlike most models of explanation which insist that a theory does not really explain anything unless it is the best theory or possesses a high degree of confirmation, the problem solving approach allows a problem solution to be credited to a theory. Independent of how well established the theory is, so long as the theory stands in a certain formal relation to the problem within the problem–solving model of Landen, one has to see that for every theory, one assesses the number and the weight of empirical problems it is known to solve, similarly assess the number and weight of its empirical anomalies and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

finally assess the number and centrality of its conceptual difficulties or problems. Therefore, the scale of progress prefers that theory which comes closest to solving the larger number of important empirical problems while generating the smallest number of significant anomalies and conceptual problems. We accept theories which promise fertility in extending the range of what we can explain and predict. One must pursue and explore the highly progressive theories, whereas only the most adequate theories be accepted.

The crucial point in any discussion of methodology of paradigm shift calls for recognition of inter paradigm frame of an on going scientific enterprise which alone permits continuity (which is sometimes questioned by the upholders of this model of paradigms of science) in a scientific cognition. It is not possible at all to understand the sense of this paradigm shift outside arbitrariness and mere craze for novelty, if it makes no sense to say that the shift was warranted in a particular direction in favour of solutions of the anomalies that had been noted in the working of anterior paradigms. Modification, transformation and elimination of anomalies, procedures and framework must be valid in a sense outside the earlier and later paradigms that replace the earlier. This meta–paradigmatic framework provides for the interparadigm discourse, and all theory appraisal terms like efficiency, comprehension, etc. call for paradigm neutral interpretation in order to make any descriptive sense of cognitive enterprise.

Conclusion

In the light of the above remarks the problem arises as to what extent the role of verifiers could be raised to the level of inter paradigm discourse, even if it is conceded that all observation statements are theory laden. Is it possible to translate

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the representation under one system of measurement to another without residue or are such inter paradigm transfers in principle incommensurable? Consider for instance shift from classical mechanics to relativistic mechanics. In both theories 'mass' can be characterised as the ratio of force to acceleration. In Hamilton it is the 'linear momentum.' To say that these are not parts of the meanings of 'mass' and 'linear momentum' is to beg the question. To say that only those characterisations of the terms which do change should be allowed to count in "part of meaning" of the term is unwarranted. In other words, certain features are in a sense shared by competing paradigms and are common to both of them suggests that there is an agreement between competing paradigms and they are commensurable and comparable through appeal to shared meanings.

While there is no denying that science employs kinds of structured empirical constructs that, in the tradition of P. Duhem, Kuhn has exploited to suggest that they are free from external constraints and valid by confirmation of empirical objects. We would be doubting the theory of theoretical entities of scientific objects which argues that such theoretical constructs nevertheless are objective correlatives which are capable of inter hypothses convergence and reinterpretation by two geomtries describing a set of points in a particular domain. What is to be noted here is that a structured configuration of points could be given alternative description which can be as precise as a geometrical topology; yet there cannot be any doubt in principle that in either of the two systems two descriptions or languages is a possibility of radical translation of all the strings in one mode of describing to another without any residuary change of truth value.

Lastly, it would be very difficult to give any satisfactory account of growth of science if the full implication of Kuhnian

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

insistence of incommensurability of inter paradigm discourse is relentlessely maintained. His latest recapulation that nature being the reference of our scientific enterprise and the final arbitor, is neither here not there; either we have some notion of nature, which, as rightly pointed out by modern examination of theoretical constructs, [10] is in some way constituted by our rational categories and yet manages to act as a touch stone for a set of alternative problematic hypotheses and if this is not so then Kuhn fails miserably in articulating the role of nature in deciding the direction of science. [11]

I hope I have shown that the idea of incommensurability thesis in Kuhn is methodology perverse in as much as it fails to take note of the crucial role of verifiers in formulating any measure of problem solving adequacy of competing scientific theories and as such is an inadequate delineation of actual scientific practice.

GEETA MANAKTALA

Department of Philosophy,
Panjab University,
Chandigarh–160014

NOTES

1. Kuhn, T. S., *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago University Press, 1970. Kuhn is confused about the notion of "Theory". He is committing a category mistake in thinking that all theories belong to one homogenous type. But only in one sense we can say that there can be alternative theoretical formulations that range over a given unproblematic range of observed data, despite the fact that this range, in the first instance, was constituted by introducing certain stipulative definition, and likewise at still lower ranges observation statements themselves may require some linguistic conventions and so on.

In short, Kuhn misses the neat levels and tiers of different senses of 'theory' and 'theory dependence' in the scientific study of the phenomena.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is clear that theoretical constructs, data and observation statements all employ variously abstract definitions and conceptual frameworks. These multiple frameworks must not be confused with alternative theoretical hypotheses which need to be scientifically preferred, on the methods of empirical support supplied by experiments and observations in terms of predictions and their verifiers (i.e. theoretical constructs, data and observation statements). Thus in modern epistemology of science everybody knows that no verifiers are completely and categorically free from theoretical incorporations. Nor could they be isolated in any test situation while testing hypothesis or preferring one out of a set of hypotheses by means of these verifiers. The level of hypothesis and its abstractions has to be distinguished from levels of its apposite verifiers and their theoretical nature. In no way latter could be considered equiform with the hypothesis under examination.

3. It is a theory regarding phenomena which in any case science tackles while students of epistemology ask questions regarding the conceptual status of theories of phenomena themselves.

4. Knowledge is either a singular proposition or universal assertion regarding the nature of phenomena and it is possible to continuously approach a more reliable representation of the phenomena.

5. Landen, Larry; *Progress and its Problems*, University of California Press, 1977

6. Scheffler, S., *Science and Subjectivity*, Bobbs Merril, 1967

7. This concerns details about the procedure to be followed as to how to pick and choose from among the various theories about the unproblematic domain.

8. Kindly refer to earlier note 2 above about the various functions of scientific theories and theoretical abstractions where we emphasised the distinction between theoretical abstractions or observation data from the level of theoretical positing of hypothesis in scientific procedure. To speak of one theory simpliciter is to indulge in gratuitous category mistake.

9. The notion of scientific theory uses a notion of problem solving adequacy, and the latter can be represented as follows :– it entails a possibility of occurances of predictions which are confirmed by observations which are called theory verifires and problem solving adequacy is a large set of positive verifiers and no negative evidence against the hypothesis. These two together consititutes the notion of "problem solving adequacy".

10. Pandit, G. L.: "Epistemology and an Interactive Mode of the Growth of Knowledge", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. III. 4, July, 1976.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

10. As a student of Philosophy of Science Kuhn very strongly disputes classical platonism and respected orthodoxy of the methodological position that sharply draws a cleavage between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Rather he advocates mostly that Philosophy of Science till recently had noting to do with science and scientific practice and was in the habit of indulging in gratuitous abstractions concerning theoretical criteria of preference with anyone acquainted with actual history of science would dismiss as purely mythological and far too idealised to elaborate the concrete facts of scientific performance, and even scientific model building, and as such Kuhn brings in a certain degree of historical concreteness to the epistemology of science.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Poona–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 3
July, 1988

KANT'S THEORY OF CULTURE

The rich and the ramified implications of the concept of "Culture", as revealed by the various definitions of anthropologists like E. B. Tylor, Leslie A. White, Coon, Bidney, Parsons, Ralph Linton, A. L. Kroeber, Kluckhohn and others, suggest how hard it is to comprehend and define this concept or that it is a concept which means many things to many people. No human society exists without culture nor does culture function without society. Culture is a humun product or a product of social interaction or as Bidney's definition of it would imply it is "a product of society and is acquired by man in social interaction".[1] But it is not a mere product but also "a guide for subsequent interactions" or "the conditioning elements of further action" as Parsons, Kroeber and Kluckhohn would put it. That is why culture is said to be pervasive in the sense that it touches every aspect of human life–past, present and future of human society itself. It refers to the social heritage of the people and hence Merrill contends that "the history of culture is, in a sense, the history of man as a human being."[2]

The existence of plurality of societies implies the existence of plurality of cultures. Each society has a culture of its own and there is also the tendency to emphasize different cultural elements by different societies. Henee the saying : "man is one but cultures are many". Moreover, "the more complex the society, and the more exposed it is to differing influences, the harder it is to identify and make generalizations about culture themes."[3]

Received : 24–7–86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Consequently, the process of identification of a particular culture requires prior knowledge of the cultural development of that particular society.

The knowledge of the cultural development of a society would be easier when approached from its functional rather than from its substantive aspect. Even here, the understanding of a culture is made very difficult by another factor. That is, a culture is generally identified only through inferences from physical behaviour, verbal behaviour, material artifacts, etc. This means that culture is an abstraction, an abstraction from the visible behaviour of individuals. It is also an abstraction in the sense that it is identified from the uniformity of human behaviour of which it is the source. Added to this, it is said that man makes his culture with his mind. All human institutions–political, religious and cultural institutions–are nothing but concrete expressions of human ideas. Man gives expression to many of his ideas in the form of symbols because only he is capable of creating symbols. Hence it is said that " culture began when man as an articulate, symbol using, primate began."[4] These symbols may be either specific or non–specific or they may be referential or denotative or expressive or connotative. Thus culture is symbolic in character which is easily and readily transmitted. And, in the process of its transmission, some of its elements are being lost, some changed and some added.

From the foregoing discussion, certain basic characteristics of culture can be deduced. Culture is visible, learned, transmissive, social, ideational, gratifying, adaptive and integrative. These characteristics of culture take us to the relative problems of cultural variability, acculturation, similarities, assimilation and deviation. Cultural variability may be ascribed to the variations in geographical environment, technological development, cultural drift and historical accident or chance.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This does not mean that the direction of culture is determined by environment but merely that culture must adjust to the geogrophical necessities, if it is to continue. Acculturation, a term often used as a synonym for socialization, refers to "the process of cultural change induced by contact with foreign cultures."[5] Cultural similarities promote cultural assimilation. Cultural deviation, like cultural conformity, is socially determined depending upon the values and norms that the people cherish. Moreover, the process of cultural identification is often accompanied by prejudices of ethnocentrism or "the act of regarding one's culture as the center of the universe and hence as the basis for all comparisons with other cultures"[6] against which a student of culture must take precautions. This means that identity presupposes the need for openmindedness, tolerance and wide knowledge of cultural heritage of the different societies.

Culture is generally identified through the philosophical language in which it is expressed. Philosophy sums up the cultural achievements of a society and it is taken as "a sort of cultural self-assessment." But culture differs from society to society and the existence of plurality of cultures seems to suggest the existence of many valid philosophies having distinctive philosophical traditions of their own. Although culture is identifiable through mathematics, science, literature, art, social and religious practices, since philosophy is taken as a fundamental cultural trait, the philosophical way seems to be the easiest way,

The philosophical way is the best way. Kant is a philosopher of that way. He develops his theory of culture in the 83rd section of the *Critique of Judgment*. Traces of it may also be found in his essay "The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose". And, before we enter into Kant's theory of culture, it must first be remembered that for Kant "whatever conception of freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

will's manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e., human actions are determined in accordance with natural laws, as in every other natural event. "[7] Two things are made clear by this statement (1) Kant's theory revolves round man and nature and (2) man is a part of nature, and like all other objects of nature he is determined by natural law. But at the same time he is also to determine himself in accordance with moral law. In other words, he is both determined and free. Here Kant makes a distinction between the two senses of the term " nature ". In one sense, nature limits the freedom of man, and in another sense, it is a wise creator of the conditions of his freedom. Freedom is the essential nature of man and the freedom of man implies the use of his reason.

What is meant by freedom of man ? Kant distinguishes between three types af freedom–moral freedom, cultural freedom and freedom of discipline. Moral freedom makes man responsible for his actions. Cultural freedom is that which produces institutions and government. It provides the necessary conditions in which the development of moral freedom is possible. There is, then, the third kind of freedom, freedom of discipline, It consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires."[8] While cultural freedom consists in the freedom to transform nature, freedom of discipline consists in emancipation from nature. History begins with cultural freedom, but ends with the freedom of discipline. Therefore, writes Kant, " Man is destined by reason to live in a society with men and in it to cultivate, civilize and moralize himself by means of art and sciences. "[9]

Thus, Kant holds a teleological view of nature and attributes a rational purpose to it. Anything that is not meant for use or anything which does not fulfil its purpose for which it is created is a contradiction in Kant's theory. This includes either a living organism, or an arrangement (social or political), or both, Kant

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

calls it ethico–teleology. Nature has value and it helps man to prepare himself for what he himself must do in order to be an end–in–himself Here Kant raises three questions regarding man as an end–in–himself. (1) What now is the end in man? (2) What is this end which is intended to be promoted by means of his connection with nature? (3) Is this end to be found in man himself? Kant first answers the last question in the affirmative and then proceeds to answer the first two. If it is the end which is intended to be promoted by means of his connection with nature, then " it must be of such a kind that man himself may be satisfied by means of nature and its beneficence " or " it is the aptitude or skill for all manner of ends which he may employ nature both external and internal "[10] Kant calls the former as happiness and the latter, culture.

Happiness, according to Kant, is " a mere *idea* of a state, and one to which he seeks to make his actual state of being adequate under purely empirical conditions. "[11] For Kant, this is an impossible task because by an *idea* he means " a concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience... ".[12] Moreover, man's conception of happiness often fluctuates because he projects this idea of happiness himself, projects it in different ways, alters his conception of it so often, and, arbitrarily sets it as an end before himself. This raises the basic question : What, in fact, constitutes happiness which would never be attained by man ?

Any attempt to answer the above question would only be merely arbitrary and dogmatic. The reason for this is that man's own nature is such that he cannot rest satisfied with any enjoyment whatever. Nor has nature favoured man over all other animals to enjoyment. More often he is met with natural calamities like plague, famine, flood, cold, attacks from animals,

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

etc. Above all, man himself adds further to his misfortunes and misery of his own race through his inventions, power, wars, and so on. From all these, Kant comes to the conclusion that happiness of man cannot be the ultimate end of nature, nor is man himself destined for that. As the sole being upon earth possessing understanding, he is destined for some other higher end which must ultimately be found only in man and not outside of himself. But, where in man, at any rate, are we to place this ultimate end of nature? Kant answers this question by saying that it is to be placed in man's "capacity for setting before himself ends of his deliberate choice" [13] or in the "capacity to take ends as one's motive" as Patrick Riley would put it. This capacity is what is known as culture or to quote Kant, culture means "the production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing, consequently of the aptitude of a being his own freedom..." [14] Only this capacity or culture which transcends the relative ends of natural inclinations like the individual happiness can be the ultimate end of nature.

Now, this takes us to the last question viz., How to identify this capacity or culture in man? or what are the means which nature employs to bring about the development of the innate capacities of man? Kant recognizes several forms of culture but he does admit that not every from of culture can fill the office of this ultimate end. He separates two elements of culture from the rest namely skill and discipline. Skill means "the principal subjective condition of the aptitude for the furthering of ends of all kinds" [15] It is positive but by itself, it is incompetent or inadequate to assist the hnman will in its determination or choice of ends. It has to be disciplined. And discipline consists (as pointed out earlier) "in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires." Therefore, it is negative. In other words, if skill develops an "aptitude for ends," discipline lets us take the "ends of reason" as our ends. [16]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Kant is both pessimistic and optimistic. He is pessimistic about individual success but optimistic about mankind. The fulfilment of the natural capacities of man requires a vast length of time. It may require a series of generations in which one generation passes on its enlightenment to the next and finally reaches the goal of human aspirations, i.e., the development of the germs implanted by nature in human species. For this, nature has endowed man with reason and freedom of will, which make clear the intentions of nature Nature intends that man should be a maker of his own destiny. It is not the well–being but the *self-esteem* of man that is more important. Man must make himself worthy of everything. As an individual, Kant says, man is mortal, but immortal as a species. And here we see Kant's anticipation of the modern conception of culture as "super-organic in character" or that culture is held by individuals, but that its existence is independent of any particular individual. [17]

The means which nature employs to bring about the development of the innate capacities of man is that of antagonism within society. Antagonism, in this context, means the *unsocial sociability* of man. [18] Man's inclination *to live in society* and *to live as an individual* and the expected mutual resistance all around, provides an opportunity to awaken his powers. He cannot *bear* and yet he cannot bear *to leave* others. To him hell is 'other people', but yet he cannot live without them. This under-standing of the natural conflict in man is the first step towards culture and towards the gradual development of his talents. Man transforms his *pathologically* enforced union with others into a moral one. All his talents would remain hidden for ever, if he had not been endowed with these asocial qualities. He would remain "as good natured as the sheep" and would scarcely render his existence more valuable than that of the animals. It is nature's intention to foster the social incompatibility of men.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

" Man wishes concord, but nature knowing better what is good for his species, wishes discord. "[19]

The unsocial sociability of men creates competition among them. Competition breeds inequality. Inequality is the means by which skill is developed in the human race. " Skill can hardly be developed in the human race otherwise than by means of inequality among men, " writes Kant in the *Critique of Judgement*.[20] Inequality leads to the division of society into two classes viz, the higher and the lower. The higher class, usually a minority, who apply themselves to science and art (Kant calls science and art as " the less necessary branches of culture ") are provided with the necessaries of life by the majority. Hence the higher class keeps the masses always in a state of oppression. In course of time, the culture of the higher class spreads to the lower class. As a result luxury or " devotion to what is superfluous " begins. It begins to be prejudicial to what is indispensable. And with the advance of this culture, misfortunes increase equally on both sides. Misery and misfortune are the means by which nature tries to attain its goal.

This does not mean that man has to submit himself to these evil forces. Instead, " the evils visited upon us, now by nature, now by the truculent egoism of man, evoke the energies of the soul, and give it strength and courage to submit to no such force, and at the same time quicken in us a sense that in the depths of our nature there is an aptitude for higher ends.[21] But this aptitude for higher ends can be developed only by discipline of inclinations. If the first step towards culture can be called " culture by way of skill ", the second step can be called " culture by way of discipline. " Human inclinations, according to Kant are, " a great impediment to the development of our humanity. " They have to be disciplined. And in this respect, nature gives us that education that opens the door to higher ends than it can

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

itself afford. Through fine art and sciences we come to admit the possibillity of universal communication. In fact, they have "the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interest of social communication."[23] They introduce polish and refinement into society and make men civilized beings. Thus nature educates man through culture. Culture is a bridge between nature and man and through culture a new way of thinking in terms of humanity in general.

But this nature education or nature's intention that man should accomplish the development of all his natural capacities or the highest purpose of nature and also of man can be fulfilled only in a free society with utmost freedom and with the specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom. For this, man needs a *just constitution* which can provide *freedom under external laws*. But the problem of establishing *just civil constitution*, Kant admits, is the most difficult task for mankind. It is difficult because while living in a society, man desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all and at the same time wants to exempt himself from it wherever he can. This problem can be solved only at the end because "man needs for it a correct conception of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience tested in many affairs of the world, and above all else a good will prepared to accept the findings of this experience."[24] Rarely one would find these three factors together, and that would be possible, according to Kant, only "after many unsuccessful attempts."

Conclusion: And finally the question arises: Has nature's education of man begun? Two hundred years back Kant wrote: "Culture, considered as the genuine education of man as man and citizen, has perhaps not even begun properly, much less been completed."[25] But today, we can definitely say that nature's education of man has already begun. A cursory glance into the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

recent international events is sufficient to prove this. Today, the world is faced with the menace of nuclear overkill, with no end to the stockpiling, deployment and development of new and more parsome weapons. The super powere of the world now-a days are engaged in a deadly arms race. Governments of underdeveloped countries are slowly becoming mere pawns in the escalating world arms race. Many of them have become 'play grounds' for the nuclear powers to play their "endless game" of arms race. The result is that whole word is talking of peace. The issues and facts concerning peace and disarmament are being seriously discussed. Added to this, the recent meetings of heads of states like USA, China, Britain and India, are a sure sign of the growing awareness of the need for peace worldover. Progress can be made only slowly. Does not Kant speak of slow and gradual progress? Surely, men are progressing; they become more and more cultured and the days perhaps may not be far off for men to become civilized also.

Philosophy Department K. SUNDARESAN
Vivekananda College
MADRAS–600004

NOTES

1. Francis E. Merril, *Society and Culture* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962), p. 114.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Leonard Broom & Philip Selznick, *Principles of Sociology*, (New York: Harper & Row. Publishers, Inc. 1970), p. 57.
4. Leslie A. White "Culturological vs Psychological Interpretations of Human Behaviour", *American Sociological Review*, 12 (1947), p. 693.
5. Leonard Broom & Philip Selznick, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
6. William Graham Summer, *Folkways* (Boston : Ginn and Company, 1906) p. 13.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

7. I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," trans. H. B. Nisbet in *Kant's Political Writings* ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1970). p. 41.

8. Kant, I.; *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 94.

9. Quoted by Karl Jaspers, *The Great Philosophers* (London : Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962), p. 329.

10. Kant, I.; *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 92.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Kant, I.; *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. K. Smith (London : Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1956), p. 314.

13. Kant, I.; *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C: Meredith (Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 93-94

14. *Ibid.* p. 94.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

16. P. Riley. *Kant's Political Philosophy* (Totowa N. J. : Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), p. 77.

17. A. L. Kroeber, *The Nature of Culture* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1952). Chapter 3.

18. Kant, I.: "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, ' trans. H. B. Nisbet in *Kant's Political Writings* ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 44

19. *Ibid.* p. 45.

20. Kant, I. *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 95.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 97

22. *Ibid.*,

23. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

24. Kant, I "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose " trans. H. B. Nisbet in *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.47.

25. Beck, L. W. (ed.), *Kant on History*, (New York : Bobbes - Merrill, 1963) pp. 60-61

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CARAVAN BOOKS
DELMAR, NEW YORK
PUBLICATINN
JUNE 1988

PAPERS FOR CONSIDERATION:
C/o Department of Philosophy
York University
Downsview Ontario, Canada M3J IP3

Early Modern Philosophy II

Edited by Stanley Tweyman and Walter E. Creery

Editorial Board

David Berman, *Trinity College Dublin*
Jack W. Davis, *Universiiy of Western Ontario*
Peter Jones, *University of Edinburgh*
Doris Olin, *Glendon College, York University*
Craig Walton, *University of Nevada*
Fred Wilson, *University of Toronto*

Contents

7

Alternative Readings : Hume and His Commentators
James Noxon, *McMaster University*

25

Smith and Kant Respond to Mondeville
David Levy, *George Mason University*

41

Ideas and Perception in Malebranche
Steven M. Nadler, *St. John's College*

61

Skepticism and the Senses in Hume's 'Treatise'
Aleksandar Pavkovic, *University of Melbourne and University of Belgrade*

75

John Locke, David Fordyce and Jean-Jacques Rousseau: On Liberty
Susan Tatton, *York University*

85

Hume and Gibbon :
The Origin of Naturalistic Study of Religion
Andreas Weber, *Universitat Mannheim*

103

The Riddle of Bacom
Joseph Agassi, *Tel Aviv University and York University*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV. No. 3.
July, 1988

THE CONCEPT OF SELF REALIZATION : AN APPROACH TO THE UPANISADIC THEORY OF VALUE

The concept of Self–realization makes a significant difference in the consideration of a variety of value conceptions in the *Upaniṣads*. In this paper we expound this concept as the highest value concept presented by the *Upaniṣadic* seers, analyze the implications of this concept and examine reasons for considering it as the highest value. In the process of analysis, we have at times taken liberties with the *Upaniṣadic* texts, not in order to read meanings into them that were never intended, but because these seemed to be logically suggested by them.

A thorough reading of the *Upaniṣadic* literature poses problems in the articulation of Self–realization as the highest value concept. The reason is that the erudite language of the *Upaniṣadic* texts and the manner in which the seers often develop their themes, tend to cloak the essence of the thought and do not permit of its logical analysis and development. As a result, there appears to be more diversity than agreement in the *Upaniṣadic* literature in the articulation of a general theory of value. With this in the background, if we disregard the *Upaniṣadic* diversity on the conception of value, we may hope to clear the way for an explicit awareness of the core on which there is agreement on the principle of valve. We shall characterize this agreement of *Upaniṣadic* considerations as the following :

1. There is a unity of the individual self–*Jīvātman* – with the universal self–*Paramātman*.[1] As a living organism, *Jīva* is never

Received : 22–3 86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

merely a static unity. It is constantly in a process of equilibrium, in a process, that is, of maintaining itself in the midst of, and despite, identifies with the universal or cosmic Self. The individual self *(Jīva)* is active and expansive in ways in which the universal self is. In other words, the individual self is directed towards the universal Self as a being that can say 'I' (I am *Brahman*) to itself.[2] It does mean, rather, that, *Jīva's* differentiated modes of experiencing is but functional unfoldings of its basic potentialities directed toward *Paramātman*.

2. *Jīvātman* is not only aware of itself as acting, as being engaged in various situations, but also as determining in a large measure its relation with *Paramātman* in acting. In and through acting, the individual self realizes himself. That is to say, *Jīva* exists essentially as a becoming rather than as a mere being.[3] This aspect of *Jīva* as a self-directed becoming consists in the essence for man's search for values.

3. The individual self–*Jīva*–acquires knowledge and knowledge being one of the objects of value provides unison with the supreme Self. "That Eternal should be known as present in the Self (*ātmasaṁstha*); Truly there is nothing higher than that to be known..."[4]

4. *Jīva* as a minded organism is the agent in all conscious experience and control of mind is a means of obtaining realization.[5]

5. *Jīva* attains realization with the fulfilment of its drive toward the universal Self, although *Jīva* is patterned by individual purposes, aims, intentions, motives, desires and the like.[6] This drive for realization is not simply a drive for more life in the purely quantitative meaning of more, but a drive toward qualitatively distinct manifestations of life. It is a drive which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

permeates and overreaches *Jīva* with the supreme condition of self. In this supreme condition of self the distinction of good and evil is blurred.[7]

It might seem that the characterizations given above emphasize various aspects of a single underlying conception of the principle of value. We may hope that by combining all these characterizations a single totality, a uniformity which underlies as formulating the *Upaniṣadic* highest value can be achieved. A study of the *Upaniṣadic* literature may seem to pose serious obstacles to such an undertaking. The difficulty is increased in view of the fact that while propounding one of the above characteristics as the ultimate, the *Upaniṣads* reject all others explicitly. For example, those who define the highest value as 'knowledge' (of the supreme) explicitly exclude from their definition other characterizations explained above. Therefore, a complete and rational approach demands a careful consideration of the formulation in penetrating beneath the verbal forms and accidental contextual implications to the deeper strata of *Upaniṣadic* reflection on highest value. We shall look into the subject of 'highest value' in the kind of background in which it is found in the principal *Upaniṣads*.

When we look into the *Upaniṣadic* passages, we see as many as twentyfour apparently different candidates for the highest value. These refer to (1) *Ātman* (self) realization, (2) *Buddhi*, (3) character or conduct, (4) Desire, (5) Duty, (6) Faith (*Śraddhā*), (7) Freedom, (8) Happiness, (9) Intelligence, (10) *Karman*, (11) Knowledge, (12) Light, (13) Mind, (14) *Mokṣa* (liberation), (15) Pleasure (16) Plenum, (17) Power, (18) Scripture, (*Vedas*), (19) Space, (20) Sun/Moon, (21) Thought, (22) *Ṛta*, (23) *Prāṇa* and (24) *Yoga*. These twenty four postulates may be discussed by certain references to some scale or ladder of values. But that is not the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

purported task of this paper. The real problem now is this: What is the highest value possible? To what trans-subjective value do the *Upaniṣadic ṛṣis* commit themselves? With this avowed aim let us group the twentyfour candidates for value under the following table.

1.	Value of fulfilment	:	*Ātman* realization, *Mokṣa*
3.	Values of enterprise	:	Mind, Knowledge, Thought, *Prāṇa*, Intelligence
3.	Values for well-being	:	*Karman*, Freedom, Ṛta,
		:	Scripture, *Yoga*
4.	Values for gratification of appetites	:	Desire, Pleasure, Happiness, Power, Plenum
5.	Values of Sense Pleasures	:	Space, Light, Sun/Moon
6	Values for communal living	:	Character or Condnct, *Buddhi*, Duty, Faith

It may be said that these twenty four conceptions of value are inter-related in manifold ways. The objective significance of value that inheres in Self-realization as the highest one as stated in table 1, is realized by an individual when through action he sees through his *Jīva* nature and passes on to the transcendental that is the *Paramātman*. Through action, at the first stage the full nature of *Jīva* is apprehended. On the second stage this full knowledge of the empirical self leads through an understanding of its background and conditions to the self that is beyond the empirical self. In this way, the identity of the empirical self with the transcendental self (*Paramātman*) is fully realized. This realization is experienced as the climax of action and the highest point of fulfilment. Thus the true objective significance of Self-realization as the value-ought is experienced. That is to say, that the empirical self - *Jīva* - in its fullness realizes that the transcendental self-*Paramātman*- is the matrix of the empirical self.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The above table of groupings further emphasize that the highest value (Self–realizasion) is neither a quality constitutive of the nature of the object nor a self–existent ideal entity. It means that the highest value is encountered in experience and thus the reference to a subject cannot be eliminated. Now the question is on what grounds can we say that Self–realization is the highest value? The above six tables of groupings except the first one cannot serve as a standard of any kind because it varies with the needs and moods of particular individuals in particular situation. Although all values of things and events are values for us and are experienced by the valued object elicits in us, but they are true and objectively valid values only when our experience is in harmony with the assumed experiences of a universal and lasting ideal which transcends the immediately felt values As Werkmeister says : "In the total context of value experience we (now) realize a dual aspect of that experience. There are (a) the felt satisfaction, the joy of creation, the happiness that comes from having achieved what we ought to do. There are, in other words, all the basic levels of felt–value experiences. But at the level of insight and self–legislation there is also (b) the value placed upon what is being achieved – a value which transcends the immediately felt values. And because of (b), (a) may be purely coincidental. In other words, we must distinguish between being motivated by (a) and being motivated by (b). This distinction, we believe, is crucial for any value theory, for it is (b) which opens up a whole new dimension of our value experience."[8] In the *Bṛhad–āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the conversations of Yajñavlkya and Maitreyī concerning the all pervading Self emphasize the above point. Yajñavalkya urges to the fullest achievement of 'value' which is to be attained by the knowledge of Self which is higher than everything. He explains that everything is dear to an individual only when he considers his self as the highest one. In the *Upaniṣadic* words, 'it is the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

self that should be seen, that should be hearkened to, that should be thought on, that should be pondered on, because the self's being seen, hearkened to, thought on, understood, this world all is known.'[9]

A closer look at, and a careful investigation into, the function of the aforesaid groupings of value leads to a number of general conclusions. The first is the acceptance by the *Upaniṣadic ṛṣis* of the intimate relation between popular and philosophical considerations on the problem of value. Value-conceptions such as pleasure, happiness, knowledge and the like represent certain individualistic value-criteria. But in the whole of the *Upaniṣadic* literature, these individualistic value-conceptions pave way for a highest one which is considered universal. Understood in this way, value-scales in the *Upaniṣads* have the kind of significance which is attached to universal experience as opposed to merely private and individual experiences. The highest value for the *Upniṣadic ṛṣis* rests upon a broader basis than the fluctuating value-criteria of individuals. Thus, the highest value penetrates into the nature of experience by which the individual estimates his degree of development toward the highest one.

We may also note here the immense variety of attitudes taken towards the relation between popular and philosophical thought.[10] The *Upaniṣadic* seers, by conserving and re-interpreting the popular belief, rather than rejecting it, converged the individual beliefs towards a unity. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* we see especially an attempt to converge the individual beliefs towards a unity.[11] Five learned house holders-Prācinaśāla Aupamānyava, Satyayajña Pauluśi, Indradyumna Bhallavega, Jana Śārkarakṣya and Budila Aśvatarasvi – greatly learned in sacred lore (*śrotrīya*) came together and discussed "Who is our *Ātman?*" "What is *Brahma?*" These five decided to resort to Uddālaka Āruṇi who had the reputation of understanding the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Universal *Ātman*. But he was reticent. The six then approached the famous Aśvapati for instruction. Aśvapati elicits from each of them his present conception of Universal *Ātman*. One says that he venerates the sky as tne Universal *Ātman*. Aśvapati commends the conception and gives assurance that he is shining like the sky, but a great deal more. The sky would be only his head. The others in their turn enunciate their conceptions all of which are accepted as true, but taken as totally false. Aśvapti taught the six Brāhmaṇas the noble truth about the Universal *Ātman* as no other than their own Self. In conceiving of *Ātman* as something apart from themselves, they were committing an error.[12] Such an attempt is made by Yājñavalkya to Uśastas. "He who breathes in with your breathing in is the Soul (*Ātman*) of yours which is in all things. He who breathes out with your breathing out is the Soul of yours which is in all things. He who breathes about with your breathing about is the Soul of yours which is in all things.[13] We see such attempts in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Taittirīya Upaniṣads* too.[14]

It is clear from the above that the *ṛṣis* were not primarily concerned with the individualistic criteria on values. It may be argued that it is the reflection/attitude rather than the norm that concerns the seers. Hence the arrangement of value notions they advocate is not, primarily, a classification of goods but rather a classification of attitudes towards such ' goods ' in terms of the degree of reflection and philosophical insight manifested by the attitude On that account, the *ṛṣis* were concerned with an advance from subjective individualism of phenomenally experienced entities to collectively held views of values. They further argued for an advance from collective morality to a philosophical critical attitude toward the concept of value. A further advance was called for from this philosophical/critical attitude towards a higher metaphysical unity. Thus, they provided for the attainment

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of liberation resulting in a unison with the Absolute. Yājñavalkya, for instance, emphasizes the value of Ātmānic experience ' and righteous conduct as apposed to the acquisition of material possessions. [15] He convinced Maitreyī that the worldly goods are not the pathway to the Self. We see such a view in *Tatttirīya Upaniṣad* too. [16]

Upaniṣadic passages pertaining to the experience of the highest value thus acclaim ' Self ' realization ' as the highest of all and thereby exhort the aspirant to renounce the narrow horizons, the selfish interests for worldly goods. The *Bṛhadāṛṇyaka* tells us that when the individual Self (Soul) *(Puruṣa)* is embraced by the all embracing spirit *(Prajnānātman)* he attains his proper form in which his desire is fulfilled (*Āptakāma*) in which his desire is the spirit (*Ātmakāma*); he is without desire (*Akāma*) and apart from grief (*śokāntaram*).[17]

Let us now consider the nature and aim of this new shift form phenomenal entities to a more philosophical and metaphysical one. (Here we do not discuss the evolution of values from phenomenal entities to a metaphysical one.) It may be argued that the diverse value conceptions were synthesized by the ṛṣis by extracting some universal essence of value from the individual conceptions. Reflection upon what is implicit in this quest for value leads inevitably to the ideal of a non–contradictory experience for all individuals in which the individual value conceptions are harmoniously and completely realized. This ideal of maximal realization is the highest value experience or the highest principle of value. In the *Bṛhadāṛṇyaka Upaniṣad* we see an attempt in this direction. Here, king Janaka was instructed by the great seer Yājñavalkya regarding six partial definitions of *Brahman*, concerning the Soul, its bodily and universal relations. Yājñavalkya instructed him that the light of man is the Soul.[18] Insight into this principle is taught to be superior in value to common

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ungrounded opinions of individual citizens as, for instance, Maitreyī. This was also true for the administrators who are charged with the guidance of the destiny of the community. For example, the king of Vārāṇasī approaches Yājñavalkya and seeks his help for the attainment of the highest principle.[19]

Such approaches to the 'understanding' of value, present in the whole of *Upaniṣads*, are grounded in great exaltation of metaphysical truths at the expense of mere pleasure [20], or mere power.[21] In other words, the *Upaniṣads* exalt the cosmic and the individual self at the expense of wealth and bodily pleasures. That is to say, that we find in them the exaltation of a universal idea – Realization of Self – at the expense of many fluctuating particulars, of *ṛta* as opposed to chaos, of self as opposed to body, of *prāṇa* as opposed to the other parts of the body, of reality at the expense of sense appearances. This shift in the general attitude towards value is characteristic of the *Upaniṣadic ṛṣis.*

So far we have been seeking for the background and setting in which candidates for the highest value in *Upaniṣads* are found. It is clear from the above investigation that the postulates such as individual and cosmic self, knowledge and *ṛta* will be adopted rather easily by the seers. But snch candidates as pleasure, plenum, wealth, power, and the like will need to be reinterpreted before it will be possible for the seers to accept even these as reasonable candidates. With this in mind let us take two important items — knowledge and mind – with a view to obtaining a proper understanding and appreciation of the concept of Self–realization as the highest value.

Knowledge :

It is illustrative that the *Upaniṣads* acclaim 'not much learning' but the understanding of metaphysical truths. They advo-

...3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cate the problem of knowledge 'not only in connection with philosophical speculation, but also in the practical affairs of life'.[22] Hence, the seer exhorts: "He who knows (*Brahman*) as the real, as knowledge, as the infinite... He obtains all desires".[23] Knowledge, thus, is one of the supreme means of liberation from bondage. While ignorance (*a-vidyā*) is the cause of bondage and transmigration; true knowledge (*vidyā* or *Jñāna*) liberates one from bondage.[24]

Knowledge, thus, leads to the attainment of identity of the individual self with the absolute Self. Knowledge, for them, is the intuitive realization of one infinite, eternal, universal spirit; it is becoming *Brahman (Brahma-bhavana)*, becoming all (*Sarvabhavana*); it is the vision of the self of the Universe (*Sarvātmā darśana*); the vision of the one Self in all (*ekātma darśana*). It is the state of identity (*sāmya, ekatva*) of the individual self with the supreme Self. It is free from love, hatred, delusion, joy, sorrow and fear; a state of freedom from demerits and merits, a state of super moral transcendent purity.[25] Knowledge leads to immortality,[26] leads to the Brahma-world and procures fulfilment of desires,[27] frees from all fetters,[28] influences one's re-incarnate status,[29] over comes *karma* and re-birth.[30] The supreme knowledge, thus, for *Upaniṣadic* seers is the knowledge of the supreme. But they insist that the 'eternal should be known as present in the self' (*ātmasaṁstha*) and 'truly there is nothing higher than that to be known.' Thus, 'when one recognizes the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment, and the Universal Actuator, all has been said...[31]! In this supreme knowledge there is no duality between the subject and the object. In his discourse with Maitreyī, Yājñavalkya propounds this view. "For where there is duality (*dvaita*) as it were (*iva*) there one sees another; there one smells another; there one hears another; there one speaks to another; there one thinks of another;

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

there one understands another. When, verily, every thing has become just one's own self, then whereby and whom would one see "?"[32] This same view is propounded in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* in the following way. "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else–that is a plenum. But where one sees something else–that is the small. Verily, the plenum is the same as the immortal. But the small is the same as the mortal.[33] In this way the *ṛṣis* indicate directly that knowledge–seeking tendencies should be trained and directed so as to recognize and accept the supremacy of Self–realization, not merely as an external force, but as something within one's own true nature. The reform, through knowledge, suggested is thus a reform of the self. Looked at in this way the *Upaniṣads* substitute the philosophic/critical spirit in knowledge in place of of the materialistic and sensualistic attitude.

Our brief investigation suggests the following :

1) Knowledge ultimately determines the actual and particular character of Self–realization in every possible form.

2) Knowledge, in its turn, is determined by the knowledge of the realization of Self.

3) Knowledge recognizes the individual's ability to know his self i. e., knowledge of one's true self leads to realization which consists in knowing the ultimate reality as dwelling in the heart. It is described as having access to *Brahma*, as being merged with *Brahma*.[34]

4) Knowledge, thus, rests upon the individual's partnership in the (spiritual) possession of self.

Knowledge, thus, is a process to know the self and it ends with the realization of Self where there is no duality. Understanding in the *Upaniṣadic* spirit, knowledge, then may be considered as a candidate of value only in so far as it leads to the realization of Self.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Mind :

The *Upaniṣads* advocate that Prajāpati made three things for himself-Mind, Speech and Breath. It is with mind that one truly sees. It is with the mind that one hears. Desire, imagination, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, meditation, fear-all this is truly mind. Therefore, even if one is touched on his back, he discerns it with the mind.[36] According to this analysis, mind is disclosed as an equipment to be used. This does not mean that mind is first discovered as an object and then assigned a use for specific purposes. This is the force of the *ṛṣis* well known allegorical description of the mind as the form of a person. The *ṛṣis* phenomenally portrayed that the *Yajur Veda* is its head, the *Ṛg Veda* its right side, the *Sāma Veda* the left side, teaching, the body (*ātman*) the hymns of the *Atharvans* and the Āṇgirasas, the lower part, the foundation.[37] They have likened mind to the reins of a chariot-driver.[37] For them, mind is higher than the Sense[38] and the suprasensible person is framed by the heart, by the thought, by the mind.[39] The *Kauśītakī Upaniṣad,* while dealing with the correlation of the individual's function with the facts of existence exhorts thus "... the mind is one portion there of taken out. Thoughts and desires are its externally correlated existential elements."[40] The *Mūṇḍaka Upaniṣad* discusses mind as the source of the human person and of the cosmic elements.[41] We see similar explanations of mind in other *Upaniṣads* too.[42]

The above passages suggest that the *Upaniṣadic* seers have projected their conception of mind not only as a conscious agent in all experiences but also as an organizing principle in all fluctuating experiences within the individual. It is clear from the *Maitreyī Upaniṣad*[43] that the reform of the mind, in the way of controlling it, gives forth the true ideal, the ideal of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

realization of Self–paving way to the destruction of materialistic and sensualistic attitude of body.

Our exploration of the *Upaniṣadic* conception of mind as one of the conceptions for highest value paves way for a variety of considerations that enter into the working out of a theory which proposes mind as a value. We have not attempted to articulate these in a fully satisfying fashion, but have only sketched the notion of mind and its role within the value spectrum in the *Upaniṣads.* We can sum up the discussion by pointing out the following :

1) In the *Upaniṣadic* literature the mind has been viewed as the agent in, and more than that as an organizing principle of, all conscious experiences.[44]

2) There is an advance from the view of mind as an organizing principle to a conception of it as the source of the human person as well as the cosmic elements.[45]

3) A philosophical and critical advance was called for from this reflection on the nature of mind to a conception of it as a metaphysical reality conceived as the source of every human thought.[46]

4. Mind as a metaphysical reality and as a source of every human thought is immaterial and antithetical to the physical.

5) As considered above, there is a view of the mind being pure and impure.[47] And when the impurities of the mind are eliminated by concentration, the individual attains the joy of realization (which is not other than self–realization). The joy is said to be indestructible.[48]

Conclusion :

What we set out to do in this paper is to present an analysis of Self–realization as the highest value concept in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Upaniṣads. It is understood that criterion of the nature of value experience the *ṛṣis* advocate is not a classification of 'goods' but rather a classification of attitudes towards such goods in terms of the degree of reflection and philosophical insight manifested by the attitude. Thus the *Upaniṣadic* genius synthesized diverse elements of value into one integrated whole viz. realization of one's true self. To this purpose we have considered briefly, knowledge and mind, two of the chief items for the highest value to determine in what way the two have been regarded as constituents of the highest value concept. The basic argument is that the attainment of the highest value is directly proportionate to the degree of insight. Where the insight is little, value is little and where the highest level of insight has been reached, the highest degree of value is attained. This insight is the realization of one's own true self in which all value conceptions are harmoniously and completely realized. This ideal is realized only when the felt–value experiences and the empirical motives become shot through with a more transcendental insight. Thus, the felt–value experiences lose their empirical character and pass over to the transcendental and transmutes it into a perfect order and harmony of the ideal realm. This, however, is the life which we describe as the life of Self–realization. Looked at in this way, this highest value achieves the character of completeness which no other positive value can possibly replace or rival.

Department of Humanities and
Social Sciences, I. I. T.
KANPUR–208 016 (U. P.)

V. T. SEBASTIAN

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

* I am thankful to Professors S. N. Mahajan and S. A. Shaida for their friendly criticisms, suggestions and modifications at various stages of this study.

1. *Bṛh.* 2. 5. 1–13; 4. 4. 5. *Chānd.* 3. 18; 6. 3. 2; 6. 11. 3. *Ait.* 1. 3. 13; 1. 2. 4. *Katha,* 1. 3. 7. *Iśa* 16. All *Upaniṣadic* quotations in this paper are taken from the translation of Hume, Robert Ernest. *The Thirteen Principle Upanishads.* Translated from Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* and an annotated bibliography. Second edition, Revised (Oxford Univ. Press, Ely House, London W1).
2. *Bṛh.* 1. 4. 7, 1. 5. 15; 2. 4. 1; 2. 5. 15: 2. 4. 6–7. *Iśa* 16. *Maitri* 6. 17; 7. 7. *Tait* 3. 10. 4. *Chānd.* 3. 12. 7–9.
3. *Bṛh.* 3. 7. 1–23.
4. *Bṛh.* 1. 3. 28; 1. 4. 17: *Chānd.* 1. 2. 8. *Katha.* 3. 7–8. *Tait.* 2. 1.
5. *Bṛh.* 1. 5. 3, *Jiva* as the conscious agent and the experiencer is established in many passages in the principal *Upaniṣads.*
6. Ajātaśatru explains to Gārgya regarding *Atman* as the intelligent principle through the examples of waking, dreaming and deep sleep status. Also
   Bṛh. 2. 1. 20. *Chānd,* 7. 26. 2.
7. *Mūṇḍ.* 3. 1. 3. *Katha.* 2. 14. *Chānd.* 7. 2. 1; 6. 14. 2; 6. 8. 6. And also *Śānkara Bhāṣya* on *Chānd* 6. 14. 2.
8. Werkmeister, William Henry ; *Man and his Values,* Lincoln, Univ. of Nebraska Press (1967), p. 126
9. *Bṛh.* 4. 5. 1–15.
10. Ranade, R. D.; *A Constructive Survey of the Upanishadic Philosophy : being an introduction to the thought of the Upaniṣads* (2nd ed.), Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1968, Chapter, I.
11. *Bṛh.* 4. 1–2. *Tait.* 3. 1, *Chānd.* 5. 11–18
12. *Chānd.,* 5. 11–18
13. *Bṛh.* 3. 4. 1
14. *Bṛh.* 4. 1. 2. *Tait.,* 3. 1.
15. *Bṛh.,* 2. 4. 5
16. *Tait.,* 3. 1
17. *Bṛh.,* 4. 3. 21
18. *Bṛh.,* 4. 1. 2. to 4. 3. 7

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

19. *Ibid.*, 2. 1. 20
20. *Chānd.*, 7. 23
21. *Bṛh.*, 1. 4. 8. *Chānd.*, 8. 7. 1
22. Hume, R. E., *op. cit.*, p. 58
23. *Tait.*, 2. 1
    Iśa 6. *Katha.* 1. 2. 8, 9, 12, 24; 2. 3. 9, 14; 1. 3. 7–9
    Mūnd. 1. 2. 13; 2. 2. 3; 3. 1. 5, 8, 9; 3. 2. 2, 6
24. *Iśa* 9, 11. *Katha.* 1. 16; 1. 2. 4, 5
25. *Iśa* 6, 7. *Katha.* 1. 21; 2. 12; 2. 3. 14, 15;
    Mūnd. 2. 1. 10; 3. 2. 7–9. *Tait.* 3. 10. 5
26. *Brh.*, 4. 4. 18. *Chānd.*, 8. 5. 4
27. *Mūnd.*, 3. 2. 2
28. *Katha.*, 6. 6–8
29. *Kauś.* 1. 2. *Katha.*, 5. 7.; 3. 15
30. *Mūnd.*, 1. 2. 7; 9, 10. *Śvet.*, 1. 11
31. *Ibid.* 1. 12
32. *Bṛh.*, 2. 4. 14
33. *Chānd.*, 7. 24. 1
34. *Śvet.*, 1. 7.; 6. 10
35. *Bṛh.*, 1. 5. 3. *Maitri.*, 6. 30
36. *Tait.*, 2. 3.
37. *Katha.*, 3. 3. 6
38. *Ibid.*, 6. 7
39. *Ibid.*, 6. 9
40. *Kauś.*, 3. 5.: *Ibid.*, 3. 6., 4. 20. *Kena.*, 1. 4. 5; 3. 3. 6
    Katha. 3. 10 & 6. 7–9
41. *Mūnd.*, 2. 1. 8.
42. *Praśna.*, 4. 2; 4. 8 & 3. 9. *Maitri.*, 6. 5. 6. 30
43. *Maitri.*, 6. 34
44. *Bṛh.*, 1. 5. 3
45. *Mūnd.*, 2. 1. 8 *Praśna.*, 4. 2 *Maitri.*, 6. 5 & 6. 30
46. *Kauś.*. 3. 5. 6 *Katha.*, 6. 7–9
47. *Maitri.*, 6. 34
48. *Ibib.*, 6. 34 *Ait.*, 3. 5. 1

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 3,
July, 1988

IDENTICALNESS

Where something is stipulated as possessing identicalness, its identity predicates will serve to afford it a means to unity and at the same time defend it against contradiction. Where X and Y designate the same object in *phi* and X has the property F, then Y must have the same property and one which is substitutable in identity predication. The variants X and Y will, if the entity in question is assumed to be one and the same thing, have the property of identicalness in some respect, that is, at least symbolically and in name. F is therefore the close or weakly ordered property in common of necessarily having the indeterminate property G of identicalness, which is the property of being identical with a certain object in some or in all positive respects H coterminous with time to a measurable duration and in some degree of freedom. F is a universal property by virtue of which G as an 'inexact predicate' has been assigned the interim property of identicalness in some or all respects H. F and G, since they both retain their identicalness with respect to the object in question, share this identicalness in common and are limited to it such that F and G will be interchangeable properties expressed in class membership and in terms which are mutually substitutable. F and G are class properties which share in common in some or all respects the property of identicalness with the symbolized object which possesses this property. F and G are logically and semantically equivallent insofar as they share identicalness. The object possesses an all–inclusive, common and

Received : 4–2–86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

actually shared identicalness in existence and hence also a causal identity in time duration and sequence rather than only a semantical or purely logical identity.

The interchange of identities in class membership depicting identicalness in existence in some or all respects along with other determinate possibilities is asserted in order to establish the essential identicalness of any entity with which we are concerned.

The problem is to achieve a positive identity formula that will hold universally and in all actual as in all possible contingencies; it will give a complete description of the way in which one world might be given repeatedly in what may be called a 'maximal proposition'. There is no prejudice in favour of the actually existing. We have x and y as individual variables identical in *phi* and we want first to bestow upon them the property of a freely elected identicalness in some essential respect to hold under the unique conditionality of possessing a certain measurable duration in time. The property F is a class of properties in *Delta Phi*, the constant of the set of all properties. The property F is any essentially stipulated property of identicalness in kind, i.e., a 'near' property, and retains its ordered identicalness through substitution of like properties in kind which are alike in the sense that they are the same only in their identicalness in principle, but not the same absolutely. In other words the property F bestows class homonymity or equivocacy, which allows individuality as to reference in a truth-bearing object while retaining a common meaning in class membership. Sameness of identity eventually resolves itself into the fact that substitution either may be made or it need not be made.

To have identical properties means that the entity or entities under consideration will possess an essentially stipulated property F of having the freely elected and indeterminate property of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

identicalness G in some essential respect H in common and shared with something else and substitutable. Substitution will be in terms of class membership, i.e., in terms of some change of class membership of F, which will be a substitution of terms in kind. This amounts to a substitution of non-irreplaceable terms coterminous with each densely ordered time contingency.

It may be observed that an entity is not identical even with itself without risk of duplication of terms, that is, without embarrassment of the possibility of substitution of identifying terms in synonymy. There is, however, an allowable differentiation or 'time' sameness in dissolution in identifying paronomy cognate terms short of their full definitive meaning. To keep the entity identified at all means that it must retain its identity in class membership at the risk of sharing this identity with some other subclass, or of having this identity substituted for by another like subclass or even of losing its original identity altogether through accidental or definitional cognate terms in paronomy A property that is assumed to be identical 'de re' may be said 'de dicto' to have the 'near' property of identicalness essentially if F is the stipulated property of possessing the all–sufficient property G of identicalness necessarily and in some or all respects H. F and G share in common the actual identicalness of the thing that has it such that they are the same in class identity and their referring object necessarily is truth, with still some risk of error. I have the property of being identical with myself, but not absolutely, since I am identical with myself (a) 'de re', whereby I am identified with myself substantively and in assumption as object and at best only as a symbolic variant and (b) 'de dicto', in which I am self–identical and reidentified with myself symbolically in at least two ways, (i) self–attributively and (ii) successively and in class substitutivity, dissoluble and limited in the time context.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

We reconstruct, not by way of predication given accidentally only, but assuming identicalness first definitively, pure and simple, and by reidentifying through the not–inconsistent substitution at law of one class identity for another class identity based upon a 'maximal' subject proposition stated in the contrafactual sense and in consideration of all ways of equal possibility in which this or that subject–word might be given in existence.

There is no guarantee that we are always talking about the same thing; there is no certainty that an entity is identical with itself at every moment of its existence unless it is first supported by an assumption of the property of identicalness in kind and in some respect. In some sense, however, the self–identity of a thing or an event as subject is not essential to it. That is to say if the identity in question is known to be unique and explicitly distinctive to itself alone it may be substituted for and shared, but only tacitly, symbolically and in provisional synonymy. But in another respect a thing, to be identified, requires the shared identity of something else in common with it, and it may bear identity only when its own identity in essence is substituted for by at least one other identity in kind and in some degree of freedom coextensive with a time limitation. A thing need not always be identified in identically the same respect in order to remain identically the same object with itself.

We are saying that x is the same in *phi* as y, that is, that x and y are indistinguishable in respect to some property, *psi*, which is expressed as a predicate. Two objects, for example, $\hat{u}$ and z are identically the same in some respect, coterminous in time and in some degree of freedom, that is, within a time gradient. These two objects may have identically the same height or whatever, which is to say that they share some property in common and that this common property must be selective and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

may be substituted for symbolically. This in turn is to say that a property in common expressed as a proper predicate in causal connectivity and instrumental in furthering a continuing identity may be meaningfully substituted for in two ways, (1) uniquely and by itself alone and (2) essentially and by another in kind. In either case the substitution occurs along with a referential object if necessary, verifiable in the time context.

The predicates *psi*, psi_1 can change class membership within *Delta phi*, requiring a stabilizer, i e, *psi epsilon Delta Phi*, such that we are able to speak of this or that individual table as a class member that changes in membership either as it changes its own identity, where one identity is substituted for another identity resulting in its reidentification, or as its identity remains the same substantively. Where these identities prove to be logically and semantically true, identicalness is established truth functionally, i.e., $\forall (F \equiv G) = T \rightarrow \Box (F = G)$, where F is the property of necessarily having the property of an indeterminate identicalness G in some respect coterminous with time, i.e., in a time gradient. Read: the truth of the logical or semantic equivallence of all free instances of properties F and G implies the necessary identicalness of F and G in kind in some or all respects in existence but not absolutely. If the nominal subject G has the 'near' property F as a necessary property in order to identify it essentially, then the proposition 'necessarily F is G' is necessarily true.

We resymbolize and substitute for the symbol, i.e., for the predicate variable and in kind; the symbolic property as such and as subject may be taken as an interim or designated entity, an abstract yet particular subject in its own right where it is assumed to be meaningful. 'Socrates is wise' says something about Socrates and tells of one of the attributes of the man we no longer have with us. Wisdom is not a property at all of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

name 'Socrates,' for it is Socrates himself who is wise and not his name. It is the attribute wisdom rather than the predicate 'wisdom' which is the property that Socrates has. Yet in fact it will be the fledgling identity 'Socrates' held provisionally as subject rather than Socrates the man that we may first hope to predicate of in a categorical sense and to reidentify subsequently at law. To do this means to predicate essentially of 'Socrates' as a subject in existence at least the unique property of identicalness, i.e., the symbolic or 'close' property F in kind of having the all–sufficient and indeterminate property of identicalness G in some or all respects generally and coextensive with the time gradient, or, as we might say, having the property G maximally and in all possible contingencies. We predicate of subjects and not of things, or at least the most we are able to say is that we predicate of things taken as maximally possible subject entities held nominally in existence. The point seems to be that the subject–name possesses the 'near' property of e.g. wisdom in kind, which is not wisdom at all, but only a predicate place-holder which marks out a logical space giving entitlement to a wisdom that has applicability, a wisdom that may or may not be instantiated at any appropriate time contingency.

Predication in terms of identification theory, as in second-order quantification logic must needs be in the form of a universal instantiation and incompletely dispositional, an identification by means of a universal formula accepted in consensual agreement in order to make good the claims that we are actualizing and synthesizing one and the same thing. The only property about which are concerned is that of a common and in some respect limited identicalness shared by some subject that is already provisionally held and tacitly designated in name, not at first essentially but uniquely and virtually. To identify a thing is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to be able to subsequently and in succession and in kind substitute one given identity for another given identity negatively such that this reidentification may be open to verification in the ongoing time milieu.

The aim has been to establish reidentification by means of a universally agreed upon formula in order to make good the claim that we are talking about one and the same entity in its identicalness, and to unify and synthesize the entity in question into one ordered paradigm of interchangeable parts, i.e., substitutable terms. The paradigm with which we are concerned can only be a language model. Not that we do away with predication, but that predication is achieved in terms of class identicalness which is repeatable and substitutable in kind in order to identify an entity in terms of some kind of identity predication which will be uniform and universal in substitutable class membership. To claim identity is to be able to substitute one identity for another identity in kind and to not know that it is not substitutable such that the identity is still open to risk in rational possibility. The thing or event to which we refer can then be comprehended in terms of a universal symbolic formula upon which we are subsequently free to establish an ongoing litigious agreement or disagreement by means of our own peculiar kind of communicable discourse.

59 Victor Street,
London, Ontario,
Canada N6c 1B9

A. W. J. HARPER

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

REFERENCES

1. Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, London, Oxford University Press, 1974.

2. Leonard Linsky, *Names and Descriptions*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1977.

3. Stephen P. Schwartz, ed., *Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds*, London, Cornell University Press, 1977.

4. Saul Kripke, 'Naming and Necessity' in *Semantics of Natural Language*, D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Reidel, Dordrecht, 1972.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 3
July, 1988

SENSE-DATA AND PHYSICAL OBJECTS

A Systematization of Moore's View

It is well known that G. E. Moore showed his inclination for different views regarding the nature of sense-data and their relation to physical objects at different periods of his long philosophic career. However, hardly any writer on Moore has tried to systematically link up his views of different periods and to find out the rationale underlying the apparently queer pattern of growth of Moore's view in this respect. In the present paper my aim is threefold :

(i) to systematically link up Moore's different views about sense-data and their relation to physical objects,

(ii) to find out a possible explanation as to why the pattern of growth of Moore's views in this respect is as it is and *not* otherwise, and

(iii) to see whether any new light can be shed on Moore's philosophic commitments (may be only unconscious commitments) by looking at the periodic changes in his views from a phenomenological standpoint.

Accordingly, this paper is sub-divided into three parts which are concerned with the above three points in that order.

I

In order to make the links between Moore's views of different periods more easily discernible, the salient features of his views

Received : 28-2-87

...4

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

regarding (a) the status of sense–data and (b) their relation to physical objects, are at first presented here in a chronological order, and afterwards we endeavour to show how these can be systematically linked up.

a) *The Ontological Status of Sense–Data* : Under this head we shall consider Moore's attitude at different times towards the question whether sense–data can exist even when unperceived. As in the case of the logical status of sense–data, in this case also, an interconnection and a consistent pattern of development can be discerned among the apparently unconnected, sundry views held on this point at different times by Moore.

i) 1903 : The view held by Moore on this point in his 1903 paper "Refutation of Idealism" may be regarded as having the strongest ontological commitment. Thus, during this period he not only regarded the existence of unperceived sense–data a logical possibility, but used to think that whoever denies such possibility is 'committing a selfcontradictory mistake.[1] Moreover, he believed that the concepts of 'existence' and 'of being perceived' are so radically distinct that about *nothing* it can be true to hold that 'its existence consists in its being perceived'. He consequently, confidently asserted even the existence of an *'unfelt* pain' as a distinct possibility in 1903.

ii 1905–6 : In his paper of this period "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception" the same tendency to admit the possibility of existence of sense–data which are unperceived continues, although his rather dogmatic self-confidence in this matter, seems to have become a little self–critical. And we find his confidence shaken at least in the case of 'unfelt pain', when he says that 'certain kinds of things – pains, for example, do *not* exist when they are not perceived and that other kinds of things – colours, for example, *do* exist, when they are not perceived.[2]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

iii) 1910 : In the lecture given during this period, Moore still seems favourably inclined to the view that sense–data may exist even when they are not perceived. To strengthen his case he makes a distinction between 'sense–data' and 'acts of sensing' and maintains that although the latter cannot, the former can exist, even when unperceived. One feature of his view of this period, is that he does not raise the issue about 'unfelt pain'. The way in which he classifies different kinds of objects of direct apprehension, seems to indicate that 'pain' would be regarded *not* as a sense–datum – but as a state of consciousness and consequently the case of pain, even if doubtful, would not affect the possibility of the existence of unperceived sense–data.

However, although Moore was inclined in favour of the objective existence of sense–data and would be only too glad if someone could provide him with an absolutely conclusive argument in favour of such a position, he, unfortunately, failed to remain as confident of his position as he was in 1903, because the facts of *relativity of perception* and of one and the same object being characterised by two or more incompatible sense–data, threatened the objectivity–claim of sense–data, and Moore found no satisfactory way of meeting this threat. Thus we find him admit that the *'accepted view'* about sense–data (which implied the subjectivity of sense–data) is very likely to be true and the arguments in its favour, are too strong to be met easily, although such arguments might not be 'absolutely conclusive'.[3] Thus his 1910 view sill maintained his bias for the objective existence of sense–data, although in a somewhat guarded manner.

iv) 1913–14 : During this period, too, Moore is highly inclined in favour of the objective existence of sense-data[4], but is not absolutely confident of the tenability of his position with regard to *all* sorts of sense-data.[5] I have already pointed out that but for the fact of relativity of perception, (according to which diffe-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

rent; often incompatible, sense–data to belong to one and the same object,) which threatens the *objectvity-claim* of sense-data, Moore would unhesitatingly accept the position that *every* sense-datum (in the 1910 sense) may exist even when not perceived. Consequently, in 1913–14, we find Moore trying to find out a way of meeting the argument from relativity of perception and to justify his inclination for the view that sense-data can exist unperceived. For this purpose he makes two *ad hoc* assumptions viz., (a) sense–data exist *nowhere* in space i.e., are non-spatial, and more than one incompatible sense–data may *be* in the same place without violating the law of non–contradiction[6]. (This is a view which used to be put, by other sense–datum philosophers including Russell, in a different way by saying that sense-data do *not* exist, they only *subsist.*) The other *ad hoc* assumption was that (b) though experience of sense–data depends on subjective factors, the *existence* of sense–data does not, and consequently the fact that two persons may *experience* different sense–data as characterising one and the same thing simultaneously, does not *prove* that the *existence* of sense–data depends on being perceived by those persons.[7]

v) 1918–19 : His view of this period is just a continuation of his 1913–14 position, the only difference being that during this period, Moore discovered another hypothesis, equally *ad hoc,* which; if aceeptcd as true, would justify his claim that sense–data can exist independently of being perceived by anybody. The *ad hoc* assumption that he made during this period may be put thus 'a sense datum may have qualities other than what they are *directly apprehended* to have'.[8] If this assumption is correct then the *seemingly* incompatible sense–data that seem to characterise the same object simultaneously, need *not* be *really* incompatible and hence could be regarded as existing in the same place without inconsistency.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

vi) 1925 : His paper of this period has mainly a *negative* importance. In his "A Defence of Common Sense" he seems to have realised that the *ad hoc* assumptions that he made in 1918–19, even if true cannot save the view that every sense–datum may have an objective existence i. e., existence *not* dependent upon being perceived by somebody. Because, in cases of 'double vision' we seem to see a single thing double i. e., we see two distinct sense–data, and it is meaningless to assert that the two *distinctly* seen sense–data are in fact *not* distinct.[9] However, though his faith in the objectivity of sense–data is considerably weakened in 1925, it still lingers on. This is evident from his 1928–29 view, where he makes a distinction between 'sense–data' and 'sensequality', the implicit assumption being, that the former can although the latter cannot exist unperceived.

vii) 1942 : His view during 1942 is, as usual, full of indecision and vacillation. Thus to Ducasse he concedes, on the one hand, that in all likelihood, to hold that *any* sense–data can exist even when unperceived, is self–contradictory[10] and yet says, on the other hand, 'I cannot see *why* there should be a contradiction in supposing the opposite, (of what he conceded to Ducasse) I cannot see *where* the contradiction lies'.[11] But although there is still an element of vacillation and indecision in his views of 1942 and 1952, the emphasis has certainly shifted from the side of objective existence of sense–data to the view that *most* sense–data (probably all of them) do not exist when not perceived.

viii) 1957 : In his paper of this period "Visual Sense–data" the vacillation of the earlier period is minimised and the shift of emphasis to the *subjectivity* of the sense–data seems to be complete and the *ad hoc* assumption which he made in 1918–19 to save the *objectivity claim* of sense–data is characterised by him as 'non–sensical'.[12]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Thus we find that Moore's view on the 'ontological status of sense-data' also underwent gradual change, each successive stage of development of his view being *logically* connected with its corresponding previous stage. The basic feature of the development of his view consists in the gradual transition from the belief in the absolute *mind-independence* of sense-data, to their almost absolute mind-dependence.

b) *Relation between Sense-Data and Material Objects*: Before we try to systematize Moore's views, held at different times, about the nature of the relation between sense-data and material object, we should better classify, the different possible suggestions as to the nature of such relation, which Moore took into consideration.

All the different suggestions about the nature of R,[13] that Moore entertained may be brought under three broad heads: i) R stands for some sort of *identity relation;* ii) R denotes some sort of *connection* other than that of identity, and further, R is analysable in terms of one or more other known types of relation; and iii) R stands neither for the 'identity relation' in any form nor for any relation which can be further analysed in terms of other known relations-in short, R is an unanalysable relation, and is different from the identity relation.

Each of these heads again can be sub-divided into more than one subheads.

There are five kinds of view about R, considered by Moore, each of which can be brought under the first alternative i.e., identity view.

a) Positivistic-Phenomenological view of the Mill-Russell type:- According to this view material objects are *nothing but* a series of sense-data, actual and possible, connected with each other according to a fixed pattern. In Mill's language a material

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

object is nothing but a 'permanent possibility of sensations.' This is classified under the identity–relation head, because, according to this view material objects are *nothing other* than a *series* of sense–data which manifest themselves to us according to a fixed plan. Hence, it may be regarded as a sort of identity relation. Henceforth, we refer to it as 'M–R type' view.

b) Russellian View : On this view a material object is *nothing but* a 'huge collection' of sense–data almost in the sense in which a glass of water may be *identical* with a 'huge collection' of hydrogen and oxygen atoms. Henceforth, we shall call it the '*huge collection*' view.

c) There is a third view according to which a sense–datum may be regarded as *identical* with a part of the actually–seen surface of a material object. In future, we shall refer to it as the '*surface identity*' view.

d) Fourthly, there is another possibility according to which a sense–datum is *wholly identical* with material object. Sometimes Moore believed that the case of a clear soap–bubble is an illustration of such complete identity. We propose to refer to it as the '*complete identity*' view.

e) Finally, there is another version of the identity view according to which what we call a material object is *identical* with some modification of consciousness. This may be called the '*idealistic view*'.

All the five types of view mentioned above, shall, henceforth, be collectively called the 'identity view'.

Under the second group we may include the following types of views :

a) First, there is the view that the relation between material objects and sense–data is a causal one. There may be two vari-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

eties of this view viz., a material object is *the* (i.e., the only) cause of its corresponding sense-data, and the other, it is not the *only* cause, but just *a* cause i.e, one of the many causes of the corresponding sense-data. Both of these versions of the above view we call the 'causal view' about R.

b) Then there is the Lockean view according to which a material object is the *possessor of* at least some of the sense-data (which are called primary qualities by Locke). For obvious reasons we refer to it as the Lockean view.

c) Another possible view about the nature of R is that it is an *a-causal* but epistemologically necessary connection. On this view, the so-called material object is a non-spatio-temporal, a-causal *determinant* of its corresponding sense-data. In Kant's terminology the causal determinant is a *'thing-in-itself'* and what it so determines are the 'manifolds of sensibility'. This third type of interpretation about the nature of R, we call the *'Kantian view'*. Of course, we do not mean that nobody else than Kant held such a Kantian view or any view similar to it. The same remark applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Lockean view.

Under the last heading, one may include the following possible views :

a) According to the first suggestion, R is a *not-further-analysable* relation and if any name is at all to be given to R we may call it the relation of 'being a manifestation of'. Thus, a group of sense-data is a manifestation of its corresponding material object. We may call this the *'manifestation view'*.

b) The other kind of unanalysable view about R is that, it (i.e., R) can only be *indicated not explained*, in terms of *'a definite description'*. Thus, a material object is that to which a 'definite description' in terms of sense-data applies. This view shall be referred to as the 'definite description' view.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

According to the 'definite description' view a material object is '*the* thing which stands in a certain relation R to some sense-data that are being directly apprehended.' Obviously, the nature of R has been kept *unspecified* in the above version. Russell, the originator of this view, himself kept the nature of R unspecified, to avoid any metaphysical commitment. Now, since the nature of R is kept unspecified, it is amenable to more than one interpretation. Some may regard R as the relation of identity, others may regard it as a causal relation; R may also be regarded as an unanalysable relation etc.,. We propose to call the above three versions of the 'definite description' view 'identity version', the 'causal version' and the 'unanalysability version' of the definite description view, respectively. Henceforth a similar convention about naming the other possible versions of the definite description view shall be followed consistently.

The preliminary classification being made, I shall now try to bring to light the pattern of regularity that connects the different views about R held at different times by Moore.

(i) 1910 : During this period we find that Moore is *very much confident* that no sort of 'identity view' can properly characterize the nature of R and he declares with a tone of sanguinity that no sense-datum or a collection of sense-data can be identical with any material object or part thereof.[14]

In the Seventh Chapter of his *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, he takes into consideration the different versions of the 'identity view' and also the Kantian view, and rejects them one by one as unsatisfactory.

Thus, he first rejects a view, which may be regarded as, the M-R type' view[15]; then he rejects a version of 'huge collection' view.[16] After this he rejects the 'idealistic' view.[17] He also rejects a version of the Kantian view.[18]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The common–ground for the rejection of all these versions is, as I have shown earlier, the failure of each of them to *exhaust the meaning-content* of common sense view about material object and its knowledge.

ii) 1913–14 : During this period the hardness of his attitude towards the 'identity view' has been softened to some extent. Thus, although he rejects the '*causal view*' about R,[19] the '*huge collection view*' about it,[20] and also the '*Lockean view*'[21] almost summarily, he treats the 'M–R type' version of the identity a bit more sympathetically. Though he cannot accept it whole-heartedly for its inability to exhaust the meaning–content of common–sense[22], yet he shows some *definite inclination* for this brand of 'identity view' whenhe says : "The great recommendation of this view seems to me to be that it enables us to see, *more clearly than any other view can*, how our knowledge of physical proposition can be based on our experience of sensibles"[23].

Two distinct features of the 1913–14 view to be noted are the following :

Firstly, Moore's opposition to 'identity view in any of its forms is no more so strong as it was in 1910; he being, in fact, inclined in favour of a particular version of the identity view viz., the 'M–R type' view about the nature of R.

Secondly, he almost explicitly introduces the '*definite description*' view about R as a distinct *possibility*[24], and although he rejects one possible version viz., the *causal version* of the definite description[25] he does not say that he rejects definite description view in any of its other versions.

iii) 1918–19 : During this period Moore's inclination for the 'identity view' was further augmented and besides fondly treating the M–R version of the identity view he also developed an inclination for another form of the identity view viz., the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'surface identity' view. Thus he praises the M–R type version as the *only* one that gives a '*tolerably clear* answer' to the question 'what is the nature of R?'[26] and maintains that 'some such view *must* be true'[27] although with a reservation that it is not 'at all certain that any view of this type is true'[28]. Similarly, he also praises the definite description view by saying that it is so clear that he wonders 'how anyone can deny it'[29], although he cannot accept it as wholly satisfactory because of its inability to satisfy the *requirement of uniqueness*[30]. He concludes, finally, that "At the present moment, I am rather inclined to favour the view that what I am judging of this presented object is that it is itself a part of the surface of an inkstand – that, therefore, it really is *identical* with this part of the surface of this inkstand'[31]. By 1918–19, his inclination for the 'surface identity' view grew so strong, that he invented the *ad hoc* assumption that 'sense–data may have qualities other than what they seem to have' to save this version of the 'identity view' against the objection based on the 'relativity of perception'.

However, if the 'surface identity' view is accepted then from this it follows, as a corollary, that if in the case of at least some kinds of physical objects, the part of the surface being directly apprehended happens to be identical with the whole of the physical object then one must admit that, in such special cases at least, the sense–data may be regarded as *wholly identical* with the physical objects. It is because of this inevitable logic that we find Moore to admit even 'complete identity' between sense–data and material objects as feasible (at least in some cases).

Thus, in 1918–19, Moore's inclination for the 'identity view' had become more pronounced and he went upto the extent of admitting the possibility of 'complete identity'. However, as I pointed out earlier, his confidence in the M–R type identity

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

version was still on a high level and the status of the definite description view was also further increased. Moore had some inclination for each of these, but from what Moore says in 1918–19, it appears that in a hierarchy of order of preference in an ascending order, the definite description view comes first, the next higher one being the M–R type version and finnlly, the 'surface identity' view comes at the top.

iv) 1925 : As usual, Moore has nothing new to offer in his paper of this period. Here he considers *only three* possible altarnatives about the nature of R viz., the 'surface identity' view, the 'M–R type' view and the 'definite description' view. The important features of his view of this period are :

a) *loss of faith* in the 'surface identity' view because of the phenomenon of 'double vision'.[32]

b) The status of M–R type view being *lowered* on the ground that it tries to explain the *actual* existence of material objects *solely* in terms of 'some hypotheticals', and fails to exhaust the meaning–content of common sense belief about material objects in other respects.[33]

c) The status of the 'definite description' view being raised – the only objection against it being that it fails to satisfy the 'requirement of uniqueness'.

v) 1928–29 : During this period the status of M–R type view was *further lowered* in Moor's system and it received a very rude treatment because 'common sense was *against* it'[34]. The loss of prestige that the 'surface identity' view suffered in 1925, was still not made good. And finally, the 'definite description' view, in its 'unanalysability verson' was given further importance[35] (although the 'causal' and the 'Broadean versions' of it were rejected).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

vi) 1942 : During this period the 'identity view' in any of its form was almost completely given up [36] except for occasional doubts against it because of his shift of linguistic usage from 'material objects' to 'physical objects'. Because of his lingering (though unfounded) faith in the 'identity view' Moore had to declare bluntly that he 'was strongly inclined to take both of these incompatible views' (the 'identity view' as well as the 'non-identity view') [37]. However, no *explicit* mention of the definite description view was made by Moore in 1942. In 1952, the *status quo* was almost perfectly maintained.

vii) 1957 : His paper of this period seems to have completed the process of his losing confidence in the 'identity view' and the identity view is branded as 'silly.' [38] And after a period of silence over the 'definite description view', a subtler and modified version of it viz.. the '*double definite description*' version is recommended by him in the 1957 paper. [39]

What sort of a pattern of regularity do we find among his different views regarding the nature of R ? Before making this pattern explicit, I think it necessary to add a few more words about Moore's 1910 view.

As I have pointed out earlier, Moore held that *one of the* necessary elements of our knowledge about material objects is an '*indirect apprehension*' of the material object. But what is an immediate apprehension ? According to Moore, one may be said to have an indirect apprehension of x *only* when he is aware of x although x is *not* directly apprehended by him (i.e., not directly *given* like sense–data etc.,) *and* he is aware of x *either* because some proposition about x is being *directly* apprehended by him *or* because he is aware of x in some *other* way (if there is any such way) *not* involving a direct apprehension of any proposition about x. [40] The other *necessary* factor, involved in any

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

knowledge of material objects, is the direct apprehension of some sense-data[41]. Now, if these two assertions are put together Moore's view about the nature of the knowledge about material object can be expressed thus :

'Our knowledge of material objects consists in *directly* apprehending certain sense-data *and entertaining* a proposition about the material object at the same time'. This formulation can be *transformed,* with a little change in terminology, into the following : 'whenever we know any material object we directly apprehend certain sense-data and know it as *the* thing which stands in a certain relation R to those directly apprehended sense-data'. Here the proposition 'material object is *the* thing which stands in a certain relation R to such-and-such sense-data' is the proposition through which the material object is *indirectly* apprehended. Obviously, formulated in this way, Moore's 1910 view may *definitely* be regarded as having an *implicit* reliance upon the 'definite description view'.

Another important feature of the 1910 view is its *implicit* reference to the unanalysability view. Thus when in the chapter on "Ways of Knowing" he admits that although he is able to indicate the *necessary* conditions of our knowledge of material objects, he is *at a loss* to say what other conditions *must* be included to make the conditions *sufficient* and ultimately when in the chapter "Hume's Theory Examined" he appeals to '*immediate knowledge*', which, as I have pointed out earlier, he explicitly called '*intuition*' in 1928-29, all these go to show that Moore had a *nascent* fascination for the 'unanalysability view'.

These two points about his 1910 position being clarified, I may now proceed to make explicit the overall pattern of development of Moore's view about the nature of R from almost the beginning of his philosophic career to its end. The study

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that we have made of his different views on this point reveals the following points :

a) Element of the 'definite description view' was always present, (initially only implicitly and later explicitly, in his writings of different periods. In 1910, it was present in an implicit and undeveloped form. In 1913–14 a semi-explicit reference to it was made and still later its formulation was made quite *explicit* and it was honourably treated in 1918–19. In 1925 the status of the definite description theory was further *raised*. During 1928–29 the view gained further in status, the status of the other two alternatives (viz., the 'M–R type' view and the 'surface identity' view) being somewhat lowered and the *unanalysability version* of the definite description view was given the seal of official acceptance in Moore 's system *almost* without reservation. An indication of the emergence of a still modified version of the definite descriprion view viz., the '*double definite description*' view was also discernible in his 1928–29 view. Finally, in 1957 the 'double definite description view' was given the status of a most satisfactory view about the nature of R.

b) Appeal to some form of *immediate knowledge* or *intuition* is present with varying degrees of explicitness – the most explicit formulation of it being made in 1928–29. Such an appeal to intuition was never explicitly rejected by Moore.

c) The pattern of growth of the 'identity view' is a little queer. Thus, he begins in 1910 with a clear opposition to 'identity view' in any form. In 1913–14 he feels *a little* inclination for the identity view of the M–R type. This period of 1918–19 is marked by further increase of his inclination for the 'identity view' and he shows his willingness to accept the *stronger* forms of identity view. viz., 'surface identity view' and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in some special cases even the 'complete identity view'. In 1925, his faith in the identity view, specially the 'surface identity' view is thoroughly shaken and from this period onwards, the 'identity view' gradually loses importance in Moore's philosophy. In 1928–29 the status of the 'identity view' gets lowered still further. In 1942 it is almost *completely given up.* And finally, it is simply branded as silly in 1957. Thus, Moore *begins with* and *ends in* the same position – a position which is opposed to the identity view – the identity view gradually went on gaining in status upto 1918–19 and then began losing status gradually upto 1957.

d) The 'causal view' was always very harshly treated by Moore and it could never gain ground within Moore's philosophy.

Thus, we find two clearly recognizable features of the pattern of growth of Moore's view about sense–data and their relation to physical objects – viz., (i) the *definite description view* about the nature of R was present throughout his writings in some form or other and its status was progressively elevated without any downward trend at any period; (ii) the *identity view,* on the other hand, gained higher and higher status upto a certain period and then its status gradually declined and it was finally branded and rejected as silly in 1957.

Let us see how we can account for this peculiarity of the pattern of growth of Moore's view.

II

In order to understand why Moore's view developed in that peculiar manner and why he vacillated between different possible views about sense–data and their relation to physical objects, it would be more profitable to adopt an indirect approach. Let us consider, what conditions, if fulfilled, would enable Moore to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

stick to a specific view about the nature of R and *not* to vacillate between different views. Now keeping in view the fact that Moore could never come to decision about sense-data and their relation to material objects, let us enquire what conditions, if fulfilled, would help Moore to decide definitely either in favour of or against any particular alternative.

(A) A given view about sense-data and their relation to material objects would be *definitely acceptable* to Moore *if*

either i) such a view were logically true i.e., its denial were self-contradictory,

or ii) it *fully* satisfied the set of commonsense criteria,[43]

or iii) such a view could fully exhaust the meaning-content of commonsense views about the existence and nature of material objects.

Similarly, (B) any given view about sense-data and their relation to material objects would be *definitely rejectable if*

either i) such a view were logically impossible or self-contradictory,

or ii) it unmistakably went against the set of commonsense-criteria i.e., were inconsistent with the set of commonsense criteria,

or iii) it failed *altogether* to exhaust the *meaning-content* of commonsense views about the nature and existence of material objects,

or iv) it led to some consequences which are patently absurd.

Finally, (C) if there are no two alternative views about the nature of sense-data and its relation to material object, such that (a) all of them *individually* satisfy the set of criterion under (A) above and (b) yet are *mutually inconsistent with* each other.

...5

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Although from the point of view of logic, this last set of conditions under (C) is *necessary*, yet in Moore's system this does not have much significance, for, the problem that Moore faced was that of finding *even a single* satisfactory view regarding sense-data and their relation to material objects rather than eliminating all but one view from amongst two or more alternatives, mutually incompatible and yet equally tenable views regarding sense-data and their relation to material objects.

We have already pointed out that if there is any view such that neither it nor its denial is definitely incompatible with the set of acceptability criteria, then Moore should find it difficult to come to a decision with regard to it. But does Moore ever actually consciously take this course? From his writings it can be shown that he does, although he nowhere formulates his set of criteria so explicitly as we have done. Thus in his "A Defence of Common Sense" he refers implicitly to a set of acceptability criteria regarding which Paul Mehrenke observes that "according to Moore, if by philosophic inspection we should arrive at the decision that phenomenalism or that representative perception, one or the other, analyses sense-perception correctly, (i.e., gives a correct view about sense-data and their relation to material objects) this analysis would not be inconsistent with plain man's knowledge. These theories, (i.e., alternative theories about analysis of sense-perception) Moore appears to hold, are not demonstrably inconsistent with any proposition that belongs to the commonsense view of the world."[43] Again, referring to the difficulty of using commonsense as guide-line for deciding between rival theories about sense-data and their relation to material things Moore says: "'Common Sense' in one, and the most important of its senses, takes no view at all on this subject; it simply doesn't raise the question'[44] Similarly when he rejects the view according to which "the existence of the train

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

simply consists in the existence of the sense-data which you and the other people travelling in it are at the moment directly apprehending"; on the ground that such a theory as to our knowledge of material objects and their relation to sense-data does "plainly give an *utterly false* account of what we believe in ordinary life"; or again, when he rejects as untenable the view according to which 'all that we know of material objects is that they are unknown causes of our sensations;' and this is what we mean by 'material objects, on the ground that although such a theory "may seem very plausible so long as you merely state it *in abstract* terms, ... it seems to me to lose its plausibility as soon as you consider what it implies in *particular concrete instances*";[45] his ground of rejection, stated in our language, is the failure of those theories to accommodate the whole meaning-content of ordinary beliefs about material objects and their relation to their *sensible appearances*, which are called sense-data in philosophical jargon.

Hence, on the basis of the foregoing discussion it seems clear that Moore works on the assumption that no analysis of sense perception, involving the notion of sense-data and their relation to material objects, can be acceptable if it is either inconsistent with the commonsense beliefs or fails to exhaust the meaning-content of ordinary man's belief regarding the knowledge of material things. And he is at the same time aware that since common-sense does not hold any definite view about sense-data etc., no philosophic view can be shown to be definitely incompatible with common-sense. Moreover, although the different views about sense-data etc, fail to exhaust the full meaning-content of commonsense belief, yet it is not the case that they fail to accommodate such meaning-content even in part-and a particular view may better accommodate an aspect of such meaning-content than another, while the latter may better acco-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mmodate another aspect of such meaning-content than the former. Moore is also aware of it. Thus, although he praises eloquently the Mill-Russell type theory as the *only* one type of view which gives a *tolerably clear* answer to the question 'how are sense-data related to material objects'[46] and holds that "there would seem to be *no possible alternative* but that we must take some view of what I have called Mill-Russell type"[47] and yet points out its inadequacy by pointing out that "there is nothing in it of which it could truly be asserted that *it* is a material thing"[48] and says that this view "does not seem to me at all certain that any view of this type is true".[49]

This being the situation it is natural to expect that Moore should go on critically assessing the different views regarding the correct analysis of judgements of perception in terms of sense-data and their relation to material *objects, now being* inclined to favour one, now the other and shall be almost at a loss to *decide definitely* in favour of any one of them exclusively. Thus, we find him saying as early as in 1918-19 : "I am completely puzzled as to what the true answer can be"[50], and as late as 1942 : "I am completely puzzled about the matter, and only wish I could see any way of setting it".[51] The above fact explains why we do not find Moore definitely holding any specific view about sense-data and its relation to material objects at any time of his philosophic career. Rather we find that he is only *very much inclined* in favour of one particular suggested view, his inclination to all other possible views not being *nil* altogether at any time.

If the observation that we have made above is correct then it is likely to be the case that no static chronological stratification of Moore's views about sense-data and their relation to material objects is either natural or possible. That means no account of Moore's position stated in the form 'during such and such period Moore *held* such and such a view about sense-data' etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

can be regarded as satisfactory and we should expect fairly wide temporal cross references in his different views on this matter. In fact this is what we exactly find in him. Thus in 1910 he holds that a material object is *not identical* with any "sense–datum or part of sense–datum or collection of sense–data".[52] In 1926 he maintains that there is *nothing self–contradictory,* in the supposition of their being identical.[53] Again in 1942, in his 'Reply to My Critics' he *thinks* (but is *not* confident) that to make sense–data and material objects identical *might be self-contradictory,* while in 1957[54] he categorically calls the identity view about the relation between sense–data and material objects as 'silly'.

In the context of what has been said above, it should be clear that during the early phase of his philosophic career when Moore was vehemently reacting against the idealistic brand of philosophy he was naturally over zealous to regard sense–data (even unfelt pain at a certain phase) as mind–independent things. On the other hand, if the sense–data were assumed (for argument's sake) to be mental or wholly mind–dependent, then also they would not be able to mediate between perceiving as a subjective activity and the extra–mental objects perceived and we would fall into Berkeley's trap. But, besides these, the fact of perception would not allow Moore to equate sense–data with physical objects. Hence, during this phase, he is opposed to the identity view and at the same time emphasizes the objectivity (i.e., mind–independnece) of sense–data.

But, nonetheless, if 'no part of any material object can be identical with any sense–data' (as Moore held in 1910), and if, as Moore believes, a physical object is perceived only via the sense–data then we are committed to a sort of representationalism of the Lockean type and the physical objects become something which '*we know not what*'. This is incongruent with the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

spirit of Moore's Common-sense-realism. So in the second phase Moore should be naturally more inclined to the identity-view (1913-14) *provided* this could be defended against the objections from relativity of perception and when he is able to invent such a defence (the *ad hoc* of 1918–19) he categorically admits his inclination for a kind of identity viz., the surface-identity view. But since no form of the identity-view could exhaust the *whole* common-sense-meaning-content of physical-object-statements Moore could *never* declare that such and such form of identity-view is *the* correct view about R. During this phase Moore's confidence in the identity view was at its peak and he went to the extent of declaring that in the case of some physical objects, e. g., soap-bubbles etc., the sense-data may be regarded as wholly identical with the physical object.

This high-tide of confidence in the identity view continued until he became convinced (in 1925) that the difficulty arising from the phenomenon of '*seeing double*' could not be avoided by adopting the *ad hoc* hyothesis (of 1918–19) that 'sense-data may have properties other than what they appear to have' because, in the case of 'seeing double' two distinct sets of sense-data appear to '*exist*' and existence is *not* a property and it is almost a contradiction to say that 'sense-datum appears to exist but *actually* it does not' – nothing can *apparently* exist.

Consequently, during 1925, Moore's confidence in the identity-view is thoroughly shaken, and its status is irreparably damaged. And since Moore could invent no new defence for the identity-view against arguments from *seeing-double*, after 1925, that view dies out gradually but naturally and its death-knell is rung in 1957, when it is branded as 'silly'.

On the other hand, the status of the 'definite-description' view' (in some form or other) gradually became higher and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

higher in Moore's philosophy because, as Moore gradually came to realise through a sort of trial–and–error process, that every possible characterisation of the nature of R in terms of some other commonly recognized relation like complete–identity, surface–identity, set-membership (e.g., in the case of 'huge collection view'), causal–effect being a manifestation (Cf Moore's rejection of the Lockean and the Kantian type of view) are *utterly inadequate* to comply with the 'criterial of acceptability' and after giving a fair trial to the other possible alternative views regarding R, Moore characterises R as a fundamental relation which being *sui generis* cannot be analysed in terms of any other *more* fundamental relation and characterises a perceived physical object as '*the* thing which is related to a specific set of sense–data by means of some unique and not further analysable relation R'.

Now, it should be evident that had Moore not invoked the idea of sense–datum as a *mediating* link between perceiving and the physical objects perceived, he could have saved him all the troubles of finding out a meta–physically tenable view regarding the nature of R consistently with the requirements of common–sense view. Furthermore, 'sense–data' is never normally included in a common–man's vocabulary and an ordinary man in the street holds no belief as the existence or non–existence of sense–data – he is simply not aware of any such possible entity–, and Moore himself admits this in "The Nature of Sensible Appearances" when he says that the plain man i.e., the man who shares with Moore the common–sense view of the world, has no "beliefs" about sense–data, and in particular no "beliefs" about the relation of sense–data to physical objects. Why did Moore then invite lots of trouble by *postulating* sense–data as an indispensable ingredient of any perceptual–situation? Why did

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

he not dispense with sense-data altogether and save him the trouble of analysing common-sense beliefs about material objects in terms of such an uncommon-sensical entity ?

The simple answer to this is that he didn't do it because he couldn't, for three reasons :

First, some sort of *indirect* theory of perception was *epistemologically necessary* to account for the *possibility of error*, for which the unsophisticated brand of direct realism, called naive realism, is inadequate. On the other hand, if a sophisticated form of direct realism like that of H. Holt or S. Alexander is admitted then common man's view about perceptual error is explained in a way which is most opposed to common-sense, by postulating that the objects of erroneous perception, which are ordinarily believed to be *not there*, are actually there.

Sensationalism of the Humean type or mentalism of the Berkeleyan type may give us another sort of direct theory of perception According to the former, material object is just a collective name given to a group of sensations that often go together, while according to the latter the so called material objects consist of our 'ideas' with which we are in immediate contact. But to Moore these versions would seem utterly untenable because both of them fail to exhaust the meaning content of common sense and cannot account for the *materiality* of physical objects; since, Moore points out, materiality of a thing according to common-sense consists in its having the *three* characteristics ; (a) it is quite a different sort of thing from acts of consciousness, (b) it is at any given time situated in some region of space and (c) it can exist whether or not we are conscious of it.[53] Now it is clear that both the sensationalistic and the mentalistic reconstruction of our knowledge of material objects fail to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accommodate one or more of the above three essential features of materiality and hence must be unsatisfactory for Moore's purpose.

Secondly, it it not strictly true that a sense-datum-like *tertium quid* is not a part of a common man's conceptual frame-work, specially if we remember that in Moore's sense, conceptual frame-work, of common-sense *includes* within it *belief in the findings of modern science*. Thus, given the common-sense belief that light takes time to travel it follows that there is a time-lag between the actual state of an object and its perception, whence it follows further that an object as perceived is not identical with the object as it is.[36] Now, such scientifically backed up beliefs apart, Moore believes there are other facts which show the implicit presence of a sense-datum-like *tertium quid* as an ingredient of a scientifically unsophisticated common man's conceptual frame-work. Thus in 1910, he asks his audience to recognize that all of them are seeing the *same* envelope although the patch of colour, the shape, the size etc., that each of them sees *differ* from each other and hence the latter group of seen-objects, which Moore calls sense-data there, cannot be identified with the envelope which is the physical object. Here it is to be noted that although he gives *reasons* to show that the varyingly-seen-objects cannot be identical with the invaryingly-seen physical object, he *does not give* any argument to convince his audience that they do see such a group of varyingly seen objects whenever they see the one and the same envelope, but merely ask them consciously to recognize it. This indicates that Moore is confident, and it seems rightly so, that the analysis of the perceptual experience of even a scientifically unsophisticated common man would reveal the implicit presence of a third something — although he (a common man) may not explicitly characterize that *tertium quid*, as sense-data.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Similarly, when in 1925, he gives us directions for picking out sense-data and assures us that if one only looks at his own right hand he 'will be able to pick out something' which is a sense-datum in Moore's sense, Moore is again indicating his confidence that the notion of sense-datum necessarily forms a part of common-sense conceptual frame-work and all we need to do is to open our eyes, clearly to recognize this Now if this be a part of common-sense belief then one must admit that although common-sense does not *explicitly* hold any view about sense-data *qua* sense-data, yet a *tertium quid,* a third intervening factor is, at least *implicitly,* entertained as forming a part of common-sense conceptual frame-work.

However, it must be remembered that the above mentioned view is not inconsistent with Moore's view, stated earlier, that common-sense does not have any belief about sense-data; because what the above view establishes is that even a common man's analysis of perceptual situation *necessarily implies* a distinction between what is directly given to us and the object we perceive on the basis of it. This directly given *tertium quid* is at least sense-datum-like, though it is not explicitly identified with a full-fledged sense-datum by any ordinary man.

Thirdly, the other justification that Moore would give, for admitting sense-data, is that any other theory which tries to account for the perceptual knowledge-situation by taking recourse to a sort of direct presentationism must either follow the extreme realistic line of Holt, S. Alexander and others or it must follow the sensationalistic-mentalistic line of Hume and Berkeley. But either alternative would be much more drastically opposed to the common-sense conceptual frame-work than the postulation of sense-data.

Now, if the postulation of sense-data had so many convincing reasons to be adopted then it is natural to expect that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Moore should have as much confidence in their existence as he had of the existence of material objects. In fact, a look at his writings reveals that it never occurred to him that the existence of sense–data may be doubted. Although he tried to accommodate sense-data on different grounds at different periods, yet as to their existence he never entertained any doubt. Thus in 1913–14 he maintains that whenever I know any physical object, I cannot but know sense–data as well, because "I should never have known any of those propositions (e.g., this is an ink–stand) if I had never directly apprehended any sensibles nor perceived any relation between them".[57]

Similarly, in 1918–19 he holds that "if there is anything which is this inkstand, then, in perceiving that thing, I am knowing it *only* as *the* thing which stands in a certain relation to this sense–datum."[58]

Again in 1925 he says that with regard to the proper analysis of such propositions as "*This* is a human hand" one of the two things of which he is quite *certain* in such cases is that there is *always* some sense datum about which the proposition in question is a proposition."[59]

This confidence in the undeniability of sense–data was not shaken even after Paul Mahrenke's criticism of Moore's 1925 view, for in 1942 Moore still maintains that the sense in which we use "see" when we say that we see a thing which is a physical object, is such that the seeing of a physical object *necessarily involves* the seeing of a sense–data.[60]

Now, it being granted that Moore had good and almost conclusive reasons to admit sense–data, it follows that he could not avoid discussing (i) the various problems connected with the nature of sense–data and their relation to material objects and (ii) the possibllity of being certain about the existence of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

material objects which are *almost never directly given* (although sometimes he implies that they may be so given) on the basis of the sense-data which are *almost always directly given.*

If, what has been said above is kept in mind and due weightage is given to the interplay of the different philosophic forces which were operative in shaping Moore's view about sense-data and their relation to physical objects, then it should be evident that the *pattern of growth* of Moore's view in this respect, was more likely to be what it has been and *not* otherwise.

III

After having systemetized Moore's view and finding out its underlying rationale, let us now look at the problem, which Moore tried to tackle, from a different perspective and see how it can help us to have deeper understanding of Moore's position.

The problem of perception in classical philosophy stems from the basic distinction between what is *immediately given* and what is known only *mediately* on the basis of such givens. Once this basic duality is regarded as irreducible, one must admit that what we directly come in contact with — the given — must be distinct from the mediately known 'object'. And this passage from the 'given' to the 'not-given' takes place when the perceiving subject 'interprets', 'deciphers', or 'orders' a sensible matter (which is believed to be immediately given) according to an ideal law which it possesses. Such an ideal law is supposed to be imposed upon the 'given' *ab extra*. Now, to admit it is to admit that knowing consciousness necessarily *distorts* its object in the very process of knowing it and consequently the problem of perception i.e., the problem how can we know the *true* or *undistorted* nature of the object *per se,* arises in classical philosophy.

Those who try to solve this problem within the frame-work of classical philosophy try to bring down perception to a *single*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

level of *self-evident* truths through a sort of reductive analysis and try to reconstruct the whole structure of our perceptual knowledge on such a foundation of dubious strength. Thus, the empiricists like Hume regard sense–impressions as self–evidently given and try to explain all factual knowledge *solely* in terms of such sense–impressions. On the other hand, people like Descartes start with some *indubitably given* truths like 'cogito argo sum' and try to derive the knowledge about the actual world of experience *solely* from it No wonder that both of them go astray. They end up either with *scepticism* (as Hume did) or by making all knowledge of the experienced world *logically necessary*, as was the case with Spinoza or Hegel or even with Descartes, granted the veracity of his God.

Thus, the roots of the classical problem of perception lies in the following assumptions that are made by the classical philosophers : They assume that the relation between the 'sign' and the 'meaning' — the 'given' and the 'not–given' is an *accidental* one and hence requires some kind of *mediacy* like 'deciphering', etc., of the given, to link it up with the 'non–given' element in knowledge They further assume that such a passage from the 'given' to the 'non–given' consists in an '*intellectual synthesis*' i.e, in an activity which can be completely made intelligible by reason in terms of the laws of *formal* logic. All the classical attempts to solve the problem of perception failed because they failed to take cognizance of the *necessity* of admitting a '*non-formal*', 'non-intellectual' factor in the analysis of perceptual knowledge–situation.

A non–classical (by which I mean phenomenological) formulation of the problem of perception and its solution may, in contradistinction to its classical formulation, be put thus. [61]

We cannot apply the classical distinction of 'form' and 'matter' to perception; nor can we conceive the perceiving

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

subject as a consciousness which 'interprets', or 'deciphers' or 'orders' a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses. The classical analysis of perception *reduces all* our experience to the *single* level of what is judged to be absolutely true. But, on the contrary, when we consider the *whole setting* of our perception, it reveals another modality which is neither the *necessary* being nor the simple sensory event. The meaning that we ultimately discover in the 'given' is *not* of the conceptual order. It is *necessary* that 'meaning' and 'signs' be related from the beginning – the 'matter' of perception be *pregnant* with its 'form'. In other words, the synthesis which gives meaning to the perceptual data is *not* an *intellectual* synthesis – let us say with Husserl that it is a '*synthesis of transition*'.

It is true that we arrive at contradictions when we describe the *perceived* world, but it is because perception itself is paradoxical. It is paradoxical because there is a paradox of immanence and transcendence in it. Immanence, because the perceived object cannot be foreign (i.e., not some how given immediately) to him who perceives; transcendence, because it always contains something *more* than what is actually given.

Another important point to which phenomenology draws our attention is the *eseential fallibility* of all human knowledge. They argue that since we *must* say that at each moment our ideas express not only the truth but also our capacity to attain it at that given moment and as our capacity to attain knowledge is conditioned by so many boundary conditions, hence, the truth that our ideas express at any given moment is necessarily limited and subject to further development and correction. Hence, no absolutely infallible knowledge of truth is humanly attainable.

Now, on comparing the above two formulations of the 'problem of perception' with Moore's formulation of the same, (in so far as it is expres ed through his formulation of the problem of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

having perceptual knowledge of material objects on the basis of sense-data) we find that Moore's formulation of the problem is made wholly within the so-called classical frame-work, though in trying to give a solution of it Moore often goes beyond classical frame-work and sometimes strikingly anticipates the phenomenological frame-work.

As I have pointed out earlier that all our knowledge of material objects must *necessarily* be based on the direct apprehension of sense-data. Here, sense-data are the *immediately given* elements and the knowledge of material objects is a sort of mediate knowledge Moreover, just having certain sense-data will not do, we must also 'interpret' them in a certain way, viz, as manifestations of *the* thing that stands in a relation **R** to the given sense-data And here the trouble begins for Moore. Thus, we find that since Moore began by assumiug an irreducible duality between the 'given' i.e, sense-data and the 'non-given' i e., the material object, his formulation was certainly classical in form.

But he went beyond the classical frame-work when he insisted that the relation between sense-data and material objects — between 'signs' and its 'meaning' — is not accidental but essentially intimate. He also refused to step into the shoes of the classical thinkers by refusing to reduce our experience to a *single* level as Hume and Mill and Russell did. Moore's persistent refusal to accept phenomenalism, 'huge collection view' etc., bears testimony to it.

Moore's ultimate sympathy for the 'unanalysability view' and his frequent appeal to some *non-formal* and *non-intellectual* mode of knowing e.g., 'immediate knowledge'[62] and 'intuition' may be interpreted as an indication for his tendency to emphasize, what the phenomenologist would call, the 'non-intellectual nature of the synthesis of transition' — a syntnesis of the 'sign' with the 'meaning'; because what Moore means, by calling the rela-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tion between 'sense–data' i.e., the 'sign' and the 'meaning' i.e., material object, unanalysable, although intimate, is that such connection is not further conceptually analysable because of its uniqueness.

Again, Moore, seems to have been aware, however vaguely, of the 'paradox of immanence–transcendence' involved in perception. Thus, when he asserts that every knowledge of material objects is *necessarily* based upon what is immediately given to us (viz., the sense–data) he is trying to do justice to the aspect of immanence. On the other hand, his untiring insistence on the fact that any knowledge of material object containing *something more, not* explainable in terms of the immediately given, he is trying to do justice to the aspect of 'transcendence'. In general, whenever he is *inclined* for the 'identity view' he is trying to do justice to the 'aspect of immanence' (because if sense–data are identical with material objects, the problem of transcendence does not arise at all).

Similarly, whenever the demand of the 'transcendent aspect' makes itself felt Moore opts for the 'non–identity view'. Since, the claims of both these aspects are equally pressing, the pattern of Moore's inclination for the 'identity view' and the 'non–identity view' remains constantly changing. This, besides explaining the 'queer pattern of growth of the identity view in Moore's philosophy', also explains why Moore felt obliged to admit the paradoxicality of any perceptual situation and feels equally inclined to accept both of the incompatible alternatives.

I have already pointed out that the inclination for 'definite description view' was always present in Moore, that this view gradually gained higher and higher status and finally in 1957, Moore in his famous paper seems to accept it as the most satisfactory. This fact also fits in well with the above account of transcendence–immanence issue. Since, in the definite description-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

theory a reference to some immediately given sense–data is essential, it takes into account and does justice to the aspect of immanence. On the other hand, since it asserts that a material object is something *more*, over and above the sense–data and is *not* a simple *'logical construction'* out of sense–data[63] nor can, for that reason, be regarded as an *'incomplete symbol'* or a *'logically eliminable concept'*, the definite description view does justice to the 'aspect of transcendence' also. No wonder then that Moore would finally approve of this view as most acceptable.

I have pointed out earlier that the 1918–19 paper of Moore contains a few sentences emphasizing what, following Merleau-Ponty, we may call 'the primacy of perception'[64] although Moore could not stick to it or carry it out to its logical consequences. However, a sentence or two quoted from that paper of Moore and Merleau–Ponty's paper "The Primacy of Perception" may help one to see how similar they are.

To quote Moore : "I do, in fact, see that that *is* a door, and assert in it no more than what I see; ... that I may be truly said to be *perceiving*, by sight or touch, such things as that is a door, this is a finger and not *merely* inferring them ... I am not, therefore, afraid to say that I do now perceive that this is a finger".[65]

On the other hand, we find in Merleau–Ponty the following : "...what is perceived enables us better to see the perceived itself. I perceived before me a road or a house, and I perceive them as having a certain dimension : the road may be a country–road or a national highway; the house may be a shanty or a manor. These identifications presuppose that I recognize the true size of the object, quite different from what it appears to me

...6

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

from the point at which I am standing. It is frequently said that I restore the true size on the basis of the apparent size by analysis and conjecture. This is inexact for the very convincing reason that the apparent size of which we are speaking is not perceived by me ... there is no deciphering, no mediate inference from the sign to what is signified, because the alleged signs are not given to me separately from what they signify." [66]

After having made explicit the interconnections among the different views, held by Moore at different times, regarding the nature of sense-data and their relation to physical objects and also having made the phenomenological undertones of Moore's philosophy explicit, we may now try to see what sort of reconstruction of Moore's view on this problem would be most satisfactory and yet quite in accordance with the spirit of his philosophy.

I venture to think that the most satisfactory reconstruction would be the following :

Sense-data are the signs of material objects which are the signified. The relation between the two is intimate although not further analysable. Material objects cannot be reduced into sense-data without residue – although independently of sense-data no knowledge of material object is possible. The *step* that enables us to pass from the sense-data to the material object – from the sign to the signified – is *not* a formally analysable mediate inference, nor is it a process of induction – it is, rather, an immediate, non-inferential mode of knowing that enables us to know of the existence of material objects when certain sense-data are directly apprehended by us.

However, although I say that the above is the most satisfactory reconstruction of Moore's view about the nature of the relation between sense-data and material objects, it must not be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

taken to mean that Moore ever *actually* categorically held or propounded any such view – because, as I have tried to show, Moore *never* held any view *definitely* and *categorically*, he only used to have different degrees of inclination in favour of different possible views during different periods of his philosophic career. The above reconstructed view is one which a supporter of Moore might have accepted as '*the* correct view' in order to give the rough edges of Moore's view a smooth shape, without ever encountering any explicit inconsistency with what Moore had said at different places in different times.

Philosophy Department
Jadavpur University
CALCUTTA– 700 032. (W.B.)

TUSHAR KANTI SARKAR

NOTES

1. Moore, G. E., *Philosophical Studies (PS)*, RKP, London, pp. 12–13.
2. *Ibid*, pp. 91–92.
3. Moore, G. E.; *Some Main Problems of Philosophy (SMP)*, George Allen and Unwin, London; pp. 44–45.
4. *Op. Cit*, *PS*, p. 181
5. *Ibid*, pp. 182–83
6. *Ibid*, p. 184.
7. *Ibid*, p. 183.
8. *Ibid*, pp. 244, 247.
9. Moore, G. E., *Philosophical Papers (PP)*, Collier Books, New York; p. 56.
10. Schilpp, P. A. (ed), *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (LLP)*, Tudor Publishing Co., New York, 1952; p. 658
11. *Ibid*, p. 660.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

12. Mace, C. A. (ed.), *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century (BP)* George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.: p. 211.
13. Henceforth R shall be used as an abbreviation for 'the relation that holds between sense-data and material object'.
14. *Op. Cit*, SMP, p. 131.
15. *Ibid*, pp. 134-135.
16. *Ibid*, pp. 137-8.
17. *Ibid*, pp. 138-9.
18. *Ibid*, pp. 135-6.
19. *Op Cit*, *PS*, pp. 192-3.
20. *Ibid*, p. 194.
21. *Ibid*, pp 195-6.
22. *Ibid*, pp. 190-92.
23. *Ibid*. p. 190.
23. *Ibid*, p. 192.
25. *Ibid*, p.193.
26. *Ibid*, p. 224.
27. *Ibid*, p. 251.
28. *Ibid*, p 224.
29. *Ibid*, p. 234.
30. *Ibid*, p. 247-8.
31. *Ibid*, pp. 251.
32. *Op Cit*, *PP*, p. 56.
33. *Ibid*, pp. 57-8.
34. Moore, G. E.; *Lectures on Philosophy (LP)*, edited by C. Lewy; George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, p. 89.
35. *Ibid*, p. 102
36. *Op Cit*, *LLP*, p. 658.
37. *Ibid*, p. 659.
38. *Op Cit*, *BP*, p. 209.
39. *Ibid*, pp. 206-7.
40. *Op Cit*, *SMP*, p. 74.
41. *Ibid*, p. 84.
42. These criteria have been explicated in my paper "The Philosophical Methodology of G. E. Moore' which won me the P. R. S. award. These criteria, in short, are (i Naturality, (ii) Acceptability to very-many persons, (iii) Belief-behaviour consistency and (iv) Freedom from both auto-referential and hetero-referential paradoxes.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

43. Mahrenke, P., "Moore's Analysis of Sense Perception" in *LLP*, p. 279 (Bracketted portions mine).
44. 'The Representative Theory of Perception" in *LP*, p.88.
45. *Op Cit*, *SMP*, pp. 134-7 (emphasis mine). The first of the two rejected views is a version of phenomenalism, while the second is a version of *Kantianism*.
46. *Ibid*, p. 224.
47. *Ibid*, p. 250.
48. *Ibid*
49. *Ibid*, p. 224.
50. *Ibid*, p.251.
51. *Op Cit*, *LLP*, p. 659.
52. *Op Cit*, *SMP*, p. 128.
53. Moore, G. E., "The Nature of Sensible Appearances", PAS-Suppl., Vol. VI, p. 182.
54. "Visual Sense-data" in *BP*.
55. *Op Cit*, *SMP*, p. 9.
56. Referring to a similar view Moore says : 'it depends on premises which are supposed to have been scientifically established. And I am bound to say it seems to me a very strong one'. *LP*, p. 67.
57. Moore, G.E., "The Status of Sense-Data", Symposium in *PAS*, Vol. XIV,
58. Moore, G. E., "Some Judgements of Perception", *PAS*, Vol. XIX. pp. 1-29.
59. Moore, G. E., "A Defence of Common Sense" in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, *London*, 1925.
60. Addendum to "Reply to my Ctitics of 1942", in *LLP*.
61. In this formulation of the non-classical view I have followed M. Merleau-Ponty closely.
62. I have discussed the role and significance of 'immediate knowledge' in Moore's philosophy in the part I of my thesis on G.E Moore.
63. *Op Cit*, *LP*, p. 89.
64. *Op Cit*, *PS*, pp. 227-8.
65. *Ibid*.
65. Merleau-Ponty, M., "The Primacy of Perception" in *The Phenomenology of Perception and Other Essays*' edited by J. M. Edie, North Western University Press, 1964 : pp. 14-15.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CALL FOR MANUSCRIPTS

Brill's Studies in Epistemology, Psychology, and Psychiatry

General Editor

M. A. Notturno
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Allegheny College

Editorial Board

Arthur C. Danto
Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy
Columbia University

Stenley Fish
Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of English and Law
Duke Universty

Joseph Margolis
Professor of Philosophy
Temple University

Paul R. McHugh, M D.
Henry Phipps Professor of Psychiatry
The Johns Hopkins University

Sir Karl R. Popper
Emeritus Professor
The University of London

Brill's Studies in Epistemology, Psychology, and Psychiatry is devoted to the publication of recent philosophical work in these disciplines and, especially, in the areas in which these disciplines intersect. Such works may be of contemporary or historical interest, and of theoretical or practical significance. But they are related in their treatment of philosophical issues and problem pertaining to our understanding of the human mind, its acquisition, validation, and use of knowledge, and the conditions under which such acquisition, validation, and use are or should be regarded as rational.

Should you wish to submit a manuscript for this series, please write to : E. J. Brill, attention Elisabeth Erdman, P. O. B. 9000, 2300 PA Leiden, The Netherlands.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 3, July, 1988

STEVENSON'S WORKING MODELS

Stevenson's main object is two-fold: (i) to analyse ethical judgements and (ii) to analyse various methods of argumentation for settling the ethical disputes. Instead of presenting the moral disagreement at the very outset in the full fledged form, he proposes certain models of analysis which he regards provisional or tentative and hence calls them 'Working Models'. The models which he presents are not to be taken as the final analysis of ethical judgement because ethical terms are ambiguous and vague. So, we must not expect just one and only one final analysis of an ethical judgement. He presents three such working models which roughly present before us the ways in which different moral judgements can be analysed.

(1) "This is wrong" means *I disapprove of this; do so as well.*

(2) "He ought to do this" means *I disapprove of his leaving this undone; do so as well.*

(3) "This is goood" means *I approve of this; do so as well.*

The working models, however, are not to be taken as literal translation of the moral judgement. They are just broad outlines of their analysis.

Such an analysis has two parts: (1) declarative and (ii) imperative. The declarative or descriptive part is expressed by the first part of the model, in, "I approve or disapprove of this", and the imperative part is expressed by the second part of the model ..., "do so as well".

Received : 20-1-86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The models are claimed to be adequate on the following grounds :

(1) Every moral disagreement (or agreement) involves two things : disagreement or agreement in belief and disagreement or agreement in attitude. The working models are justified on the ground that they take care of both the types of disagreement or agreement. As such they are capable of explaining successfully the nature of moral judgement. The descriptive part takes care of agreement or disagreement in belief and imperative part takes care of agreement or disagreement in attitude.

(2) The models are justified also on the ground that they can also be used to explain ethical arguments, i.e., the cases of ethical agreement and disagreement can also be translated quite adequately in terms of the models

For instance :–

A. This is good.

B. I fully agree. It is indeed good.

It is a case of ethical agreement. It can be translated in terms of (3) in this way :

A. I approve of this; do so as well.

B. I fully concur in approving it, (continued to) do so as well.

Again :

A. This is good.

B. No, it is bad.

It is a case of ethical disagreement and it can be translated in terms of the model as

A. I approve of this; do so as well.

B. No, I disapprove of this; do so as well.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Criticism– One of the reasons given by Stevenson in support of the model is that we can translate quite adequately a case of ethical disagreement in terms of a model for the ethical world involved in the judgement of the disputants. Similarly, we can also translate ordinary ethical agreements in terms of the models. But an ethical agreement in ordinary language is not expressed in terms of Stevenson's model. It is expressed in terms of convergent moral judgements. Therefore, it needs no argument to say that the satisfactoriness of the models very greatly depends on the legitimacy of the claims Stevenson makes of in saying that they can take care of ordinary language version of agreement or disagreement. His own illustration is as follows :

A. This is good
B. I fully agree. It is indeed good.

Translated into his working model due to the ethical word 'good' as follows :

A. I approve of this; do so as well.
B. I fully concur; do so as well.

This, he thinks, is the right way of translating the ethical agreement. But it may be remarked that this is perhaps not the right way to translate in terms of the model used. Using the model in a logical manner, the right translation seems to be the following.

A. I approve of this; do so as well.
B. I accept that you approve of this and you want me to do as you are doing; I also approve of this, do so as well.

This translation obviously shows that it is a mistranslation of the real ethical agreement and, therefore, it is *ipso facto* clear that the models cannot be used to express adequately what we express by our judgements.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Further, in the ordinary language version the second part of B's statement i.e. 'It is indeed good' is redundant. It is redundant because B cannot say "I fully agree but I do not want to call it good" But the translation effected on the line of the model makes it not so redundant.

Again the translation seems to entirely misrepresent the ethical point of an ethical agreement When B agrees with A it means that B agrees on a moral issue i e, B agrees with A in having the same evaluation of the object concerned. It is out of point to say that B accepts that A approves of the object A calls good. Agreeing with A when B says x is good means agreeing in calling x good. But if Stevenson's model for good is accepted, it becomes possible to say, "I fully agree but I do not call x good". This becomes equivalent to "I accept that you approve of x and you want me to do the same, but I do not want to do so." This expanded sentence is not a contradiction. Hence, the analyses i.e., the translation after the model is not the faithful explication of the analysandum, i e. the ordinary expression of ethical language.

Now to emphasise the disagreement or agreement in attitude and to avoid the confusion between agreement or disagreement in belief and the same in belief about attitude, he distinguished the model with another which seems to be identical with it but in fact is not. This is as follows :

"This is good" means I approve of this and I want you to do so as well.

Though it looks very similar to the above mentioned model yet it is quite different from them. In this scheme, agreement or disagreement in attitude has been entirely ignored. Both of its components are descriptive. The second part looks like imperative but virtually it refers to an agreement in belief about attitude.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Moreover, this model reduces an ethical judgement to a conjuction of two introspective statements and therefore it will rule out the very possibility of argumentation in the field of moral. But we do and we can argue about any ethical judgement. Secondly, if this model of analysis is accepted then an ethical dispute ceases to be a real dispute. It seems to be one due to the non–recognition of the ambiguous nature of the pronouns used. For example, suppose A and B disagree

A. I approve of this (x) and I want you to do so as well.

B. I disapprove of this (x) and I want you to do so as well.

In a real dispute the statements of the disputants are contradictory but here they are not. They are really as stated below.

A approves of x and wants B to do so. And B disapproves of x and wants A to do so as well.

They are two different statements and they do not contradict each other. If 'p' stands for one statement, the other, in order to be its contradictory, should be represented by 'not–p'. But here we cannot use 'not–p' for the second statement. Rather we should use q. However, the whole statement is very confusing here.

Accepting the models as they are, there arises another question : what implication will these models have on ethical methodology, i.e., if we accept the models then what effect shall they have in settling the ethical disputes ? In an ethical argument we prove the ethical judgement which according to Stevenson consists of two parts–declarative and imperative. Hence to prove an ethical judgement we have to prove both these parts. The declarative part can be proved but the imperative part cannot be proved,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

though we can give substantive proofs or supportive reasons to get it accepted. These reasons work on attitude via beliefs, i.e. by changing the beliefs the reasons change the attitude and get the imperative accepted.

But Stevenson is not correct here, because imperative can be proved according to the rule of logic and further the declarative part cannot be proved because it is a personal feeling of like or dislike. Stevenson proposes certain modifications in the working models in order that the models may become satisfactory tools for the analysis of moral judgement. So he points out certain defects in the working models and shows how they can be removed.

Firstly, the descriptive part of it makes the descriptive meaning of the ethical term very poor. The descriptive meaning of the ethical term, viz., "I approve of this" refers to the speaker's attitude only. But what we want to describe in the moral judgement is very offten more than what the model represents. For example, by 'x is good' we generally mean that x possesses many qualities and not only one i.e, the speaker's attitude towards it. Stevenson says that this inadequacy can be eliminated by accumulating as much by descriptive content as we desire in the reasons given to support a moral judgement. For example, if one asks "why should I call x good", we should reply "because x is polite, kind, generous etc." This we can do because the descriptive meaning of ethical terms is both ambiguous and vague.

Secondly, the presence of imperative part of the model makes the model too direct, crude and blunt. This defect is eliminated by introducing the notion of emotive meaning i.e., by saying that a moral judgement is not exactly an imperative but works like an imperative in virtue of its emotive meaning. The emotive meaning of a word is its power to express, arouse, effect or strengthen

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

feeling, emotion and attitude. All ethical words have ethical meaning by virtue of which they function like imperative. But they influence conduct or attitude more indirectly and politely and they are not as coercive or crude as ordinary imperatives are.

Philosophy Department
Gaya College,
GAYA (Bihar)

BIRENDRA KUMAR SINHA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

International Journal of Dravidian Linguistics, a biannual covering scholarly Articles on Dravidian and other languages of India and abroad.

Professionally rated as the best journal published from India and one of the best in the world.

Currently running its sixteenth volume, each number with 200 pages.

Single issue costs Rs. 25/–

Annual subscription is Rs. 50/–

Life Membership is Rs. 500/–

Chief Editor : **V. I. Subramoniam**

Associate Chief Editor : **A. P. Andrewskutty**

An International Board of Editors suggests and comments on the articles, references, notes and communications.

Please Contact : The Associate Chief Editor,
St. Xavier's College P. O.
TRIVANDRUM.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV. No. 3.
July, 1988

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND COMMUNICATION
An Appraisal of Bhartrhari's Theory of Language.

The basic feature of 20th century philosophy is the gradual dominance of the problem of language and meaning. Different facets of language in its relation to facts, meaning, convention, syntax, pragmatics have been discussed and debated in the philosophical literature of our times. This trend in philosophy is still going strong. However, it is interesting to note that approximately in 450 A. D., an Indian philosopher Bhartṛhari advanced a very comprehensive theory of language. He belonged to the Indian school of thought, which is known as the school of grammar. But this school of thought did not discuss grammar as the primary subject matter, their chief concern was the philosophy of language. Bhartṛhari, as is evident from his treatise on language — *Vākyapadīyam,* delved deep into the problem of language to unfold its multiple nuances. His theory of *sphoṭa* is one of the oldest theories of meaning; yet its importance in the contemporary philosophic background, in no way, appears outdated and obsolete.

The term 'language', as the modern philosophers understand it, stands not only for the uttered sounds or a collection of written words guided by certain grammatical rules and conventions, but also is conceived essentially as a vehicle of human communication Once the communicative role of language is accepted certain crucial questions automatically arise, such as – Does the task of the philosopher end with an analysis of language as it is used or should he go beyond the level of uttered language to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

understand how the speech is understood ? Whether the meanings of the utterances are conveyed from the speaker to the hearer independent of any logical ground of communication ? If not, which concept can serve as the logical ground of communication ? It is a common experience that sometimes we fail to communicate what we intend to speak and sometimes we fail to communicate what the utterer wants to convey through his utterance. In such cases communication fails. This shows that language as a tool of communication points to certain residual concepts which are to be explained if we are to view language as a communicative apparatus. Bhartṛhari's theory has a special appeal in the sense that he anticipated these issues and made an elaborate discussion on these problems. He examines language in its two dimensions - as the uttered speech and as the bearer of meaning. His main problem is : how the meaning is communicated. So he transgresses the level of uttered language to find its connection with thought and ultimately its connection with the universal ground of meaning. In this paper, I intend to explore Bhartṛhari's line of analysis and the way he explains the concepts that are involved in the communicative aspect of language. Besides, I venture to compare notes with some of the modern views regarding this line of analysis with special reference to Frege[1] and Davidson[2]. I choose to discuss Frege and Davidson in this paper because Frege's notion of 'Thought' and Davidson's notion of 'Interpretation' seem to point to the same direction as Bhartṛhari has been trying to locate in his notion of *sphoṭa*.

Before we go on with our task of examining the language-thought relation and the logical ground of communication as propounded by Bhartṛhari, I deem it proper to say a few words about the concept of *śabda*. This term is used profusely in the Indian philosophy of language. But the term has a special significance in case of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, for *śabda* is not only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the key concept of his epistemology but also of his metaphysics. *Śabda* in its ordinary sense implies sound, but philosophically the term implies the sound which can be used as a symbol for the expression of meaning. The essential nature of *śabda* lies in its significative power. For Bhartṛhari, the term has still deeper significance. *Śabda* does not mean for him just a collection of uttered sounds accompanied by a meaning; it also stands for the universal unit of speech and meaning, which is manifested through the uttered sounds. In the opening chapter of the *Vākyapadīyam* Bhartṛhari discusses the nature of *śabda* by recognising two elements in each significant word[3], i.e., the element of sound and the element of logos or the real word which possesses significance of its own. The logos or the real word (in modern idiom we may also call it the 'content' of utterances) is revealed by the uttered sounds *dhvani*. This real word is ever present in our thought and as such cannot be apprehended unless it is conveyed by appropriate sounds. The *śabda* which Bhartṛhari identifies with *sphoṭa* is the ultimate ground of meaning and can be manifested through different forms of uttered sounds. The variations in language and the variations in speaker's intonations, accents and pitch do not affect the 'meaning' or the 'real word'. So Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language deals with the analysis of uttrered sounds along with the role of grammar, convention, uses of language in this level of language, as well as the communicative power of language and the logical conceptions involved in the process of communication.

Bhartṛhari undertakes an triadic analysis of meaning where he makes a distinction between the language, referents and thought, which in actual practice we often obliterate. For him the study of meaning involves the interrelationship between the uttered words and thoughts on the one hand and the interrelationship between the words and the referents on the other. It ...7

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

should be noted here that in the pre-Wittgensteinian and Wittgensteinian era the philosophers have focussed too much attention on the language–referent relationship. This is the reason why some of the philosophers viewed the concept of 'thought' and the terms associated with it as smacking of some sort of psychologism. The concepts like 'thought', 'idea' 'understanding' are warded off either as verbal dispositions or else have been interpreted as non–significant. However, in the last two decades philosophers have started taking interest in language–thought relationship, as is evident from the writings of Quine, Davidson, Guttenplan and others. Bhartṛhari, surprisingly enough, took this quite seriously and made interesting contributions to this subject matter. He highlights that if meaning is understood to be communicable then thought must be taken as significant phase of the process of communication.

Bhartṛhari emphatically makes it clear that "The meaning of an utterance is that which is conveyed to the listener by uttering it; there is no other definition of meaning" (*Vākyapadīyam*-II–328).

This definition is the corner–stone of his philosophy of language. But this process of uttering the sentence and conveying the meaning to the listener is not that simply explainable. One of the peculiarities of the uttered speech is that it is not presented as a whole. We utter words syllable by syllable and each syllable is no more heard the moment the next is uttered. So, if language is to be taken as a vehicle of communication then the explanation of meaning in terms of speaker, hearer, intention and belief of the speaker, the context of utterance, etc., are not enough. In fact, Bhartṛhari discusses all these factors while analysing the empirical level of language. But he shows that there is a need for explorations into the depth analysis of communicability,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which can be done by enumerating the connections between the uttered sentences and thought and further by showing their connection with the ultimate unity of meaningfulness. So 'thought' is to be presupposed as a relevant phase of understanding the language. The unity of uttered words and ascription of meaning to them involves further unification on the level of thought. Of course, it may well be argued that what Bhartṛhari is offering is a psychological process through which the succession of uttered letters are united. But Bhartṛhari does not analyse thought in terms of memories, ideas and associations. He insists that meaning is not conveyed from the speaker to the hearer, rather the spoken words serve only as stimulus to uncover or reveal the meaning which is already conceptually existent in the mind of the hearer[4]. Sometimes though the full sentence is not uttered, the hearer understands what the utterer wants to convey. So, Bhartṛhari is not analysing the psychological process of uniting the letters through words or words through sentences. Nor does he interpret 'thought' in terms of ideas, for he explains communication in terms of sharing the common content of meaning both by the speaker and the hearer.

Bhartṛhari shows that thought is a definite phase involved in the logical explanation of the communicability of language. Language needs thought and thought needs language. He says : "There is no thought or concepts without the operation of words; all cognition is shot through and through by words; all cognition is illuminated through words" (*V. P.* I. 114). Again he emphasizes, we cannot be aware of anything if we take out the name. If name or word is extracted from the cognition, it ceases to be a cognition since it lacks illumination and consequently its knowledge remains latent and inert. (*V. P.* I. 125). So our thought and conceptionalization lacks significance without the terms expressive thereof. Thought presupposes language. What-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ever is conceivable is nameable and describable, and whatever is not describable in terms of words is not thinkable. It may be the case that we may sometimes grope for the right word, yet there cannot be any thought totally devoid of linguistic expressibility

Some traditional Indian philosophers have raised objections to this sort of interpretation of knowledge and thought. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Nyāya philosopher, in his book *Nyāya Mañjari*, argues that there can be thought as well as cognition without words and names. According to him we first of all cognize objects, then attach names to it. Prof. G.N. Shastri provides an answer for such a criticism by pointing out that this would lead to an infinite regress in an attempt to explain why a particular word should be used in response to a particular object[5]. Moreover, it is evident that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's analysis, in this case, is more about the temporal sequence of cognition than the logical sequence of cognition. It has also been argued by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa that if thought is to be interpreted in terms of language then a child who does not know the language cannot think. But Bhartṛhari's answer would be that a child does not think about things; he is just aware of them and bare awareness is not thought. Moreover, it may as well be argued that for Bhartṛhari thought does not mean actual thinking but rather implies the linguistic potency.

If thought is interpreted in terms of linguistic expressibility, the immediate conclusion may be that 'thought' does not have conceptual autonomy and it is just equivalent to "speech-disposition" as it has been put forward by Willfrid Sellars[6]. Bhartṛhari, however, does not go to this extent in his interpretation. According to him uttered speech and thuoght are only inter-dependent stages of the same process. Speech principle, as Bhartṛhari states, manifests itself in three levels — they are *Vaikharī*,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Madhyamā and *Paśyānti*. *Vaikhārī* is the actual utterance, expressing the intention of the speakers and understood by the heart. *Madhyamā* is mental and conceptual in nature. It represents the manifestation of meaning-essence on the level of thought. All the elements linguistically relevant to the uttered speech are present in this stage in the latent form. The same meaning is revealed by different forms of *Madhyamā* depending on the language adopted. These two stages correspond to the two aspects of linguistic situation i.e., *Vaikṛta dhvani* (the individual utterances in purely phonetic terms) and *Prākṛta dhvani* (the phonological structure, the sound pattern of the norm). The *Vaikṛata dhvani* is the actually spoken language accompanied by the variations in intonations, accent and pitch etc., whereas *Prākṛta dhvani* is marked by the absence of all non-linguistic personal variations. However, both the speaker and the hearer are conscious of the normal phonological structure. The time sequence which is the characteristic of the uttered speech is present at this stage. It is well-known that according to Bhartṛhari the linguistic communication is made possible because of the identical meaning essence or *sphoṭa*. The meaning-essence is the same though the language adopted for its communication may vary. The *Prākṛta* and the *Vaikṛta dhvanis* are the external aspects of language, and the internal aspect, which is directly attached to meaning, is *sphota*. This is the sequenceless, partless integral linguistic symbol which is manifested through sequencial utterances along with rules of convention, parts of speech etc. at the *Madhyamā* stage and *Vaikhrai* stage. This accounts for the possibility of translation of one language into another language without the alteration of meaning. *Sphoṭa* or the universal meaning essence is the same but languages may be different. (V. P.-I. 95). According to Bhartṛhari, speech and thought are only two aspects of the same speech principle (V. P. II. 31). He all along highlights that sentence is the fundamental linguistic fact,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

words or concatenation of words does not give us meaning in true sense of the term. The division into words and word meanings is only useful means in the study of language. *Paśyānti* is the stage of grasping the unity in meaning of the sentences.

Our brief discussions on the nature of *Vaikhārī* and *Madhyamā* and the aspects of language known as *vaikṛta dhvani* and *prākṛta dhvani* reveal that speech and thought are not conceptually reducible to one another. There is no scope for dismissing thought as "verbal disposition". Similarly spoken language is also not a copy of our thought. One and the same thought can be expressed in different forms even in one and the same language.

The interdependence of thought and language and their further reference to the ultimate ground of meaning brings us to the central concept of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, viz., *sphoṭa*. This is *śabda* in the true sense of the term. *Sphoṭa* is a term which cannot be accurately translated into English. It has been translated as "meaning essence" or "word–essence"[7], implicit speech element[8], 'integral linguistic symbol'.[9] Prof. G. N. Shastri, however, is of the opinion that the Greek conception of *logos* can best convey the meaning of the term *sphoṭa*. According to him "The fact that *logos* stands for an idea as well as a word wonderfully approximates to the concept of *sphoṭa*".[10] *Sphoṭa* comes from the root *sphut* which can be translated as 'bursting–forth'. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in the *sphoṭavāda* describes *sphoṭa* as that from which meaning bursts forth and also as an entity which is manifested by spoken letters. Philosophically, *sphoṭa* is the symbol standing for the unity of spoken syllable and conveyed meaning. Meaning is clearly distinguished on the one hand from the words and on the other from the denoted objects. *Sphoṭa* stands for the universal meaning essence shared both by the speaker and the hearer so that the communication

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of verbal manifestation can be possible. This linguistic potency and the meaning–essence remains unaffected by the peculiarities of the spoken language. It is grasped both by the speaker and the hearer. So though the uttered sounds die after the are pronounced the whole sense of the sentence is conveyed by the speaker and understood by the hearer. Often in the books on Indian philosophy the concept of *sphoṭa* is unnecessarily mystified, and its episternic significance is overshadowed by the metaphysical interpretation of the term.

II

On the background of one of the oldest theories of meaning and language, outlined briefly above, it will be quite interesting to compare notes with the views advanced by two modern thinkers, Frege and Davidson. I discuss their view-points with reference to two of their papers – "Thought – A Logical Inquiry" by Frege and "Thought and Talk" by Davidson. It is to be noted that the thought-language issue, in recent times, has gained tremendous importance. Largely as a result of Frege's work it has been brought to the light that some concepts which are necessary to describe language are also an integral part of the description of the mental attitudes. Frege's most significant discovery in the field of philosophy of language is the distinction between the sense and reference. In addition to the name and reference, he adds a third element which he calls the *sense*, which implies the meaning or the descriptive content of the word. So he undertakes a triadic analysis of language in terms of words, referents and sense. This is very akin to Bhartṛhari's analysis of language. Frege extends this distinction from the singular and referring expressions to the predicate expressions and to the whole of sentence. He points out that sentence (which can, at least, be true or false) expresses a *thought*. Frege, in his paper, "The Thought – A Logica Inquiry"

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

makes a detailed analysis of the concept of 'thought'. He says: "I call a thought something for which the question of truth arises. So I ascribe what is false to a thought as much as what is true. So I can say : *thought* is the sense of the sentence without wishing to say as well that the sense of every sentence is a thought. The thought, in itself immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thougnt".[11]

It may seem that there is striking similarity between the Fregean view of language-thought relation and that of Bhartṛhari's view on this issue. Yet the difference in their approaches to the problem is quite easily detectable. Coming to the points of similarity. We may note that Frege's admission of thought as being immaterial, but comprehensible through the material garment of the uttered speech points to the similar distinction made by Bhartṛhari between *dhvani* (the verbal and empirical manifestation of language) and *śabda* (the unempirical principle of speech). Similarly, while defining thought as immaterial, Frege does not concede to the view that thoughts are subjective 'ideas'. Bhartṛhari also does not interpret *madhyamā vāk* in terms of ideas because he assumes that the intention of the speaker to say something and understanding of the utterance by the hearer is based on the common grasping of the content of speech. But there is a basic difference between Frege's and Bhartṛhari's approach. Frege does not start with the assumption that language is communicative in nature and language can have multiple facets. He takes up the analysis of thought to locate the content of the sentences in order to locate the status of truth. This is evident from his analysis of the phases of thought-language relationship, i. e.,

1. Apprehension of a thought – Thinking

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2. Recognition of a truth – Judgement
3. Manifestation of judgement – Assertion

Frege makes a distinction between the thought and the assertion of thought. We may however, say that Frege's notion of thought stands for the propositional content, which can be expressed through various sentences and in various languages. So the apprehension of thought may be similar to *paśyanti vāk* of Bhartṛhari. The judgement and assertion may be comparable to the *Madhyamā* and *vaikharī* stages. But this sort of comparison is quite misleading. The concept of truth is the focal point of Frege's thought–language analysis. The conception of 'truth' works as the connecting link between the level of thought and assertion. Consequently, on the level of language assertions occupy the unique position. Frege excludes imperatives, exclamations, poetics, etc., from the scope of thought.[12] At some points he wants to retain the conceptual autonomy of thought, yet it is the logic of assertion and truth–conditions, which becomes the determining factor of meaning.

Davidson in his paper "Thought and Talk" retains Frege's basic insight but avoids Frege's commitments to 'thought' and truth–values as platonic entities. Davidson makes further developments on Fregean thesis by modifying Tarski's notion of truth. Regarding thought–language relation, however, he clearly maintains that thought is not a speech–disposition. According to him : "... the parallel between the structure of thoughts and the structure of sentence provides no argument for the primacy of either, and only a presumption in favour of their interdependence".[13] This is the primary premise from which he concludes that "a creature must be a member of speech community if it is to have a concept of belief. And given the dependence of other attitudes of belief we can say more generally that a creature that can interpret speech can have the concept of thought".[14]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This interpretation, again, seems fairly close to Bhartṛhari's analysis of thought–language relationship. But as we have noticed in case of Frege, Davidson also makes the concept of 'truth' the central point and consequently highlights the role uf assertions on the level of language. The conception of truth as the key–concept leads to the importance of assertions on the level of language and of belief on the level of thought. So Davidson describes thought as the inter–locking system of beliefs which can be held to be true, though he admits that thought can be autonomous in respect of belief. He says " .. although most of thoughts are not beliefs, it is a pattern of belief that allows us to identify any thought; analogously, in the case of language, although most utterances are not concerned with truth, it is the pattern of sentences held true that gives sentences their meaning ".[15] The attitude of holding a sentence to be true relates belief and interpretation (understanding of an utterance) in a fundamental way.

So, in case of Frege as well as Davidson the notion of truth has a vital role to play in the explanation of meaning. This obsession with truth and assertion may be due to the fact, as it has been observed by Prof. D. M. Datta, that "In English the word knowledge implies a cognition, attended with belief".[16] However, Prof. Datta tries to adjust the notion 'belief' in the typical setting of the Indian philosophy of language He is of the opinion that "... a *vākya* (sentence) asserting a fact produces a belief in the fact which forms its objective intention (*tātparya*). A *vākya* comes, therefore, to be a source of knowledge about facts ".[17] I, on my part, would prefer to disagree with Prof. Datta's interpretation of the role of belief and nature of statements in the Indian philosophy of language. Though there in no unanimity of opinion amongst the Indian philosophical schools of thought regarding the nature of language, source of language,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the unit of meaning, etc., yet *vākya* is not defined in terms of factual and assertive sentences alone Nor is belief understood in the sense of objective intention. Imperatives, interrogatives, metaphorical and suggestive use of sentences are also analyzed by the Indian philosophers in the context of *vākya*. John Brough correctly observes that in the west "most of the philosophic discussions of meaning confine itself to a relatively small portion language behaviour, namely, statements which describe or report a state of affairs – the propositions of the natural sciences, or more generally, such statements as are traditionally handled by logic".[18] This obsession still continues. Though in recent times some philosophers have devoted their attention to the logic of imperatives, aesthetics and other forms of language but an integrated study of language along with its multiple forms of expression are not quite often undertaken. Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* highlights this multiplicity of linguistic uses and reacts against Fregean analysis of language in terms of truth. But his non–essentialistic stance makes him concentrate more on the functions of language than on the explorations into its structural basis. In post–Wittgensteinian era communication–intention theorists, have made further examinations of the basic concepts of communication, viz., the pragmatics of language, the role of intention, belief, the speaker–hearer relationship, etc. But by doing this, they have most often concentrated on the level of uttered speech. Here Bhartrhari seems to score over his modern counterparts in the sense that not only does he examine the language at the level of the uttered speech but probes also deeper to bring out the ultimate logical grround of meaning. He elaborates with equal zest the role of usage, convention, syntax, speaker–hearer relationship, the context of the speech, when he analyses language at the level of the verbal manifestations or speech. But he, at the sametime, is of the opinion that we must go beyond the level of the uttered speech to find out how the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meaning is conveyed inspite of the variations in the form of language adopted and the peculiarities of the speaker. I feel, Frege as well as Davidson are also in search of this ultimate basis of meaningfulness, which I propose to take up in the concluding part of my paper. But for the time being our problem is : can we fit the Indian notion of language in the model of assertions ?

Prof. Datta, in order to show that in the Indian philosophy of language the role of belief and truth are equally accepted, tries to highlight that the two of the conditions of meaningful sentences admitted by some schools of Indian philosophy, at least, refer to belief and truth-conditions. The *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā* and *Vedānta* schools of philosophy accept four conditions for the meaningfulness of a *vākya* (sentence); they are – *Ākāṅkṣā* (syntactic expectancy) *Yogyatā* (logical compatibility), *sannidhi* (phonetic contiguity) and *tātparya* (intention or the general purport of the sentence). According to Datta *tātparya* refers to the belief of the speaker. But *tātparya* is understood in terms of the intention of the speaker. This is an additional qualification of sentences besides *Ākāṅkṣā, Yogyatā* and *Sannidhi*. The intention of the speaker, according to some, is to be recognised in order to discern meaning when a sentence is ambiguous. But 'intention' and 'belief' are not identical concepts. They have different implications. So *Sāparya* does not refer to 'belief' at all. Similarly, *Yogyatā*, in the true sense of the term, does not "compatibility with facts", as it has been interpreted by Prof. Datta. Prof. K. K. Raja correctly observes : "It is necessary to distinguish between inconceivable combinations like 'the circular squre' and the conceivable combinations which are against our experience such as 'the rabit's horn'. Strictly speaking it is the inconceivability of mutual association of word-meanings that renders the whole sentence non-sensical; it is not the lack of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

correlation with the actual facts, but impossibility of connecting the word-meanings that stands in the way of verbal comprehension"[19]. So, neither the concept of belief is accepted as one of the conditions of knowing the sentence meaning nor the factual statements the compatibility with facts) is the only type of statements. Bhartṛhari does not emphasize the role of belief for he holds that the content of speech is not transmitted by the speaker to the utterer, rather the spoken words serve as a stimulus to reveal the meaning which is already present in the mind of the hearer.

Bhartṛhari strongly holds that it is the sentence which is the primary unit of meaningful speech, and there is certain self-sufficiency and completness about its expressive capacity when the meaning is understood along with the intention of the speaker. He also is of the opinion that there is a natural fitness (*yogyatā*) between the language and meaning. It is by learning the connection through the convention that we can decipher the meaning connoted by words. But our uttrerances as such have a meaning potency. So truth does not come in between meaning and language. Bhartṛhari accepts the self-validity, which is metaphorically called as self-illumination of language. He, of course, talks of truth and falsity of the utterances by admitting the distinction between the primary meaning i.e., the denoted object and secondary meaning i.e., the mental status of the conceptions in reletion to meaning. Words, according to him, are concerned with the secondary meaning and within this realm can convey meaning whether they have anything corresponding to them in the outside the world or not. The basic point is that as soon as meaning is cognized it has a cognitive meaning. The sentence "Tree exists" is true if corresponding to it the external object called 'tree' exists, but the sentence "tree exists" is false if the sentence has a conceptual status on the level of thought but nothing corresponding to it exists in the outside world.[20] So, in a sense, speech

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in its conceptual level points to something which is either true or false. But on linguistic level he does not confine his analysis to assertions only. I do admit that both Frege and Davidson accept that language can have other uses too. But they prefer to concentrate on the logic of assertions. This may be convenient for the formalistic explanation of language. But when language is viewed as a vehicle of communication we may find that the study of language is much more complicated and excavating the logic of language through the concepts of 'belief' and 'truth' do not solve all the problems. The basic approach to the language–thought relation in case of Bhartṛhari is different from that of Frege and Davidson. Bhartṛhari explains 'thought' and 'language' from the stand–point of communicability. But Frege does not proceed with the assumption that language is essentially communicative in nature. He makes a distinction between the 'thought' and 'language' to show the distinction between the propositional content and the sentence. Bhartṛhari also tries to locate the content of speech. But it is not the content of the speech only with which he is exclusively concerned; he also tries to trace further unity of all our meaningful utterances. Davidson, on the other hand, tries to locate the counter–part of assertions on the level of thought to locate the mental attitudes that are accompanied by sentences like I believe, I feel, I think, I doubt etc., which he does ultimately in terms of belief.

Our problem does not end with showing the difference of approach to the problem of language–thought relationship as envisaged by Bhartṛhari on the one hand and Frege and Davidson on the other. It will not be too much out of context to say that both Frege and Davidson are in search of the logical ground of meaning as has been done by Bhartrhari. This logical ground can be located in the concept of 'thought' in case of Frege and concept of 'interpretation' in case of Davidson.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Frege holds that "'thought' belongs neither to my inner world as an idea nor yet to the outer world of material, perceptual things".[21] So "Thoughts are by no means unreal but their reality is of a quite different kind from that of things. And their effect is brought about by an act of the thinker without which they would be ineffective, at least as far as we can see. And yet the thinker does not create them but must take them as they are. They can be true without being apprehended by a thinker and are not wholly unreal". Even then. they could be apprehended and by this he means that they could be brought into operation.[22]

This sort of explanation of the concept of "thought" comes closer to the concept of *sphoṭa*, the ultimate ground of meaning unaffected by the speaker and the objects of the world. For Frege 'thought' implies 'truth' self-evident in the sense that "It is not true for the first time when it is discovered, but is like a planet, which, already before any one has seen it, has been in interaction with other planets".[23] The word 'true' is here used by Frege definitely in a different sense than it has been used as a characteristic of assertions. Here "thought" stands for the logical ground of language and meaning. Is not Frege's description of 'thought' approximating the Bhartrhari's concept of *sphoṭa* which is self-expressive and self-valid? Frege further observes, "one sees a thing, one has an idea, one apprehends or thinks a thought. When one apprehends or thinks a thought one does not create it but only comes to stand in a certain relation, which is different from seeing a thing or having an idea, to what already existed before-hand".[24] Bhartrhari conceives *sphoṭa*, also, as the meaning-essence or the implicit principle of meaning neither definable in terms of objects nor in terms of the words used. Here I do not intend to claim that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Frege's views are nothing new but have already been anticipated by Bhartrhari. I have already indicated the differences of their approach to the problem of language. But once language is analysed in its depth it is apt to direct us towards some sort of unity, which Frege locates in the concept of 'thought', whereas Bhartrhari conceives it through the assumption of the concept of *sphoṭa*.

Davidson, while trying to do away with Frege's entitative commitment to 'thought' advances the theory of interpretation. He says, "we usually think that having a language consists largely in being able to speak, but in what follows speaking will play an indirect part, what is essential to my argument is the idea of an interpreter, someone who understands the utterances of another".[25] Here is a thesis which interpretes both thought and speech in terms of communicability. But what is the ground of interpretarion ? Davidson's answer is that the method of interpretation "puts the interpreter in general agreement with the speaker, according to the method the speaker holds the sentence true under specified conditions, and these conditions obtain, in the opinion of the interpreter, just when the speaker holds the sentences to be true".[27] So, for Davidson, ultimately holding a belief to be true is the central point of communication. But on what ground does the interpreter judge an utterance to be true ? Is it because of its relation to the facts and referents ? Davidson again clarifies : "this notion of truth is not a semantical notion : language is not directly in picture... it is a part of the frame. For the notion of a true belief depends on the notion of a true utterance, and this in turn cannot be without a shared–language".[28] So from the notion of communication he comes to the concept of truth to return again to communication. In any case, it seems that we cannot escape the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

universal 'meaning–essence' or in other words, the logical ground of meaning, if language is to be interpreted in terms of communicability.

Philosophy Department
Utkal University
Vani–Vihar
Bhubaneswar–751 004 (Orissa)

TADRA PATNAIK

NOTES

1. Frege, G. ; "The Thought : A Logical Inquiry" (translated by A. M. and Marcelle Quinton) in *Philosophical Logic* ed. P. F. Strawson, Oxford University Press, 1967.

2. Davidson, D. : "Thought and Talk" in *Mind and Language* ed. S. Guttenplan, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1976

3. Bhartṛhari, : *Vākya padiyam* I. 44
Dvau upādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavido viduḥ
eka nimittaṁ śabdānām aparo'rthe prayujyate

4. Brough, John : "Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians" in *A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians*, ed. J. F. Staal, 1 : 44–46.

5. Shastri, G. N. : "The Doctrine of Śabdabramhan – A criticism by Jayanta Bhatta" in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XV, pp. 441–453.

6. Sellars, Willfrid : "Conceptual Change" in *Conceptual Change* ed. D. Pearce and P. Maynard, Dordrecht, 1973, p. 82.

7. Coward, Harold . *Sphota Theory of Language*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1980.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

8. Matilal, B. K. : *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*

9. Raja, K. K. : *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1963.

10. Shastri, G. N. : *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1959.

11. Frege, G. : "The Thought : A Logical Inquiry" p. 20.

12. *Ibid* : p. 21 and 22.

13. Davidson, D. : Thought and Talk – p. 10.

14. *Ibid*

15. *Ibid* : p. 14.

16. Datta, D. M. : *Six Ways of Knowing*, University of Calcutta, 1972. p. 19.

17. *Ibid* : p. 332.

18. Brough, John : *Some Indian Theories of Meaning* p. 165.

19. Raja, K. K. : *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 165.

20. Coward, H. G. : *Sphota Theory of Language*, p. 118.

21. Frege, G. : *Thought* p. 35.

22. *Ibid* : p. 38.

23. *Ibid* : p. 29.

24. *Ibid* : p. 29–30. n

25. Davidson, D. : "Thought and Talk" p. 9.

26. *Ibid* : p. 9.

27. *Ibid* : p. 21.

28. *Ibid* : p. 23.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV. No. 3.
July, 1988

APPENDIX

to

'THE COMPARATIVE AND THE CREATIVE'

A. I. 1. After all, what is this primary creativity to which it seems fashionable to lay a claim ? It is the ability of a select few in the whole history of human thought and may or may not be related to the status they achieve or the esteem in which they are held. All other creativity must automatically become of the secondary variety. In this, the germ or nucleus supplied by a pioneer is explored, elaborated or nurtured with care, insight and perception by another. If one is really interested in tracing the lineage of primary creativity to its origins, it is only the Creator, if there is one, or the Primordial Cognitive Pool, if again that can be considered possible, which can lay legitimate claim to it It is there that we must trace all germs of thought, discovery or invention. If we are unwilling (or unable) to accept this due to any reasons, or want to give us mortals primary creative status, this is applicable only in case of those who develop, discover or invent the nucleus around which growth occurs. Everything else, the planting, the watering, the sprouting, the branching, the blossoming, the beholding and the studying is, to that extent, a secondary process. Thus, every other writer who writes on a certain topic after the first one becomes a secondary thinker. In every sphere, therefore, the prerogative of primacy rests with a few ancients who were privileged to come in time before us, and propound the germ of a thought that we elaborate upon, or

Received : 20-5-88

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

depart from. In fact, purely because certain thinkers precede us in time, they have the privilege of being called originators or primary creators. It would then be incorrect to assume that any significant or new departure in philosophising represents primary creativity precisely because, although apparently new, it is not at all primary. It is an elaboration on something primary already existing and, to that extent must be called secondary creativity. That, however, does not make it any less significant either in its departure or its importance.

It would be equally incorrect to infer that either primary or secondary creativity is superior or inferior to the other. Having being born in point of time today, we can at best assume secondary creative status, howsoever great our ability to original or creative thinking. In this, we are neither superior nor inferior to other thinkers before us, or the ones to follow. In this, further, we are neither under–privileged nor inconvenienced; nor should we consider ourselves either unfortunate or get disappointed In fact, we have to accept this status and build upon it, for this and the generation of thought to follow. To do so, we will first have to give up our fantasy and fashion of claiming primary creativity for ourselves or our favourites; and unrealistic ambisions Only in the remote possibility that there still exists a germ lying in the aforesaid primordial pool of thought that has escaped discovery, will primary creativity ever be manifest in this or future generations. You may ask why we consider this possibility remote. Well, the only compelling reason for this is of course the possibility of tracing everything that is claimed to be original thought today, or tomorrow, to something that existed yesterday. This should help sober down fantastic ambitions and help overcome our pomposity. It need not involve either giving up or ignoring creative pursuits. Or serve as a hindrance to true original thinking. In fact, if anything, this should serve as a water-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

shed between the true creative thinker and self–seeking masquerader. It will allow proper articulation to both the thinker who has lost his way in this quagmire, and the follower who may have got himself drenched therein unwittingly.

A. I. 2. The creative thinker, often, has the ability to be unconventional, though we must qualify this by saying that this is not invariable. Originality can be as much a rejector of certain conventions as a supporter of others. In general, however, it cannot tolerate or allow for blind subservience or fervour, for dogmatism, or for thought born primarily out of the need to belong or conform. Getting labelled, therefore, may have a special aversion for him; and even if this is not so, labels themselves may ill-fit him except for short spans of time. Frameworks seem unable to restrain or strait–jacket his thinking, and he is easily bored and disillusioned by them. This is one of the main reason why he often seeks new frontiers for exercising his creativity. And in whatever sphere he engages the same freshness of approach becomes apparent; and sphere itself is that much the richer.

Such thinking, further, has a special aversion for the psychology of the mob. It avoids the mentality and motivations of the herd, especially those prompted by shared short–term or selfish gains, or appeals that camouflage collective fear, panic or insecurity. These feelings arouse prompt and fervent responses from the laity, but usually leave him untouched. However, the properly oriented original thinker also knows that this need not motivate him to reject concepts purely because they are accepted by the majority. In other words, it is not the laity which is the issue; it is their unreason that he avoids; whilst from the realistic aspirations of the majority he can never afford to be detached. In fact, being conscious of the latter distinguishes the creative thinker who is a visionary eternally venerable from the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pen–pusher, the opportunist, or the meteoric thinker who burns out as fast as he rises. Further, non-conformity can itself become a dogma and a creed, and he knows well, and early, in his development, the dangers of applying it unscrupulously, as a master–tool. What he essentially combines is honest criticism with constructive realignment so as to lead to a more robust, vibrant and, only if necessary, altogether new framework.

A. I. 3 In creativity or originality, although novelty is essential, it is not a sufficient attribute. One would even say it is not necessarily the most important one. We must have it, of course, but we must have something much more. What follows is that not every idea need be considered creative just because it is new. It should be able to *create*, or atleast lead to some such constructive goal. Any accent otherwise cannot but result either in pedantry or in chaos. For, just as obsession with the old can be stifling, that with the new can be equally anarchical. Part of the energies of thought cannot but be consumed in both this differentiation and its avoidance. Hence, to our earlier quality of originality, we must add constructiveness as another significant attribute of creativity of any worth.

What must also follow from this is that in an obsession with the label of creativity, one need not keep searching for new ideas alone. This is not as easy to avoid as it may seem. While most would agree that this be so, an equally large number would continue to acquiesce in it, and a not insignificant number may be made up of those who agree to what we said in the earlier paragraph. This is both out of design as well as ignorance. The latter can change with realisation, hopefully. It is the former from whom the greater danger lies.

Let us elaborate a little on why we should so believe. New-ness and its search can itself become a dangerous addiction. In

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

direction, especially if allowed unbridled sway, it can lead as much to significant as to reckless departures. Hence, rather than say we should keep searching for new ideas, we must quality that we should keep searching for new *constructive* ideas If at any time obsession with the former makes us forget the latter, it can be disastrous for both the thinker, his ability and his followers. In this the thinker has to act as responsible to himself as to posterity and its directedness The powerful appeal of mischief, recklessness, despair and ennui has resulted in some philosophising that has been as new in its approach as profound in its depths. But judge it by the yard-stick of whether it is refreshing or constructive and we will know whether such creativity is ever of any worth; or anything more than an assay in thought-masturbation, a self-abuse practised down the centuries with some aplomb by a number of thinkers and their ardent and, one suspects, unwary followers. For, ardour coupled with carelessness is the surest guarantee of misdirection.

14, Shivakripa
Opposite St. Mary's Convent
Nahur Road, Mulund (W)
Bombay-400080

AJAI R. SINGH
and
SHAKUNTALA A. SINGH

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BOOKS RECEIVED

1. Boruah, Bijoy M.; *Fiction and Emotion : A Study in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, First Edition, 1988, pp. viii + 133, Rs. 110/–

2 Chattopadhyaya; D. P.; *Sri Aurobindo and Karl Marx*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, New Edition, 1988, pp 336, Rs. 250/–

3. Sondhi Madhuri; *The Making of Peace*, Selection Book Service Syndicate, New Delhi 110 048, First Edition, 1985, pp. 345, Rs. 275/–

4, Sprigge, T. L. S.; *The Rational Foundations of Ethics*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, First Edition, 1988, pp. 283.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 3,
July, 1988

BOOK — REVIEW

INTERPRETING KANT. Moltke S. Gram, (ed.) Iowa City, University of Iowa Press. 1982. pp 149. US $22.40

This book, dealing as it does with some of the finer points to be met with in interpreting Kant 's philosophy, consists of an introduction by the editor of ten pages followed by eight essays by various authors who obviously are specialists in their respective fields. After two hundred years of interpretation, Kant 's philosophy in English now appears to resolve itself mainly into a matter of probing the semantic divergencies that are to be found within his basic terminology, allowing especially for what may be called a ' semiotic indeterminism ' discoverable in the course of translating the original eighteenth century German in which Kant wrote his three *Critiques*. There is at present a deep concern for correct and up–to–date translation that centers around key terms in Kant 's writings, terms such as *Anschauung, Empfindung, Vorstellung, Willkür, Zweck*. There is also a great deal of emphasis put upon correct grammatical usage in translation, in stylistic preference and in philological derivation. The proper reference in pronouns in Kant 's long and involved German sentences becomes crucial to the original intended meaning. Alternate possible readings are suggested and a comparison is made of the work of different translators. All in all, the niceties of text and translation are attended to in this publication edited by Gram, not a long work, but one in which the material is extremely condensed. Each essay will be briefly dealt with in what follows.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Richard E. Aquila in a relatively brief essay asks on Kant's behalf 'Is Sensation the Matter of Appearance?' The focus here is on passages in the first Critique in trying to determine whether Kant always takes Empfindung (sensation) to be an ingredient in our being presented in the way in which we are presented rather than only as an indicator of the way in which we perceive those appearances. There is some question concerning translation of the German preposition *an* as to whether sensation is actually 'in' the appearance or whether sensation in some way only is connected with appearances. Kant himself has said that sensation posits (*setzt*) an object that has a correspondence to the sensation of space and time where the sensation in question denotes the real of intuition, Aquila is concerned to show that the original texts are in some cases much more ambiguous than translators (Norman Kemp Smith is cited) have indicated and that such ambiguities tend to be smoothed over in translation. *Empfindung* may be extended to the material aspects of appearances insofar as sensations form a part of the intuitions that present themselves to us, for there are places where Kant unceniably states that sensation is the ingredient of appearances corresponding to the material of appearance, as for example at A 167/B 208–9' In the *Critique of Judgement*, (tr.) James C. Meredith, 1986 (Introduction VI, 29) it is stated that sensation is the matter of representations. Yet Aquila finds that there are places, for example at B 147, where Kant may be takent to say that material appearance for all practical purposes can be equated with our sensations, i. e., subjective to us as simply our 'being presented, and that sensation only expresses rather than consists in the materiality of external things.

Perhaps the key essay in the series is 'The Sense of a Kantian Intuition' by Moltke S. Gram, who thinks that translators of Kant 's German texts have for the most part succeeded in bequ-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

eathing to us a confused Babel of words. Kant himself, it is felt, in company with eighteenth century philosophy in general, has prostituted the usage, for example, of ths term *Anschauung*, usually rendered in English by 'intuition'. He has brought it down from its exalted state which originally suggested a state of mystical awareness, something akin to a beatific vision held apart from any kind of symbolic knowledge whatsoever, a vision which, for example, Meister Eckhart, the thirteenth century Dominican preacher and theologian attempted to convey to his listeners. With Kant, *Anschauung* has been degraded to the level of human procurement under the aegis of human cognition and therein has been deprived of its mystical overtones. Gram 's approach is to trace the word to its source in early medieval literature in order to explore the traditional German usage of the term, the only way, it is claimed, to even partially resolve some of the agravating problems associated with *Anschauung*. Accordingly, Gram ably investigates tradititions in German usage of *Anschuung* or *Anschouung* or *anscouuen* as found in the language of the later middle ages as a kind of mystical intuition designating a non-discursive rather than a discursive awareness. *Anschauung* as intuition may be taken to encompass the super–sensuous as well as the sensuous object.

In any event it is Gram's conclusion that the sense of intuition for Kant denotes something that may in itself be neither a property nor a set of properties. Although Kant's writings are anything but clear about what is really meant by *Anschauung* and never enlighten us as to whether intuition may be called a perception allowing it to be brought under an act of judgment Kant has however told us in sufficiently clear language that intuition is to be taken as a singular concept. In other words, this means that intuition utilized as a cognitive instrument is conceptually dead, leaving intuition to be understood in a kind-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of category that is to be reached only by acquaintance. In a protracted discussion attempting to distinguish intuitions from concepts, the author is constantly searching for a satisfying meaning for *Anschauung* and in conclusion insists that we are entirely lacking in any suitable definition of the term.

Ralf Meerbote investigates in depth Kant's understanding of the terms *Wille* and *Willkür*, an area in which again there have been problems in interpretation among commentators. The author disagrees with most Anglo-Saxon translators of Kant's original texts, believing that no one translation does justice to Kant's mature views. *Willkür* suggests choice and *Wille* for Kant is practical reason or *Vernunft*. But no one has yet explained how it comes about that practical reason, as an individual conscious will (my free will) in all its perversity is able to operate from a noumenal realm residing as it does outside of space and time altogether. Autonomy of the will for Kant is made to be strangely noumenal where there is supposed to reside no theoretical awareness for a metaphysics of morals or for any understanding of morality or indeed for any understanding of any kind. The individual free will must therefore surely do its work, not in the noumenal world but in the world of space and time, as anyone would have a right to expect.

We are reminded that *Willkür* is the object of *Wille*, but since the will and hence its object is already in existence when the will wills something, *Willkur* can hardly be said to be brought into existence, at least not entirely by the will's own act of willing. The natural will, which is alleged to be the object and content of the will, would therefore to some extent exist independent of the very free will which orders it into existence, all of which would be somewhat like saying that the wake of the vessel is created in advance of its fully completed slide down the launching ways. But it does make some sense to say, as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Meerbote contends, that *Willkur* as choice, that is, as the object for which *Wille* (the individual will) is ever striving, must in principle hold the will to responsible and voluntary choosing rather than allow simply any form of undisciplined arbitrary behaviour. Arbitrariness would mean that our much valued freedom of choice could degenerate into a subjective irrationality rather than give evidence of the sober consideration we would want to see associated with it.

Commentators seem now to be mainly concerned with how to render some of the more important terms upon which Kant's philosophical system rests At least this is the opinion of Werner Pluhar in a brief but closely argued article entitled 'How to Render *Zweckmässigkeit* in Kant's Third *Critique*'. For example, it is pointed out that what is known as an 'implant' in translation into English may introduce distinctions that are illusory and therefore result in the misdirection of future research. Again, what is called an 'erasure' in translation may telescope two or more German words into one English word and hence wrongfully conflate the meaning of the terms. James C. Meredith in his 1928 edition of Kant's *The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement* is taken to task as one who is guilty of both forms of mistranslation Several examples are given which bear the impact of heavy criticism. Both *urteilen* and *beurteilen* in German have the meaning of 'to judge,' but Meredith translates the one as 'to judge' and the other as 'to estimate,' a manifest example of implantaion. But Kant already has a word for 'to estimate' which is *schätzen,* so that when Meredith translates both *beurteilen* and *schätzen* as 'to estimate' we now have a glaring instance of erasure. Again. *Zeichnung* for Kant carries the unambiguous meaning of 'pattern,' but notoriously by the device of implantation it is given variously in English as 'pattern,' or even as 'intention,' renderings which, it is claimed,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

could make research into Kant's philosophical writings very difficult or at worst altogether misleading.

Translation of the German term *Zweckmässigkeit* comes in for special attention toward the end of the essay, and while 'purposiveness', its suggested correct translation, should call to mind a general term that is no more than noncommittal, reference to some specific purpose is not thereby ruled out. The generality of the term avoids the direct implication of any one purpose *Zweckmassigkeit* may imply that some useful function is to be served although a deliberate design is for the most part lacking if not absent altogether. The German word thus should never be rendered only as 'purpose' with its implied sense of finality,

In a contribution entitled 'Translation and Kant's *Anschauung, Verstand,* and *Vornunft* ', Hans H. Rudnick again points up the fact that equivalemce of meaning is often lost in the process of translation. The difference in meaning hinges very much on cultural as well as on semantic grounds, reflecting ways in which the philosopher in his employment of his own original language has interpreted his world. New semantic content may be added according to the style of the translator and his manner of argumentation making it doubly difficult to be certain of the intended original meaning. Rudnick is of the opinion, rightly it would seem, that there has not been a sufficient carrying over of the full meaning of the eighteenth century German idiom into the vernacular of modern languages for successful communication with the modern reader. There is also with Rudnick a concern about the German term *Anschauung*, an issue that was already dealt with in Moltke S. Gram's essay. Rudnick's considered view is that *Anschauung* for Kant stands primarily for a sensuous awareness of the 'archetypal essence', a seeing and observing (Schauen) in me, the latter referring to a conscious perceiv-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ing not only of what is going on actually, but of what goes on beyond actuality in suggesting a prophetic 'seeing' in relation to the transcendental.

Although Rudnick keeps his discussion on a fairly general level there can be little quarrel with the points that he has endeavoured to make. Translation of terminology from the source language is difficult, especially the translation from eighteenth century philosophical texts. The tradition of German Idealism is found to be quite unlike recent pragmatic developments in the western world and it is more than evident that philosophical thought processes from the two different cultures have developed along different lines.

Looking at Hans Siegfried's essay 'Kant's "Spanish Bank Account": *Realitat* and *Wirklichkeit*", the author emphasizes that more is required than a linguistically accurate translation in order to understand Kant's writings in another language and in a different philosophical environment. It is necessary to understand the tradition from which Kant's philosophy emerged. Kant's philosophy should be read *entwicklungsgeschichtlich*, that is, against the history of the development of traditional philosophy and its problems. For example, translators (and Norman Kemp Smith again comes in for his share of criticism) have not always been faithful to Kant's intended meaning of *Realitat* (reality) and *Wirklichkeit* (actuality). Kant, in the 'hundred thalers' illustration is saying that actual thalers, not 'real' thalers, would make a difference to his bank account. It is claimed also that Professor L. W. Beck, in dealing with Kant's criticism of the classical ontological argument for the existence of God, should make the distinction between actuality and possibility on the one side and something entirely different, namely 'reality' on the other side as was intented by Kant. Professor Beck writes 'reality' for 'actuality'. *Realitat* and *Wirklichkeit*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are meant to denote something very different in kind although their separate meanings tend to be blurred in English and even in contemporary German.

A pronounced influence on German 'school' philosophy may be traced to Francis Suarez, sixteenth century Spanish Jesuit philosopher. Suarez pointed out the fact, later to become part of Kant's thesis, that no amount of only 'predicamental' or categorical determination is sufficient to bring a thing into actual existence, even though such determination may be declared to be 'real'. Kant's claim, therefore, is that the determination of a thing in or from being alone is not enough to constitute a full determination of the thing, not enough, that is, to lend the thing an actual existence in actuality and obviously not sufficient to furnish the thing with an actual concrete existence such that it can be touch and felt. Despite Kant's doctrine as it was thus derived from Suarez, it has been found that in the writings of philosophers after Kant's time there sitll has been confusion in this matter whenever it is insisted that because something is fully determined in the reality of being, that is, predication alone, it must thereupon exist in a state of full–fledged actuality

In the article by W. H. Werkmeister, 'What Did Kant Say and What Has He Been Made to Say', Norman Kemp Smith is once again criticized, this time for holding that Kant's first *Critique* conforms to what Smith terms a 'patchwork theory'. If such is Smith's preconceived notion, it is undeniable that any translation he makes will reflect to some extent a view which may nevertheless be unjustified. Further, it is claimed by Werkmeister that it is hardly true to Kant's intentions to render *Erkenntnis* as 'knowledge' as Smith has done, rather than as 'cognition' which more correctly conveys the meaning of *Erkenntnis* as the process or act of knowing. The reason for this is that Kant's *Critique*, it is maintained, does not pretend

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to be a work of metaphysics, but sets out a transcendental philosophy which concerns itself only with our mode of cognition of objects, categorically and in quanta, as it were, insofar as this is possible a priori rather than with the objects as they are in themselves. The first *Critique* (at B 25, for example) is quoted in support of this rather fundamental point. Also of interest is Werkmeister's version of Kant's 'Wie sind synthetische Satze a priori moglich', (B 17, 73) Kant is not asking about a priori propositions in the way in which we have been accustomed to read Smith's English translation, as for example, 'How are a priori synthetic judgments possible', but is asking instead how synthetic judgments are a priori possible. The change in word order renders the 'a priori' not as an adjective but as an adverb and the 'a priori' modifies not 'propositions' but their being possible. In asking, therefore, how there can be possibility, not judgments in the a priori sense, there is now removed from the a priori something of what might be taken to be its harsh necessity. The a priori is allowed to stand in a modifying capacity leaving the way open to approach it in a sense of contemplation or even of wonderment as it serves to introduce us to the nature of possibility itself and our assessment of it.

Vorstellung, as it is used by Kant, is taken to express a very general concept which could be suggestive of the act of intuiting or of thinking as well as designating whatever it is that one might intuit or think. Indeed, *Vorstellung* is made to encompass even a 'notion' which, as a concept of and as an idea, transcends experience itself. But we here meet a problem scarcely acknowledged by Werkmeister, namely, that concepts have all along been supposed by Kant to arise out of the faculty of the human understanding. How the same vocabulary can do double duty for the world of experience and the supersensible world is certainly

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

not dealt with and we are never enlightened as to how it may be possible to join the finite and the infinite in the same concept. *Vorstellung* translated as 'representation' suggests a kind of blanket term and thereby hardly does justice to all the diffierent shades of meaning to which the term may be exposed, meanings which will also depend upon the context within which the term is employed.

The problem of *Vorstellung* is also taken up by Rolf George in '*Vorstellung* and *Erkenntnis* in Kant' and he is, of course, not the first to speculate on the difficulty to be experienced in defining the term *Vorstellung* or representation as used by Kant. Kant claimed in his *Logic* (Kant's *Logik* A 41–42) that a representation can be defined only by means of another representation. The indefinability of this most general epistemological term for Kant has tended to be total since it is taken to be the highest genus in his entire philosophical system. If we become curious to know what it is that representation may ultimately represent, it is of interest to note that Kant allows for representations that do not represent, that is, representation given as subject term, for example, without the necessity of it having any content. There can, it is conceded, be objects that are given in some form of representation, as it were, where no corresponding representation is actually present. On the other hand there may be representations existing of which we are not at all conscious. The author again tries to make it clear that, in dealing with *Erkenntnis*, the translation is to be rendered as 'cognition' rather than as 'knowledge' as we find it in English translations with which we are familiar. He points out that cognitions should be taken as purely mental processes instead of considering them as judgments in the course of the acquisition of new knowledge in the more or less abstract epistemological sense.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It goes without saying that the philosophical vocabulary developed by Kant and bequeathed to us in the *Critiques* has proven itself to be of significance for modern philosophers and has been taken up by and has become part of philosophy since Kant's time. A careful perusal of this book will be most rewarding for anyone interested in tracking down many of the finer points of Kant's philosophical writings and the various nuances of his thought seldom otherwise discussed.

59 Victor Street
London, Ontario, Canada
N6C 1B9

ALBERT W. J. HARPER

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

LIFE MEMBERS

(Individuals)

254. Dr. Avinash Kumar Shrivastav
Amber Chauraha
Near Mahadev Temple,
Bihar Sharif,
Nalanda 803 101 (Bihar)

255. Miss Tanya Mukerjee,
Hara Gauri Bhavan,
Road No. 6, Rajendra Nagar
Patna 100 016 (Bihar).

256. Dr. Ramesh Chandra Das,
Lecturer in Logic,
Panchayat College,
Bargarh 768 028
Dist. Sambalpur (Orissa).

257. Prof. Samari Kanta Samanta
C/o Sadhana Press, Bachurdoba
P. O. Jhargram,
Dist. Midnapore 721 507 (W.B.)

258. Dr. (Mrs.) Shakuntala A. Singh,
13/14 Shiva Kripa,
Opp. St. Mary's Convent
Nahur, Mulund (W.)
BOMBAY 400 080.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 4
October, 1988

UTILITARIANISM: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW

Utilitarianism is obviously an ethical theory of a long historical standing. Even a casually prepared list of its exponents or opponents is sure to contain the names of some very eminent thinkers. But in what follows, instead of giving a historical, or developmental, account of it, I shall try to present a conceptual or thematic one. My objective will be to formulate the chief questions it tries to answer, state some of the answers it has given to them which have acquired respectability in the history of ethical theory, bring out some of the difficulties or problems these answers have given, or may give, rise to, and assess how best it can take care of them without changing its character. I shall sometimes have to mention the positions taken by some utilitarians or their critics. But my aim will always be only to clarify some conceptual issue or issues and not to illumine any unlighted, or inadequately lighted, corner of its history. Since the entire discussion has to be accommodated in the body of an essay, it has to be brief. But it is hoped that its bravity will not sacrifice its clarity, nor will make it superficial.

The theory derives its name from its emphasis on the concept, or rather the principle, of utility. According to it "the sole ultimate standard of right, wrong, and obligation is the *principle of utility* or *beneficence* which says quite strictly that the moral end to be sought in all that we do is *the greatest possible balance of good over evil* (or the least possible balance of evil over good)."[1] The basic claim of the principle of utility, is, therefore

Received : 22-6-88

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that the highest moral end, value, or goal is the greatest possible balance of good over evil. Consequently, an action is right if and only if it is a means to the latter. We ought to do that, and only that, which produces or is likely to produce the greatest possible balance of good over evil. By 'good' in such contexts is generally meant 'intrinsically good.'

It may be asked why the theory states its criterion in terms of the greatest possible balance of good over evil instead of stating it in terms of the greatest possible good. The reason is two-fold: (1) Generally the consequences of our actions are of a mixed sort, some are good, some are bad, and some are neither. The latter need not be taken into account in assessing the total value of the consequences. Therefore, their net or total goodness can be only the balance of their goodness over their badness. (2) The concept of the balance of goodness over badness also takes care of such actions, if they happen to be done, which have only good consequences. Since they would not have any bad consequences, the aggregate of their goodness would also be the balance of their goodness over badness. Suppose an action has consequences a, b and c off which a and b are good and c is evil. Then the balance is in favour of the good which is $(a+b)-c$, of course, assuming that c is less than $(a+b)$. Suppose a, b, and c are all good. Then the aggregated goodness $(a+b+c)$ is also the balance of their goodness over badness. As the amount of badness is zero, we can say it is $(a+b+c)$ or $(a+b+c-o)$ because $(a+b+c) = (a+b+c-o)$.

Utilitarians do assume that we ought to promote what is good and prevent what is evil. Frankena calls this the principle of benevolence, and says that it is a presupposition of the principle of utility. It seems to me that it is a presupposition of all

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

teleological theories, whether utilitarian or non-utilitarian, i.e., of any theory which considers the concept of value as basic and that of obligation as its derivative.

It is thus a normative, substantive, ethical theory, and not a descriptive or scientific, nor even a meta-ethical, one. A scientific theory of morals aims at giving an authentic description of the moral ideas and ideals of a certain society and discovering and systematizing the reasons or causes for its having them. Quite often anthropological and sociological studies of morals attempt to give such descriptive and explanatory accounts. A meta-ethical study, on the other hand, aims at analyzing the logic of ethical concepts and of ethical reasoning. None of these is the principal aim of utilitarianism.

A normative moral theory tries to present, on the other hand, a set of moral principles by using which, or in the light of which, one may decide what he ought or ought not to do, a set of goals or values one should aim at and try to achieve. Its objective is to help one understand what constitutes a morally good life and cultivate it as best as he can. Therefore, its basic questions are normative and the answers it gives to them are also normative; they are supposed to function as guides to good moral living. A philosopher, being unaware of, or confused about, the distinction between the normative and the non-normative, may offer, or may think that he can justifiably offer, a non-normative answer to a normative question, or *vice versa*. But to accuse any one of the important utilitarians of this kind of blindness or dimsightedness will amount to unduly underrating their philosophical abilities. It should be noted, however, that when dealing with a normative question, one is not forbidden to enter into the territory of the non-normative. He may have to attend to and form his opinion about certain non-normative issues, i.e., certain questions of fact, for example, concerning

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

human desires and aspirations, or certain meta–ethical questions, for example, concerning the logical relationship between fatual and moral judgements. But he has to be always conscious of the fact that neither an answer to a normative question can be an answer to a non–normative one, nor a method of arriving at the former be a method of arriving at the latter.

Utilitarianism is primarily a theory of obligation, a theory about the criterion of moral rightness or wrongness of actions. The question of its chief concern is: What is it which makes a morally right action morally right (or a morally wrong action morally wrong)? It does not aim at answering the meta–ethical question 'What do we mean when we say of an action that it is morally right (or morally wrong)?,' nor the scientific one 'What kind of actions are *considered,* and why, to be right (or wrong) in this or that society?.' Even the normative question it tries to answer is a moral question which can relevantly be answered only by a statement giving the criterion of moral rightness. It is not a question about rightness in general; something may be right but not morally right. '4' is the right answer to the question 'what is the product of 2×2?' but it is not a moral answer, since the question is not a moral question Similarly, the right thing for a thief to do may be to steal the gun of the houseowner whose house he is burgling, if he thinks he can properly protect himself only if he has his gun. But it is morally wrong since it is morally wrong to steal or enter a house with the intention of committing burglary.

It maintains that there is a property which all right and only right actions have; this obviously means that an action which does not have it is not right. It is thus concerned with actions which can be called morally right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden. Since only voluntary actions, and not all actions, can be called right or wrong, it is really concerned only with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

voluntary actions. Such actions are voluntary which, as Moore puts it, "are under the control of our wills, in the sense that if, just before we began to do them, we had chosen not to do them, we should not have done them,"[2] i. e, actions which we would have done if we had chosen to do Therefore, what it offers as the criterion of rightness is to be applied not to all but only to voluntary actions. Actions in the doing of which the agent has no choice, which he is compelled or forced to do, which he does accidentally, or inadvertantly, not being voluntary, are not morally judgable and therefore are beyond the range of the utilitarian criterion.

Like any other moral theory utilitarianism also takes it to be an obvious truth that there are situations in human life in which there is more than one thing the agent can do if he chooses to. That is, it holds that it is a fact that we do sometimes choose to do x, or choose not to do y.

Moore thinks that all that utilitarianism, or perhaps any theory of the criterion of rightness and wrongness, admits is that "in many cases, there certainly are a considerable number of different actions, any one of which we could do, if we chose.. .. It assumes, that is to say, that in many cases if we had chosen differently, we should have acted differently; and this seems to be an unquestionable fact,... even if we hold that it is never the case that we could have chosen differently." It does not have to hold, according to him, "that we ever really could choose any other action than the one which in the end we do choose... "[3] It does not have to commit itself to the view that we can really choose to do something other than what in fact we do. Moore himself may be satisfied with such a hypothetical position, and perhaps some other ideal utilitarians also would be. But the others, specially those who are not ideal utilitarian, do not seem to agree with Moore in this regard. In fact, unless one assumes

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that off the two alternative actions, x and y, available to an agent in a certain situation, he can really choose either one, there is not much point in saying that even though he really did x, he could have done y if he had chosen to do it. It seems to me that for any theory of the criterion of rightness and wrongness it is necessary to assume that at least in some situations one can really choose to do any one of the alternative actions available to him.

Choosing to do something can be conceived positively as well as negatively. I can choose to do x, or to refrain from doing x. Since, in a good sense of the term 'do', refraining from doing something is doing something, even in refraining one exercises his power to choose. If my choosing to do something is said to be the exhibition of my positive freedom, my choosing to refrain from doing it can, by the same logic, be said to be that of my negative freedom.

It has been said earlier that utilitarianism is a theory of obligation and also that it is a theory of the rightness (or wrongness) of actions. Some thinkers make a distinction between the concept of 'right' and that of 'duty' (or 'obligation'). For example, Moore would say that an action is a duty "which will cause more good to exist in the universe than any possible alternative", and it is right or morally permissible if it "will not cause less good than any possible alternative"[4] According to him, then, only one action can be in any situation a duty, whereas more than one can be right or morally permissible. Therefore, if only a theory of duty is to be called a theory of obligation, a theory of rightness cannot.

In this essay I shall not make any distinction between a theory of obligation (or duty) and a theory of rightness. A theory of rightness can quite fittingly be called a theory of obligation. If, for example, in a situation I find that both x and y are equally

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

right, I can express this fact equally correctly by saying either that it is my duty to do, or I am obligated to (i.e., I ought to) do, or it is right for me to do, either one of the two actions, x and y (of course assuming that there is no point in doing both of them). We can adopt a similar mode of speaking when we find x better than other alternatives. We can then, for example, say that doing x is a duty, or obligatory, or right. It seems then that we can say by means of the concept of right all that we want to say by means of the concept of duty or obligation. A theory of rightness is a theory of obligation also because to admit that it is right to do x in the situation is to admit that it is obligatory to do x in s. It is odvious that if in a situation both x and y are right, our judgement will assume a disjunctive form. This method of explication, as will be clear from what follows, is not only more elegant but also more appropriate for presenting a philosophical or conceptual account of utilitarianism.

As a theory of rightness, utilitarianism is obviously a form of consequentialism because, according to it, the ultimate, or final determinant of the rightness of all right actions is the intrinsic goodness, worth, or value of their consequences. Some utilitarians hold that the rightness of every right action, taken as a particular action, is determined by its consequences. Therefore, according to them the relationship between the rightness of a particular action and its consequences is direct According to some others a particular action is right because it is in conformity with, or an exemplification of, a certain rule, but the validity or soundness of the rule itself is determined by the goodness of the consequences of its general adoption or implementation. A particular action is thus right, if it is right, because following the rule or practice prescribing the class of actions, to which it belongs, generally has worthwhile consequences. Therefore, even according to these thinkers, the final determinants of the rightness of right actions are their consequences.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The principle of utility, stated in the beginning of the essay, can also be stated as saying that an action is right if it has the maximum usefulness or utility. A right action is one which is a means to producing or attaining the greatest balance of good over evil, or maximum possible goodness. Therefore, it is useful, or has utility, or rather has the maximum utility. To be right it must produce, or is likely to produce, more good (i. e., a greater balance of good over evil) than any other available action, or at least as much good (i. e., as great a balance of good over evil) as any available action, produces, or is likely to produce. In a slightly imprecise manner, all this can be said by saying that what makes an action right is the sum-total of the intrinsic goodness of its consequences, or that utility of an action is the ground or criterion of its rightness, and disutility that of its wrongness. It is the utility of the action itself which makes it right when it is the only action to be done, and it is its comparative utility when, along with it, some alternative action is also available.

Utilitarians claim that the principle of utility holds good not only of actions but even of motives, attitudes, character traits, institutions, etc. To make clearly visible its comprehensiveness or generality, it can be stated as the principle according to which any morally assessable x (where x may be an action, a motive, attitude, character trait, rule, or an institution, etc.) is right if and only if it is optimific, i. e., if and only if it possesses maximum utility. In this form it can be said to be the basic principle of all types of utilitarianism. It is the only basic principle of obligation or rightness the theory admits and claims that all other principles are derivable from it. In this essay, however, we shall discuss the principle primarily as a principle of the rightness of actions and rules. Its application to other things can very easily be reconstructed in the light of this discussion.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Since utilitarianism admits no criterion other than the goodness of the consequences, it is, as a theory of rightness, a monistic theory. It is not that one action is right because of its consequences, while another is right because of something else. All right actions have to have a common property, the property of being optimific, i.e., of being productive, either directly or indirectly, of maximally good consequences. The rightness of a right action (or the wrongness of a wrong action) is, therefore, not an intrinsic but an extrinsic property of it. It is not by reflecting upon the nature of any action that we can decide whether it is right or wrong. We can do that only by ascertaining its consequences.

A theory which is directly opposed to utilitarianism in this regard is deontological intuitionism. For convenience in use I shall use the short from D–intuitionism for the term 'deontological intuitionism' and T–intuitionism for 'teleological intuitionism.' The distinction between the two is as follows: for T–intuitionism the concept of right (or ought) is secondary in the sense that it can be explicated or analyzed in terms of the concept of 'good', whereas for D–intuitionism it cannot be so analyzed or explicated. Moore is a T–intuitionist because for him the concept of right (or duty) is analyzable in terms of that of 'good', while Ross is a D–intuitionist because for him the concept of right is *sui generis,* as it cannot be analyzed in terms of the concept of 'good.' Both are intuitionists because for Moore the (intrinsic) goodness of a good thing is known by intution and so is for Ross the rightness of right action.

T–intuitionism need not be opposed to utilitarianism because both are teleological theories. Both hold that the criterion of rightness is the conduciveness of the right act to something intrinsically good. This is a rather too simplistic account of their position but it is not incorrect, though it has to be made more

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

precise. We have seen that for Moore an action is right if and only if it is a means to something good. Other, non-intuitionist, utilitarians also hold that its rightness is a function of its being productive of some such consequences which are intrinsically good Since all varieties of utilitarianism consider a set of the results or consequences of an action as constitutive of its rightness, Brandt calls them 'result' theories.[5] The two terms, 'result theory' and 'consequentialism' mean the same thing.

D-intuitionism is directly opposed to utilitarianism because according to it, the rightness of a right act, and therefore the wrongness of a wrong act, is an intrinsic, not an extrinsic, property of the act. If it is right to keep a promise it is so because it is what it is, i.e. because it is keeping a promise, and not because of its consequences.

As Ross puts it, the main issue between utilitarianism and non-utilitarianism, say, his own D-intuitionism, is whether or not there is one general property which makes all right acts right Utilitarianism is, on this issue, as I have already said, a monistic theory, for according to it, there is one general feature, i.e., optimificity, present in all right and only right actions. For a non-utilitarian like Ross, on the other hand, there is no such single character of right actions which can be said to be the ground of their rightness. Fulfilling a promise is right because it is fulfilling a promise, telling the truth is right because it is telling the truth, and there need not be anything common between them which makes both of them right. D-intuitionists are generally pluralist as regards the ground or criterion of rightness.[6]

Since utilitarianism makes the worth of the consequences of actions the only ground of their rightness and wrongness, it is a fully objectivist theory. The rightness of an action depends upon its results, upon what it causes or produces, and not on any-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

body's liking for it, or his attitude of approval towards it, as is the case with subjectivist theories. The results of actions are objectively determinable or ascertainable. All (or almost all) utilitarians seem to have an empiricist, nontheological, attitude towards morals; they regard the consequences of actions as empirically ascertainable. Consequently, *ethical disagreement* does not present any serious problem to them. When two persons disagree about the rightness of an action (or a class of actions, or about the rightness of anything whatsoever which may be called right), the way to reach an agreement is to find out what are its consequences and how good or bad they are. The entire exercise would be an empirical examination of consequences, real or in imagination, and calculation of their worth.

Because of its built-in objectivism, utilitarianism very comfortably accepts what is nowadays called the generalizability or universalizability of ethical judgements or concepts. Roughly speaking, the principle of universalizability can be stated as follows : If it is right for a person P to do X in a situation S, it is right for any other person similar to P in a situation similar to S to do X. It has been maintained by many eminent, classical as well as modern, moral philosophers like Kant, Moore, R. M. Hare, M. C. Singer; etc., that the universalizability of ethical judgements is rooted in the very logic of ethical concepts. A subjectivist cannot accommodate this principle in his theory. For example, if it is right for P to do X because he likes doing it, is cannot be right for Q to do it, if he does not happen to like it, howsoever, in other respects, he may be similar to P and howsoever his situation may be similar to P's. The utilitarian faces no problem in accepting the universalizability principle.

The principle of universalizability can be stated also by generalizing or universalizing the action concerned, as Moore has done. Suppose the action x has its total effects represented by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A and is right because of the goodness of A. Then any other action whose total effects are precisely similar to A would also be right. Further, if x is to be preferred to y whose total effects are represented by B, then x is to be preferred to any action whose total effects are precisely similar to B. [7]

The effects or consequences of an action being objective phenomena, the utilitarian's grounding rightness and wrongness on their utility–disutility makes utilitarianism an impersonal theory, a theory not hooked to the personhood or individuality of the agent, the doer, of the actions judged to be right or wrong. If the total value of A, the total effects of x, has the balance of good over evil, then doing x is right, no matter who does it. The personality, individuality, or the social status, of the agent does not matter at all. " In judging an action there is no need to know who is doing what to whom so long as the impact of these actions–direct and indirect–on the impersonal sum of utilities is known. " [8] In ascertaing the rightness of any thing we need to have information only about the relevant utilities and about nothing else. This is a great informational constraint implied by consequentialism and therefore by utilitarianism.[9]

As a result of the informational constraint the utilitarian ethical reasoning becomes very simple in its structure or form. Its form will be : x is right because it has such and such consequences. This does not mean, however, that it becomes very easy to decide what is right, because, as we shall see, calculating the total utility or value of all the direct and indirect consequences of any action is in itself a very difficult task. It becomes still more complicated if we have to find out the comparative value of the consequences of one action by comparing it with the values of the consequences of all the other actions open to the agent.

An obvious corollary of limiting the range of information to the consequences of x in order to determine its rightness is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that the motive behind doing x (if x is an action, or following x if it is a rule, etc.) becomes irrelevant. We do not have to find out the agent 's motive in doing it. Whatever be his motive, if its consequences are good, it is right, and if they are bad, it is wrong.

For Kant, an extreme non-utilitarian, on the other hand, it is only the motive of an action which makes it morally right. And, it is not any sort of motive, but exclusively the motive of doing it for the sake of duty. That is, an action is morally right only if the sole motive of the agent in doing it is his realization that it is his duty to do it, or in Kantian terminology, his reverence for the moral law. Consequences of actions are not at all to be taken into account in ascertaining the rightness or wrongness of actions. Kant's criterion of moral rightness is, thus, the opposite of the utilitarian one. The only information relevant to the determination of the rightness of x, for the utilitarian, is that about the worth or utility of x's consequences, whereas for Kant that about the agent's motivation.

But to be fair to both, it should be noted that neither would Kant say that any consequence is as important or unimportant as any other, nor would the utilitarian that any motive is as honorable as any other. To state precisely, the Kantian position is that consequences of an action are not to be made in deciding whether or not it is morally right. The goodness (or badness) of consequences do not form even a part of the criterion or ground of moral rightness (or wrongness). Similarly, the utilitarian position is that though motives of actions are not morally unimportant or irrelevant, the value of a motive does not constitute even partly the criterion or ground of rightness (or wrongness).

Motives are taken into account, in our ordinary, common, transactions, while making moral evaluations. The utilitarian's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

claim that motives are irrelevent to the determination of moral rightness, however, need not surprise us because even a non-utilitarian, as important as Ross, also holds a similar position. For Ross [10], to declare an action right is to say that it ought to be done, and to say that it is right because of a cerrain motive would amount to saying that one ought to have that motive. Since 'ought' implies 'can,' it must then mean that one can acquire that motive if he chooses to. But motives are not under the control of our will in the sense that it is not upto us to, acquire them whenever we want to. Therefore, we cannot make rightness of a right act depend on its motive, since then we cannot protect the obvious implication of declaring an action to be right that it ought to be done.

Moore [11], while agreeing with other utilitarians and Ross that the rightness of an action never depends upon the agent's motive, assigns to motives a prominent place in moral evaluation! According to him they are relevant to our judgements of mora. praise or blame passed on the conduct of an agent. Whether or not a man deserves moral praise or blame for a certain action of his, is very much determined by the motive he has in doing it. We praise a man for his good motives and blame him for the bad ones. A good motive is likely to lead to a right action and a bad one to a wrong action. The point of our praising him for having a good motive is to encourage him to have good motives and that of our blaming him for having a bad one to prevent or discourage him from having bad motives. Ross also seems to hold not a very different position from Moore's in this regard because he seems to maintain that the possession of a good motive is a constituent of what we mean by a morally good man, and to call one a morally good man is to praise him.

An utilitarian, who considers motives as morally assessable, may, in consistency with his general utilitarian position, say that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

motives themselves can be graded in terms of their utilities. That is, if a motive leads to, or is likely to lead to, actions which have good consequences, then it is a good motive.[12] But against this view and even against Moore's it can be said that, if Ross is right and many would say that he is right, since the acquisition or possession of a motive is not under our control, since we cannot have a certain motive simply because we want or will to have it, motives cannot be the objects of moral assessment.[13]

Moral decisions are made by individuals in the pursuit of their personal goals and also by public bodies (including states) in pursuit of theirs. Utilitarians think that the principle of utillty, the utilitarian criterion of rightness, can be used, or rather ought to be used, in personal as well as public decision–making. As far as its role in personal decision–making is concerned, there is no doubt that it is used. In fact, it is considered as a mark of rationality to choose to do the actions one considers likely to produce consequences possessing maximum good. We may object to his conception of a worthwhile consequence or goal, i.e, his theory of value. But if we accept it, there is no reason to object to his utilitarian choice of actions as right actions. It may be, and I think it is the case, that in practice he also uses sometimes some other, non–utilitarian, criterion or criteria. But this does not mean that the normative claim that the utilitarian criterion is the correct criterion for all cases of moral decision–making is invalid. It may be the only correct criterion even when it is not in fact used by everyone in every decision. But from all this it also does not follow that it is the only correct criterion, or even one of the correct criteria.

Aa regards its use in public decision–making is concerned, the situation is the same, almost the same. It is used by public bodies, and it is not the only criterion used in all public deci-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sion-making. Public bodies not only sometimes use some non-utilitarian criteria; they sometimes take moral decisions, say, about how to ensure the welfare of divorced, indigent, women of a certain community, on political, non-moral, considerations. Anyway, it is clear that there is no *theoretical* bar against its use either in personal or public decision-making.

Sen and Williams think that utilitarianism assumes that in the case of public decision-making " there is or should be one sovereign decision centre to determine what is right ".[14] That there should be a decision centre, or decision-maker, is a requirement or assumption of any theory of moral criterion, utilitarian or non-utilitarian, when applied to public choice. But excepting dictatorship, or the theory of the divine right of kingship, no theory requires an absolute sovereign decision-maker. The utilitarian criterion can be used without any self-inconsistency in a society in which decision-making is done at several levels, provided its constitution or administrative set-up contains, formal or informal, directions or instructions as to how to coordinate these decisions, how to conciliate between them when they conflict. This, again, is to be done to make workable the use of any criterion, utilitarian or non-utilitarian. The utilitarian will have, of course, to do one thing which others do not have to; he will have to give a utilitarian justification for the directions or instructions referred to above.

Being a consequentialist theory, utilitarianism has to take a clear stand about (a) the denotation of the concept of action and the method of computing the value of the consequences of actions, (b) the criterion (or criteria) of good (and bad) consequences, and (c) the beneficiary of the good, i.e., the domain of the class of persons in respect of whom the goodness (or badness) of the consequences has to be considered. Utilitarians are

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

aware of the importance of these issues and also of the fact that the viability of their position very much depends upon the viability of their position on these issues. Quite naturally, all of them do not say the same or similar things about all of them, and consequently utilitarianism assumes different forms.

(A) Actions

a) Let us first take up the question of the denotation of the concept of action. It is natural to ask 'Does the word 'action', in the statement of the utilitarian criterion, denote a particular action, or a class or type of actions'? For some utilitarians it denotes a particular action, while for some others a class or type of actions, leading to two forms of utilitarianism which have been called in the philosophical tradition (1) Act-utilitarianism (abbreviated as AU) and (2) Rule–utilitarianism (abbreviated as RU). For AU the rightness (or wrongness) of every single, particular, action is determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences, while for RU it is the rightness (or wrongness) of classes or types of action which is so determined. I shall take up AU first and through a discussion of it show the reasons which motivated some utilitariens to propound RU.

(i) Act–Utilitarianism

Act–utilitarianism is a "normative doctrine which maintains that a particular act (as opposed to a type of act or a class of acts) is right if and only if its utility,–that is, its contribution towards instrinsically good states of affaiairs – is no less than that of some alternative."[15] According to it the consequentialist criterion is to be applied to each particular action singly. That is, whenever one has to choose between doing two actions. x or y, he should find out the comparative value of the consequences of each one of them and then do the one which is going to have

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the best consequences or whose consequences are not going to be less good than those of the other. Similarly, if a moral judge has to assess the rightness of x and y, if they already have been done, he has to find out how the consequences of the one compare with those of the other, and then he may conclude that both are right (if their consequences are equally good), or x is right if x's consequences are better than y's, or less bad than y's in case both have bad consequences. In fact, there could be several possibilities when one has to ascertain the rightness of x as a result of a comparative evaluation of the values of the consequences of x and y in case he is in a position to do either one if he chooses to.

As any action may have both good and bad consequences, in deciding to refrain from doing it, what makes the step taken right is the balance of good over evil and not just the goodness of its consequences. Whether an agent has to choose between doing x or refraining from doing x, or between doing x or doing y, he has to determine the rightness of the step to be taken by finding out the net good likely to be produced. In both the cases he has to compute the balance by comparing the values of the consequences of the alternatives available (i.e, doing x and refraining from doing x, or doing x and doing y).

Let us assume that his alternatives are doing x and doing y. Slightly modifying Moore's analysis[16] of the various possibilities which may confront him, we can state them as follows. Moore presents his analysis assuming, of course, for the sake of argument, that it is the pleasantness of a consequence which makes it a good consequence. I shall not make this assumption and list the possibilities only in terms of the goodness or badness of consequences. What makes a consequence good or bad will be discussed later.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1) It may be that both x and y have only good consequences. In that case the one the total goodness of whose consequences is greater than the total goodness of the other would be the right action. If both have the same total goodness, then both would be equally right.

(2) If x has only good consequences and y has both good and bad consequences, then again we have to compare the total goodness of x's consequences with total goodness of y's consequences, and proceed as in (1). The total goodness of x can be determined by aggregating the individual goodness of each one of its consequences. The total goodness of y can be determined by aggregating the individual goodness of each of its good consequences, the individual badnesses of each of its bad consequences, and then subtracting the latter aggregate from the former. Suppose the aggregate of the goodnesses of y's consequences is A and that of their badnesses B. Then their total goodness would be A–B. Let us call it C. If the total goodness of x's consequences is D, then x alone would be the right action if D is greater C. If C and D are equal, then both x and y would be equally right.

(3) If both x and y have good and bad consequences, then again we have to find out the total goodness of each one and then decide as in (2).

(4) If it is found that there is a balance of badness over goodness in each case, then the action the total badness of whose consequences is less than that of the other's would be the right action. The total badness of the consequences of an action can be arrived at in a manner similar to that in which its total goodness can be arrived at, i.e, by subtracting the aggregate of the individual goodnesses of each one of its consequences from the aggregate of the individual badnesses of each one of them. It may also happen that the total badness is the same in both

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the cases and the agent has to choose to do one of them. Some would say that this is not a real choice; while some others would say that there is some choice even here, but then it does not morally matter which course of action one adopts. Since AU offers, like any other brand of utilitarianism, only a moral criterion for choosing what to do, such a case would not show that its criterion is defective. It would only mean that it is not a case fit for its application.

(5) It may also happen that the total value in each case is neither good nor bad. In such a situation the actions x and y are neither right nor wrong. Every action does not have to be either right or wrong. According to any moral theory, or theory of action, some actions may be right, some wrong, some and neither.

Against the act–utilitarian thesis that an individual action is right in virtue of its causal properties, i.e., because of its conduciveness to an intrinsically good state of affairs, it may be urged that some action may be right because the *very doing of it* is an intrinsically good thing, and not because it *leads* to an intrinsic good. For example, if one holds that pleasure is intrinsically good, then any action which leads to it is certainly right. But one may also do something because he enjoys the very doing of it, and not because of its being a cause of or means to something else. A hedonist utilitarian cannot say that it is not a right action. But then the thesis that *all* right actions are right because of their causal properties would seem to be threatened.

Bernard Williams seems to suggest that the act–utilitarian can take care of this situation only by slightly modifying or widening his consequentialism. For example, he may say that an act is right if the doing of it either conduces to, or is constitutive of, something instrinsically good, better than which nothing else is accessible to the agent. That is, if one does A, and A leads to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

P which is intrinsically the best thing accessible to the agent, then A is right; but doing A is also right if P is not the effect of A but is partly or wholely constituted by A. [17] But it seems to me that the act–utilitarian, who would adopt this line of defence, would have to give up his total consequentialism.

The act–utilitarian can take a more radical, or rather an aggressive, stand. He may say, for example, that the generally offered examples of right actions, not deriving their rightness from their consequences, are morally irrelevant because, in fact, all morally relevant actions derive their rightness from their consequences. For example, one may sing (or compose poetry) because he enjoys it and not because of any one of its effects. But then such an act of singing is morally irrelevant. It becomes morally relevant only when its effects, on the singer, or someone else, are taken into account. In fact, it is difficult to find out a morally relevant action without taking into account its actual or possible effects. This is so because morality is by its very nature a social phenomenon.

He may even say that in cases where we seem not to take the consequences into account, we do not really ignore them. For example, we may be vaguely, or unanalytically, aware of the effect of singing on the attitude of the singer towards his neighbours; we may find that be becomes quite affectionate towards them after he has sung undisturbed. And, we do become conscious of the effects if they become conspicuous; i. e, when he starts neglecting his invalid father, or the education of his children, because of his enjoying singing.

For utilitarianism in general and for AU in particular, whether the consequences which determine the rightness of an action are its actual, or anticipated or expected, consequences, is a very important question. Some utilitarians hold that it is the former,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

while some hold that it is the latter, on which its rightness depends. The diffuculties with the first position are the following: (a) Since the actual consequences of only past actions are definitively known, and not of the actions which are yet to be done, only past actions can definitively be judged to be right or wrong, and not the actions to be done. (b) One of the most important problems of moral life is that of deciding what to do, i.e., making a decision about a future action. We should decide, if we accept AU, to do the action whose consequences would not be less good than those of any other available action. But we cannot say definitely what the actual consequences of an action are going to be. Therefore, we cannot decide what to do.

To avoid these difficulties, some utilitarians hold that the consequences to be taken into account in the case of future actions are not the actual but the expected or anticipated ones, and those which the agent has good reasons to anticipate or expect. That is, not any consequence which one expects to be brought about, but only that which the available evidence in his possession entitles him to expect. If this view is accepted, then AU will cover both past and future actions.

AU has been criticised very forcefully by many thinkers. (1) For example, it has been said that it will justify doing an action which our moral common sense considers to be wrong, e. g. punishing an innocent person, breaking a promise, etc. If the consequences of punishing an innocent person are going to be on the whole good, for example, if we are going thereby to preserve, law and order and ensure personal peace and social security for a pretty long time, why should we not do that? The standard utilitarian reply is that this is not likely to happen, and the consequences of such actions are likely to be more evil than good. But a consistent utilitarian may even say that we should

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

go ahead if we are sure to produce more good than evil by breaking a promise, or by telling a lie.

(2) A common criticism of AU or of utilitarianism in general, is that it is very difficult, almost impossible, to find out the net comparative value of the consequences of any action. Any utilitarian theory requires, what Sen calls, sum–ranking, i.e, aggregating the values of the consequences of an action and comparing their total value with the tolal values of the consequences of all other available actions. Every action has numerous consequences some of which may be good, some bad, and some indifferent. To calculate the net goodness of the consequences of any action is extremely difficult, and to compare it with the net goodness of those of all other available actions would be all the more difficult. It is also very time–taking, and therefore the magnitude of the effort one needs to make in order to calculate and compare may become a handicap to his doing what is right, specially when he has to act very quickly. If one starts deliberating about the consequenccs of taking a man with a fractured brain in a car–accident to hospital H or to hospital J in the utilitarian manner, he may take so much time that the patient dies while waiting to be hospitalised.

Utilitarians feel that this is exaggerating the difficulties of sum–ranking too much. Our past experience and common sense are good enough guides in helping us when to deliberate and for how long.

(3) Bales[13] thinks that the application of the act–utilitarian criterion leads to an infinite regress. His argument runs as follows : Suppose one has to choose between doing A and B. Then he has to calculate and compare the net value of A's and B's consequences. But the act of calculating and comparing their net values is also an act. Let us call it C. Therefore, he should also

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

calculate the value of the consequences of C. Now he has three alternatives A, B. and C, the values of whose consequences he has to calculate and compare in another act, say D. In this way the number will go on increasing indefinitely.

To get rid of these difficulties, some act–utilitarians come forward with the suggestion that our moral experience has thrown up certain rough guides, or rules of thumb, which minimize our task of calculating and comparing. [19] For example, finding that keeping a promise generally has better consequences, i.e., has more utility, than breaking it, we habituate ourselves to believe that we ought to keep promises. This belief, or the rule 'Keep your promises,' works as a rough guide or rule of thumb, with the result that when we have to keep a promise, we do not always need to calculate and compare the values of promise-keeping and promise–breaking. But the rightness of promise-keeping is still constituted by its consequences; the rule of thumb only reminds us that they are generally desirable, and thereby saves our time and labour.

By admitting the use and importance of rules of thumb, the act–utilitarian takes care of almost all of the objections mentioned above. If punishing the innocent has been found in our experience to have led to undesirable consequences, there is a good reason for not punishing one in the present situation. The act–utilitarian, thus, does admit the importance of moral rules. He only says that they are not inviolable, nor independent of the concequences of the actions they prescribe or proscribe.

The act–utailitrian's reference to rules also becomes visible when he uses what is called the method of utilitarian generalization. This method is used specifically to show that AU does not justify any obviously wrong action on consequentialist grounds. We have referred earlier to the example of justifying

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

punishing an innocent man in order to stop crimes. The method of utilitarian generalization consists in imagining the results which would occur if the practice of punishing the innocent is generalized. The act–utilitarian can argue as follows : Even if the results of punishing this innocent man in this case my be good, imagine what would happen if everyone started punishing some innocent individual in order to control some crime or crimes. Quite obviously the results would be too bad.

To make use of the generalization technique is to appeal to a rule. In the above case the rule implied is some such one as 'Punish an innocent person to stop crimes', and the thrust of the argument is that since its general adoption will lead to devastating consequences, it is wrong to punish an innocent person even in the present case.

Some utilitarian critics of AU see in the above AU's inherent incompleteness. They think that the move shows that by its inner logic it has been forced to give to rules a much more decisive role than what it assigned to them while giving to them the status of mere rules of thumb. In its use of the generalization technique, AU, it is said, leans towards making the conformity of an action with a rule, depending upon what kind of rule it is, the determinant of its rightness or wrongness. Punishing an innocent in a particular case, even if expected to be useful, is said to be wrong because the consequences of the general adoption of the rule with which it conforms (i.e., whose instantiation it is, or which has been obtained by generalizing it) are too bad.

But to determine rightness or wrongness in this way is to go beyond the logical boundary of AU, as it would supersede the act–utilitarian criterion of rightness

This line of thinking is further developed in RU.

(ii) Rule–utilitarianism (RU)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

When the importance of moral rules is noticed, it is felt, as it has been already said, by some, that we cannot stay at the stage of AU. If we still admit that the rightness of each single act is be determined by its consequences and treat rules only as rules of thumb, then rules are to be used only if we are lazy, or do not have enough time to deliberate. In all such cases of acting under the guidance of rules we shall feel hesitant and unsure; we cannot say that we are doing the right thing because our guide is only a rough guide. Such a guide cannot justify our non-calculation and non-comparison of the values of consequences, or even cutting calculation and comparison short. Nor can it stop us from breaking a promise because we are not fully sure of the rule of promise-keeping itself. We can take advantage of the rules only if we do not treat them as mere rules of thumb and do not make the consequences of each single action the real determinant of its rightness (or wrongness.)

Rule-utilitarianism is a kind of indirect consequentialism, though it is utilitarian nonetheless. According to it, the rightness of types, or classes, of actions, and not that of each single action, is determined by their consequences. Suppose a person has to choose between doing A and B. If there is a rule prescribing the class (or type) of actions to which A belongs, and there is no rule prescribing the class of actions to which B belongs, then it is obligatory for him to do A. A rule of action prescribes or proscribes a class of actions, and not a single action. That is, an action is right if it is in accordance with a rule, and wrong if it is a violation of it.

Saving the life of a drowning man is right because it is prescribed by the rule : Do as much as you can to alleviate human suffering. But the rightness of a rule, RU holds, is determined by the consequences of its general adoption. If one has to decide which rule. R, or S, is a right rule, he has to find out the ne

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

value of the consequences of the general adoption of each one of the two rules and call that one right the consequences of whose general adoption have the greater of balance good over evil If the balance is equal in both the cases, then the two rules would be equally right.

Sometimes one has to choose not between following R or S, but between following or not following R, when only one rule is relevant to his situation. In such a situation R is to be called a right rule either if the results of its general adoption are shown to be good, or if the results of its general non–adoption are shown to be bad. Both are utilitarian methods.

The advantages of RU over AU are the following : (a) We do not have to ascertain every time we have to choose between two actions what are their consequences and which set of consequences has what sort of value. (b) We cannot also be confronted with the suggestion of considering a particular action right because of some expected good consequences even if doing it is revolting to our moral sense, e. g., the action wnich consists in punishing an innocent person if it is expected to stop crimes. The rule–utilitarian can say that it would be wrong because it would go against the accepted (or ideal) rule 'Never punish a person who has not been proved to be guilty.'

It may be the case that in a certain situation the consequences of punishing an innocent person are (most probably) going to be good but the consequences of violating the rule, 'Do not punish...,' which forbids it, are generally bad, or the consequences of the adoption of the rule are generally good. Therefore, says the rule–utilitarian, we should follow the rule even in this situation and refrain from punishing any innocent person. In this way, he thinks, we can protect (almost) all that our common–sense morality approves of, i. e., all that it has good reasons to approve of.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The rules for RU are not merely rough guides, or rules of thumb. They are not ad-hoc rules, or rules to be appealed to merely for minimizing inconveniences of decision-making, or to be used merely as time-saving devices. Rather, it is they which make particular right acts right, and they have to be followed unless the consequences of following them in general practice are found to lack utility.

A question arises here with regard to the status of these rules: Are they the rules actually in vogue, or some sort of ideal rules? S. E. Toulmin takes them to be actual rules and R. B. Brandt to be some sort of ideal rules which may not have been accepted in actual practice. Actual rules are the accepted, conventional, rules of a society. Such rules may be regional i. e., accepted by some and not by all societies, or universal, i.e., accepted by all societies. Ideal rules, on the other hand, are those which need not be conventional, or actually accepted, but those which if accepted would lead to good, desirable, consequences.

Critics of RU point out that it is too difficult to find a complete system of prescriptions or rules covering all possible types of actions. If the system we have is not complete, we may not have available to us a rule covering a particular action. Then we shall have no criterion to decide whether or not it would be right to do it. But rule-utilitarians say that normally our rules cover all important cases, and new rules keep coming up if the demands of life require them on utilitarian grounds.

But a more imporant question is this: What should we do when two rules, whose general adoption has been found in experience to be optimific, conflict? For example, suppose the rule 'Tell the truth and only the truth' requires a doctor to tell a patient of cancer that he is suffering from an incurable desease, thereby making him lose his will power to get cured, and the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

rule of his professional ethics 'Always keep the morale of the patient high' requires him to conceal this piece of truth. A rule-utilitarian may suggest that there should be added to the list of rules some second-order rules deciding which rule has preference over which in case of conflict. But as Brandt points out,[20] even these second-order, preference, rules may conflict and then we may have to have third-order preference rules. But then the system of rules would become too complicated.

In fact, the only way to solve the conflict of rules would be to appeal to consequences of adopting the conflicting rules. Like any other brand of utilitarianism, RU will have ultimately to appeal to consequences. And, since it is difficult to claim that all the consequences of following a rule all the time for all persons concerned are going to have the balance of good over evil, rules are bound to remain at the most highly utilitarian, and never absolutely utilitarian. This means that they are likely to be at the most good rules of thumb, and not unfailing, inviolable, directives. But then the distinction between act and rule-utilitarianism starts evaporating. For example, it would be too much to claim that all the effects of truth-telling all the time are good, and therefore, what we can at the most say is that we should follow the rule except in those cases in which following it is non-optimific. This is what AU also says.

All types of utilitarian theories, AU and RU alike, have by some been criticised on the ground that it is practically impossible to take into account all the effects of any action or of the adoption of any rule. Some effects are direct, some are indirect, i.e., the effects of some effects; some take place when the action is being done or immediately after it has been done, while some in the remote future. If the direct as well as indirect, immediate as well as remote, all effects of any action have to be taken into account to determine its rightness, then it would be insuperably

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

difficult to do that since the effects would obviously be innumerable. In the case of a rule the task would be virtually impossible to perform. A rule covers a class of actions which are innumerable. Therefore, to compute the value of the effects of its general adoption is to compute the values of innumerable effects of innumerable actions falling under it.

Utilitarians are not insensitive to the difficulties mentioned above. But they handle them in the utilitarian manner; they claim that there is no utility in taking into account far-flung, indirect, effects, or effects which may happen in the too distant future. It is one of their assumption that very remote effects do not matter. Moreover, they also believe that our common moral experience, the experience of the race, helps us in deciding which effects to take into account and which not, of course, on utilitarian grounds.

(B) Good and Bad consequcnees

The utilitarian theory of the rightness and wrongness of actions cannot be complete unless it is accompanied with a intrinsic value which tells us what it is which makes a consequence a good consequence, or what sorts of consequences are intrinsically good. The utilitarian has to inform us of his conception of the good which it is our obligation to produce or promote.

It was noted earlier that the principle of benevolence, as Frankena has phrased it, is a presupposition of the principle of utility. J. J. C. Smart [21], an act–utilitarian, puts this point in a slightly different way when he says that the utilitarian appeals to the sentiment of generalized benevolence, the sentiment or attitude to seek good consequences. Utilitarianism assumes that we have an obligation to promote the good and prevent the evil, and therefrom derives support for the doctrine that the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

right action is a means to the greatest good, or to the good which is not less than the good producible by another action available to the agent. Therefore, the utilitarian must tell us what he means by a good (and bad) consequence, i.e., he must give us his theory of value.

Some utilitarians hold a hedonistic theory of value according to which pleasure or happiness is the only intrinsic good Sometimes a distinction is made between pleasure and happiness, and 'hedonism' is reserved for the view which considers pleasure to be the only intrinsic value, while 'eudaemonism' is used as the name of the view which gives that status to happiness. In this essay we shall call both the views hedonistic

For all hedonistic utilitarians, like Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick, it is the pleasure or happiness present in the consequences which make them good, desirable, or worthwhile, and therefore an action (or rule) is right if and only if it produces at least as much pleasure or happiness as any other available one. There are some minor differences among hedonistic utilitarians. For example, Bentham does not make any difference of quality among pleasures whereas Mill does But they all agree about the criterion of rightness. The hedonistic utilitarian is thus monistic both in his theory of value (by holding that only one thing is intrinsically good, i.e., pleasure or happiness) and his theory of obligation (by holding that we ought to do only that whose consequences are not less good than those of any other available action).

Maximization of the intrinsic value(s) occupies perhaps the most prominent place in all utilitarian, hedonistic as well as non-hedonistic, theories of value. Exactly speaking, it is not just its conduciveness to the intrinsic good but conduciveness to the maximum possible intrinsic good in the circumstances, which makes an action right. Bentham and Mill extend the notion of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

maximization in the direction of both the experience and the experiencer of happiness. Therefore, they declare that the highest value which everyone ought to aim at is the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number, i. e., the greatest possible amount of happiness experienced by the greatest possible number of persons concerned. A right action consequently is one which contributes to it.

Some other utilitarians, on the other hand, maintain a pluralistic theory of value. Among them Moore is the most prominent According to him there is not only one thing which is intrinsically good. He calls pleasure, knowledge, appreciation of beauty, etc. all intrinsically good. Therefore, any action, which is a means to at least as much pleasure, knowledge, or appreciation of beauty, etc., as any other available one, is right. Those who consider something other than pleasure also to be intrinsically good are called ideal utilitarians.

Hedonist and Ideal, both forms of utilitarianism, locate intrinsic value in some state or states of consciousness. It is the mental state of consciousness, the experience, of feeling pleased or happy, of being enlightened by the acquisition of knowledge, or of enjoying beauty, which is intrinsically good. It is not a state or object of the external world.

One may, however, locate the intrinsic value in something not exclusively constituted by a mental state. Suppose, for example, one says that the intrinsic good is the satisfaction of a desire by obtaining the object of the desire. Since the object of a desire can very well be, or generally is, an external object (like a position of power, wealth, etc.), here what would be intrinsically good would be satisfying the desire by getting the desired external object. Since desires may be either reasonable or unreasonable, the theorist may lay down the condition that they

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

must be rational desires, i.e., desires based on a sound understanding of relevant facts and supported by logic. Some such position is maintained by Richard Brandt.[22]

The good may also be said to be constituted by the satisfaction of the basic needs of the person or persons concerned. A need is differnt from a desire in the sense that one may not desire what he needs, or desire what he does not need.[23] Some of the welfare states define the good in this way and follow a policy of providing means for the satisfaction of what they consider to be the basic needs of their citizens. As a result of education or public relations work one may start desiring the satisfaction of a need which he did not desire earlier. But whether an utilitarian considers a state of consciousness, a desire satisfied, or a need fulfilled, as intrinsically good, his theory of right will have the same form. Its content will differ in accordance with what he considers to be the good.

(C) The Beneficiary of the Good

Whatever is said to be intrinsically good, a natural question to ask would be : What is the relevant domain of persons who could be the beneficiary of good, i.e., with reference to whom the value of the consequences of a right action is to be calculated ? For the sake of convenience I shall discuss this issue with reference to only one intrinsic value, happiness, since the discussion will apply to all intrinsic value, may be with some minor adjustments.

Assuming that it is the net consequential happiness, the balance of happiness over unhappiness caused by an action, which makes it right, the question which we posed above can be rephrased so follows : Who should be considered to be the relevant beneficiary, or the enjoyer, of this balance of happiness,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or, whose happiness the action should cause to be called a right action? If one answers this question by saying that it is the agent's, the doer's, happiness, then he is an egoist; if by saying that it is not the agent's but someone else's happiness, then he is an altruist, and if by saying that it is the happiness of all concerned, or of as many of them as possible, then he is a universalist. In point of logic, therefore, there could be three forms of utilitarianism, egoistic, altruistic, or universalistic. But generally, in recent philosophical literature, only the univeralistic form is called utilitarian. Thererefore, I shall limit my discussions only to it.

Every action which can be judged to be right or wrong is done in a context, in a certain social set-up[24], and the persons figuring in that context or set-up are the persons concerned, or relevant to the evaluation of the action as right or wrong. They constitute the domain of the class of persons in respect of whom the value of its consequences is to be considered. Let us imagine, to make our discussion neat and tidy, a context in which there are seven persons who are all hungry and to one of them some food–packets are given to be distributed among them. Let us also assume that feeding a hungry man is to make him happy. As Bentham and Mill would say, the utilitarian ideal here is the greatest happiness of the greatest number; even others would say that the distributor of the food–packets ought to make all concerned, i. e., all the seven including himself, or as many of them of possible, happy by distributing the food–packets among them. Utilitarianism is in this respect fair to the agent as well as to others, and therefore free from the one–sidedness of egoism and altruism.

For utilitarianism each person is equal to the other; none is more are less equal than anyone else. Therefore, the problem of distribution of the good is bound to arise. In this case, how

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the happiness, which can be caused by feeding some or all of the hungry seven, has to be distributed among them ? According to the utilitarian criterion of rightness, an act of distribution would be right if the net happiness caused by it is not less than that which could have been caused by any other mode of distribution available to the distributor. Suppose the food–packets are not enough to satisfy completely the hunger of all the seven. Imagine one possible mode of distribution in which the distributor distributes all the packets only among a group of four consisting of himself and three others who are his cousins. He thereby causes in them the complete satisfaction of their hunger, but lets the remaining three continue to feel as hungry as before. Suppose we give 10 units to one complete satisfaction of hunger, and 4 to one existing state of hunger. Then the net happiness caused would be $(10\times4) = 40$ units. Imagine an alternative mode of distribution in which he distributes the food equally among all the seven and produces in each one only half satisfaction of his hunger. If we give 5 units to one half satisfaction, the net happiness would in this case be $(7\times5) = 35$ units. Therefore, on the utilitarian criterion of rightness, one would say, the first mode of distribution is right and the second wrong.

The utilitarian makes the net value or utility the sole decider of rightness and does not let the mode of distribution play an important role. He seems to treat each person's happiness (or unhappiness) as an isolable unit which can be aggregated with other such units or subtracted from relevant aggregates. And, in his scheme it is only the aggregate which matters; it does not matter how the aggregate has been achieved.

But the mode of distributing utilities cannot be ignored. It is when we start judging a mode of distribution to be right or wrong that we find ourselves using the concept of justice, or that of distributive justice. Any normative theory of value has

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to opine about how a value has to be or ought to be distributed, and, therefore, it has to have a corresponding theory of justice. Utilitarians are not oblivious of the importance of the concept of justice. But for them it is a secondary, or derivative, concept in the sense that it is derivable from the concept or principle of utility. A just society, for them, is one which is so ordered and organised that it procures the maximum possible welfare of its members, no matter how this maximum is distributed among the members. For example, it may not matter if a few are conspicuously more benefited than some others. Perhaps the utilitarian assumes that the happinesses of some would compensate for the miseries of some others, letting the sum of all the happinesses of all the members remain the maximum possible in the circumstances. He may be doing so because, as Rawls says, "Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons."[25] If the utilitarian method of aggregation, or sum-ranking, shows that the net sum of utilities is the maximum possible, the society deserves to be called just. But this may seem unfair to many. To many thinkers the utilitarian theory of justice goes against our ordinary, untutored but sound, moral intuitions about justice. It is a sound intuition, they would say, which judges a certain mode of distribution of utilities or advantages, e. g., the second in our example (of seven hungry men), to be more just than another, e. g, the first in the example, even though the net happiness caused by it is less than that caused by the other.

It may be suggested that the utilitarian can establish harmony with our intuitious by incorporating distributive justice as another value to be taken into account while determining the rightness of an action or of a mode of distribution. The concept of distributive justice refers to appropriate or sound distribution of relevant advantages and disadvantages by an individual

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

among the concerned persons, or by a society among its members, that is, among such persons among whom they can be relevantly distributed. David Loyns thinks that ideal utilitarians, since they consider more than one thing to be intrinsically good, can add distributive justice to their list of intrinsic goods.[26]

In case the above suggestion is implemented, a right action, involving distribution of utilities, to be right would have to be both optimific and just. But what to do when the two demands are not satisfiable at the same time ? Moreover, will the theory remain consequentialist or teleological, which it must be in order to remain utilitarian, if along with the maximization of the good it also considers distributive justice as an intrinsic value of equal status ?

To answer the above questions we shall have to discuss in detail the nature of distributive justice, or rather of justice. But this work cannot be taken up here as it deserves another full essay.

RAJENDRA PRASAD

Opposite Stadium Main Gate,
Prem Chand Path,
Rajendra Nagar,
PATNA 800 016.

NOTES

1. Frankena, William K., *Ethics,* (prentice – Hall, 1963), p. 29.
2. Moore, G. E, *Ethics*, pp. 10–11.
3. Moore, G. E. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
4. *Principia Ethica*, p. 148. Even Ross (*The Right and The Good*, pp. 3–4), who otherwise differs from Moore in his theory of the meaning of right, makes a distinction between 'right' and 'duty' or 'obligatory' in very much the same manner as Moore does. Therefore the argument given here applies to his position as much as it applies to Moore's.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. Brandt, R. B., *Ethical Theory* (Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 380.
6. See Ross, W. D., *The Right and The Good*, Chapt. 2.
7. *Ethics*, pp. 84–85.
8. Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard (ed.) *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge, 1982), p. 5.
9. *Loc. Cit.*
10. *The Right and The Good*, pp. 2–5.
11. *Ethics*, pp. 116–17.
12. Adams, R. M., " Motive utiltiarianism ". *Journal of Philosophy*, August, 1976.
13. Sen, Amartya, " Utilitarianism and Welfarism ", *Journal of Philosophy*, September, 1977.
14. Sen, Amarty & Williams, Bernard, *Ibid*, pp. 1–3.
15. Bales, R. Eugene. " Act-utilitarianism : Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure ? ", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1971, p. 257.
16. *Ethics*, pp. 15–20.
17. Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, B., *Utilitarianism : For and Against* (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 86–87.
18. Bales, R. Eugene, *Ibid.*
19. Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, B. *Ibid*, pp. 42–43.
20. Brandt, R. B., *Ethical Theory* (Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 399.
21. Smart J. J. C. and Williams, B., *Ibid.*, p. 17.
22. See his *A Theory of the Good and the Right* (Oxford, 1979).
23. For a detailed but somewhat different treatment of these three ways of conceiving the good, see James Griffin's " Modern Utilitarianism, " *Revue Internationale De Pholosphie*, 1982, No. 141.
24. This set-up could be very small, e. g., a small family, or very large, e.g., the United Nations Organization whose members constitute almost the entire world, and it may include the present as well as future generation of human beings.
25. Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford, 1972), p. 27.
26. Loyns, David, *Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism* (Oxford. 1965) p. 5

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 4, October, 1988

MEDITATION, METAPHOR AND MEANING

This paper is an attempt to understand the nature and origin of meaning. The focus is on metaphor because meaning cannot be understood until metaphoric meaning is adequately explained. In ordinary language meaning is taken to be primarily literal and metaphor is measured against the literal. The paper suggests that this prejudice of the literal mind distorts meaning and makes metaphor impotent and unintelligible. The literal mind is incapable of understanding metaphor or meaning for that matter. Thus primary aim of the paper is to show that literalism leads to absurdity and fails to account for meaning. It is only when the prejudices of literalism are overcome that the mind is open and capable of appreciating the rational power of metaphoric meaning, indeed of rationality itself.

The Primary of Metaphoric Meaning

There has always been something mysterious about metaphors, and common sense has usually been ambivalent about it. One voice of common sense remains in awe of metaphoric meaning regarding it as the highest flight of poetic imagination and the deepest reaches of insight. But the predominant voice of common meaning takes metaphor to be frivolous, decorative, and secondary. This ambivalence in ordinary language persists and the two dispositions of common sense remain split and unmediated. The result is that metaphor has not been properly understood, and with the eclipse of metaphor all aspects of meaning become shrouded in darkness.

Received : 8–3–88

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Perhaps the main reason for the mystification and deprication of metaphoric meaning is that the literalist voice of common sense has dominated consciousness and repressed the other intuitive non–literalist voice. One task in this study is to explore the workings of the literalist mind and show how it systematically reverses the order of meaning and leads to a pathological condition in everyday life and language. The literalist voice believes that literal meaning is autonomous and primary and that all other forms of meaning are derivative and based upon the foundation of the literal. It teaches that all modes of meaning have central reference to primary reality which is disclosed in the literal vision of the world and experience It moves in the faith that literal meaning is the absolute standard of fact and truth, and that other modes of meaning must be measured against this standard. Indeed, the literalist voice is taken to be the voice of rationality and understanding itself, hence the ultimate judge of what makes sense and what does not.

This study will attempt to show that the literalist mind has gotten priorities reversed and has forgotten the primacy of metaphoric speech. From its prejudiced point of view the literalist mentality is incapable of appreciating the true liberating power of metaphor and in fact only leads to absurdity and irrationality. By contrast, the repressed alter–voice of common sense - is brought to the fore and an attempt is made to mediate the two voices of common sense. While the literalist voice leads to absurdity and irrationality, the other voice makes clear that common sense essentially trades on metaphoric meaning in its every breath It is disclosed that metaphoric meaning is primary discourse–the noble but repressed voice of common sense which can liberate the mind from the bondage and fixation of literal meaning.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Thus, it is only with the true appreciation of metaphor that meaning and understanding come into focus. But to come to this appreciation the mind must first transform itself beyond the artificial limitations of literalism. So another objective of this study is to attempt to understand the dynamics of transformation of consciousness from literalism to metaphoric meaning. When the repressed and pre-conscious metaphoric voice of common sense comes to consciousness it then comes to light how common sense meaning can work. We then see that metaphors essentially call for a transformed consciousness to be understood, but at the same time they are the primary vehicles of such transformation.

Literalism and Primary Meaning ; The Faith of the Literal Mind

To understand literal meaning we must approach it in the context of the form of life from which it arises. Literal meaning is an expression of a mentality which I shall call "literalism", so let us approach literal meaning by analyzing the features of the literalist mind.

Literalism is an *ontological* disposition–a way of being in the world, an attitude towards reality, an understanding about thought and meaning as these reflect that reality.

Meaning is primarily an ontological affair, and this is no less true of the forms of meaning which comprise "common sense" as expressed in ordinary language. So let us explore the ontological attitude of common sense.

The fixation of meaning

Common sense teaches that the conscious, rational thinker lives in a world that surrounds him, a world that is external to and independent of him. The world is changing, but with relative fixity of things. Things "out there" have a certain fixity and continuity in change so that we can identify them

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

fairly easily. In ordinary language, which reflects common sense, names are given to things and these names stand for the things they name. We can use names to refer to things and pick them out in the environment. Things are identifiable and have properties for which we also give names. These attribute names stand for properties or qualities of things. and we can pick things out by naming them and describe things by using the property words. One important function of thinking and using language is to pick out things and describe them, and in this way we represent or picture the world out there. Despite ongoing process and change both in the world as well as in ourselves the names and terms of our language and thought have a relative fixity of meaning A given name means the thing it refers to. So there is an ongoing one–to–one correspondence between words and things. The stability of meaning is grounded in the relative stability and fixity of things. This fixity of things gives a certain order to thought and the world and allows language to work.

The first point of interest in this simple common sense picture is that there is logical space between the thinker and the world- there is a structural distinction between the locus of thought and the locus of world. This original dual structure is a primary ontological feature of the literal mind : it sets the stage for the nature of meaning as representational–where meaning is a correspondence between the two realms.

The second point to notice of ontological interest is that meaning is grounded in things... the way the world is. And things have inner stability which allows us to identify them and which differentiates them from other things. To state this in ontological jargon–things have essence and continued identity. Again, things are differentiated from one another by their unique properties–to be a thing is to comprise unique properties.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Since thought as expressed in ordinary language replicates the world we find that on the side of thought the structure of things is reproduced. Thought consists of names standing for things and property words which stand for the qualities of things. In logic this is called "predication"–thought consists in combining logical subject and predicate. The main point is that thought copies the world and meaning consists in a primary relation between the two. Later we shall face the question of the nature of this supposed relation– what do the two realms have in common to allow thought to replicate the world ? What is the unity between thought and world that allows signification or meaning to take place ?

In the above relatively simple common sense picture of meaning we find the ontological origins of literalism. It is so simple and powerful and intuitively clear that it seems to be beyond question to the literalist mind. Common sense has been carefully cultivated over centuries. And centuries of the best philosophical reflection has attempted to articulate and formalize this intuition of literalism. In logic from Aristotle to Wittgenstein the logic of literalism has been explored and formalized. Here the central concern has been with understanding logical form–the form of thought. Likewise in ontology the history of the tradition has been an attempt to articulate and formalize the nature of things with special emphasis on identity. Let us draw out briefly some of the main points of the tradition which has attempted to articulate and explain the literalism mentality – the philosophy of common sense and ordinary language.

I shall suggest that when the more complete picture of literalism is articulated it will be exposed as being incomplete, highly problematic, incoherent. To facilitate a brief sketch of the features of literalism I shall review some themes of several of my earlier published papers.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The Ontological Explication of Common Sense:

Ontology is the science of common sense, the science which gives an account of meaning as it arises in relation to reality and thought. We have seen that common sense (the shared meaning of a community of speakers) situates itself in a structure which makes reference to the world, to thought and to things. But common sense is not something that stands on its own apart from the speaker or thinker who entertains the sense, it is essentially an expression of the form of life of the speaker. The texture, quality and being of this sense is essentially a function of the state and quality of life of the speaker–thinker. The presence and identity of the speaker is implied in common sense, it usually remains implicit and in the background and is taken for granted. Yet it is of the utmost importance in ontological analysis to query the identity of the speaker–thinker, for the origin of sense is not just to be found in the words that are uttered, nor in the form of language spoken, but in the very voice or consciousness of the speaker-thinker. Common sense is a form of human life and literalism is an ontological mentality which expresses a certain quality of life of the speaker-thinker. Thus, in exploring the ontological structure of literalism we must constantly remember the central reference to the *identity of the speaker* in literalist thought, speech and meaning.

We tend to think of common sense as though it were an object having independent existence, analogous to how we think of the world, or language or thought. It seems that sense or meaning is an objective relation between these three things having no essential dependence on the identity of the thinker. Indeed the identity of the speaker–thinker is taken to be just another entity in the world; it is an entity which thinks and apprehends sense. But we shall see that in the ontological analysis of common sense this naive view must be corrected.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Literalism is the predominant way in which common sense has articulated itself... it has evolved over centuries in different cultural traditions.... it is in effect an ontological theory or self–interpretation of sense – thought interpreting itself.

There are numerous alternative ways in which we may approach the *ontology of literalism*.

One place to begin is to notice that sense is essentially some sort of relation which arises in a dual structure in which thought stands over against the world. We may say that reality is a comprehensive unity which encompasses any possible thing including thinker, thought and world. While the thinker is in the world and part of it, thought stands over against the world and attempts to think or apprehend the sense of things. Thus, sense arises in a dual structure.

Another starting point is to notice that common sense begins with dual intuitions both of which appear to be primitive—one is the intuition of unity, the other of diversity or plurality. That is, reality must be all encompassing, a totality of existence spanning all possible things. While the world consists of innumerable diverse things, reality is a universal ontological space which "contains" it all—a unifying whole. We shall see that this intuition of an absolute unity is a formal condition of the rationality of common sense. And this unity is not just the unity of reality, but a recurrent requirement throughout common sense – the speaker–thinker must have a unity, language must have a unity, there must be unifying condition of meaning, objects have their unity, and so on. At the same time, common sense teaches that there is diversity, difference, plurality, multiplicity. An essential part of the particularity and identity of things is that they are *differentiated* from one another and irreducibly distinct. It will be crucial for us to determine how the dual requirements or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

conditions of common sense reason (of unity and diversity) are to be reconciled. The central problem of this study is to understand how common sense accounts for unity in the presence of duality and diversity.

Sense, Grammar and Logos : Ontological Space :

In preparation for the articulation of literalism we need to see how this *dual structure* of sense arises and it is necessary first to explicate some fundamental terms and themes which set the context for the literalist mind.

First, I shall use the term "Logos" to indicate that space which makes possible and holds together in mutual relationality the realms of thinker, thought, world and language The term "Ontology" specifies the science which accounts for Logos – the science of reality. Thus, "Reality" is synonymous with Logos and indicates the all encompassing space that includes all being. I shall use the word "sense" to indicate the essential relatedness of thinker ("I"), thought, language and world–all of which are included in Reality, or Logos. It may then be said that Ontology is the science of Logos / Reality / Sense. I use the term "Ontological Space" to indicate that universal domain in which thinker, thought, world and language co–exist in mutual dependence and relatedness. And the term "Grammar" is the form of Logos or Ontological Space.

It is crucial for our purposes to understand the pervasiveness and depth of *ontological Grammar* : all aspects of common sense are grammatical, all forms of experience reflect grammar, the world as such is constituted in grammar, language and its diverse forms of meaning arise in grammar, the very identity and existentiality of the thinker and thought are possible only in the context of grammar, and so on. To live, to interpret, to think, to speak, to understand, to be rational, is to be grammatical.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Let us call this the "*hermeneutical theme*": any form of sense or meaning is the expression of grammar – any form of interpretation must be relative to grammar.

Literalism is a certain attitude towards grammar and sense, and it is appropriate here to elaborate on the origin of sense in ontological grammar. A grammar is a structure or system which defines a language of reality, and historically diverse grammars have been developed. For example, the traditional Hindu language–world is the expression of a certain grammar. This grammar differs in fundamental ways from, say, the traditional Christian grammar or world. Human history has articulated a diverse range of ontological grammars which have emerged in the form of world cultures. And it is evident that what makes sense in one cultural grammar does not make sense in another. The particular shape of ontological space in the Hindu world differs remarkably from the grammatical form of the Christian grammar. Thus, from the ontological point of view reality, experience, rationality, and meaning are differently constituted in diverse grammars. What is taken to be common sense facts of existence in one world are not even intelligible in another world; common sense itself differs dramatically in diverse cultural grammars. So the first fundamental point about meaning is that sense is relative to a grammar of reality, and what literally makes sense in one grammar differs from what literally makes sense in another.

Grammar and Voice : Ontological Univocity

First we need to explore the origin of the literalist *voice*. In developing the hermeneutical theme it would be helpful to introduce the concept of "voice". It was just stated that the very existence of the thinker is already situated in grammar. Here the "thinker" includes any possible form of experience and human life to be human is to be grammatical. So whether "thinker"

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

includes thinking, willing, judging, speaking, acting, etc., these are all activities situated in grammar. Let us use the term "voice" to indicate any possible mode of "I" as the speaker in grammatical space.

Now we may say that the primary condition of speech and meaning is that voice be *univocal*.

"Univocity" means having a Primal Unity, Uniformity or Universality.

The primary transcendental condition of discourse is that grammar and voice *be univocal*.

The Univocity Condition may be explained as follows :

If Grammatical space were not Unified and a unifying Force, discourse would not cohere. So Univocity means primal unity, consistence, uniformity and universality.

Ontological Universality needs to be explained : To be universal is to be all encompassing, and this means to be a unifying point of reference for all possible things. An ontological universal cannot have its unity external to itself. This is another way of saying that an ontological universal must constitute the Universe.

It has long been recognized that rationality in some sense depends upon there being ontological univocity. If grammatical space were note univocal then meaning would not cohere and would be *incommensurable*.

Furthermore, the Univocity Condition requires that *voice* be ontological univocal with grammatical space as well. If voice were not univocal with grammar, then speech would not cohere. There must be a primal unity (non-difference) between voice and grammar.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This means, of course that the features of grammar are the features of voice : and the univocity condition holds for voice as well—voice must be univocal for speech to be coherent.

It has been taken for granted throughout the history of thought that voice is ontologically univocal. Usually this point is not even brought up for discussion, it is simply assumed. Even in voices like Hume's where it is seen that there is no existential univocity for the "I" from moment to moment (for Hume questioned existential univocity) he nevertheless assumed ontological univocity in his own speech (in his own voice;) otherwise his treatise would not hold together in all unity.

If we carry Hume's point to the ontological level it would be readily apparent that ontological univocity of voice is a condition of intelligible speech :

Imagine (if it is posible) that voice were discontinuous from moment to moment and not univocal. (And we should question as well the univocity of time itself in this respect.) If voice were not ontologically univocal a continuity, unity, uniformity and a universal condition – thought, speech, meaning wouldd disintegrate into chaos.

It must be stressed that ontological univocity (universality) is not the ordinary form of univocity or unity that we find in experience. For we shall see shortly that conventional univocity already eclipses the primal univocity of grammar. Primal Univocity is in some sense non–dual and prior to there being any possible determinate identity or differentiation. The mere presence of the differentiated "I" or voice has already disturbed the original univocity of grammar and voice.

The Holistic character of primal univocity of grammar/voice will be developed in section 3. But it is essential that we begin

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with a preliminary sense of the univocity condition, if only by contrast to the artificial univocity of the literalist voice.

The literalist mentality or voice has already divided (equivocated) grammatical space and cannot in its own terms recover or apprehend the primal univocity of grammar. Holistic Univocity is prior to identity/difference, internal/external. There is no separation, duality, diversity, multiplicity, and unity, polarization, opposition differentiation, individuation, particularization. In short, it has none of the features which arise with the duality of identity or literalism. Thus, in primal univocity grammar is a unity and unifying condition unto itself, there being no external or internal unifying point of reference.

Features of Artificial Univocity of Literalism

With the particularization of voice, grammatical space is divided against itself and there is a fault between voice and grammar, often experienced as the dual structure of "consciousness" standing over against the world (object). When grammatical space is thus divided the primal univocity of grammar/voice is lost, and a self–polarization of voice takes place.

But (the literalist) voice recognizes the need for univocity and creates an artificial univocity in an attempt to replicate the original univocity condition.

The presence of the individuated voice structurally divides grammatical space and sets a recursive divisiveness or polarization in perpetual motion. Let us see how this polarization of artificial univocity works.

The polarized grammatical space of literalism is committed to there being individuated identity – and this means a differentiated self existence or existential independence and determinacy. But any locus of grammatical space inherits the univocal feature

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of grammar. The individuated voice sets itself up as the univocity condition within its domain.

Any individuated locus of grammatical space replicates (inherits) the features and dynamics of grammatical space as a whole. This means that any sub–divided portion of grammatical space will require the univocity condition in that domain.

So each domain will universalize itself and attempt to be a universe unto itself – having its unifying condition within itself – self referential univocity. This is the ontological meaning of self–existence – not being dependent upon an external thing for unity and integrity. Thus, any domain of divided grammatical space will universalize itself and have absolute dominion over its space. It will fill its space and be a universe unto itself.

Notice that this individuated univocity is set within a deep structural duality in which it stands over against *what is other then itself*. There exists a division between internal and external when grammatical spece is divided.

Grammatical Cosmology : The Origin of Grammars

The literalist voice is one that takes itself to be one which exists, which has determinacy and identity, which is (distinctive) unique and differentiated. It takes its own features to be an absolute necessary condition of the way things are. When we *begin* with this individuated voice grammatical space takes on a particular appearance, and we need to pause to inquire into the grammatical background that makes the individuated voice possible.

Grammatical Cosmology

Identity divides grammatical space, and to exist is to occupy a domain of grammatical space. The division of holistic grammar of course interferes with primal univocity and a divisive polari-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

zation is introduced. Let us do some grammatical cosmology and attempt to recover the dynamics which were set in motion with the dividing of Logos. This is not a temporal (historical, evolutionary) process.

With the division of grammatical space a self–polarization arises which recurs throughout any domain, for the primal univocity condition is eclipsed.

With division comes polarization and with polarization identity and difference emerges. Now it is possible to differentiate regions of grammar and this implies a univocal point of reference with respect to which differences are held together.

Any region universalizes itself and stakes a claim over its territory. This is the law of existence—to exist is to occupy grammatical space and the force of existence is to create its own univocity–to be ontologically autonomous, independent, and self—identical. This is not a temporal (Historical, Evolutionary) process.

In effect this means that the differentiated voice strives to take up its space universally (universally being precisely and fully occupying one's space).

This dynamics of self–universalization inherent in divided space expresses itself in the form of *self–existence* – the self reference (reflexivity) in which it provides its own inner univocity.

But self–existence finds itself in a deep predicament in attempting to provide its own univocity—for in defining its territory it finds itself in opposition to *otherness* (other univocities), the presence of that over which it stands in having its boundaries. The presence of otherness is ontologically threatening to the universality and univocity of the individuated voice. In declaring

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

itself universal and a universe, hence independent, it finds itself delimited and limited by the presence of the other. It thus finds itself in an inner tension of taking itself to be univocal, but at the same time realizing that its very existence reveals it to be delimited, particularized, differentiated and not univocal.

Another prefatory note would be timely. In a grammatical excursion such as this it is important for the author to flag his own voice as a reminder for himself and the reader of the locus of his voice at any given time. We shall see that an essential feature of voice is its ability to occupy diverse regions of grammatical space simultaneously and thus speak in multi–vocity.

Let us begin with the inner dynamics of the individuated voice in its own self–referential grammaticality.

The Literalist Voice

The individuated voice finds itself thrown in a deep tension and predicament.

On the one hand it sees itself as independent and self–existent and having its own inner integrity and univocity. In this respect it universalizes itself and claims universal dominion over its space. It takes itself to be the nniversal point of reference and the univocal condition of discourse.

However, in so doing it comes to see that its own inner self existence places it in polar opposition to external others and otherness in general which borders its space and delimits it. The mere presence of the *other* ontologically threatens its self image of being the universal point of reference and univocity—and a dual inner tension arises.

On the one hand it sees itself as being unique and universal and independent, but in that very image it realizes that it is dependent, delimited, particularized and challenged in its purported univocity.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Its response to this predicament is to assert itself in its self-universality and expand its territory and dominion to be all encompassing. It sees that two distinct voices cannot occupy the same space so it expands space, i.e., its *univocity*, to find a higher point of univocity which would encompass the diversity of otherness. But this polarized dynamic and triangular strategy only finds itself in the same dilemma of univocity of the higher locus, for it too is individuated and differentiated, and the polarization continues, without beginning or end.

The above grammatical cosmological myth of "origins" needs to be drawn out more fully.

Now the author will step outside the internalized self-image of polarization and take a more distant external and neutral locus and perspective.

The self universalizing (univocating) forces of divided grammatical space place any individuated voice within the polarized dynamics.

The drive to univocity of any voice expresses itself in polar ways :

The internal inertia to universality operates on the individuated voice to become a universe onto itself, to fully encompass all of its space and be fully self-existent and independent. This gives rise to the atomic tendency to be its own univocal condition and hence be grammatically unique and incommensurable, a totality unto itself.

When the individuated voice takes this polar voice, it finds itself polarized by an external force beyond itself which reminds it that it is delimited, not universal and stands in opposition to something beyond itself. This polar force is an *anatomic* tendency which calls for a higher point of unity and univocity. The ana-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tomic voice of universalization is a self–transcending force which recognizes that the way to univocity must be a higher more encompassing point of reference. Since the universe is an all encompassing, all inclusive totality and unity the anatomic voice addresses itself to a higher point of unity to encompass polarized opposites.

But this voice must remain open ended and recursive since, as we have seen, any purported transcendent point of univocity in divided space will always fall short of the primal univocity of holistic grammar, and polarization and triangulation goes on without end.

It is not just for individuated voice that the polar dynamics holds, for polarization is the inner feature of divided grammatical space itself, and whatever appears in localized space will show within itself the oppositional dynamics of identity – the simultaneous pull of the atomic and anatomic poles.

Let us elaborate on the polarization of voice and univocity in divided space.

It was just suggested that divided space strives for a univocity which it cannot achieve since voice becomes divided against itself in polar opposition The atomic voice strives for self–universalization in one direction while the anatomic voices pulls in the opposite direction to reach its univocity, but the polar voices remain self–divided and the irony is that in each striving for univocity equi–vocity is produced, and the necessary condition of rational coherence is violated at the deepest level.

The atomic strategy is to achieve absolute univocity by *excluding* anything else from its space – it moves to the limit of complete exclusion of any other and complete self–inclusion and simplicity. This form of self–universalization moves towards full

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

determinacy and specificity and finitude and it carries finitization to its infinite limit. It expands its *interior* space to the infinite limit which gives rise to an internal self–transcendence and indeterminacy.

By contrast, the anatomic voice makes the external self–transcending move to find a higher univocal point of reference which would be all–inclusive and encompass all possible space, all possible objects. The voice strives to the limit of infinitude as the universal point of univocity thus achieving universality on the cosmic level. Here it presses external self–transcendence to its infinite limit of complete indeterminacy.

The net result of this polarization is that any discriminated thing—any identity in grammar –will " speak " these two voices at the same time and thus be fundamentally equivocal.

We are in a better position now to resume the direct presentation of the general hermeneutical theme.

It was suggested earlier that grammar makes the world, thought experience, language, meaning and thinker—" I " possible. And although we began this presentation taking the literalist voice as the starting point, we then found it necessary to back up and inquire into the grammatical origins of the literalist voice and of the literalist grammatical space. We may now proceed to see how divided grammatical space conditions and makes all things possible.

With the division of grammar into voice and field a dual univocity is initiated. And the attempt of voice to recover or recreate univocity only deepens the problem and leads to pernicious multi–vocity.

Our aim now is to try to understand the general dynamic of the separated voice to achieve univocity in grammar.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The irrepressible drive to univocity takes the form of a fixation of voice–a tendency for voice to fixate itself in grammatical space to take a determinate point or locus as the univocal point of reference. Univocity becomes a fixity of voice/locus in grammar.

But the most striking feature of the separated voice is the division of grammatical space into voice on the one hand and the *field* (field of consciousness) on the other.

It is within this division (duality) of voice and field that the dynamics of univocity is to be discerned

What makes this task complicated is the ability of voice to take diverse univocal points of reference in the field as well as to stand back from the field and witness the field.

There is, in effect, an initial multi–vocity of voice in this dual context, one which can be seen in grammatical ambiguity in the meaning of "I". The self–referential term "I" becomes equated with the voice–locus in grammar. In one breath the "I" may be identified with "ego" as the univocal point of reference. The ego is an object in the field, like any other object; to be an object of any sort is to be located in univocity in the field. The field of grammar takes on one reality when voice is identified with "I = ego". But voice may identify itself at any other univocal locus outside the ego in the field, and this gives a different phenomenology of grammer. Or the voice may take a generalized univocal position in the field transcending any given object in the field, including the ego–self. Here again grammatical space is disclosed in a different voice with this center of reference. Again, the voice has the power to disassociate itself from the field as a whole and the "I" becomes the witness of the field as a whole. In this contemplative posture the dynamics of univocity discloses itself in a different voice, and so on. Thus, the variability of voice in its univocity–locus requires that we remain

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mindful of multi–vocity of speech in this exploration of univocity. We shall see that literalism includes this variability in voice in grammatical space. It is a strategy and habit of univocity within the context of the multi–vocity of voice.

The Self and "I" in the Grammatical Field

It is natural to begin with the locus of the Self and "I" – the self–referential voice in the grammatical field. For this becomes the universal conditioning univocity of voice in any further thought, or experience. The first person univocating voice conditions all further thought, experience, meaning, world. It is a transcendental condition of speech and life, and certainly in the conversational structure of the present inquiry and author's voice. So we must begin with the recognition of the ever–present *self–referential univocity* of voice in the grammatical field of any speech. (The pronoun "I" is a *variable of univocity* of voice in grammatical space which can take different univocity positions. There is inherent multi–vocity in the univocity of "I".)

With this as a transcendental preface we may now proceed to discern the general dynamics of univocity in the grammatical field.

We want to understand the fixation and fixity of voice and meaning that is found in common sense in its literalist voice.

As we explore the field of common sense we find discernible things–the self (referred to in the first person voice "I"), the world, or cosmos, objects, events, relations, thought, language, meaning, speech, and so on.

There is a typical dynamic of univocity that conditions anything in the grammatical field. Let us begin with "I":

That the self (I) is a univocal point of reference in grammar is readily seen. Indeed, the "self" is a postulated *transcendental*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

univocity which univocated all diverse utterances of "I" at different grammatical loci (space) and at different grammatical "times". Common sense assumes an on–going, continuous, ever–present univocal point of reference in the grammatical field which is the very existence of the self. This univocal self conditions all discourse.

With the univocity of the self comes the dynamics of polarization spoken of earlier. With the self–referential univocity of "I" comes the polar voices, each of which strives for primary univocity : First, the postulated univocity of "I" immediately in its specifIcation and differentiation discerns the *not–I* (that which is *other than I*) as immediately given with the presence of the univocal I; with the I arises the not–I as an alien univocity. But the need for universal univocity in the field calls the "I" to a higher univocity, a higher encompassing point of univocity which can encompass both the I and the not–I; and this need for univocity calls for an equivocity in the I both in itself and beyond itself at the same time.

This produces a self–transcending univocity in the postulated univocity of the I and thus we find the *anatomic voice* as a univocity requirement of I.

On the other hand, the polar opposite voice–the atomic voice–feels the threat of complete existential dependency on the internal univocal point of reference and asserts its independence. It moves to its inner autonomy or univocity and takes its inner (self–existent univocity) to be its absolute center of reference. In this voice the self–referntial univocity takes the position of the cosmological universal for all discourse.

Thus in the very attempt to find its self–referential univocity the voice of the self finds itself split in a polar equi–vocity which appears to be beyond reconciliation or univocity.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

For each of the polar voices, the move to its cosmological universal is a recursive process – a self transcending postulated univocity that recurs ad infinitum – there is something of the infinite in this process of self–univocation.

One polar limit leads to the transcendent infinite univocity – sometimes called "God" in certain religious grammars. The other polar limit leads to the immanent infinite univocity of absolute self–existence – the substantial self which underlies all attributes of the self, and is itself without attributes.

But this very dynamic of univocity recurs in any item which may be discerned in the grammatical field.

Let's loook at the "world"... the cosmos... which is the grammatical field itself taken as a whole... the all inclusive grammatical space of reality.

As we proceed with the grammatical cosmology we may now focus on the field of grammar which stands over against voice, which surrounds voice aud envelops it as well.

Holding the positioned univocated voice in the background for now, we may inspect the presence of grammatical field as a whole.

Here too we find the expected univocity condition which makes a unified field possible; indeed, the univocity condition of that field is precisely the cosmic universal (univocity) mentioned earlier. The cosmic univocity is that transcendent and ever-transcending cosmic point of referenee which encompasses all possible reality. But despite this infinite recursivity of the cosmic univocity we nevertheless find the polarization of multivocity at this global level as well.

For the field as a univocal whole stands over against the univocity condition of voice and these compete for being the one and true univocity of grammar. The alleged cosmic univocity

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the field cannot tolerate the independent univocity of the voice which necessarily conditions it and makes it possble : there would be no discernible cosmic field without the otherness of voice nor with the otherness of at least the *possibility* of an alternative field. So here again the drive to univocity finds itself in a self-divided situation of equi-vocity which cannot be resolved or mediated. To negate or defer the univocity of voice to the cosmic field is not the answer. And the strategy of postulating a higher mediating neutral univocity would be self-defeating as well.

The background hermeneutical context is now prepared so that we may get closer to the literalist voice and the literalist specification of the grammatical field. We are trying to trace step by step the determinants of the literalist voice in the full determinacy of common sense. We must remember that when we began our reflection centered in the voice of common sense we are *already* located in a highly determinate voice and grammatical field. We are ready now to examine the ontological dynamics in which the literalist voice is positioned in a determinate grammar of reality–a life world.

Let us begin with the internalized voice centered in a grammatical world. This voice lives in a cosmos which has determinate texture and specificity. *The cosmos* (reality) is taken to be identical with the life-world in which it is centered. The grammatical field has universal specificity and the voice self locates itself in this field and takes on specificity of the field as well.

The first point to notice in this internalized voice is that the world or cosmos in which it finds itself-its life-world– has a cosmic univocity or universality which encompasses all reality. Viewed from within (positioned within this univocity) on external independent reality or world can be conceived or imagined

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to exist. The question of alternative independent worlds or grammatical fields cannot arise for this internalized voice.

We have seen that with the separation of holistic grammatical space into voice and grammatical field the dynamic of polarization and the problem of primary univocity arises. And we have seen that all subsequent speech-life is conditioned by the self-referential postulate of univocity of voice–that the voice of the speaker–thinker is indeed univocal and determinate in the speech situation. But we have suggested that this alleged postulate of univocity of voice is problematic and cannot be granted from the start. On the contrary, it is more appropriate to assume the *indeterminacy* of voice in ordinary language. That is, despite the required postulate of univocity of voice the dynamics of polarization in fact lead to multi–vocity of voice and it cannot be assumed that there is a true univocity of voice in conventional speech. This original indeterminacy of voice should emerge more clearly as we excavate the hermeneutical layers of the ordinary speech situation. So the question which prefaces this inquiry is: If the self–referential voice of the speaker–thinker is *not* univocal, not operating under a true univocal point of reference, then how can ordinary speech be coherent or rational?

Within the primary polarity of voice and field we may now witness how the basic hermeneutical categories of world, thinker, thought, language, meaning mutually interrelate and replicate the same dynamics of polarization (univocity) just sketched. First, a world in general in the hermeneutical sense is an all encompassing univocity. The field as a whole which stands over against voice and even encompasses voice is the form of the world. Anything that does, or may or could appear in the world–field is postulated to be encompassed under a cosmic or global univocity condition. The form or substance of the world is precisely the universal univocity of the field. This formal univocity condi-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tion of the world necessitates that there could be nothing that is not encompassed within the world. The world is thus a self–universalizing univocity for any possible thing.

The world, of course, ambiguously encompasses voice and yet must be witnessed by it as its "other". And this original ambiguity is part of the indeterminacy of voice we just spoke of. Voice apparently has the capacity to fixate at different univocal points of reference in grammar. If voice takes the global univocity as its point of reference the voice too must include itself within the world–field. And voice may equally fixate on any thing *in the world,* taking it as its provisional point of univocal reference. So there is a sort of univocal transparency in voice– it is able to focus on a given object and take its univocity as its own point of reference and in a way *becomes* that object In this way, the polar dynamics of univocity reiterates itself for any given univocal point of reference in grammar.

Conclusion

Thus, we have found in our meditative experiment that all meaning in natural language is conditioned by the presence of voice/grammar. We further found that the presumed univocity of meaning (literal meaning) traces directly to the presumed univocity of voice of thinker/speaker. But our experiment found that within the literalist mentality no real univocity of voice can be achieved. Instead, we found that the presence of voice in natural language always turns out to be inherently equivocal, multi–vocal and inherently indeterminate. The voice-field that conditions all natural language is found to be lodged in primordial indeterminacy if we begin from the postulate of literalism And of course this discovery of the indeterminacy of voice is devastating for the literalist faith since it implies that all meaning in natural language would be infected with original indeterminacy of sense/reference. In recent discussions in logical theory we

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

have become more used to the possibility of radical indeterminacy of meaning in ordinary discourse. For example, in Quine's discussions of radical translation we are now familiar with the idea of ontological indeterminacy of the referent. Our meditative experiment has followed the lead of Nāgārjuna and expands this limited indeterminacy of Quine's to its full form in the radical indeterminacy of voice (speaker/thinker). But with Nāgārjuna we find that this pervasive indeterminacy in natural language is really a radical critique of the literalist mentality with its deep compulsion to reify self, voice, mind, meaning, discourse and world. Our meditative critique has shown that it is the reifying mentality that is reduced to absurdity and incoherence, and cannot adequately account for the workings of meaning in natural language. And this clarified result brings us to the horizon of a more powerful hypothesis that we shall present in the sequel and try to show is more successful in accounting for the workings of natural language, the univocity of meaning and the primacy of metaphoric meaning. The way is open to the meditative exploration of the metaphoric or holistic mind.

Philosophy Department
Haverford College
Haverford, PA
HAVERFORD 19041 (U.S.A.)

ASHOK K. GANGADEAN

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 4,
October, 1988

FROM HUMANISM TO HOLISM
(An Ecological Approach)

Humanism is only Anthropocentric

I want to draw attention to the narrow outlook of humanism, whether spiritualistic or materialistic. This narrow outlook consists in making humanism anthropocentric. Man prides himself in thinking in terms of humanity as a whole, irrespective of the differences of creed or culture, race or religion, habitat or language, colour or sex. Humanism thus has a universal appeal to man as a man. Its chief interest is in the welfare and progress of the human species. Man is prepared to extend his love to his kind. Thus humanism means philanthropism.

It could of course be said in justification humanism that no other thought or ideology could be regarded as covering the entire range of human race. Thus it escapes all parochial thinking in terms of different groups of men. Its interests are not sectarian, but truly universal. No thinking is made in terms of man simply as a man. This indeed is its positive contribution, a plus point, as opposed to the partial thinking in terms of one's identification with one kind of group or another. Man often thinks as identifying himself with family, or caste or community, or with one's nation, race or religion. Thus there are cross interests of groups and classes going at tangents, resulting into conflicts. Human race has been at conflict with itself through-out history. Man has rarely been at peace with his kind. The history

Received : 13-9-87

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of man is filled with bloody wars. The truth about man, if he has eyes and mind to see, is that man is the worst enemy of man. Man does have his big fears from the calamities of nature, floods, famines, holocausts, earhquakes, volcanoes, windblasts, pestilences and so on. Over these he has no control, or at the most a very limited control. But the greatest source of his fear is his next-door neighbour, if he is not indoors also. Death tolls taken in murders, group conflicts and wars far exceed those due to natural calamities. Human hatred has been more heinous than nature's wrath. In any case, man who prides himself in the possession of reason, has shown more cruelty to man than the so-called inanimate nature has exhibited towards him.

Man's Actual and Ideal Nature

Humanism can, therefore, be looked at from two points of view. Humanism may stand for man's actual nature, or it may stand for his ideal nature. Man as he is, is an admixture of good and bad qualities, virtues and vices. This, of course, is a liberal understanding of human nature. If we take the proportion of the good and the evil aspects of man's natures, even normally man's evil nature is overpowering over his goodness. Man is regarded as a rational animal. This really means that his anthropological character as an animal is fundamental and his rationality is a superficial growth. His animal passions are basic, and his rationality is only a week addendum. It is well-known that flesh is stronger than spirit. So that the human intelligence is under the spell of his beastly instincts. Man uses his intelligence in the service of the satisfaction of his animal wants. This distinguishes human animality from the brutish animality. Animal behaviour is spontaneous instinctive behaviour. Animals kill, not for enjoyment but for the satisfaction of hunger. They mate not for the sake of the mating enjoyment, but for the sake of continuation of the species. Man, on the other hand, is calculating and planning

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in his instinctive satisfactions. Therefore his behaviour is aggressive, self–aggrandizing, possessive and selfish in the full sense. Because of the calculating reasoning in the service of animality, his animality is more pronounced than that of any animal. Therefore, human behaviour is more brutish than that of the brutes. He is indeed the cruelest of all the animals. His vices are more brutish than any of the beasts.

Man's is selfishness and cruelty and his habits of eating, drinking and sex, his selfishness and possessiveness, his tendency to crime cannot be comparable in their extensity and intensity to those of any of the lower animals. It is indeed unjust to the beasts to call human actions as beastly. Men usually describe certain human crimes as beastly. But men are found indulging in crimes of which the brutes are incapable. There are no murders, no rapes, (no group–rapes), no wars amongst beasts. These happenings are in the spontaneous working of nature.

Man is a Curse against Man, Animate and Inanimate Nature

Human existence, because of his vicious nature, is a curse against other men, a curse against animal life and plant life, a curse even against inanimate nature. This is what man actually is, as found in the past history and the contemporary history in the making. It is difficult, as it is most shameful, to give the ghastly description of human killings, and atrocities. Any one can read these things and events from the pages of history. Men do not simply kill in thousands and millions, but rejoice and boast in these performances. With all the scientific and technological achievements and the so-called progress in the modern civilization, twentieth century itself is illustrative of the great and the greater wars, the battles that are being fought every day in the different quarters of our globe, and the vigorous preparations going on for the greatest war possibly in the present century itself. One shudders at the very thought of the nuclear war, but

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the humanist human beings are destined to settle the truth of their opposite humanist ideologies by taking recourse to the only method with which they have been historically familiar. That method, as they very prudently declare, is of the war to end war. It appears that it will be the final war with the most dangerous of human weapons, such that it will be the end of all humanity and life on earth. From the remnant ashes new man will take his birth, to fight again with teeth and nails and stones at the most. Our march of the technologically most advanced civilization is onwards (or backwards ?) to primitive animal life of barbarism.

This is indeed the story of man as the worst enemy of man. How much worse his behaviour must be towards the lower creatures, the beasts and the birds which he kills for enjoyment of killing as also for the satisfaction of his varied taste of fresh meat. Men can complain against men, though to no use. But who can give justice to the beasts of prey ? Men indulge in killing enormusly for the sake of the satisfaction of their tongue and their appetite. Men are indeed essentially butchers,—for hunger is the greatest and the most insatiable of all instincts. Human beings are really unmindful of the criminal activity on their part against their fellow creatures. The slaughter–houses all over the world are equipped with the most advanced machinery for killing millions of animals every day.

Animals are killed in the name of religion also as sacrifices to Gods and Deities. This shows that religions are human religions for the sake of the so–called good of human beings alone. This is the most inhuman side of the spiritual religions. On special religious ceremonies when merry–making and felicitations go on a large scale among men, these are the times for the animals to tremble with the fear of intending death followed by the severe pangs of actual death. Can any human being project through his imagination as to what the animals must be thinking,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(if they are given the power to think and speak), as to the nature of man and his philosophy humanism? The animals would warn animals: 'Beware of humanism!' Because for them humanism is equal to violence against life. They would be wishing that man should be more of an animal than a human being. Let man come back to animality than continue in being a man. That indeed is an aspect of 'going back to nature', as often a whim comes to the man. Man would indeed be less cruel as an animal than as a man. This is the animal view of humanism as expressed in man's actual nature.

Man is not violent to man and to the animal alone; he is also equally violent against nature as a whole. His technological and industrial civilization is based on the exploitation of man by man. The roots of this exploiting nature of man are in his biological existence. The biological laws are 'natural selection', 'struggle for existence' and 'survival of the fittest'. The opposite and rival humanist ideologies are making use of all their technological knowledge in their struggle for existence and establishment of supremacy. In order to be successful in this struggle man has exploited the energies derived from nature in such a way that it has disturbed the balance of nature. The reactions of this ultimately will be on the very existence of man. This way humanism will come to a pitiable end, not merely for man, but for the entire life and existence. The lesson from this is that man will have to think not merely in terms of man, but in terms of the whole existence—human, animate and inanimate.

We have above referred to the distinction between the two aspects of humanism, namely, as interpreted in terms of nature of man as he is, and as ideally he should be. It may be objected that the description of the actual evil tendencies in man is one-sided and farfetched. History does not record merely wars and cruelties and atrocities perpetrated by man; it also records the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

good that he has done He has made a tremendous progress in science, philosophy, art, religion and many other small or big spheres of his life. He has, in short, produced great civilizations and cultures. All these speak volumes regarding the immense potentialities in man. There is no doubt that both these trends of good and evil have been there. That shows that man can be good if he means to be good. He is not incapable of giving the right direction to his inherent goodness. But the fact remains that he has not invariably trodden the path of goodness. The evil which is equally, if not more, strong in his nature, has also expressed itself in the most damaging fashion. If we draw the picture merely of his goodness, that will be equally misrepresentative. This only means that off, and on he wishes to put forth his best, but that is not his uniform, much less rectilinear, line of progress

Humanism as a Human Ideal, and its Shortcomings

Having come to realize his lacunae, his shortcomings, his narrow visions, his parochial tendencies, his submission to the devil within him, he advocates as to what an ideal life will be for man. That is the idealistic interpretation of humanism. Thus, humanism is not the picture drawn as it were by the beasts of the actual behaviour of man, and to be cautious about his so called humanism. It is the human picture of man as he should be. Humanism is a norm, an ideal, a value. It is, according to him, that which is worthy of human realization. Humanism is a picture of the perfection of manhood.

But what I wish to contend here is that even the picture of the idealist humanism is not at all a very happy picture. It is true that whatever be the diverse interpretations that have been put upon this ideal form of humanism, man has tremendously fallen short of its realization. It would be immensely good for man to realize humanism in its ideal form. But even in this

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ideal form humanism is too narrow. Humanism is only an expression of man's love towards mankind. This means that he is interested in the welfare of the human species. His thinking is bound by the homosphere. It is anthropocentric. It is nothing less than the expression of the rank egoism of the human species. It shows an unmindfulness towards the non-human existence of the beasts, the birds, the plants, the trees, and the nature as a whole. This negligence is born of the tremendous ignorance on the part of man about the contribution of the non-human existence towards the human welfare. It is time for him to realize what he owes to nature as a whole for his own maintenace and preservation. He cannot think of his welfare at the cost of nature, both animate and inanimate.

Human Ecology

Ecological studies, especially those of human ecology, have thrown a flood of light upon how man and nature together constitute unitary existence Living organisms are in intimate relations with their environment. Every organism has to play its part in maintaining the whole order of existence. The environmental structure is made up of all the five elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth They have given rise together to life on earth, which has its grand evolutionary process from amoeba to man, from unicellular organism to the most complex of organisms. The minerals, the vegetation, the insects, the birds, the beasts and the human beings–all influence one on other in a very complicated network beyond the complete grasp of human intelligence. From the complex complementary actions of heat, air and moisture microbes and plant life come into existence. Fish, reptiles, and various species of animals come into existence. The herbivorous animals feed upon herbs. The carnivorous animals feed upon the herbivorous. There are some animals which live on both herbs and flesh. Each of the species has its own ways

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of behaviour. Its habitat, its eating and mating habits, its dealings with other species, its enmities and friendships are uniformly decided. When animals die, even the most ferocious and powerful among them are eaten by microbes. They ultimately are reduced to soil. This circular process, of life feeding upon life, and the ultimate reduction of everything to earth, from which again everything springing into life, – goes on constantly numberless times. This is how the globular existence maintains itself. Sun is the source of its energy, earth is the recipient and consumer of this energy in various form. All kinds of growth take place on earth. Thus metaphorically speaking sun is the father and earth is the mother of all globular existence. Both sun and earth are a part of the stellar universe. From the different direction of the entire astronomical existence different kinds of invisible rays penetrate the solar system Some of them are dangerous from which natural protective measures save our life, while some others are helpful for the maintenace of congenial atmosphere. Man is what he is because of all the visible and invisible forces which are at work in the entire ecosphere and biosphere. His preservation is made possible owing to the equilibrium that is maintained in the workings of nature as a unitary existence.

Man and Nature together form one reality

It is quite wrong to bifurcate reality into nature and man. Man cannot be thought of apart from nature. Nature enters into man as much as man is a part and parcel of nature This bifurcation is not made by nature. It is man–made artificial bifurcation. It is human consciousness which is responsible for this division. He is aware of himself in a manner in which nature does not seem to be aware of itself. This gives a sense of superiority to man. Man dubs nature as unconscious and insentient, therefore not worthy of his attention or recognition. Neither plant life nor animal life could stand any comparison with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

human life. If at all they are to be reckoned with, they are only instrumental to human life. It appears to man that the entire existence is in the service of man. He is the centre of the universe, the crown of all creation. He thus holds a position of supreme honour and dignity. In this way his idea of humanism is born of his egoism and superiority complex, as he holds a very unique position in the universe.

But if we take a correct view of the ecological findings there should be no place for the sense of self-alienation of man from the total reality. Once this evil idea of egoism enters into the human mind it proves to be disruptive and destructive of the unity of reality.

With the increasing knowledge of the laws of nature, man gained power over nature. He used his knowledge towards bending nature to serve human purposes. In the primitive stages of human existence, man was at the marcy of natural powers. But with the advancement of science, knowledge became a power in the hands of man. So much so that it went into his head. He prided himself in the conquest of nature, not knowing that he is inviting his own defeat. His technological civilization has been based on the erosion of natural energies. These energies really help preserving the entire existence, including that of man. But man was uncalculating in his intrusion in the inherent balance of nature. Excited in getting quick results, and in abundant fulfilment of his increasing wants, he was totally blind to the impending dangers which slowly but surely were beginning to strangle man into death. The apparent progress was the real regress. Digging the energies from earth, he was actually digging his own grave. The bund of technology was broken, and in its flood, he did not know how to stop this flow to save himself from drowning in it. His unfriendly attitude to nature resulted in rousing the demon in nature. Man got knowledge and power from nature,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

only because nature was a real repository of both knowledge and power for exceeding that man could ever have. In this competition man was destined to lose. Man could never be equal to nature.

Nature is a Repository of Wisdom

Man is totally wrong in thinking nature to be merely insentient and unconscious existence. Man actually derives his knowledge by understanding the ways of nature's behaviour. What he calls the laws of nature are really the uniform ways of orderly behaviour of nature. While human knowledge is theoretical, nature is replete with this knowledge as expressed in its behaviour. Man prides himself in his possession of awareness which he wrongly equates with actual knowledge. He thinks that since animals and inanimate nature do not possess awareness, there is no knowledge in them. But it is important to note that awareness and utter ignorance go together. Man has awareness of the possession of body. He is also aware that he is existent. But he has absolutely no knowledge, or if at all very little knowledge, of what the nature of his body is or what his true nature is. That is, inspite of the fact of man's awareness of himself he has utter ignorance of his own bodily and spiritual nature.

On the contrary, nature, whether animate or inanimate, does not possess any kind of awareness equal to that of a human being. We cannot conclude on that account only, that there is no presence of knowledge or intelligence of some sort in nature. Intelligence in narure is of a different sort. Nature is full of design, order, arrangement, system. These are formulated by the natural scientist in terms of the laws or uniformities of behaviour on the part of nature. If these constitute human knowledge, howso incomplete it may be, then it is sheer expression of obstinacy on the part of man, not to accept the presence of knowledge in nature. Nature does not write books. Man, on the other,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

hand, writes books. But in fact nature herself is a very big book of infinite pages, of which man reads a few and expresses their meaning in his own language. If man's knowledge is derived from nature, if man's knowledge gets its sanction from nature, then virtually, nature is the real source and storehouse of inexhaustible knowledge. Nature does not merely possess knowledge, far exceeding all the knowledge of all the men and the scientists and the philosophers collectively, it possesses real wisdom of keeping the equilibrium of its forces, so that everything is sustained in existence, and is preserved. This sort of wisdom man very miserably lacks. He uses his intelligence egoistically to violate the balance of nature, and in return loses his balanced state in the total affairs of nature and its laws.

The Universe is Man's Home and Family

The entire existence constitutes man's total environment. This environment is so very important that man derives his life from it. He also gets his sustenance from it. Man could not have been born nor preserved if the five elements were not there, if the vegetation and the various bacteria, germs, insects, birds and animals in all the variety of species were not there. In short, his environment in all its intricacies of interrelationships, is verily his home, This is the idea expressed in saying that the whole earth together is the family (*Vasudhā eva kuṭumbakam*). Or again, in saying that for the enlightened man the entire universe becomes one nest. (*Viśvaṁ bhavatī ekanīdam*).

The lesson from this is that man connot think only the good of himself or his own species, neglecting his intimate family relationships, not only to his kind, but to the whole existence forming into one unit. That is, he must shift his interest from the homosphere, to the biosphere and to the ecosphere. Then only he can safeguard human interests. The entire existence is so designed that it can sustain itself satisfactorily as a unitary whole.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

There are wholes within wholes, orders within orders, systems within systems. They penetrate into one another in an incomprehensible cosmic order. Man may try to understand this complex order of existence. But there are inherent limitations on his understanding, owing to the infinite variety of the complications into which the world order is interwoven. Man himself is a miniature universe, a microcosm (*piṇda*) in the macrocosm (*brahmāṇda*) having certain affinities.

Holism exceeds Humanism

The truth, therefore, does not lie so much in humanism as an exclusivist concept, as it truly lies in the all–inclusive concept of 'holism'. Holistic view refers to man in his total relationships with the reality as a single and singular whole. In the holistic nature of reality, man does not get a privileged place.

The assertions of holism are that the entire reality is one unit. It is omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent spiritual principle. It is holy or sacred in all its aspects of manifestations, the inanimate, the vegetative, the animal and the human. All the things and events are very intimately interrelated, forming a grand system in a very orderly design. In all these there is a revelation of the immanent spiritual intelligence. The world is not exhausted in its sensuously visible or perceptible aspect. The unsensed, the unperceived, the invisible also constitutes a very influential aspect of the reality, which transcends easy comprehension by the limited tools of knowledge which a normal human being possesses. Any change or occurence anywhere in the totality of reality affects in a small or a great way the rest of existence. The different sciences try to get different glimpses of the uniformities that prevail in the total order of reality. These uniformities are diverse in their forms. It may be a mathematical uniformity, or it may be a physical, chemical, biological, psychological, social, aesthetic, moral or a spiritual uniformity. These are not independent of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

one another, though they are distinguishable from one another. Whatever be the nature of each, its essence consists in helping its preservation. This is the basic nature of *dhāraṇā* or *dharma*, the law of existence. It is the oldest truth, but reasserted through the ecological study, though initiating in biology necessarily touches all other disciplines.

Man, Crown or Clown ?

The view of holism may be rephrased as holistic humanism or ecological humanism. But I would like to avoid the concept of humanism and qualify it as holistic or ecological. Because in such a phraseology humanism becomes prominent. Man, mankind or humanity becomes central in the humanist ideology. But man is not the central or fundamental truth, reality or existence. Holism is the impersonal, objective view of the situation. While holism includes human existence, its converse is not true. Man is so familiar to himself that he makes him the centre of his thinking. The Protagorean doctrine of 'homo mensura' set the humanist ball rolling. It means : Man is the measure of all things. It is true to say so in a certain limited sense. But it has misled man into giving them the central value. Another two similar ideas about man are that man is the crown of creation, and that man is made in the image of God. All these three ideas, originating as they are in the human mind, have expressed the egoism of the human species. It may be natural for man to think highly and subjectively of himself. This way of thinking has its importance, but it has closed an objective view of man. Man could be thought of in terms of the total reality and his place in it, however important that place may be.

For, if it is true that man is the crown of creation, it is also true that in the drama of existence he has often played the role of a clown, a fool. If he is made in the image of God, it is also true that man is responsible for the damage he nas done to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

God's creation. Man is indeed the intruder who has disturbed the balance, the equipoise of nature. This perhaps is the *Sāṅkhya* view when it has been pointed out that originally *Prakṛti*, the unmanifest nature is in *sāmyāvasthā*, the state of equilibrium; and it is because of the association of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti* that this equilibrium comes to be disturbed. It is the sense of the ego that is responsible for this undesirable modification in the smooth movement of nature.

Man the intruder in the Ecological Balance

Every small or big creature in this universe has its own role to play in the continued maintenance of the universe. Therefore it has a right to exist. With all the development in the sciences man has not as yet understood the full workings of nature, and what the contribution of each species is to the maintenance of all. To give some examples, in Brazil, people experienced some trouble owing to the night bats. They abhor light, and move and fly rapidly all over the jungles and cities. On the governmental level decision was taken to kill them all. It was realized after three years that the botanical fructification had almost stopped and there was a great economic setback as the jungle production went down. So the study was undertaken of the behaviour of these night bats. It was realized that they were responsible for pollenization of about six hundred species of plants and trees. Therefore, though they were ugly and foul-smelling, it was again decided that the bats may be allowed to multiply. Similar experiences were about the large scale killing of birds in China, and frogs in India. Thus, through sheer ignorance of their important contribution, man was responsible for causing imbalance in nature. This reflected on his own well-being adversely. He had to change his attitudes. There is a great truth in the virtue of non-violence. It is not merely a moral virtue, but an aspect of the cosmic law of preservation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A good thought, a good action will have its vibrations throughout the universe. An evil thought, an evil deed will also have its repercussions all over. There is a sort of resonance which runs through the entire existence. How this happens is a mystery. But it does not remain a mystery when we accept the spiritual unity of reality which manifests itself in various forms. The result of it is that wonderful balance is maintained. One of the most striking example is that of the lemmings, a species of small arctic rodents. If they multiply beyond certain numbers which cannot be maintained, they voluntarily march into the sea and drown themselves ! What a marvellous example of collective and purposeful surrender to death ! Is it possible to think of men doing so ?

Wonderful ways of the world phenomena

The mysterious parapsychological phenomena of clairvoyance, clairaudience, thought–transmission, hypnosis, prophetic dreams etc. are suggestive of extra–sensory ways of communication, some of which powers are to be found in the birds, the insects and the animals. The ways of the world phenomena are wonderful. We cannot put them in the mere human category. These phenomena throw more light upon the oneness of the cosmic reality, than the familiar human modes of experiences. It is only the dogmatic scientist believing in the absoluteness and ultimacy of the sensuous perception, and inferential knowledge dependent upon such perception, that remains impoverished of the richness of reality.

These above considerations do not warrant us to conceive humanity as the central core of the cosmic existence. We cannot understand man by belittling the non–human existence. We must take a cosmic view than the humanistic view, the holistic view than the partialistic view. The ecological view is more comprehensive than the human view. Ecological view originates in a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

scientific study of man and other organisms in their far reaching environmental situations. The speculative ecology, like the philosophy of physics takes us to the metaphysical view of the entire existence. Thus the better picture of any part of existence, including that of man, is given by the cosmic view, or the holistic view. Therefore, the concept of holism, cosmism or ecologism by itself is preferable to that of humanism.

Man alone can Implement Holism

It must, however, be admitted that there is some important truth regarding considering man to be somehow holding the central position. For, though the whole is more important than man as a part of it, though the ecosphere is more comprehensive than the homosphere, though the macrocosmic is inclusive of the microcosmic, this truth is known by man. And whatever implementation in practice is to be done of this truth, that is only possible for man, than for any non–human existence. That is, ultimately man has to know as to how he should behave. It is man who alone is capable of putting his theory into practice.

But to accept such a central position of man in theorizing and in practice is not to accept the view of humanism. The sum total of the truth is that man accepts the truth of holism or ecologism, and then he makes it a point to abide by this truth. The codification of conduct is for man, not for the brutes, the birds or the plants or the rivers and the rocks. Man indeed is the proper subject or object for the moral and the religious life. What does holism teach man ? It teaches that man should not merely think in terms of his own good or of his country's good or even of his own humankind's good. All these goods are good in increasing gradation. But he should rather think and act in terms of the good of the animate and the inanimate existence. They are also various forms of expressions of the one underlying

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

spiritual reality. They are not conscious of their rights, and they have no cousciousness of the duties to perform. But man is endowed with the powers of awareness or consciousness. He knows both his duties and rights. But he also can have a projected awareness of the rights that the non-human existences have, because of their important contribution towards maintaining the equipoise of the entire reality or nature. Man, thus, has consciousness of his duties towards them, which duties he must observe irrespective of reciprocal expectations of behaviour from them towards man. The one good that is inherently there in all nature's creations excepting man is that they all spontaneously abide by the laws of nature to which they owe their existence and sustenance. It is not given to them to violate the laws of nature. That indeed is the natural order. Man, alone, because of his sense of consciousness, and egoism born of it alienates himself from nature and is endowed with freedom, as it were, either to abide or not to abide by the preservative laws of nature or *dharma*. Thus, while for the non-human nature *dharma* is spontaneous, and knowledge of *adharma* is impossible, for man, the knowledge of *dharma*, both in the sense of the laws of natural preservation and in the sense of moral duty for human conduct, as derived from his knowledge of nature, is to be acquired. Further, there is no direct linking between his theoretical knowledge of *dharma* for himself, and his actual implementation of that knowledge into action. There is a big gap, as reportedly put by Duryodhana, between knowing and willing. He says, 'I know what my duty is but I am not inclined to do it. I know what is bad conduct, and yet I am not inclined to desist from it'. (*Jānāmi dharmaṁ na ca me pravṛttiḥ, jānāmyadharmaṁ na ca me nivṛttiḥ—Pāṇḍavagītā*, 57). Or again, there are men like Arjuna who are inclined very much to do the good, they have a sense of duty, but they confess their ignorance of

...6

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

what their duty is. This is because of the extreme complexity of the situations in which they find themselves. Thus, from these two opposite kinds of characters we find that either there is no knowledge of *dharma* or there is no will to do *dharma*. In both the cases the gap between knowing and doing is very clear.

But generally speaking in man the tendency to evil, or to animal like lower behaviour, wields greater force than the tendency towards goodness. And hence man differs from the beast in this, that while for the beast, his spontaneous law of nature or his *dharma* is inviolable, for man, his inclination to choose *adharma* is more predominent than the choice of *dharma*. This being so, there is a need for training man botn in his theoretical knowledge of *dharma*, and also in the cultivation of practical will towards the invariable choice of good in every respect.

This brings us to another truth in humanism in its idealistic form. Humanism as an ideal for man is worth realization. It is his dream, a value, an end which lies far ahead of him. Actually man is very weak, and is full of ignorance and lacks the strength of will. Therefore, the actual conduct of humanity has to overcome its dehumanized form, and make a long and difficult march towards reaching the ideal manhood. This being the immediate need humanism in its ideal form needs to be taught. It is, of course, better to be truly human in its ideal form than to remain in the actual dehumanized condition in which he finds himself. But there is a further goal to be sought beyond the idealistic humanism. That is of holism. It could be achieved by casting off the egoism of humanism. In order to do this man has to develop an attitude of reverence to reality and to everything in nature. Nature as it phenomenally appears is not all. There is a supernature behind it. Nature is indeed a manifestation of divinity. Man has worshipped nature right from the primitive stage of his understanding. He might have done it through fear

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the destructive forces of nature. He may have worshipped nature to appease nature. This primitive religion has developed itself in the enlightened reverence to nature. The spirit in man and the spirit in nature are the manifestations of one and the same absolute spirit. This is the ancient *Vedāntic* truth confirmed by the ecological science leading to Holism.*

A. G. JAVADEKAR

13, Patel Nagar
Siddhanath Road
BARODA 390 001 (Gujarat)

NOTE

* Special Lecture on Humanism delivered in the Indian Philosophical Congress Session held at Jadavpur Universi y, Calcutta, 1986.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Poona–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 4,
October, 1988

WORRINGER'S THEORY OF ABSTRACTION AND SPATIAL FORM IN TURNER

I

It is indeed interesting to note how remarkably Turner succeeds in employing spatial form, as understood in its modern, post–Lessingian sense, in the composition of his later art. In order to bring home the significance of this statement, I propose to undertake here an analytic study of some of the select and maturer visions of Turner's last phase, such as *Shade and Darkness, Light and Colour* (both of 1843), and *The Angel Standing in the Sun* (1846), in the light of Wilhelm Worringer's theory of abstraction as propounded by him in his classic *Abstraction and Empathy* (1908).[1] This, I strongly feel, is necessary, for without it no account of the use of 'spatial' form in plastic art–especially of the type I am concerned with, in relation to Turner's abstract visions–would either be complete or adequate. The main line of argument, therefore, followed in this paper, is to point out, after expounding some of the salient features of Worringer's thesis about the principal art styles and the concepts working behind their evolution in the history of Occidental art, how far the visionary abstractions of Turner's later life fallt within or outside the framework of Worringer's theory of abstract art.

II

Now, for Worringer, if we look at the development of the history of art from the days of antiquity to our own times, we find that there are two different styles, one naturalistic and the

Received : 6–4–87

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

other abstract, which have ruled the plastic arts of the various cultures of the world from time to time, depending upon the pre-dominance of the urge in man to empathy or abstraction. While the process of empathy is associated with the concept of naturalism or realism in its broadest sense, the process of abstraction that acts as an anti-pole to empathy, is invariably associated with the concept of non-organic style in art. The reason for this diversity in the reigning art style of different periods is, according to Worringer, not far to seek. When the people of a particular age, influenced by the cultural ethos of the time, have found themselves to be in harmony with the capricious, obscure and chaotic flux of the phenomena of the external world, their artistic impulse has always been to naturalism, to the portrayal of the world in all its detail and roundness which could best be represented in a three-dimensional work of art. Here there is no attempt to run away from the seeming arbitrariness or the senseless confusion of events and occurrences taking place in the outer world, precisely because of the establishment, to use Worringer's own words, of 'a happy pantheistic relationship of confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world'.[2] Such naturalistic art satisfied man's psychic need for the beauty of organic form by activating his self to participate freely and uninhibitedly in the mysterious power of such form, at once vital and felicitous. This is how naturalistic art becomes an objectification of one's own pleasure ('objectified self-enjoyment') in which, as Worringer would have it, 'one could enjoy more intensely one's own organism' (*A & E*, 28). In the history of Occidental art this sort of empathy is finally accomplished in such great epochs of naturalism as the period of Greek classical sculpture and architecture and the period beginning with the age of Italian Renaissance and ending with the close of the nineteenth century, when the artist attempted to portray not only the objective world of every-day experience,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

but the processes of organic nature, man included, with al loving care and attention, in a three-dimensional manner.

This, for Worringer, is the materialist way of looking at things, a sort of 'artistic materialism,' according to which an object is represented not in its essential purity, but as vitiated by one's subjectivity and by relating it to or making it dependent upon other things. But this has not been, happily enough, the only measure for evaluating the stylistic greatness of a work of art, nor the urge to empathy been the only one leading to the florescence of a particular art style, for, according to Worringer, there have been other ages in the evolution of plastic arts when an altogether different and opposite impulse–the urge to abstraction–has led the artist to the creation of non–naturalistic or non–representational art. Ages, best representative of such non–naturalism in art, as Worringer proposes, have been those associated with the art of primitive peoples, the monumental art of ancient Egypt, Oriental and Byzantine art, sculptured masterpieces of Gothic art, and the abstract art movement of the twentieth century. The range is wide, txeending from the art of a people living at the lowest level of culture to that of the people subsisting at a very high level of cultural advancement.

Worringer, following Riegl the Austrian scholar to whom he is much indebted for the 'greatest incentives' to his own work, says how Riegl was the first to make a serious breach in the otherwise strongly established and traditionally accepted system of naturalim. It was Riegl who, by introducing the concept of 'absolute artistic volition' or 'will–to–form' during his investigative pursuit of various methods employed in all artistic creation, revolutionised not only one's way of approaching the history of the evolution of art, but also one's way of looking at and appreciating a work of art from a non–traditional angle.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Naturalistic art style had so deeply ingrained itself in the soil of Western art that it was regarded almost as an act of sacrilege to appreciate non-naturalistic piece of art since it constituted a distortion of naturalism owing to the artist's technical inability. Reigl, saying 'no' to this one-sided method of appreciating art, pitted the concept of 'will-to-form' against that of the ability to form. History of art was no more to be considered as representing a history of ability, but a history of volition. The stylistic features or peculiarities of any past epoch of art, whether naturalistic or non-naturalistic, were not to be accounted for any lack of ability, but to be explained by a differently directed intention or will-to-form. Non-naturalistic presentation in art therefore did not represent any inability on the part of the artist, but his unwillingness to make any effort towards naturalistic presentation. As Worringer would have it, "What seems to us to-day a strange and extreme distortion is not the fault of insnfficient ability, but the consequence of differently direction volition. Its creators could *do* no otherwise because they *willed* no otherwise" (*A & E*, 124). For Reigl too, the incentive to creation in art did not lie in acquiring mere technical skill or ability, but in the form-determining will, not in the impulse to mere imitation, but in one's absolute will-to-form. As Joseph Frank so very aptly puts it, "The impulse to creation in the plastic arts, Riegl believed, was not primarily an urge towards the imitation of natural objects; for if it were true, esthetic value would be identical with skill in naturalistic reproduction, and the best works of art would be those which most skillfully duplicated the appearances of the natural world. Instead, Riegl postulated what he called an absolute will-to-art, or, better still, will-to-form." [3]

Mere imitation consists in creating an effect of verisimilitude, in presenting the replica or illusion of a given object without evoking one's feeling for the aesthetic value and significance of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the organic. As against this, the will–to–form acts in a different manner in so far as naturalism in art is concerned. It acts here by evoking the delight of man in the reproductions of art that are replete with the beauty and vitality of forms found in the outer, organic world of three–dimensionality. What is striven after is the joy of the organically alive and not the truth of mere presentation, thus accomplishing the fusion of man's inner feeling of vitality and the inward force of the organically dynamic in nature. Man's psychic need for happiness is finally achieved in naturalism through such active participation of his self in the inexpressible beauty of the organic form. A sensuous object begins to exist only when it comes to be permeated by the activity of one's inner life in that 'The form of an object is always its being–formed by me, by my inner activity' (*A & E*, 6). Imitation serves in such cases only as a substratum to absolute artistic volition that is driven to depict not the object as such, but the inner rhythm and power of its form.

In non–naturalistic art the will–to–form urges the artist to reproduce an object in its essential purity of form that is at once stable, orderly and irrefutable. This is made possible by depriving the object of all external trappings it has acquired in its relation to and entanglement with other objects of the outer world, by freeing it from all the flux and happenings associated with the temporal order of the world. This is what is known as rendering an object in its absolute value, or as Worringer would like to call it, in its 'closed material individuality.' This process also makes it necessary on the part of the artist to emancipate the object from all subjective considerations as well, in that they are bound to vitiate and cloud the objective presentation of the thing in its pure form. Abstracted forms of objects, liberated from the tutelage of the temporal, alone, according to Worringer, can act for the artist as points of repose from the passing caval-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cade of nature's exhibitions as they succeed one another in an unceasing continuum of time in three-dimensional world. Thus, for an object or a natural model to be transformed into the language of art, it became necessary to divest it of all extraneous relationships, to wriggle it out of all the finite occurrences of the outer world. Only through such process of reduction or deprivation that one could approximate a thing to its absolute material individuality; only this way one could eternalize it by giving it a permanent niche in the realm of art. "Tranquillity and felicitation could make their appearance only when the spectator was confronted by the absolute." (*A & E*, 35).

The psychic pre-suppositions for the urge to abstrartion, according to Worringer, are to be found in the various peoples' attitude to the universe around them. Just as the pre-requisite for naturalistic art can be traced to man's natural urge to empathy or harmony with the surrounding forces of the outer world, the basic pre-condition for the impulse to abstraction can be found in exactly the opposite direction, in man's disharmonious relation to his natural environment, in his unrestful state of feeling that is basically out of tune with it, a state that in turn is the result of his agrophobia or fear of vast, open spaces, found most prominently among the primitive peoples. This fear, while being instinctive in a primitive man on account of his feeling lost and helpless in a yet unexplored world before him, is a product of cognition among the people of more civilized culture, for, as Worringer says, "Their spiritual dread of open space, their instinct for the relativity of all that is, did not stand, as with primitive peoples, *before* cognition, but *above* cognition" (*A & E*, 16). This was so, because the Oriental man, with his richer cultural and philosophical heritage, unlike his Western counterpart with his rationalism and his intellectual mastery of the external world, came back to look upon the world of nature

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as a veil of *Mayā*, something which was to be transcended in order to grasp the noumenal behind the phenomenal. We find something of the same order in Turner who was interested in portraying not so much the surface appearance of things as the underlying elemental forces of nature such as wind, water, fire and mist that make for the abstract patterns of his late paintings. Dissolution of image is so complete in Turner as to leave no traces of corporeal existence in the near–abstract visions of his later life.

Western man's sense of intellectual mastery or his physical confidence in the presence of bewildering phenomena of the visible world, could not deprive the Oriental of his basic sense of the unfathomable and unreal nature of the phenomena of existence and hence his natural abhorrence–rather than fear—of the world of appearance, a satisfaction with appearances, according to T. E. Hulme, being limited to Europe.[4] The tendency to abstraction therefore is bound to be greater in the artistic creations of people with a natural mistrust of a world which they considered to be essentially transient and unsubstantial in nature. In the Occidental world, the flourishing of non–naturalistic art can similarly be found in such culturally developed periods as the Byzantine and the Gothic, dominated by a theology that rejected the world of nature as one instinct with evil and imperfection. All this obviously stands in contrast to the attitude of both, the man belonging to the age of classical Greece and the modern man extending from the period of Renaissance to the end of the nineteenth Century, the former considering himself to be part of the surrounding organic nature, and the latter certain of his domination over it. "In either case, the organic world of nature holds no terrors for them: they have what Worringer calls a *Vertraulichkeitsverhaltnis* — a relationship of confidence and intimacy — with the universe; and the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

result, in art, is a naturalism which delights in reproducing the forms and appearance of the objective, three-dimensional organic world." [5]

The one major consequence of this urge to abstraction among the artists of non-naturalistic periods such as the primitive and the Oriental (Indian and Egyptian), was to find it necessary to render an object in the plane and not in space, in relief rather than in roundness, so that it could be presented in its pure, crystalline and geometric form, shorn of all details associated with space in depth. Rendering an object in its three-dimensionality is as good as snatching it out of eternity and putting it back into the corridors of time that deprive it of its essential materiality and individuality by relating it to the manifold diversity of material phenomena of this organic world. The succession of perceptual elements in a three-dimensional world makes nonsense of one's struggle to present a thing in its indisputable and necessary absoluteness, its individuality simply melting away in the presence of unwanted clutter of other related elements. Moreover, presentation of a thing in its depth dimension calls for such subjective factors as recession and foreshadowing which negate all efforts to render it in its abstraction is thus made well nigh impossible by space, its depth dimension being the one element responsible for thwarting all attempts in this direction. Aesthetic contemplation of an object in its pure materiality is denied by the dimension of depth as it comes to relate the object, of necessity, with the other distracting and agonizing facts of organic existence. Worringer therefore is right when he remarks, "Life as such is felt to be a disturbance of aesthetic enjoyment" (*A & E*, 24). Commenting on the corruptive effect of space in annihilating the individuality and abstract purity of things, Worringer further states, "It is precisely space which, filled with atmospheric air, linking things together and destroying their individ cuallosedness, gives things their temporal value and draws them into the cosmic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

interplay of phenomena; most important of all in this connection is the fact that space as such is not susceptible of individualisation" (A & E, 38).

Since space is thus a major stumbling block in attempting to arrive at the abstract form of an object, it was found necessary to do away with the presentation of depth dimension in art, because it is the one dimension that, according to Worringer, acts as *the* authentic dimension of space and, in doing so, connects the objects with the sense of time as they present themselves to the eye in a series of perceptual moments that follow one another in the unfolding drama of life. Restricting the representation of an object to the two dimensions of height and width thus became indispensable to achieve in art the much desired abstract materiality (Turner's materiality of the immaterial). "Depth relations had to be transformed, as far as possible, into plane (or surface) relations" (*A & E*, 40). Explaining the reason why non-naturalistic styles avoid the use of depth dimension in order to achieve a timeless unity by presenting objects in a unified spatial plane, Joseph Frank observes, "Presenting objects in depth gives them a time-value, or perhaps we should say accentuates their time-value, because it connects them with the real world in which events occur; and since time is the very condition of flux and change which... man wants to escape from when he is in a condition of disequilibrium with nature, non-naturalistic styles shun the dimension of depth and prefer the plane."[6]

All this offers us a new insight into our reading of the use of spatial form in plastic arts of all ages, twentieth century included, that have been primarily dominated by the artist's propensity to abstraction. And this understanding differs widely from the one offered by Lessing. For Lessing, the distinction between plastic arts and literature was clear, the one being spatial in form and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the other temporal, in that while a plastic art like painting concerned itself with the presentation of visual images in their simultaneity by juxtaposing them in an instant of time, literature, a verbal art, preoccupied itself with the unfolding of action or events in their consecutiveness, the very nature of its medium demanding a sequential arrangement of the narrative in words that must be apprehended in and through time. The picture is now changed. What we see instead is that the plastic arts, which were regarded, unlike literature, as absolutely spatial by Lessing, now came to be considered, in view of their stylistic evolution, more spatial in so far as they succeeded in avoiding the dimension of depth and less spatial if inclined to make room for its admission. This presents us with a paradoxical situation in that the plastic arts could be regarded as having been 'most spatial when they did not represent the depth dimension and least spatial when they did, since a greater degree of time–value always accompanies the presentation of three–dimensionality.[7] To put in a nutshell, one can safely assert that the greater the accent of the artist on abstraction, the better the opportunity to fully represent in a work of plastic art its inherent spatiality by doing away with the last possible 'traces of time–value.' (Joseph Frank's phrase.)

And this brings me to the consideration of the use of 'spataility' in Turner in the light of Worringer's theory of abstraction and his concept of non–representational style in art.

III

Turner is indeed so Protean an artist, what with his range and command of themes, his apocalyptic imagination and abundant energy, that it is difficult to associate him with any particular kind of stylistic composition in his long life full of daring and innovative experiments with different styles. Beginning with his tutelage to the cult of the picturesque during the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

formative years of his life or his interest in history painting, the ruling passion and High Art of the age, Turner ends by depicting those majestic, Vorticular formations of his last phase, that, besides revealing his complete liberation from the domination of the physical eye, point to his full conquest of the external world by means of an all-enveloping imagination. It is in his great compositions of the mid-thirties such as *Fire at Sea; Burning of the Houses of Parliament,* and *Snowstorm, Avalanche and Inundation,* where objects and persons alike are almost reduced to the level of nonentity behind the veil of the elemental process of nature such as wind, fire and water, that Turner is able to achieve the effect of abstraction in terms of pure patterns of light and colour. Even an early picture like *Evening Priory* of of 1797, shows Turner's progressive interest in light as the principal theme of his art in the painting of interiors, culminating in *The Interior at Petworth* where all forms are so dissolved as to transmute the scene into a symphony of light and colour.

This tendency to reduce all objects to the thiness of a water-mark or to absorb all forms in pools of liquescent colours and light, now serene, now lurid, reaches its farthest possible limit in his maturer visions of the forties such as *The Sun Setting Over the Sea* (1840), *Snowstrom* (1842), *Norham Castle-Sunrise, Sunrise with a Sea Monster, Seascape* (all c. 1840–5), *Shade and Darkness, Light and Colour,* and *The Angel Standing in the Sun.* It is little wonder that paintings like these, along with his innumerable Venetian poems in water-colour and oil–all aglow with the opalescent shimmer of Italian light, mist and colour, ranging from the bule of the lagoons to the liquid gold of the sky—have rightly earned for themselves such delightful epithets as 'sheer poems of light,' 'orchestratons of colour,' 'melting transparencies,' 'flooding luminosities,' 'spells of magic vagueness,' and 'riots of abstract splendour,' to cite but a few.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Since some of the paintings mentioned above are Vorticular in their formation, a word about vortex, the form in which Turner reaches the summit of his stylistic evolution as an artist, would be quite in order at this stage. Vortex, which he considered to be the most suitable vehicle for conveying his emotional response to a certain type of landscape had always fascinated him right from the beginning, one of the finest and earliest expressions of which we find in *Hannibal Crossing the Alps*, where in the sheaf of light streaming from the sun above, along with the arc of dark menacing storm clouds that encircle it, swallows up everything around in whirls of spiralling mist, snow and light. This indeed is a new and dynamic way of representing nature wherefrom all external connections and relationships, so very widely used in the traditional system of presenting the outer world in a naturalistic way, are done away with, in favour of vortex, 'a highly complicated field-of-force in action'[8] as Lindsay would have it.

It is after practising and breaking through such earlier styles as the pyramidal (*The Fifth Plague of Etypt, 1800)* the vertiginous (*The Passage of the St. Golhard, 1804)*, the diagonal (*Fall of an Avalanche in the Grisons, 1810*), and the lozengeshaped (*Fisherman at Sea*, 1796; *Calais Pier*, 1803; *The Shipwreck*, 1805), that Turner finds in the vortex a form wherein he could embody his most sublime visions of nature with absolute freedom and without any care for convention-ridden schools or inhibiting traditions. The vortex in Turner, at once a supreme expression of his restless energy and overheated imagination, operates on two levels, one subjective and the other objective, the former representing the agitated state of the artist's mind and the latter the fusion of nature's various elemental forces in fury, thus projecting the imagery of vortex as an index both of his perturbed psyche and of a disturbed state of nature. Turner at once suc-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ceeds in elevating it to the status of a symbol signifying the fusion of the artists' creativity and nature's activity. This fusion of the subjective (mental) and the objective (elemental) forms of energy is so complete in Turner as to establish an easy and immediate communion between the artist's essential 'self' and the spirit of nature. Like any other persistent Romantic imagery or icon in the works of other major Romantics, the vortex in Turner tends to become a powerful analogue of the artist's mental state, a veritable 'figurative mediator between outer motion and inner emotion',[9] terms that Abrams uses elsewhere for the imagery of the windharp. In final analysis we can safely assert that the psychical and physical elements are so very completely merged together in Turner's vorticular formations – those whirling pools of light suffused with ripples of melting colours — that their latent meaning emerges only after one's deep understanding of them through repeated acquaintance. At first sight they tend to strike the eye as nothing more than revolving balls of ethereal beauty, half–fluid, half–fiery.

Aware as Turner was of the fragility of man's life and his puniness against the terrible and terrifying forces of nature in its sublimity, he committed himself to paint it in terms of colour and light befitting this tragic vision of his. As Gowing observes "His audacity was a genuine courage. He was deeply aware of the terror of nature and mortality. He painted it, and the paint committed him. It was brave to make light and colour real. The tense purity of colour itself possessed a quality of the terrible."[10] We shall see later on how light in Turner acts as a power that both creates and destroys.

It is Turner's insight into the basic structure of colour and his extraordinary technique of rendering light in such masterpieces of the last two decades of his life that promote him to make all

...7

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

forms disappear, while retaining their barest possible structures that are, however, faintly visible through the enveloping veil of light, more as embodiments of colour rather than as coloured things. His passion for light and colour, the most elemental and visible qualities of an object is so deep-rooted in him that instinctively he is drawn to render not merely the beauty of visible objects as such, but 'the beauty of such objects as merely visible', as W. J. Hipple puts it in connection with Knight's definition of the picturesque.

All this leads to the predominance of abstract quality in the paintings of Turner, an abstraction that is at once lyrical and musical, the kind of which we find in the symphonies of Beethoven or in the works of impressionists where forms are sacrificed to effects of light and overlaid colour. The total effect is that of a surface shimmering with light upon which now depends the unity of an abstract or impressionistic picture, as against the unity that was earlier achieved through the logical partition of a picture into neatly apportioned areas of light and darkness. With the passing of time, we notice Turner's will-to-form being progressively diverted towards a non-representational style devoid of all relative jumble of the three-dimensional world. Age, instead of weakening his artistic abilities, leads him to create an art that is ageless. What happens is something like this: whereas the seventeenth century Dutch artists and the topographical illustrators of eighteenth century England revelled in portraying a three-dimensional world in all its corporeality as revealed by light, with Turner the whole process is reversed. Instead, Turner delights in representing it in the plane, and in doing so, makes it disappear, along with all its ambient details, behind a shimmer of unearthly light. Turner obviously seems to be interested here, not in painting a world-revealing light, but a light-revealing world devoid of all substantiality. It therefore,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

comes as no surprise when Hazlitt refers to such pictures of his as 'portrayls of nothing and very like', and Constable as 'fumes of tinted steam'.

One can notice in Turner's evolution as an artist a systematic disengagement from and a growing disinterestedness in depicting the perceptual elements of the world in their concreteness, and a corresponding increase in his propensity to render them in their essentiality by relaxing their solidity. This is clearly a result of the ascendency of imagination in Turner, and when in full command of this faculty, he creates on the canvas a poetically enchanting world wherefrom the last possible vestiges of corporeal forms are made to vanish to give place to 'airy-nothings' that form the very stuff of his abstract art. In this connection it would be of interest to know how very relevant is the definition of imagination as given by Pottle, "You will know that you are dealing with imagination when the edges of things begin to waver and fade out." [11] Abstraction seems to be imperative in such an art that refuses to surrender itself to canons of naturalistic styles demanding a cubical representation of the perceptual world. The artist, by going beyond the perceptual world offered to the light of sense. presents us with different world imbued with the sense of light. Wordsworth regarded sight as the 'sad enemy of imagination,' and Turner, by liberating himself from the domination of the mere sight, as did the great poet himself, gives us a penetrating insight into the essences of things as represented in the flooding luminosities of his maturer years. Summing up these qualities as reflected in the paintings of Turner's old age, Rothenstein observes "We can trace throughout Turner's life the progressive relaxation of interest in the material objects of nature and a corresponding intensification of his preoccupation with light... In his old age Turner moved into a luminous enchanted solitude where his

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

main concern was the creation of works in which colour infinitely transcended form. Of the pictures of his last phase, with a few exceptions, the most magical are the pure chromatic fantasies which he never exhibited. These are almost as abstract as music, yet their seemingly vague and tentative allusions to specific forms assume, beneath our wandering gaze, the character of flashes of piercing insight into the very essence of nature." [12]

Indistinctness, which Turner is reported to have regarded as his forte in painting, is at last accomplished by concealing the material forms and contours behind—to use his own words—'a matchless veil of colour'. Indeed Turner's concern for this process, with the passage of time, assumed such supreme importance in his colour structures of thirties and forties that he regarded it almost as a sacrilege on the part of the eye 'to pierce the mystic shell of colour in search of form'.[13] Gradually getting bolder, he began to get rid of his pictures of all the lineaments of a recognizable nature, sacrificing verisimilitude, volume and subject matter at the altar of his driving passion to winnow a thing from the surrounding husk of perceptual elements and represent it in such a manner as to form a whole for the imagination. Rendering of an object by means of mere perception would simply not do for an artist of Turner's stature and genius. This is what led him to transform his art into those chromatic patterns that came to be dominated by structures of pure colour, made radient by light and placed in juxtaposition to each other.

Turner's success as the supreme colourist among the landscape artists of his time, including Constable, can thus be traced to his mastery in subordinating narrative element or subject matter to landscape and material form to the demands of light and colour. This, however, does not mean that he deprives his paintings of all ideas, for, even in his most abstract visions, some or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the other kind of associational element, capable of engaging our imagination or intellect, is always to be found, though in a dimly discernible manner. Instead of relating the landscape to an actual event taking place in the dramatic world of three-dimensionality, what Turner does is to relate it to the impelling idea of his mind which does not rest till it finds expression in terms of colour tonalities and light, forces that he always regarded as superior to form. As Graham Reynolds observes, "While Turner had and retained a miraculous tact in the management of light throughout his pictures, the result of his reflections, his experience and his Italian journeys was to direct his interest towards the colour in the visible world, if need be at the expense of its form. His always present fascination for the immaterial vehicles of colour, steam, smoke, mist, helped him to make this choice. So in the later finished pictures he composes in colour, dissolving, suggesting, and only half-defining, form".[14]

If romanticism can be defined as the raid of the imagination on the materially visible and the finite, and imagination in turn as the faculty capable not so much of raising images, as of striking a chord of intellectual and emotional response, then Turner's later art should be considered as expressive of this new function assigned to imagination. In such an art, rich in its imaginative content and appeal, the artist, going beyond the thereshold of a mere 'time-space' bound consciousness, reaches for those ethereal heights of which the very air breathes the spirit of freedom, of infinity and eternity, instead of confining himself to the portrayal of a world that is painfully conditional, circumscribed and concrete. Devoid of all materiality and pictorial element, this sort of art, of necessity, reveals a world that is lyrical in its essense and symbolic in function, the artist being interested not in making manifest the truth of representation, but a poetic truth. This is what makes him realise, what Wor-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ringer and Reigl refer to as the absolute or 'closed material individuality' of a thing, in terms of pure space insulated from the enclosing pressures of a time-ridden world. Great art works of this sort thus acquire a sort of loneliness (Rothenstein's 'enchanted solitude') about them, cut off as they are from the surrounding flux of time and the elements associated with it. They begin to exist as flames of pure colour, as music of silence, of pause that ensues when all sound has ceased to be.

IV

Evaluating Turner's abstractions in the light of Worringer's classification of art styles into naturalistic and non-naturalistic, with specific periods of history assigned to each of them, poses problems. Turner is a nineteenth century artist and his art the efflorescence of romanticism at its best. Worringer considers the nineteenth century as the pre-dominant period of naturalistic style unfit to promote the works of non-naturalistic style, the primary urge of the romantics being the urge to empathy and not to abstraction. The fact that the concept of empathy finds itself flourishing during the Romantic Era, is further confirmed by Worringer in the Notes to his *Abstraction and Empathy* : "The development of the problem of empathy extends back to Romanticism" (136, n. 2). The poser therefore is : why do we then find in the nature works of artists like Turner and Constable the manifestation of abstract and impressionistic way of representation ? If the art of an age is to be judged by the major works of its leading lights, then Turner's and Constable's works need to be assessed in terms of their technique which relevals a movement towards non-linear, near-abstract, and impressionistic modes of expression. And this despite their tendency to empathize with the various aspects of nature, ranging from the pastoral to the sublime. A clear outcome of all this is a sense

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of unfinished perfection that invariably accompanies works of this nature.

To forestall all such objections, Joseph Frank, in a footnote to his article, says, "...it might be pointed out that neither Worringer nor the present writer regard these distinctions as absolute in any but a theoretical sense. These different styles are ideal constructions, to which the art of various periods has approximated in greater or lesser degree. Elements of both styles may be found in all periods; cultures are spoken of as creating one or the other on the basis of predominance, not of absolute exclusion."[15] This, however, seems to me to be an arrested defence, for Frank here talks primarily in terms of periods, and not in terms of individual artists in whom the elements of either style may be found in predominance, depending upon tne degree to which their art, at a given period of their life, may heavily lean towards. Perhaps the only solution, therefore, that can be offered to this problem is that while Worringer confines himself to the consideration of art styles in terms of historical periods in studying the evolution of the plastic arts, he should also have taken into account at least the cases of such individual geniuses (or shall we say, 'freaks of nature'?) as Turner and Constable, whose works progressively represent a variety of styles ranging from naturalistic to non-naturalistic, within the span of a single life-time. Had Worringer done so, he would have noticed how both styles, *In varying degrees,* could exist side by side not only in a given historical period, which indeed is a very broad generalization, but also in the life-time of a single artist, depending upon his *own* approach to nature and his *own* will-to- form in a particular style. This is all the more true of the Romantics, whose art, reflecting the spirit of the age, as does the art of any other age, goes beyond it all to add something more to itself and that is to reflect the spirit of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the artists themselves. Art, in the hands of the Romantics, becomes a highly personalised expression of their individual style. Art, to put it in words that Zola used in connection with Cezanne's painting, becomes here 'a corner of nature seen through a temperament' (1866).

This sort of art, as Wylie Sypher would have it, is not 'ready made,' but 'being made', not something given, but taken, permeated with meanings conferred upon it by the contemplative self of the artist, representing the artist's truth. The object is no more permitted to exist as something fixed and dead 'out there' in nature, but represented as a symbol of the artist's unique sensibility. This is subjectivity, and "Subjectivity, as Kirkegaard has stated, 'is truth.'. "The romantic painter," observes Sypher, "no longer wished to present images from the outside world only. Instead, his spirit imbued the world, changing its features and transcending its objects." [16] Nature, treated as a 'reflex of the self' (Sypher's phrase), is created anew with the artist's signature writ all across its face. Romantic painting thus becomes highly illustrative of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the world, according to which, it is no more to be treated as something existing independently of our consciousness, but as *our* idea of the world. Talking of Turner's mature art in this connection, Sypher avers, "Turner is among the romantic painters who represent the world as a form of consciousness—which is romanticism in a phrase. Turner's methods trace back to Claude's use of light and colour; but Turner's vision is more subjective than Claude's. Turner is the British counterpart of Delacroix, and what Baudelaire wrote of Delacroix he might have written of Turner. The painter, Baudelaire says, must create another world of his own, which Baudelaire calls the New : The true artist, the true poet, should only paint in accordance with what he sees and with what he feels'. Then he gains his harmony—the harmony of Turner's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

evaporating vision, a 'rich, joyful, or melancholy impression upon the soul,' making the painter a hypnotist, as if he could project thought at a distance. Baudelaire said that Delacroix's colour 'thinks for itself' apart from the object it clothes. It is as abstract as thoughts can be, and reminds us again that the romantic painter represents the world as his consciousness of the world." [17]

What is true in case of Delacroix, is equally true of Turner whose colours speak their own language and whose art becomes an ideate correlative of the artist's self. This is what makes a Turnerian landscape inseparable from the history of the artist's mind. The objective world of nature acquires a significant form only through the play of the artist's consciousness which is brought to bear upon it for shaping it according to its own will. Individual history enters into landscape in the form of reflexive consciousness. Even the most sublime and abstractly painted scenes of nature, such as *Fire at Sea, Snowstrom, Avalanche* and *Inundation,* or *Snowstrom* (1942) would merely remain theatrical pieces of art, were they not used us means to make the painter aware of the rising power of his imagination.

The non–naturalistic mode of representation that Turner achieves in his later art is therefore not a result of his urge to abstraction, but of the transforming power of his imagination, of his all–assimilating consciousness that, all its intensity, goes out to incorporate the external world within its own orbit. Turner's art can be said to owe its excellence to this intensity, bearing out not the truth of Worringer's theory of abstraction, but Keats's statement about the true merit of a really genuine work of art : "The excellence of every art is its intensity capable of making all disagreeables evaporate from their being in close relationship to Beauty and Truth (Letter to George and Thomas Keats, 21 Dec. 1817). The disagreeables driven out by Turner

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

from the masterpieces of his late art are sharp edges and sinuous contours of all material bodies, veracity, chiaroscuro, finish, etc. What is retained behind is simply a pattern of interpenetrating and dilating ripples of colour suffused with the radiance of light that is both enriching and annihilating. Such a radical treatment of light and colour and the daringly original and imaginative use they are put to is what makes the art of Turner turn towards a near abstract expression. Colour is no more used for any decorative purpose, nor light to divide the visual composition into well defined geometrical portions of brightness and shadow. The apperceptive world is instead represented to use Worringer's words, in its abstract 'capable of forming a whole for the imagination' (*A & E*, 41). As he states, "It is a question of imagination, not of perception. For only in the reproduction of this closed whole of the imagination could man find an approximate substitute for the absolute material individuality of the thing" (*A & E*, 40).

All higher types of landscape, rising above the presentation of the mere sensuous, tend to become symbolic of the artist's more imaginative and intellectual concerns which do away with anything perceptually offensive or ugly to the eye. As Knight so very perceptively observes... "in the higher class of landscape, whether in nature or in art, mere sensual gratification of the eye is comparatively small, as scarcely to be attended to; but yet, if there occur a single spot ... offensively harsh and glaring ... all magic instantly vanishes, and the *imagination avenges the injury offered to the sense*" [18]. The conquest of the realm of the objective and the visible by the imagination is so very complete that a romantic artist of the stature of Turner, instead of confining himself to presenting the world of perceived objects in terms of facts, reveals it in its pristine purity, that is, in its most reduced form, by freeing it from all relativity and cluster of unwanted

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

appendages that are irritating and unwelcome to the eye. Turner's abstractions, to repeat, are *not* therefore the result of any urge to abstraction on his part, but of an overwhelming and all-consuming imagination that cannot brook the despotic presence of either finish or of facts *qna* facts. Subjectivity here, contrary to Worringer's view, instead of acting as an element of adulteration vitiating the presentation of an object in its absolute materiality, enables the artist to represent it in its crystalline beauty from his own private angle. Every major work of romantic art therefore becomes the expression of an intense poetic experience presented from an unexpected angle that saves the work from becoming a product of shared experience or common knowledge.

Moreover, for Worringer, the presupposition for the urge to abstraction is the outcome of man s unhappy and restless condition is the face of nature's confused flux of phenomena, which state he describes as the result of one's immense psychophysical dread of space. The vaster the space, the greater the fear and hence the need to render objects in terms of abstract forms that act as points of repose wherein man can find tranquillity from the happenings of the phenomenal world. Turner's abstractions *don't* fit within the framework of Worringer's condition for the urge to abstraction, as they are not the outcome of any fear of space whatsoever on the part of the artist, for, who among the romantic artists of the nineteenth century exhibited a greater love for the immense and vast spaces of nature than Turner? His gay abunden to the boundless and colossal exhibitions of nature and his rapturous delight in its awe-inspiring spectacles, ranging from the dizzy heights of the Alps to the vast watery expanses of the Atlantic, act as a living testimony of his ardent love for and his tremendous urge to empathize with the landscape of sublimity. It is this need for empathy that establishes

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'a happy, pantheistic relationship of confidence' between him and the world around him, whether it be the interior of Petworth House, the landscape around Norham Castle or the open splendour of the Alpine sublime. Thus, though Turner exhibits neither any fear nor any abhorrence of vastness in any form, whether horizontal, vertical or perspectival, his rendering of it, in one picture after another, such as *Hannibal Crossing the Alps, Snowstrom, Avalanche and Inundation. Fire at Sea, The Slaveship, Seascape* (C. 1840-5), *Val d' Aosta* (C. 1835-40), *Sun Setting over The Sea, Sunrise with a Sea Monster*, etc., in terms of near or total abstraction stands at variance with Worringer's view of non-naturalistic art which is essentially a product of man's basic fear of space. Turner's abstractions can finally be regarded as the outcome *not* of any tendeney to run away from, but to go all out to embrace and identify himself with the immense manifestations of space in nature, at once portentous, obscure and insecure. For Worringer it would be the other way round, the urge to abstraction being the result of man's primal fear of the three-dimensional space.

However, it is in these three vorticular formations of the mid-forties, such as *Light and Colour, Shade and Darkness*, and *The Angel Standing in the Sun* – the most representative examples of Turner's mythical imagination — that one can notice the absence of depth dimension, all the three traditional distances having been compressed into a flat circular surface containing only height and width. Turner completely succeeds here in presenting them at their most spatial, thus draining them of time-value associated with the depth dimension missing here. The transformation of depth relations into surface relations is here fully accomplished. What happens in the process is that his all-conquering imagination, by mediating between his self and his perception of the phenomena of the external world, trims them

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of all unwanted elements related to the third dimension to such a degree as to make the phenomenal fit enough to be transformed into the language of art. The objects, to be made worthy enough to find fixation in art, are so deprived of their denseness and impurities, and of their dependence upon the external nexus of life, that they come to be represented in their most rarefied form, the artist having divested them 'of all but the minimum of their conditional mode of manifestation' (*A & E*, 133). Turner's art accords here with Worringer's postulate of avoiding the depth dimension which, as observed earlier, is for him the most authentic dimension of space. While all the three paintings do contain associative elements, they are presented in such a manner as to do away with any inerpretation based on actual experience or history. *Light and Colour* and *Shade and Darkness*, in as much as they deal with the primal theme of deluge, operate on a level of imagination that is mythic rather than historical.

Light and Colour is no more than a 'seething womb of light' (Lindsay's words), a huge bubble of variegated colours containing within itself a microcosmic world of smaller prismatic bubbles, each one of which symbolizes a unit of life and hope, as short–lived as the bubble itself. Other figures in the picture such as Moses representing the recording angel writing the Book of Genesis or the serpent–image symbolic of new life after the deluge, signify the myth of creation. The whole picture, rendered in terms of a circular rim of light, throbs with the vitality of Goethe's 'plus' colours, capable, in Goethe's own words, of exciting feelings that are 'quick, lively, and aspiring' The companion piece of *Shade and Darkness*, with its down–sweeping arch of the sky forming a curve around the deluge below, is another classic study in Turner's abstract vorticular formation, representing theme of chaos before the creation, unlike the theme of calm after the creation represented in *Light and Colour*. The figures of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

animals struggling in the deluge in their effort to reach the dimly visible ark at the centre of the picture and the arc of dark birds hovering in the sky, add to the vitality and movement of the picture already made dynamic by the chaotic dance of nature's elemental forces. The painting, in contrast to its sister-piece, is sombre in mood, portray as it does the the theme of destruction in 'minus' colours productive according to Goethe, of 'restless, susceptible, anxious impressions.'

The Angel Standing in the Sun, another apocalyptic painting in vortiginious form, dealing with Biblical theme derived from the *Book of Revelation*, seems to be floating in an atmosphere that transcends all sense of recorded time or history. The Angel is not only an emanation of light, but stands for the forces of darkness and death as well, as it summons up the birds of prey flitting across the upper left-hand whirl of the vortex to feast upon :

> "...The flesh of mighty man, and the flesh of the horses, and of them that sit on them, both free and bound, both small and great." (*The Book of Revelation*, XIX, 17-18).

Apart from this passage, Turner also appended to the picture of quotation from Samuel Roger's *Voyage of Columbus* with a similar theme :

> 'The morning march that flashes to be sun;
> The feast of vultures when the day is done.'

It is interesting to note that Roger subtitled his poem as 'The Flight of an Angel of Darkness'. This seems to have given the idea to Turner to represent the light of the sun as a power at once beneficent (in its 'morning march') and devouring ('when the day is done') as it comes to identify itself with its counterpart, the 'Angel of Darkness'. Referring to this double sense in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which light is made to operate in the painting, Gowing observes, "Light is not only glorious and sacred, it is voracious, carnivorous, unsparing. It devours impartially, with distinction, the whole living world".[19] It is in this sense, as observed earlier, that light acts as a force that is at once creative and desctructive. In the all–absorbing glory of light, the figures in the painting seem to have bidden their final farewell to form. It is therefore little wonder that Turner came to look upon the sun the prime source of all light and most abstract of all heavenly deities, as his very god.[20]

It is paintings of such apocalyptic nature embodying Turner's transcendental vision that serve as effective 'types and symbols of eternity', torn as they are from the contingency and temporality of a world–order founded upon the framework of history of sensory cxperience. They strike the eye as the final apotheoses of Turner's life–long search for the essential nature of light bodying forth in terms of pure structures of colour, now tense, now lyrical, all resulting in a poetry of pigment *sans* form. Redeemed by the imagination that goes beyond the mere objective historical one, they seem to repose in a world that is timeless, liberated as it is from the tutelage of the 'cognate–organic' that dominates the corridors of the perceptive world as they extend into the third (depth) dimension of space.

For Turner's mastery of the depth dimension, one has only to turn to those golden visions of his, such as *Chichester Canal* (C, 1830–1), *Petworth Park* (1830), *Ulysses Deriding Polyphemus* (1829), and *The Fighting Temeraire* (1838), where the eye is at once drawn to the horizon, and where the sun, the symbol of cosmic vortex, shines in all its splendour fanning out its varicoloured light all across the sky. For his classic studies in abstraction, whether imaginative, derivative, or rooted in experience, one has only to glance at pictures like the *Interior at Pet-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

worth, Burning of the Houses of Parliament, Fire at Sea, Snowstrom, Avalanche and Inundation, Norham Castle : Sunrise, Rain, Steam and Speed, Snowstrom of 1842, Sun Setting over the Sea, Sunrise with a Sea Monster, Seascape, The Slaveship, etc., to convince oneself of Turner's command over the non-naturalistic way of representation with the depth-dimension altogether removed or only faintly presented. The eye perceives them as notning more than veiled areas of earth, sky and sea.

Summing up, one can safely assert that all such paintings of Turner accord well with Worringer's theory of abstraction and his concept of non-naturalistic style in so far as they succeed in avoiding the depth-dimension, and *don't* in so far as they are *not* the outcome—which they *never* are—of his disharmony with nature arising out of the dread of space, which he never had.

Department of English R. K. RAVAL
M. S. University
BARODA 390 002 (Gujarat)

NOTES

1. Originally published in the German in 1908. First translated into English by Michael Bullock and published by Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, in 1953.
2. William Worringer, *Abstraction and Empathy : A Contribution to the Pyschology of Style*, trans. Michael Bullock (London, 1953), p. 15. To be referred to as *A & E* in all subsequent citations.
3. Joseph Frank, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature", *Criticism : The Foundations of Modern Literary Judgment*, ed. Mark Schorer et. al, (Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1948), p. 389.
4. See T. E. Hulme, *Speculations*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1949), p. 89.
5. Joseph Frank, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

6. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Jack Lindsay, *Turner*, (Panther Books Ltd., Frogmone, St. Albans, Herts, 1975), p. 160.
9. M. H. Abrams, "The Correspondent Breeze", *English Romantic Poets*, ed. M. H. Abrams, (Oxford, 1975), p. 160.
10. Lawrence Gowing, *Turner : Imagination and Reality*, (M. O. M. A.,) New York, 1966), p. 53.
11. Frederick A. Pottle, "Eye and Object in the Poetry of Wordsworth", *Romanticism and Consciousness*, ed. Harold Bloom, (W. W. Norton Co., New York, 1970), p. 248.
12. John Rothenstein, *Turner*, (Faber and Faber, London, 1949) Introd., p. 24.
13. Quoted by William Vaughan, *Romantic Art*, (Thames and Hudson, London, 1978), p. 173.
14. Graham Reynolds, *Turner*, (Thames & Hudson, London, 1974), p. 149
15. Joseph Frank, *op. cit.*, p. 390, n. 5.
16. Wylie Sypher, *Loss of the Self in Modern Literature and Art*, (A Vintage Book, New York, 1962), p. 56.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 47–8.
18. Quoted by W. J. Hipple (Jr.) '*The Beautiful, The Sublime and The Picturesque*', (Carbondale. Illinois, 1957), p. 259. Italics mine.
19. Lawrence Gowing, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
20. Turner's death-bed utterance, 'The Sun is God', rings with sincerity as it more than amply points to his faith in the sun, his life-long passion and object of devotion.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE LATE MR. MARTIN SACHS MEMORIAL ESSAY COMPETITION

Essays are invited for the Late Mr. Martin Sachs Memorial Essay Competition **in English** from students below the age of 25 years studying in any Indian educational institution on the theme "Modern Society and Tragic Sense of Life" for the First and Second prizes to be awarded respectively of Rs. 300/- and 200/- to the essays adjudicated to be so by a panel of referees appointed for the purpose. The prize-winning essays would be published, in course of time, in the Students' Supplement of the **Indian Philosophical Quarterly,** a quarterly journal of the Department. The conditions governing submission of essays for the competition are as follows :

1. The essay typed in double space on one side of the paper must be submitted in duplicate.
2. The essay must not be longer than 2500 words.
3. The essay must be accompanied by a certificate signed by the Head of the Institution / Department where the student is studying to the effect that
   (a the student is studying in that institution and is below the age of 25 years, and
   (b) the essay is written by him / her.
4. The essays should reach Dr. P. P. Gokhale, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Ganeshkhind, Pune 411 007 not later than 31-10-1988.
5. The decision of the panel of referees shall be binding on all the competitors and that no correspondence of any kind would be entertained on that count.

The Head,
Philosophy Department
University of Poona, Ganeshkhind,
Pune-411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 4,
October, 1988

THE DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL TALENTS AS A SOCIAL ASSET

Macpherson suggested that English political thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries had an underlying unifying assumption, which he called 'possessive individualism' and he went on to suggest "that central difficulties of liberal–democratic thought from John Stuart Mill to the present might be better understood if they were seen to have been set by the persistence and deep–rootedness of that assumption."[1] (1962, p. 111) According to him it presupposes "the conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them." (1962, p. 3) In his analysis, since the individual is the sole proprietor of his own person and he is free from any but self interested contractual relations with others, his society is nothing but a series of relations of exchange i. e., a series of market relations (1962, pp. 271–272). This doctrinal intimacy of liberalism with capitalism was seen as fatal for the former since it undermined the very basis of political obligation in our times. According to Macpherson two assumptions are needed for a valid theory of political obligation. Firstly, "individuals of whom the society is composed must see themselves or must be capable of seeing themselves as equal in some respect more fundamental than all the respects in which they are unequal". (1962, p. 272). Secondly "there be a cohesion of self-interest among all those who have a voice in choosing the government, sufficient to off set the centrifugal forces of the possessive market society." (1962, p. 273). Both

Received : 15–12–86

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

these assumptions are invalid today according to Macpherson. The rising industrial working class no longer see themselves fundamentally equal in subjection to the determination of the market. Even the system of market is seen neither as inevitable nor as rightful and with the universal franchise there is no longer the assurance of cohesion among all those with a political voice (1962, pp. 273–74).

Rawls of course does not mention Machpherson or his diagnosis of the difficulty of justifying liberalism, yet he can be seen as having responded to this very challenge. He tries successfully to sever the doctrinal connection between liberalism and capitalism by making his principles of justice independent of the possessive indivldualism.

Rawls in his *A Theory of Justice* writes " We see then that the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favoured by nature, who ever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.... ...No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favourable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate." (pp. 101–102). In a later article also Rawls argues, "we must ask: In the light of what principle can free and equal moral persons permit their relations to be affected by social fortune and natural lottery? Since no one deserves his place in the distribution of talents, nor his starting place in society, desert is not an answer... Now when the maximin criterion is followed the natural distribution of abilities is viewed in some respect as a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

collective asset. While an equal distribution might seem more in keeping with the equality of free moral persons, at least if the distribution were a matter of choice, this is not a reason for eliminating natural variations, much less destroying unusual talents To the contrary, natural variations are recognized as an opportunity, particularly since they are often complementary and form a basis for social ties. Institutions are allowed to exploit the full range of abilities provided the resulting inequalities are no greater than necessary to produce the corresponding advantages for the less fortunate." [3] (1974, pp. 144–145).

In the possessive individualism a man's talent was accepted as his own asset. This assumption, which was implicit in Hobbes's claim in *Leviathan* that, "a man's labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing" [4] (Ch. 24, p. 189) was stated categorically by Locke in his second *Treatise on Government*, "... every Man has a *property* in his own person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The *Labour* of his Body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his." [5] (sec. 26) Rawls has directly challenged this axiom of the classical individualism, an axiom which has been accepted in toto by the modern day libertarians, including its arc champion Robert Nozick.

No doubt Nozick was the first thinker to comment on the view that the distribution of natural abilities be viewed as a "collective asset." He complained, "People will differ in how they view regarding natural talents as a common asset. Some will complain achoing Rawls against utilitarianism that this "does not take seriously the distinction between persons," and they will wonder whether any reconstruction of Kant that treats people's abilities and talents as resources for others can be adequate. "The two principles of justice rule out even the tendency to regard men as means to one another's welfare."

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Only if one presses *very* hard on the distinction between men and their talents, assets, abilities, and special traits. Whether any coherent conception of a person remains when the distinction is so pressed is an open question. Why we think particular traits should be cheered, that (only) the thus purified men with us are not regarded as means is also unclear." [6] (1974, p. 228)

Michael Sandel, a critic of contemporary liberalism, cheering Nozick from the wings, not only endorsed these arguments but also turned the claim that Rawls's theory presupposes a conception of the self "... shorn of all its contingently given attributes", into a full fleged instrument of interpreting Rawl's *A Theory of Justice* in particular and contemporary liberalism in general in his *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.* [7] And also he added arguments of his own from the communitarian point of view, of which he is an ardent advocate. He argued, 'The liberal's emphasis on sharing would seem to require a strong theory of of community–an account, that is, of the way our identity as citizens is shaped by our common aims and endeavours. But it is unclear how a theory of community such as this could fit with liberalism's individualist aspiration". [8] (1948, p. 227) He further argues, "The arbitrariness of an individual's assets argues only against the proposition that the individual owns them or has a privileged claim to their benefit, not in favour of the proposition that some particular society owns them or has a privileged claim with respect to them" (1948, p. 232). Commenting on the Rawlsian claim that the natural telents regarded as social assests be used to arrange the distributive scheme to benefit the least advantaged members of the society, he writes, "First, there is no such thing as "the society as a whole"... Each of us moves in an indefinite number of communities, some more inclusive than others, each making different claims on our allegiance, and there is no saying in advance which is *the* society or community whose

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

purpose should govern the disposition of any particular set of our attributes and endowments. Second, if there is no such thing af "*the* society as a whole", taken in abstract, then it would seem unlikely that any particular society, arbitrarily identitfied, could have any greater claim to some particular set of endowments than the individual in whom they accidentally reside, for surely their location within he province of such an arbitrarily identified community could be no less arbitrary from a moral point of view... Finally, unless it is possible to identify the relevant community, acorss which "my" assets are properly shared and to establish its credentials,... Rawls's notion of common assets have the effect either of contradicting the central Kantian and Rawlsian injunction against using some as means to other's ends, or evading this contradiction by relaxing altogether the bounds between the self and the other, thus failing to take seriously the distinction between persons." (1984, p. 236).

But the sharpest indictment of Ralws's view has come from Charles Fried, "...Rawls's celebrated maximin proposal is ambiguous about the extent to which a person's talents, ambition, character are or are not social assets only provisionally assigned by the morally irrelevant hazard of what he calls the natural lottery. To the extent that maximin allows the better endowed to hold out for higher income in exchange for their contribution to the situation of the worst–off, it seems to recognize a moral title in those endowments after all. But if there is such a moral title then one wonders how an obligation to contribute what is one's own arises at all. Rawls's suggestion that the better endowed are indeed entitled to enjoy the fruits of their greater endowments but only to the extent that this improves the situation of the least well off hardly lays these doubts to rest, but rather just restates the initial proposition"? (1982, p. 92).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In my yiew Charles Fried has made a mistake. For Rawls allows the better endowed to hold out for higher income not because of any recognition of moral title in endowments but because of considerations rooted in individual autonomy. Justice as fairness forbids any use of force to elicit the use of individual endowments which are social assets even in face of the reluctance of individuals because of their limited sympathy to voluntarily use their endowments for the social purpose, since it recognizes the autonomy of the individual to schedule his capacities in his plan of life. Use of force will violate this autonomy. So the only option left is to give incentive to persons to elicit willing contribution to the social good which in justice as fairness is the maximisation of the welfare of the worst off. Hence those better endowed are allowed to retain higher income so long as they contribute to the welfare of the worst off.

Of course Nozick will reply that it is a false autonomy. "Taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour ... taking the earnings of n hours labour is like taking n hours from the person, it is like forcing the person to work n hours for anothers purpose" (1974, p. 169). This argument can be analysed by taking an example given by Nozick himself for a different purpose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction.... He signs the following sort of contract with a team. In each home game, twenty five cents from the price of each ticket of admission goes to him.... The season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team's games, they buy their tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty five cents of their admission price into a special box with Chamberlain's name on it.... Let us suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $ 250,000, a much larger sum than the average income and larger even than any one else has',

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(1974, p. 161). Now Nozick of course is interested in asking "Is he entitled to this sum? Is this new distribution... unjust? If so, why?" But we will ask and I hope Nozick will not be unwilling to ask himself, whether raking a part of Wilt Chamberlain's income as tax to improve the lot of the worst off is forcing him to labour for others if only for a few hours or not? Now the answer is not so obvious. According to Gauthier, and I think he is right, if Wilt Chaimberlain will not play and will decide to retire if he does not get the whole of $ 250,000, then taking part of that income by tax will amount to forcing him to work.[10] (1986, p. 275). But suppose he will be willing to play for anything from $ 100,000 and above but will not play for less, then surplus $ 150,000, over the minimum for which he will be willing to play, if taken as tax will not interfere with his decision to play. (1986, pp. 275–76) Is he still being forced when such surplus is taken away? Rawls's answer will be in the negative. It is perfectly consistent with the autonomy of the person to *force* him to part with the surplus above the minimum for which he will be willing to work, for the banefit of the worst off. As David Gauthier has pointed out this surplus is the factor rent. "If Nozick would treat the right to factor rent as a component of liberty, John Rawls would not only demand its confiscation, but its redistribution so that in effect the surplus represented by rent would be enjoyed by those lacking the factors" (1986, p. 276). And of course Rawlsian move will violate no one's autonomy since freedom to collect factor rent is no part of the autonomy of the individual to use his capacities as he chooses, since "the surplus represented by rent arises only through interaction" in the society (1986 p. 276).

Since the distribution of factors is arbitrary from a moral point of view, Rawls does not give the right to collect the factor rent to the individual, for this will be to give individuals which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

they do not deserve. Here Sandel's objection comes to the fore. Arbitrariness of the distribution of natural talent is an argument against individual ownership of the talents and hence against the individuals right to collect the factor rent. But it does not automatically mean that the society owns the factors and hence has a right to factor rent.

I think Rawls's reply will be that "Nor,... can we view the abilities and talents of individuals as fixed natural gifts; even if there is an important genetic component. The abilities and talents cannot come to fruition apart from social conditions and as realized they always take but one of many possible forms. An ability is not, for example, a computer in the head with a definite measurable capacity unaffected by social circumstances. Among the elements affecting the realization of natural capacities are social attitude of encouragement and support and the institutions concerned with their training and use. Thus, even a potential ability at any given time is not something unaffected by existing social forms and particular contigencies over the course of life up to that moment." [11] (1977, p. 160) It is society's contribution to the deveolpment of the natural talent that makes it the owner of the talent and hence it the right to factor rent which again arises only through interaction in the society. It is surprising that Gauthier objected, "That each individual's capacities are actualized within a social nexus does not make them collective rather than individual assets, or afford any ground for treating them as part of the common capital of the group within which the individual is formed. In putting those assets to his own use the individual does not take from others what is rightfully theirs since those others do not own him, although it does not follow that he simply uses what is rightfully his own" (1986, p. 253). It is correct that prior to our deciding it the individual's capacities are neither "rightfully his" nor

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"rightfully society's." So the question is how to balance the conflicting claims. To settle in favour of individual is as arbitrary as to settle exclusively in favor of society. So Rawls's solution is that the society has the ownership of the talents and hence has the right to collect the factor rent while individual has the autonomy to use the capacities as he chooses and hence has the right to collect the payment for costs arising from opportunities forgone. The classical individualists like Hobbes and Locke and Modern Liberatarian's like Nozick have failed to recognize any claim of society on the distribution of natural talent, which is very one sided and arbitrary.

Now we must face the question : which is " the society as a whole " or the single " ultimate " community to own the natural talents ? Here we must concede to Sandel that liberalism in general and Rawls in particular has failed to give a satisfactory answer to this question. Rawls's just society turns out to be the nation state. (1971, p. 378) which is not only an accidental product of history and hence arbitrary from a moral point of view but also quite parochial. He is open to the charge made by Sandle, " it would seem unlikely that any particular society, arbitrarily identified, could have any greater claim to some particular set of endowments than the individual in whom they accidentally reside, for surely their location within the province of such an arbitrarily identified community could be no less arbitrary from a moral point of view." (1985, p. 236) But it is not impossible to give a Rawlsian answer to the fundamental problem raised by Sandel within Rawlsian framework. Since according to Rawls, " it is precisely the moral persons who are entitled to equal justice " the capacity for moral personality i.e., having capacity for a sense of justice and capacity to understand one's conception of the good is a sufficient condition for membership of just society. Hence the pre-eminent society who must

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

own the talents can be nothing less than the society consisting of all the persons having the moral personality, which includes, barring fringe cases, the entire human race. This world society is the only society consistent with Rawlsian liberalism, in fact with any liberalism.

By treating the natural talents as social assets has Rawls violated the Kantian precept which says : " Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. "[12] (Kant, 1969, p. 91) ? Of course one can question beggingly give this precept a meaning so that it cannot be satisfied unless the natural distribution of talents is treated as an individual asset. But what does the precept require in its original meaning ? Kant was quite clear. A person is treated as a means when he is made to do an action such that he "cannot himself share the end of the action" (1969, p. 92) and persons are treated as ends in an action when they are treated " only as beings, who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action" (1969, p. 92). But this is merely the negative requirement. The positive requirement of the humanity as an end in itself is that "every one endeavours also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends of others. For the ends of a subject who is an end in himself, must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends." (1969, pp. 92–93). Given this Kantian understanding of the precept it is clear Rawls's treatment of the natural capacities of the better endowed neither violates the negative nor the positive requirement. The negative requirement is not violated since the individual is given the right to retain the minimum amount on which he is willing to work. The positive requirement is not violated since the surplus of the individuals labour is used by society to further the ends of the least well-off.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Does this amount to "relaxing altogether the bounds between the self and the other", thus a failure to "take seriously the distinction between persons"? I think the answer is in the negative. Since Rawls recognizes the right of each individual to organize his own life and hence his capacities as he chooses, the distinction between persons is respected. The taking of the surplus over the minimum for which a person will be willing to work, to give to others in need does not "relax" the bounds between the self and the others, since the individual to begin with never had the right to that surplus, he never had the right to the factor rent, and others are given the surplus not on the ground that they are the part of his own self. In fact the idea of natural talents as social assets does not require any conception of the community which partakes in the identity and interests of the individual or which is constitutive of persons, self identity. The idea of the common end which Rawls requires while defining the idea of social union, is merely formal. The common end that Rawls has in mind is the end that the distinct and separate individuals pursue goals of their own choice but whithin the limits of principle of justice. To pursue this end is not to pursue a collective goal like enhancement of national glory but only to adjust one's goods within the principles of justice. Rawlsian common goal is not another end over and above the individuals own goal. Hence, Sandel's objection that the liberalism's emphasis on sharing would require a conception of constitutive community engaging the identity and interest of individuals inconsistent with its individualist aspirations does not hold good.

Does the claim that the idea of common asset presses hard the distinction between person and his capacity leaving behind only a bare individual hold good? The answer is in the negative. It may be recalled that the classical individualists and the modern libertarians make a distinction between selling oneself and selling

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

one's labour. When the labour is sold it becomes the labour of his who has purchased it. If this does not press hard the distinction between a person and his labour (mind you: the person is not sold for that is slavery, only the labour is sold as that is wage contract) then neither does the claim that the natural talent is a collective asset. Rawls leaves the person quite thick with his capacities and allows him the liberty to use it as he chooses and gives him the right to collect the payment for costs arising from opportunities forgone in making use of the capacity in any particular way. In fact to read in Rawls's idea that distribution of natural talents is a "collective asset" or "common asset," a full fleged modern property right over the natural talents of individuals vested in the society, is a mistake.

When faced with Sandel's objections against his own theory, Dworkin replied that, "It seeams to me, in fact, a great mistake to bring ownership or possession of talents into the discussion at all... Indeed, the idea of ownership, either of talents or of material goods has, I think, no useful role to play in the abstract levels of political theory, because it is parasitic on rather than generative of basic principles of political and personal morality." [13] (1982, p. 292)

This Dworkinian reply is open to Rawls, for him to treat distribution of natural talents as a "common asset" or a "collective asset" is to accept the difference principle, he does not mean to give the former as an independent argument to support the latter. The premises of Rawls's argument are the arbitrariness of distribution of talents, and development of talent by active participation of society and not the commonality of the natural talent, it is rather a conclusion of the argument.

Before we close one more objection must be discussed. David Gauthier claims, "...Rawls distinguishes factor rent from payment for factor services, agreeing with our view that each

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

person is entitled to the latter, but supposing that the former, instead of being divided equally among all co–operators, is to be used to the benefit of the least advantaged. And this is a denial of basic liberty in the context of co–operation. If each contributes equally to the production of the co–operative surplus, then each is entitled to an equal share in that surplus, Rawls fails to recognize this entitlement". (1986, p. 277) Gauthier's claim that not to share the factor rent equally is to deny the basic liberty in the context of co–operation at best is unsupported by argument at worst is a misunderstanding of what autonomy requires. Neither is it true that each contributes equally to the co–operative surplus, for the unequal distribution of talent leads to unequal contribution to the surplus. The reason behind difference principle is the Marxian precept "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need". Each contributes to the pool of surplus factor rent according to his ability and the least well off receives this because of their greater need.

Philosophy Department **BINOD KUMAR AGARWALA**
Lucknow University
LUCKNOW 226 007 (U.P.)

NOTES

1. Macpherson, C. B., *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism : Hobbes to Locke*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962.
2. Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge : Belnap Press of the Harvard University, 1971.
3. Rawls, John, "Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion" *American Economic Review*, 64, Papers and Proc., (May, 1974).
4. Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, ed. W. G. Pogson Smith, Oxford, 1929.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. Locke, John, *Two Treatises on Government*, ed. Peter Laslett Cambridge, 1960.

6. Nozick, Robert, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1974.

7. Sandel, Michael, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge, University Press, 1982.

8. Sandel, Michael, "Liberalism and the Claim of Community : The Case of Affirmative Action", in *Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence*, ed. Marshall Cohen (Duckworth, 1984).

9. Fried, Charles, "Is Liberty Possible"? *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Vol. III, 1982.

10. Gauthier, David, *Morals by Agreement*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.

11. Rawls, John, "Basic Structure as the Subject" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 1977.

12. Kant, Immanuel, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, tr. H. J. Paton in *Moral Law*, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1969.

13. Dworkin, Ronald, "A Reply by Ronald Dworkin" in *Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence*, ed. Marshall Cohen (Duckworth, 1984).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 4,
October, 1988

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE : TOWARDS A CREATIVE INTERACTION

This paper begins by looking at the recent controversy over the question whether science as an activity can be explained in purely sociological terms. After briefly elucidating the problem in section I and setting certain records straight in section II, the paper, in section III, suggests a new orientation for philosophy of science such that both philosophy of science and sociology of science can extricate themselves from the stalemate that characterises the present debate and interact meaningfully at a new level and within a new framework constituted by hitherto unasked or neglected questions. In conceiving and advocating such a framework the paper takes its main clue from a problem Kuhn raises at the end of his magnum opus *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Needless to say, since the purpose of the paper is more constructive than critical the line of thinking is more rhizomatic than deductive.

I

The rival parties involved in the controversy are characterized as 'rationalists' whose views have dominated philosophy of science till recently and 'sociologists of science' (or better, 'Sociologicists') who have challenged the hold of the former. The central tenet of rationalism is that the 'essence' of science consists in its adoption of a method whose elucidation and articulation is the task of philosophy of science in performing

Received : 26-2-87

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which it provides an adequate account of the nature of scientific activity. Because scientists use that method disinterestedly and rigorously their community is rationality personified and institutionalized. In short, the central slogan of the rationalist camp is 'The Method is the Message.' Hence, 'rationalism' is also called 'methodolgism.'

As against methodolgism, sociologism maintains that since science, like any other human activity, is a social phenomenon, its social determination is constitutive of its essence and therefore, the terms of its adequate account must be primarily sociological. Mainly due to the loosening of the hold of methodolgists consequent upon the work of Kuhn and Feyerabend, sociologism has come out recently in its full force. Its most effective spokesmen, Bloor and Barnes, who lead the Edinberg school of sociology of science, have propounded what is called 'Strong Programme' in sociology of science. One of the central tenets of the strong programme is that both true and false scientific theories, both rational and irrational scientific beliefs are equally amenable to sociological explanation. The explanation of the false and/or the irrational in science is symmetrical with that of the true and/or the rational. In so far as the symmetrical explanation is possible, the very distinction between true and/or rational scientific beliefs on the one hand and false and/or irrational scientific beliefs on the other, becomes questionable and even spurious. And in so far as Philosophy of Science as methodolgy of science is parasitic upon such a distinction its very identity and authenticity as an autonomous discipline becomes questionable.

It is precisely this contention that sets in motion the controversy between methodologism and sociologism. The methodologists who quite rightly see a threat to the very autonomy of their discipline reject the contention that the whole of science is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

amenable to sociological treatment. They leave for the sociologists of science only those cases which deviate from the path, legitimated by the canons of scientific method. They assert, as Laudan contends, what is normal (i.e., rational) needs no explanation, including sociological; only the aberrations need explanation, possibly sociological one.[1] Of course, Laudan concedes to the sociologists of science "*exploration of the social determinants of problem* – weighting, since that phenomenon... seems intuitively to be subject to pressures of class, nationality, finance and other social institutions."[2] It should be noted that Laudan affords to concede this since for him the selection of problems is of peripheral significance to science, the locus of whose rationality lies not in the problems selected but in the way in which it successfully solves them. However, Lakatos, another prominent methodologist, goes further and claims that the rationalist will ultimately be able to reclaim the ground he has surrendered to the sociologist of science once he develops a better theory of rationality.[3]

Offended by the attempts of the methodologists to carve out for their rivals an area characterized by peripherality, delinquency and provisionality, the sociologists of science make a strong case for rejecting the picture of science drawn by the methodologists and contend that, that picture is painted with untenable dichotomies and dubious distinctions. In the process, the territorial fight between the two academic disciplines results in a clash of two points of view concerning the nature of science and what constitutes its understanding.[4]

It is not intended here to go into the details of the debate which is briefly mentioned here to be treated as a point of departure in formulating a third point of view. The third point of view is prompted by the post-positivist developments in philosophy of science. It rejects the methodologist's claim that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the only task of philosophy of science is the articulation of the method of science, the supposed locus of scientific rationality. It is opposed to sociologism to the extent that it refuses to share the latter's contention that once the slogan "The Method is the message" is shown to be hollow, philosophy of science loses its claim for independent existence. Instead of viewing the emergence of sociology of science as a threat to philosophy of science, the view maintained here construes it to be a natural sequel to the collapse of methodolgists' hold resulting in the setting at naught a picture of science that has been meticulously sustained since Renaissance. The very breakdown of rationalism placed philosophy of science within the nexus of new relations. The relation between philosophy of science and sociology of science is one such relation in explicating which philosophers of science ought to redefine their domain of activity. The emergence of a full-blooded sociology of science is thus an occasion for redefining the sphere of philosophy of science.

However, the elucidation of the third point of view, as said earlier, is mainly based on a clue from a question Kuhn raises. Before coming to this point it is necessary to clarify the relation between Kuhn and sociology of science, including and especially, its strong Programme.

II

There is a strong impression among many that Kuhn is mainly responsible for the emergence of a fullblooded sociology of science. This impression is unwarranted. To a great extent this is made clear by Barry Barnes in a recent article.[5] Undoubtedly Kuhn "explains stability ... in science sociologically, in terms of the existence of potent mechanisms of socialisation and social control."[6] Also according to Kuhn, the question whether a perceived anomaly is a puzzle or a symptom of a deep crisis of the reigning paradigm cannot be settled except in terms of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

preferences of the scientific community. Further, for him, the issues concerning the paradigm choice can not be thrashed out by logic and experiments alone. In other words, the criteria which are used while choosing among competing paradigms and the criteria on which the superiority of the new paradigm over the old one is 'established' are too complex and too unique to the situation at hand to be expressed in the neutral idiom of logic and laboratory operations. The criteria and their use can only be understood in terms of a-rationally held values of the scientific community as a sociological entity. The very notion of a paradigm cannot but be explicated in sociological terms. "If the term 'paradigm' is to be successfully explicated" Kuhn says, "Scientific communities must first be recognised as having an independent existence."[7] This means that the concept of scientific community is more fundamental than the concept of paradigm. In short, by repudiating the power of autonomous individual reason and rejecting the individualistic account of research and pointing to the scientific community as the pillar of scientific stability and as piloting the locomotives of scientific change, Kuhn stands directly against rationalism, the received view whose individualistic account of science is in perfect harmony with the ideology of liberalism.[8]

Yet Kuhn's departure from the received tradition is not as radical as it appears. In fact he very much accepts the status given to science in the rationalist school. He only provides an alternative account of how science attains that status.[9] Secondly, the terms 'social' and 'sociological' in Kuhn connote nothing more than 'communital.' That is to say, the 'sociological' in Kuhn is only invoked to bring to bear the needs and requirements, the choices and preferences, the values and evaluations of scientific community as a professional group or sub-culture. Nothing more is implied. In fact if by 'positivism' we mean a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

scientistic self-understanding of sciences' to use Habermas' phrase,[10] Kuhn does not go much beyond positivism.

As if not to give any impression that he means by these terms or includes in their connotation anything like broader social factors, he says :

> it (*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*) can be understood as an attempt to explain why the evolution of the more highly developed sciences is more fully, though by no means completely, insulated from its social milieu than that of such disciplines as engineering medicine, law and the arts."[11]

Again,

> ... compared with other professional and creative pursuits, the practitioners of a *mature* science are effectively insulated from the cultural milieu in which they live their extra-professional lives.[12]

Nothing more is needed to ward off the impression that anything like a substantial justification for a strong programme in sociology of science can be got from Kuhn. With this we will come to the elucidation of the third point of view.

III

After drawing an analogy between political and scientific revolutions and plotting the evolution of science on the non-teleological line of biological evolution as conceived by Darwin, Kuhn says :

> Anyone who has followed the argument this far will nevertheless feel the need to ask why the evolutionary process should work. *What must nature, including man, be like in order that science be possible at all ?* ... The world of which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> that community, (the scientific community) is a part must also possess quite special characteristics, and we are no closer than we were at the start to knowing what these must be. That problem–what must world be like in order that man may know it–was not, however, created by this essay. On the contrary, it is as old as science itself, and *it remains unanswered.* [13]

The question raised in the above passage is very much like the question "How is kgowledge possible?" – the central question of Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason.* Hence we can call this question the Kantian question [14] Since this question concerns the very nature of Being (i. e., Man and Nature) in relation to the possibility and actuality of science, this question is an ontological question. If and in so far as philosophy of science takes this as its central question, philosophy of science becomes, primarily, ontology of seience as distinct from mere epistemology of science which it is at present as is borne out by the fact that it is sometimes called, somewhat clumsily, scientific epistemology. Assuming such a metamorphosis of philosophy of science from epistemology of science to ontology of science, let us see what will be its various dimensions. This would, perhaps, make the metamorphosis less Kafkaean than it would otherwise appear.

The above mentioned ontological question can be decomposed into two questions : one, "What should the physical nature be like in order that science be possible?" and two, "what should man be like in order that science be possible?" Since man is biological and a social being, the second question itself can be further decomposed into, one, "what should the biology of man be like in order that science is possible?" and two, "what should the society be like in order that science is possible?" Thus, our central ontological question is divided into three sub-question concerning the physical world, the biological world of man and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the social world of man. We can say, therefore, that philosophy of science construed as ontology of science, has three dimensions which can be characterized as Metaphysics, Metabiology and Metasociology of science.

It should be noted that metaphysics of science conceived in this fashion is a different type of activity from building metaphysical theories on the basis of some particular scientific theories as did Whitehead and some others in recent times. But, in construing metaphysics of science on the above lines we are not going away from the historical tradition. Emile Meyerson's work *Identity and Reality* to which Kuhn acknowledges his indebtedness is a paradigm work in that direction.

Metabiology of science deals with the question how certain concepts germane to the very possibility of science are to be traced to the organic needs of human species as construed in our conception of biological evolution. In one important way, this has been brought out very well by the 'temperate' rationalist–Newton–Smith.

> Take for instance the question as to why we believe that collecting instances of generalization increases the probability that a generalization is true. A philosopher may explain this as a conceptual consequence of some general concept of what it is to have evidence. But that only prompts the question: why do we possess that concept rather than another? In the end it is probably only to be accounted for within some evolutionary framework in which the development and longivity of concepts is in part explained by reference to their utility in preserving our species.

Obviously this needs the enlarging of the concepts of adaptation and environment to include human cultures while firmly retaining the biological core of these concepts.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But the most important dimension of philosophy of science as ontology of science concerns the question " what should society be like in order that science be possible ?" In other words, philosophy of science as metasociology attempts to construct a social ontology in terms related to the question of the possibility of science Such an ontology provides the theoretical back–drop which facilitates the working of sociology of science in its search for explaining specific modes of scientific practice. In what follows, some of the conceivable characteristics of such an endeavour are briefly mentioned.

It needs hardly to be stressed that the nucleus of social ontology is the idea of praxis. In their social existence men perceive themselves and their world in terms of certain concepts and categories determined by their knowledge of what they are and what they ought to be and shape them accordingly. The nexus of these concepts and categories is woven into the very texture of their praxis. It is this which lends praxis specificity and plurality. The pluralistic character of the mode of social praxis should be axiomatic for any attempt to build a social ontology. In other words, the recognition of the divergent trends of scientific practice traceable to their roots in the divergent modes of social praxis must be the starting point. But at the same time a global conception of praxis cannot also be eschewed. One of the most significant challenges to metasociology of science is to show in connection with the possibility of science how the possibility of a global theory of social praxis in no way entails the monolith of socio–economic formation. In other words, it should point out how a general theory concerning what society must be like in order that science is possible, in no way logically precludes the possibility of divergent traditions of scientific practice. In doing this, philosophy of science provides sociology of science the theoretical safeguards against ethnocen-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

trism hitherto characteristic of philosophical, historical and sociological studies of science as reflected in their latent or blatant presumption that science is basically a western phenomenon.[17] Thus, whereas metaphysical and metabiological aspects of ontology of science might account only for the 'universal' component of science, metasociology does justice to the 'specificity' of scientific practice.

Secondly, metasociology should provide sociology of science the normative teeth enabling it to critically evaluate scientific practice in terms that go beyond the ones accepted by science itself or its shadow-ideology. It ought to show how a degrading praxis leads to a degrading science and how a mode of scientific practice with all its conceptual sophistication and technical achievements can still be degrading. It is only when sociology of science imbibes such critical perspective provided in terms of a set of value-judgements that it can get rid of every bit of positivist hangover.

If a mode of scientific practice is to be construed in terms of a type of social praxis which in its turn has to be understood in terms of concepts and categories in and through which human beings in a certain society perceive their own existence and the reality surrounding them, the 'rationality' of their scientific practice needs to be construed in ways unacceptable or even inconceivable for positivists or methodologists. Such a conception goes beyond internalism and externalism. Under such a conception of rationality, to use Feyerabend's words,

> There is only *one* task we can legitimately demand of a theory, and it is that it should give us a correct account of the world, i. e., *of the totality of facts as constituted by its own basic concepts.*[18]

It may be noted that such a conception of rationality is neither guided by anti-sociological considerations nor does it imply

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

anti-sociological consequences, characteristic of rationalist attempt to develop 'richer' theories of rationality. According to the rationalists like Lakatos the richer a theory of rationality the less it would leave for sociologists. There is absolutely no reason why the richness of a theory of rationality is inversely proportional to the need for sociological explanation.

In order to be receptive to and make an effective use of the the theoretical accomplishments of philosophy of science as construed above, sociology of science also should change some aspects of its strategy if not of programme. It must first eschew explicitly its construal of theories as ultimate units of scientific practice. Sociologists of science should conceive as units of scientific practice something which can be unambiguously specified in sociological terms Theories are not so easily amenable to sociological specification. Our answer to the question "what are the units of scientific practice?" is determined by and in turn determines our whole approach to science as an epistemic activity. Thus, both inductivists and Popperians found theories as units of scientific practice to be convenient to their programme and procedures. Lakatos who wanted to make Popperian frame work liberal enough to withstand Kuhnian structures broadened the unit of scientific practice and placed research programmes in the place of theories. Similarly Kuhn adopted paradigms as units of scientific practice in accordance with his general conception of scientific knowledge. As Newton-Smith points out "The positive and salutory virtue of Kuhn's use of his notion of paradigm is to remind us that in looking at the scientific enterprise it is important to focus on more than the theories (in the narrow sense of the term) advocated within a given community".[19] Eschewing theories as units the sociologist of science must adopt scientific traditions or something similar to it such that it is unequivocally specifiable in sociological terms. Of course, theories

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

continue to figure in his discourse, but not in the way they figure in the rationalist account. Such an approach gives the sociologists' programme a wholesomeness and free flow and facilitates total break with methodologism for which theories constitute the nucleus of scientific activity.

From the above discussion it is clear that sociology of science is far from threatening the autonomy of philosophy of science. If philosophy of science as metasociology of science provides sociology of science the much needed theoretical richness, analytical rigour and conceptual sharpness, it can in turn be provided by sociology of science the flesh and blood of empirical content. Even if metasociology is absorbed by sociology of science, the autonomy of philosophy of science is still not threatened since metasociology is only one of its three components. Thus, philosophy of science by redefining its domain as ontology of science and getting rid of methodo-mania can shed its socio-phobia.

S. G. KULKARNI
Department of Philosophy
University of Hyderabad
Gachi Bowli
HYDERABAD 500 134. (A. P.)

NOTES

1. *Progress and Its Problems*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, pp. 188-9.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
3. *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 134.
4. See, *Scientific Rationality : The Sociological Turn*, ed. Brown J. R. D. Reidel, 1984.
5. Thomas Kuhn, *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, ed : Skinner, Quentin, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

6. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
7. *The Essential Tension*, Chicago University Press, 1977, p. 295.
8. Barnes, Barry *op. cit.* p. 86.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
10. *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Beacon Press, 1968, p. 4.
11. *The Essential Tension*, p. XV.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 118–119 (emphasis added).
13. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 173 (emphasis added).
14. This is definitely more Kantian than the problem of demarcation between science and non-science which Popper fondly calls Kantian.
15. *The Rationality of Science*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 265.
16. For a significant attempt in this direction see, Goudge, Thomas A 'Neo-Darwinism, Mental Evolution, and the Mind-Body Problem' *Basic Issues in Philosophy of Science*, ed. Shea, William R., Science History Publications, New York.
17. For example, Karl Popper says "Polyphony, *like science* is peculiar to our western culture" (Emphasis added). *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, vol. I, ed. Schlipp, P. A, Open Court Publications Co, 1974, p. 43.
18. *Against Method*, New Leaf Books, 1975, p. 284.
19. *The Rationality of Science*, p. 106.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

PROF. G. R. MALKANI ESSAY COMPETITION

Essays are invited for the Prof. G R Malkani Essay Competition **either in English or Hindi** from undergraduate or post-graduate students below the age of 25 years studying in any Indian educational institution on the theme "Śaṁkara's Concept of Prapañca" for the First and Second prizes to be awarded respectively of Rs. 200/– and Rs. 100/– to the essays adjudicated to be so by a panel of referees appointed for the purpose. The prize-winning essays would be published in course of time either in Students' Supplement of the **Indian Philosophical Quarterly** or **Paramasa (Hindi)**, quarterly journals published by the Department. The conditions governing submission of essays for the competition are as follows :

1. The essay typed in double space on one side of the paper must be submitted in duplicate.
2. The essay must not be longer than 2500 words.
3. The essay must be accompanied by a certificate signed by the Head of the Institution/Department where the student is studying to the effect that
   (a) the student is studying in that institution and is below the age of 25 years, and
   (b) the essay is written by him / her.
4. The essays should reach Dr. P. P. Gokhale, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Ganeshkhind, Pune 411 007 not later than 31–10–1988.
5. The decision of the panel of referees shall be binding on all the competitors and that no correspondence of any kind would be entertained on that count.

The Head,
Philosophy Department
University of Poona, Ganeshkhind
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV. No. 4.
October, 1988

KARMA-DOCTRINE AND FREEDOM

Karma–doctrine is supposedly the one which differentiates the Indian religions viz. Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism (and probably Sikhism also) from the position of *Cārvāka*. If someone calls oneself to be either a Hindu or a Jaina or a Bauddha, but does not believe in *karma*–doctrine, then it makes it doubtful whether he is a real Jaina or a real Bauddha. Thus, the analysis of Indian religions necessitates the analysis of the *karma*–doctrine. In this essay, however, I am concentrating on the (so–called) Hindu version of the *karma*–theory. It seems that the Hindu version of the *karma* theory does not tally with Buddhist or the Jaina version of it, in details. But the basic logical structure which I will be attacking, seems, at least on its surface, to be the same. However, this could be an object of further research, with which I am not concerned at present.

While analysing the *karma*–doctrine, I am planning to do three things. One, I want to explicate as clearly as possible, the complicated relationship between *karma*–doctrine on the one hand and freedom on the other. Many times it is held that if *karma* doctrine is true, human freedom becomes an illusion and then it is added that the unity between self and *Brahman* would give a solution of this problem. Hindu–scholars of ancient Indian philosophy, in a large number, seem to be metaphysical non–dualists on the one hand, when on the other hand they believe in *karma*–doctrine. They believe that the fatalistic picture of human life provided by *karma*–doctrine, can be compensated by accept-

Received : 3–3–87

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ing a non-dualistic framework in which *karma*-doctrine operates. Mr. B. G. Tilak, for instance, has tried to substantiate this hope of non-dualists. So the second objective of my essay is to see whether non-dualists are justified in hoping this. I have considered Tilak's argument in the *Gītārahasya*[1] as a specimen for examination.

Certain problems arise while explicating the complicated relationship between *karma*-doctrine and freedom and these problems in turn give rise to a doubt regarding the coherence of the *karma*-doctrine itself. I feel that the *karma*-doctrine necessarily leads to a paradox and this is a reason why I am inclined to reject the *karma*-doctrine. The third objective of this paper is to explain this reason for rejecting the *karma*-doctrine.

Many a time, an appearance is created that the *karma-siddhāntins* have totally eliminated the possibility of human freedom from this theory. Tilak seems to take this position and then he takes recourse to the notion of the 'Self which is free by nature' for solving the problem of bondage. Tilak distinguishes between *māyāsṛṣṭi* or *karmasṛṣṭi* (the world of *māyā* or the world of *karma*) on the one hand and *brahmasṛṣṭi* (the world of *brahman*) on the other.[2] Unless, he thinks, human self is regarded really to be the member of *brahmasṛṣṭi*, rather than that of *karmasṛṣṭi*, human freedom makes no sense. The problem of the bondage of *karma* can be solved or dissolved if this Self is regarded as the member of *brahmasṛṣṭi*.

Here my first point is that the Hindu adherents of the *karma*-doctrine, and also the new Vedāntins like B. G. Tilak have presupposed the fact of human freedom in a certain sense. In what sense? The fact that men are faced with alternatives like 'whether to do this or to do that' and 'whether to do or not to do' and that men enjoy, many a time, at least limited freedom of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

choice has been presupposed by them. That the adherents of the *karma*-doctrine seem to presuppose this may become clear by the following consideration.

The adherents of *karma*-doctrine classify *karma* in two ways. First classification is into *sañcita, kriyamāṇa* and *prārabdha* whereas the second is into *nitya, naimittika, kāmya* and *niṣiddha*. The first classification[3] is basically between two classes. One : past *karma*, which is subject to realization as far as its fruits are concerned. Second : the present *karma* subject to performance. The past *karma* is of two types : one : *sañcita*–which is done and stored in part, the fruits of which are yet to be realised and second : *prārabdha* the stored *karma*, the realisation of the fruit of which has begun. Since actions of these types viz. *sañcita* and *prārabdha* are only past actions—they are no more than actions—there is no possibility of freedom in the case of these types. However, the possibility of freedom seems to be there in the case of *kriyamāṇa* actions. We seem to be free either to stop or to continue the actions being done. Unless we presuppose an element of freedom in at least the field of *kriyamāṇa* actions, we cannot talk of duties, morally good or bad actions, ethico–religious permissions to certain modes of actions and so on. Thus, the second classification of *karma* into *nitya, naimittika, kāmya* and *niṣiddha* becomes meaningful only if some element of freedom is presupposed in the field of *kriyamāṇa karmas*. This presupposition of freedom which is present behind this second classification may be explicated as follows. *Nitya* and *naimittika* are supposed to be obligatory actions. The actions that one is obligated to perform regularly are *nitya* while those which are to be performed on specific occasions are *naimittika*. Those actions the performance of which is prohibited are *niṣiddha karmas*. While deciding as to which actions are obligatory, and which are prohibited, *Vedas*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and *Smṛitis* were mainly regarded as authorities. Here the obligation or prohibition is not to be construed as a sort of compulsion, although it might have acted as a compulsion with respect to certain individuals in certain contexts–may be, sometimes as an internal compulsion and sometimes as an external one. In so far as one is not under compulsion to act in a certain way, we may say, one is enjoying freedom of action. And possibility of this freedom of action was presupposed while stipulating *nitya, naimittika* and *niṣiddha karmas*. In the case of *kāmya karmas*, not only the socio–legal compulsion was lacking, but the socio–legal obligation also was lacking. Thus, the sphere of *kāmya karmas* is the one where man can freely act on his wish. And adherents of the *karma*–doctrine have presupposed this freedom.

Mr. B. G. Tilak also in his own way presupposes this fact of basic human freedom. This freedom is not the one which man can enjoy necessarily because he is and accepts to be the member of *brahmasṛṣṭi*, but it is prior and fundamental to such an acceptance. It is not either freedom which metaphysical Self or *Brahman* has, but it is human freedom. Tilak accepts there to be two motives in man. One is the motive of belonging to *karmasṛṣṭi*. Let us call it the *kārmic* motive. And the second : the 'free motive of the Self.' Now according to Tilak, if on the occasions of doubt man chooses the free motive of the self and does not choose the *karmic* motive, then his behaviour is in accordance with *mokṣa*–the absolute freedom enjoyed in the membership of *brahmasṛṣṭi*.[4] Here, it is man, not either body or Self, that is having a doubt and also choosing between the two motives. Thus, Tilak also is presupposing here the human freedom of choice.

On this background we have to find out if there is any logical relationship between freedom and the *karma*–doctrine.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

While formulating the *karma*-doctrine the two notions, which have been frequently used in Indian philosophical literature, may prove very useful. They are *kṛtapraṇāśa prasaṅga* and *akṛtābhyāgama prasaṅga*.[5] These two notions refer to two kinds of 'unhappy situations' (unhappy here means theoretically or philosophically unhappy) which should not be allowed to be genuine human situations by any plausible hypothesis about human actions. In other words, they are human impossibilities. (Impossibility here is not a logical impossibility but may be an ethical-cum-factual impossibility.) The term *kṛtapraṇāśa prasaṅga* refers to a situation where one performs an action but does not realise its fruit-the action is so to say, ruined. *Akṛtābhyāgama prasaṅga* refers to a situation where one is led to some result which is not the fruit of any of one's own actions. If these two are impossibilities, and thinking them as possible is to commit some serious mistake, then we get certain 'philosophically necessary truths' by negating these impossibilities. The truths are :

1) Whatever man does, the fruit of it has to be realised by him.

2) Whatever happens to a man, it has got to be the fruit of some of his own actions.

It is quite likely that *karma-siddhāntins* first conceived this two-fold rule to be applicable to all human beings and later on thought of applying it to other animals, trees etc. But in any case when the rule was applied either to rational or to non-rational animals, it must have been applied to them individually, not collectively. It also seems to be a less confused way to apply it only to individuals rather to both-individuals and groups of individuals. Tilak has tried to apply the *karma*-doctrine to both,[6] and I think Gandhi also was subscribing to this position of two-fold application, when he held the social guilt of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

untouchability responsible for the earth-quake in Bihar. But, I think, there are difficulties in holding the position of this kind. The question is, how do we decide whether a particular action has been done by a nation or a community at large and not just by particular members of that nation or community? Many a time the decision of a leader of the community is regarded as the decision of that community, whereas sometimes the decision of the majority of members of that community is treated as the decision of the community. But if a decision is not accepted by certain members of the community, then it is no more their decision. Similarly, if minority does not approve of the decision, it is no more the decision of minority. If such a disagreeing agent has to bear the fruit of the (so-called) collective decision of the community, then this is an unhappy situation of *akṛtābhyāgama* kind, because here a person is realising something which is not the fruit of his own action. But if on the other hand a community makes a unanimous decision, and also bears its fruits distributively, then this situation can well be explained in the framework of the *karma* doctrine applied to individuals. However, as a matter of fact we do find many apparently unhappy situations. For instance, the disagreeing and non-participating members of a community may come to suffer or enjoy the fruits of the collective decision and action of the community. Or where all members of a community have made a unanimous decision and equally participated in the collective action, all members may not suffer or enjoy fruits with equal intensity, or may realise diverse fruits. Although this is an apparently unhappy situation, it cannot be really unhappy in the framework of the *karma*-doctrine. On such occasions, for instance, when an individual belonging to disagreeing minority has to suffer the consequences of the collective act, with the fellow beings, the *karma-siddhāntin* would ask-why does the person happen to be the member of that community at all, and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

then the *karma-siddhāntin* would hold the individual's past *karma* responsible for his membership of that community in which he has to suffer.

When a child is born, it is born from a particular father and mother in a particular surrounding. It is somthing that happens to a child and something the child has to realise. Whatever one has to realise – or whatever is given to one, is a fruit of one's own action. By this rule even a newborn child is realising the fruits of its own action, and hence the hypothesis of previous birth. Naturally the adherents of the *karma*-doctrine have had some notion of Self (it could have been termed as *jīva, puruṣa, ātman, pudgala* etc. in various disciplines) as subject to responsibility of actions and experience of fruits – in other words, as the bearer of 'attitudes towards action,' (*Prayatna*) *dharma, adharma* (i.e, *adṛṣṭa* or *apūrva*) and awareness. This Self is distinguished from either body, or embodied person. This transmigrating Self was capable of accepting bodies of men or animals (or trees also !), but this is not our main point. The following analysis will be significant even if rebirth is talked with reference to men alone or animals and trees as well.

If birth in a particular surrounding is itself the fruit of some previous 'action' of the Self, then since the necessary precondition of anyone undertaking action is that he should happen to be born in certain surrounding, and again *that* he happens to be born in a certain surrounding is the fruit of one's own past action, we have a beginningless series. We have to regard Self as well as its tendency towards action as literally beginningless. Here one may ask–if this tendency of action is there in the Self without beginning, how can we hope that it would come to an end ? Because this tendency becomes the permanent nature of the Self, which may end with the Self itself. But there is no reason why Self should have an end, which is equally beginningless.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Here it should be borne in mind that Self and its tendency are here to be regarded as beginningless not in the non-dualist's sense. When non-dualists talk of Self and *karma* being beginningless, what they mean is that nobody can know when Self and its *karma* began; but not that they are literally beginningless. Non-dualists believe that Self is originally one with *Brahman* but at a certain moment due to ignorance it started appearing as different. Exactly when this appearance took place, one cannot say, and hence it is convenient to call the Self as beginningless. According to non-dualists there was certainly a moment on which there was neither my Self nor my tendency towards action, but on the next moment they came into existence. Which was that unfortunate moment, is hidden in total darkness. But here, a *karma-siddhantin* will pose a problem. If one accepts the basic principles of the *karma*-doctrine he has to accept Self and its *karma* to be literally beginningless, not in non-dualist's derivative sense. Because if we suppose that at some moment of time both Self and its tendency came into being, the question would be- why is the Self born in that particular surrounding with that particular tendency, at that particular time? If we say that it is due to the past actions of that Self, then Self is no more beginningless in non-dualist's sense, but it is literally beginningless. If, on the other hand, what happens to that newly born Self is supposed to have come from outside, not from the Self itself, then it is an unhappy situation of *akṛtābhyāgama* kind.

When non-dualists call Self as beginningless in their derivative sense, they seem to do this with a purpose in hand. They attempt to show that although Self is bound by its own *karma*, originally it is not so. Since by nature the Self is one with *brahman*, it is natural for it to be freed from this bondage and get united with *Brahman* again. But if my argument is correct, then non-dualists cannot both believe in the *karma*-doctrine and hope

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for absolute freedom of the Self. Because on the *karma* doctrine, the Self turns out to be bound by *karma* by its very nature, and not due to any unfortunate accident. If a non-dualist still wants to hope for the possibility of *mokṣa*, he has to abandon his belief in the *karma*-doctrine. But most of the non-dualists including Tilak try to reconcile between non-dualists and the *karma*-doctrine. This reconciliation is untenable.

Self and its having beginningless bondage of *karma* is one side from which one can view the relationship between freedom and the *karma* doctrine. From the other side, we should try to understand the meaning of freedom one is supposed to enjoy while making decisions about actions. While presupposing that man is many a time free to choose amongst alternatives both *karma-siddhāntins* and non-dualists have presupposed the existence of a situation in which man is aware of different alternatives and he is not under any compulsion to choose one rather than the other. Here a question may be asked: Suppose A, B and C are the three alternatives before a person, and the person chooses B, when he could have chosen A or C instead, why does he particularly choose B and not either A or C? An answer could be: because B appealed to him the most, because he liked B, because he thought B to be the most proper. Here, the *karma-siddhantin* would say, that the person liked B, or B appealed to him the most etc. etc., is something that happened to the person. But why did it happen to that person? It must be due to his own past actions. In other words, even the so-called free choice enjoyed by a person is controlled by his past actions. That he becomes aware of different alternatives and that he feels free to choose between them, this also is due to his past *karma*. But that he feels free to choose, happens also due to another factor, namely ignorance. That he is not really free to choose and that which alternative he will choose is controlled by his previous

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

actions is something he does not know, and that is why he does not feel bound, or compelled. If he would have known in advance as to what he is going to choose at what time, what he is going to decide at what time, in other words, if he comes to know every active event of his future life, then the so-called choice is no more a real choice for him, the so-called alternatives are no more the real alternatives for him. Such a person will lose his freedom of action. Thus, it is human ignorance due to which human freedom seems to make sense. An omniscient being cannot be a free being. This position is deterministic. And the *karma*-doctrine gives us a peculiar from of determinism.

But when the adherents of the *karma*–doctrine and the non-dualists presuppose human freedom, they are not clearly aware that in the frame of the *karma*–doctrine this freedom makes sense only due to ignorance. Tilak also seems not to have noticed this clearly. He accepts that from the *karma*–doctrine it follows that my present action is also controlled by my past action–it is the effect of my *prārabdha*. But again while interpreting *kriyamāṇa karma* as the one which willl be done in immediate future he expresses his hope that man is free not with regard to his present action, but hopefully with regard to his future actions and thus the possibility of *mokṣa*. But in so far as the *karma*-doctrine is concerned there should not be any categorical difference between my present *karma* and my future *karma*; both are equally controlled by my past *karmas*. (Even present or future *karmas* can control my still future *karmas* when they would be 'past' relative to the future.)

Tilak says that if we think purely in worldly terms i.e., if we discuss man and his actions without considering his relation to *Brahman*, then we are inclined to say that man has no freedom of will, and he is bound by his *karma*. But our inner voice says that we can exercise our free will, use our conscience in making

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a choice. In the chapter on "Effect of *karma* and free will" he proposes to answer the question whether our intuitive belief in freedom is true or false.[7] But does Tilak succeed in answering this question? He tries to answer the question of human freedom in terms of freedom of the Self. But freedom in two cases does not mean one and the same thing. The implicit argument of Tilak namely 'since there is freedom of Self, there is human freedom' seems to be incorrect. Freedom of the Self does not mean freedom of will to act, to choose between actions or between action and inaction. Because the Self, according to non–dualists, is not really subject to will, or tendency to action or inaction; and Tilak here is assuming non–dualist stand–point. When the Self is called free (i.e., *mukta*) it is in the sense that the Self is not bound by any action because it does not really do any action, so it is free from pleasure or pain also. So the freedom of non–dualist's Self is the freedom from, and it cannot be 'freedom to,' whereas human freedom is necessarily 'freedom to' and not absolute 'freedom from'. The 'human freedom' which is presupposed both by the *karma*–siddhāntins as well as by Non–dualists, is 'freedom to'. Here we have to distinguish between the 'Self' of the *karma*-doctrine and the 'Slef' of the non–dualist theory. One may think *jīva* to be a better word for the Self of the *karma*–doctrine, and *ātman* to be a better word for the Self of non-dualist theory. In that case to deduce *jīva's* 'freedom to' from *ātman's* 'freedom from' is a mistake, which seems to be committed by Tilak.

My last point is that if it is only due to ignorance that we enjoy freedom, if there are no *real* alternatives, and if there is no *real* choice, then the truth of the *karma*-doctrine comes into danger. Let me try to explain the principles involved in the *karma*-doctrine a bit more clearly.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

When a man does something, it is very likely that it affects the external world–human or non–human. Now suppose a person A hits another person B with a stick, and B cries, we can say that, that B has pains and he cries is the effect of what A did. But if A hits B because on the earlier day B had abused A, then A would say to B–You are suffering the fruit of what you did yesterday. Normally the words effect and fruit will have different connotations especially in moral discourse. Reward and punishment for instance will be the types of fruit, not just effects. (Here it should be noted that every fruit, is an effect but not *vice–versa.*) We may say–the grammar of the words fruit *phala*, *vipāka*, reward, punishment is different from that of effect or *kārya*. There may be felt some oddity or surprise in saying that I am being punished for your guilt. We may feel that something abnormal, unexpected is happening. But there is no such oddity or surprise if we are told that A's action of hitting with a stick had a bad effect on B's body. We may feel that this is normal, when A hits B. Now whether one is justified in feeling odd and surprised in one case but not in the other, is another issue which we may tackle later. But one who believes that there is justice in the world, would reserve some words–say fruit, reward, punishment etc., to be used only in certain ways–where one is rewarded or punished for one's own actions, and not for anyone else's action. Here I am suggesting that adherents of the *karma* doctrine use the words like *phala* in this special way. I am aware that the word *phala* also means effect. But I may submit that the use of the word *phala*, when it refers to *karma-phala*, must be distinguished from its use in the context of a causal theory. When the *phala* refers to *karma-phala* then the notion of *phala* gets immediately linked with other two notions – the notion of deserving and that of responsibility. When a claim is made that a person is getting *phala* of his *karma*, it is implied that the person deserved that *phala* because he was responsible for that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

karma. Thus, the notions of deserving and responsibility can sometimes be dissociated from the notion of effect, but they cannot be dissociated from the notion of *karma-phala*.

In the light of the above discussion we can reformulate the two basic principles of the *karma* doctrine. The first principle is

1) Whatever man does the fruit of it has to be realized by him.

Its versions in this new context would be

1. Whatever man does, he deserves its fruit; or

2. Man is responsible for whatever he does.

The second principle is

2) Whatever happens to man has got to be the fruit of some of his own actions.

Its new versions would be

1) Man deserves only that which is the fruit of his own action,

or

2) Man is responsible only for his own actions.

In fact in these new versions we are bringing out the ethical import of these principles, whereas earlier versions express these principles more in the form of factual laws. The *karma*-doctrine in its essence is supposed to be both–ethical and factual.

One may say that the *karma*-doctrine becomes somewhat intelligible only if it is also presented in terms of 'deserving' and 'responsibility'. And this is the beginning of a new trouble Because one can be held responsible for or one can deserve the fruit of one's own action, only if one has done it out of one's free will. Here the presupposition of the adherents of the *karma*-doctrine is that we do have free will, there are real alternatives and there are real choices.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But in the earlier part of the essay we have concluded that from the *karma*-doctrine it follows that there is no real choice, no real alternatives; freedom makes sense only in ignorance. Suppose someone is faced with alternatives, he uses his conscience, and chooses one of the alternatives, then he may claim that it is his free choice. If he is asked–why he chose B and not either A or C, he may refer to his use of conscience. But one may ask further, why did it so happen that he came to use his conscience on that occasion, the adherent of the *karma*-doctrine would say that it must be due to his past action (let us call it action A_1). Now the next question may be posed, was that action A_1 free, of which his use of conscience is the fruit? Because only then he can be held responsible for that action and deserve the fruit. But when the question is asked as to why the person undertook that action A_1 at all, the *karma-siddhāntin's* answer has to be that, that he udertook action A_1 must be due to his past action say A_2; in that case A_1 ceases to be a free-action–proper and then the person cannot 'deserve' its fruit, nor can he be held responsible for A_1. The same argument applies to any action whatsoever, because since each and every so–called voluntary decision and voluntary action is controlled by one's past action one cannot be held responsible for it. But this result contradicts exactly with that from which we started. We started with the thesis that 'every one is responsible for each of his action' and the conclusion is that "Nobody can be held responsible for any of his actions". This is the paradox which leads us to a contradictory result that everyone is and is not responsible for any of his actions. This is one of the main reasons why I do not believe in the *karma*-doctrine.

Determinism as such does not have this fate, but *karma*-doctrine is a peculiar form of determinism which has this fate.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Here it would be interesting to see whether one can think of a weaker form of the *karma*-doctrine which will not be internally inconsistent. There are four factors which constitute the essence of the *karma*–doctrine.

1) Factual aspect of the first principle.
2) Ethical aspect of the first principle.
3) Factual aspect of the second principle.
4) Ethical aspect of the second principle.

It seems to me that a weaker but self–consistent form of the *karma*–doctrine may be obtained if we suppress either factual or ethical aspect of the second principle. Such a weak version of the *karma*-doctrine will not be examined on purely conceptual grounds, but some other arguments will have to be advanced. I am not concerned with such possible arguments here. However, such a weaker version of the *karma*-doctrine will no more be a version of the *karma*-doctrine, because it can be presented only by violating some of the essential features of the *karma*-doctrine as it was understood by its adherents.

Another interesting area of research would be to see how different systems of Indian philosophy would adjust themselves with the basic principles of the *karma*-doctrine. Although it is apparent that all Indian systems except *Cārvāka* accept the *karma*-doctrine, the nature of Self as conceived by certain systems does not fulfil the requirement of the *karma*-doctrine, whereas that conceived by certain others does fulfil. For instance, in the classical Sāṅkhya system the Self, i. e., *puruṣa* is *bhoktā* and not *kartā*, it experiences pleasures and pains, but does not do anything, whereas the objective nature i.e., *prakṛti* only does, though it does not experience. And realisation of the truth consists in the revelation that *prakṛti* is substantially different from *puruṣa*. It is evident that this picture of the Self violates the basic principles of the *karma*-doctrine. The Self of Buddhists

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

also does not seem to fit in the framework of the *karma*-doctrine, because whatever the Self is, it is everchanging. On the other hand, the Self i.e., *jīvātman* of *Nyāyavaiśeṣikas* has the qualities like desire *(icchā)*, aversion *(dveṣa)* and effort (*prayatna*) on the one hand and merit *(dharma)*, demerit (*adharma*), pleasure *(sukha)*, pain (*duhkha*) and cognition *(buddhi)* on the other. The Self of *Nyāyavaiśeṣikas* is thus a proper candidate for the *karma*-doctrine. Any way, this is outside the plan of the present essay.

Philosophy Department
Poona University
PUNE–411 007.

P. P. GOKHALE

NOTES

1. See *Śrimadbhagavadgītārahasya athavā Karmayogaśāstra* by Mr. Bal Gangadhar Tilak. First Ed. Pune (1915). I have discussed Tilak's position on the basis of Chapter X entitled '*Karmavipāka āṇi ātmasvātantrya*'. English translation of the book is available entitled *Śrimad-bhagavadgītā-rahasya or karmayogaśāstra* (Vols. I and II) (Tr. by B. S. Sukthankar) Published by R. B. Tilak, Lokamanya Tilak Mandir, Pune (1935). Chapter X is entitled 'The Effect of *Karma* and Freedom of Will' (Vol. I, pp. 359–415). The page numbers from Tilak's book mentioned hereafter correspond to ths pages of the Translation. However, while writing the article I have used the original Marathi book.
2. Cf. *Ibid*, pp. 359–60.
3. For Tilak's discussion of this classification see *op. cit*, pp. 374–377. I differ from him especially in his interpretation of *kriyamāṇa karma*.
4. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 387.
5. Hemacandra, for instance, in his *Vitarāgastuti* (Verse No. 18) uses these notions for criticising Buddhists. There he tries to show that Buddhist doctrine of momentariness violates the essence of the *karma*-doctrine. Argument involving the same notions has been advanced by Udayana against Sānkhyaites in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (*Stabaka* I, verses 14–15).
6. Tilak, *op. cit.*, p. 373.
7. Cf. *Ibid*, pp. 370–71.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 4,
October, 1988

THE FACT-VALUE DICHOTOMY

The individual who has the freedom to choose his values may feel his freedom not as an emanicipation but as a burden. The tension he has to face is : how to keep values distinct from facts on the one hand and from 'mere' preferences on the other. The problem of the fact–value dichotomy has received somewhat similar answers both from many Anglo–Saxon philosophers and from many continental philosophers. For many of the latter, it is of the very nature of the situation in which individuals find themselves that they have no other way but to create their own values, while for many of the former, the impossibility of deriving value–judgments from statements of facts is purely logical.[1]

In effect the main contention of the thesis of the autonomy of morals is that there is a fundamental distinction between statements of the facts of any situation and expressions of approval or disapproval of those facts. Two persons may describe a particular situation in the same way, but may evaluate it in different ways. The fact that two persons agree on how a particular situation has to be described (or reported) does not imply that they also agree about their approval or disapproval of it.

On what grounds does the distinction between description and evaluation rest ? Are evaluations distinguished from descriptions simply in view of the obvious differences between attitudes of different individuals ? Can disagreement about valuations be traced back to disagreement in likes and dislikes ? This, in fact, is the answer given by some logical positivists. According

Received : 26–2–87

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to Ayer[2], for example, value–judgments are nothing but the expression of the feelings of the speaker. For Stevenson[3], value–judgments express the preferences of the speaker and serve to persuade the hearer. 'This is good' means 'I prefer doing it: do it likewise'. For the logical positivists and the emotivists to say that something is 'good' is to say that it is something that someone or other prefers. The main objection raised against the view that value–judgments 'merely' state or express preferences is that on this view value–judgments turn out to be basically irrational. If value–judgments state or express preferences alone, there seems to be no way of explaining (other than in terms of a clash or conflict of preferences) such statements as "I ought to do it, although I don't want to" or "This is 'good' for him although he may not like it". In fact words like 'ought', 'right' 'good' etc; derive crucial part of their meaning from a contrast between the language of value and the language of preference. The language of value differs as much from the language of preference. The language of value differs as much from the language of description.

The contrast between value–language and preference language is often brought out by pointing to the fact that if someone calls something 'good' or 'right,' one can always ask him: "What is good or right about it?" But one cannot always ask the same question about one's likes and dislikes. One may or may not have reasons for one's likes and dislikes. One cannot press for reasons for preference as one can press for reasons for evaluations. What distinguishes value–language from preference–language is the former's commendatory force.[4] To make a value–judgment, as R. M. Hare argues, is not simply to attempt to persuade others, but to commend it either to oneself or to others for future guidance. Hare himself has called his view 'universal prescriptivism.' Value–judgments, as distinguished

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

from descriptive statements, have 'prescriptive' meaning. Value–judgments, are action–guiding : to make a value–judgment is to offer some guidance in making future decisions. Value–judgments entail imperatives. To speak of any action as 'good' is to impart a certain instruction or to convey a certain advice to the hearer, namely, 'do it' (the advice also being about actions like it in relevant respects in relevantly similar contexts). Anyone who says, 'You ought to do X, but don't,' and who intends the 'ought' to be evaluative, is contradicting himself. Value–judgments are distinguished from other kinds of prescriptive judgments by their 'universality.' A person who says, 'I ought to act in a certain way, but nobody else need act in that way in relevantly similar circumstances' is contradicting himself. Value–judgments are derivable from universal principles. To make a value–judgment is to apply universal principles to particular cases. If value–judgments are basically prescriptive, can they be said to be capable of being derived either from analytic propositions or from statements of fact alone? For Hare, the answer is obviously 'no.' No value–judgments can be deduced from a set of premises that does not contain at least one value–judgment.[5] Descriptive judgments, unlike value–judgments, do not entail imperatives. If value–judgments entail imperatives and descriptive judgments do not, a value–judgment cannot be deduced from a set of premises that does not contain an imperative.

A number of objections brought against the doctrine of "No 'ought' from an 'is'" may now be considered. A. Macintyre[6] has argued that the doctrine of "No 'ought' from an 'is'" develops only when 'man' ceases to be a 'functional' concept, when the concept of man does not refer to any purpose of function which man is supposed to carry out. The problem of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' did not present itself as such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in the Aristotelian tradition. In that tradition to call an X good is to say that it is the kind of X that might be chosen by someone who wanted an X for that purpose for which X's are typically suitable. So to speak of something as 'good' in that tradition was also to provide some information. The deduction of an 'ought' from an 'is' appears impossible when the notion of 'functions' disappears from morality, when the concept of man is no longer seen as functional one, when man is considered as an 'individual' prior to and apart from his roles.

Doubts have often been raised about the various attempts to 'distill' all values from ordinary language and to construct what has been called a 'purely evaluative element.' J. Kovesi,[7] for example, has tried to show that the 'is-ought' dichotomy is not one of the central problems of moral philosophy. Moral judgments, Kovesi says, are neither about objects 'out there' that can be *both* described and evaluated, nor about individuals themselves, in so far as they are considered to be capable of being evaluated: moral judgments are about human life in so far as this life is constituted by these very notions, judgments and descriptions. There is no transition from 'facts' to values : some evaluation is implicit in the very language of description. The 'is-ought' dichotomy, Kovesi says, is partly ideological: its elaboration is, to a considerable extent, directed towards supporting a kind of individualism and anti-authoritarianism.

Doubts about the plausibility of drawing a rigid distinction between facts and values have also been raised on the ground that it is possible to make statements that both evaluate and provide factual information. That 'value-words' can convey information of a purely factual character is not denied by most supporters of the fact-value dichotomy.[8] Hare, for example, agrees that it is possible to make statements that both evaluate and provide factual information, but he also points out that one should

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

distinguish between the evaluative and the descriptive meanings of words. To say 'This is a good knife' is not only to commend the knife as an instrument suitable for purpose of cutting, but also to provide information about the property of 'sharpness' that it possesses. If a person tells someone that P is a good knife and if the hearer has not seen P, but knows what being a good knife means, he will obtain some information about P. The evaluative meaning of the word 'good', Hare argues, is constant for every class of object to which the word is applied. Whether one speaks of a 'good knife', or 'good pen' or a 'good motor car', in each case one is commending the thing called 'good'. Since each of them is commended for a different reason, the descriptive meaning varies from one case to another, but the evaluative meaning remains the same. Although the evaluative meaning is primary, the secondary descriptive meaning is never wholly absent. The relative prominence of the descriptive and evaluative meanings of 'good' varies according to the class of objects within which the commendation is being given.[9] The more fixed and accepted the standard is, the more information is conveyed. The word 'good' in 'good egg' conveys more information than the word 'good' in 'good poem' because the standard of goodness in the former is more fixed than it is in the latter. But this does not mean that the evaluative meaning varies in an inverse proportion to the descriptive meaning. A standard may be firmly established and yet not only the descriptive meaning but also the evaluative meaning may be decidedly strong.

Another objection[10] raised against the doctrine of the autonomy of morals may be considered with reference to Kant's philosophy, to which the doctrine leads back. In Kant's philosophy, to put it in the simplest terms, the world of natural experience and science is governed by laws of causation while

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

free will and the activity of reason are excluded from the realm of causation and are characterized by rational self-direction or autonomy. But the problem is : how can the rational will find itself embodied in the world of experience if the latter is constituted as such by the synthetic activity of the former itself? How can the freedom of rational and moral will be effective within the world of experience if it is considered to be excluded from that very world ? If, on the other hand, the rational will did find itself embodied in the world of experience, values would not, so the objection runs, be the products of the rational choice of individuals, but would be encountered as facts are and so could no longer operate as values.

The above objection in effect rests on doubts about the possibility of conceiving individual consciousness as being in any way world-constitutive. Many modern thinkers would indeed argue that each individual is, rather, to be considered as one who finds himself already in a particular society, speaking a particular language and so on. His self-awareness develops in a network of relationships with other individuals. Individual consciousness is seen as the outcome of the interaction of the individual with various cultural and social factors. The very language in which individual evaluations are clothed have to be considered as growing out of complex interactions of the individual with other individual members of society. The concepts used in making judgments belong to intricate network of concepts that the individual finds to be already at work in the society to which he belongs. All interpretations are made from one point of view or another, and make use of some presupposition or other, and at no stage can one dispense with them altogether. Even the distinction between facts and values is a distinction drawn from one perspective. The supporters of the fact-value pichotomy insist on the possibility of making factual statements

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

without evoking any value-questions. But this very statement is one that upholds a certain point of view. The very concepts of fact and value can develop only within one *evaluative* perspective or another.

The arguments advanced both for and against the doctrine of the autonomy of values seem to be equally convincing when they are considered separately within their own contexts. On the one hand it cannot be denied that there is a difference between describing or recognizing a fact and deciding what is good or not good about it. It also seems impossible to deny the difference between value and preferences as such To value something is very much to prefer something, but no mere preference as such can be considered to be a value. A distinction is sometimes drawn [11] between *valuing* something and *evaluating* something: to *value* something is to accept it as a value, that is to say, to value it for being what it is, while to *evaluate* something is to impute a value or disvalue to that thing or to assess something according to some (may be only implicit) scale. To be a value a preference must have some degree of rationality, that is to say, it must be capable of being supported by reasons in the case of its being questioned. [12] To be a value a preference must also have a degree of consistency over a range of objects. A preference that is liable to change all too quickly from one situation to another is not a value. It seems impossible simply to equate values either with desires and preferences on the one hand, or with facts on the other. Even if it is difficult to decide what values exactly are, any consideration of values will have to take note of both personal preferences and desires as well as interpersonal perspectives. Hence the basic problem facing any individual trying to choose values for himself is : how to harmonize the two perspectives so as to reduce the tension between one's personal preferences on the one hand and the restraints imposed by the interpersonal

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

framework of reference on the other. He cannot ignore the demands of either of them. If he ignores the interpersonal reference, his values would be indistinguishable from personal likes and dislikes, while if he ignores the personal reference, his values would hardly be distinguishable from facts.

Philosophy Department
Burdwan University
Burdwan (W. B.)–713104

KOYALI GHOSH-DASTIDAR

NOTES

1. K. R. Popper, "What can Logic do for Philosophy", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Suppl. Vol. XXII, July, 1948), p. 154.
2. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (Penguin, Harmondsworth. 1971) p. 142.
3. C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1944).
4. R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford University Press, Oxford), p. 144. Hereafter *LM*.
5. *Ibid*, p. 20.
6. A. Macintyre, *After Virtue* (Duckworth, London, 1981), pp. 56–57.
7. J. Kovesi, *Moral Notions* (Routledge, London, 1967), pp. 142–143; also, "Against the Ritual of 'is' and 'ought'", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy III* (University of Minnesota, Morris, 1967), pp. 5–16.
8. Hare, *LM*, *op. cit.*, p. 112; and P. T. Geach, "Good and Evil", *Analysis* (Vol. 17, April, 1957).
9. Hare, *LM*, p. 122.
10. A. Montefiore, *Handbuch wissenschafts theoretischer Begriffe*, (ed.), Josef Speck (Göttingen and Zürich 1976), p. 8.
11. A. N. Prior, "Varieties of objectivity and value", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (October, 1982), p. 105.
12. D. Wiggins, "Truth, Invention and Meaning of Life". *Proceedings of the British Academy* (No. 62, 1976).

CC-0.In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV, No. 4.
October, 1988

HUME'S FORK RELATED TO SOME LOGICO-EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY

It has been rightly remarked [1] that the distinction between the necessary and the contingent truth is most basic to all recent philosophy. Equally prominent and important distinctions are those between the analytic/synthetic and *a priori* and empirical truths. Historically, of the three, the first is associated to Leibniz and the remaining two to Kant. There are some philosphers however, in the modern classical period, along with Leibniz and Kant, viz. Locke, Hume and Mill, whose logico–epistemological ideas were almost similar to the ideas mentioned above: for example, Locke's distinction between the 'trifling' and the 'informative' propositions Hume's *fork*, i.e. the distinction between the relations of ideas and matters of fact and Mill's 'real' and 'verbal' propositions. While a study of these ideas reflects upon the logical insights of these philosophers, the same is rarely acknowledged. In this paper an attempt is made to analyse and to relate Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and the matters of fact to some of the familiar distinctions mentioned above made by Leibniz and Kant.

I

Section IV of Hume's *Inquiry* begins with a distinction between what he calls 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact.' Hume presents the distinction as follows : "All objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas' and 'Matters of Fact.' Of the first kind are

Received : 13–6–87

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain, *That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides* is a proposition which expresses the relation between these figures *That three times five is equal to half of thirty* expresses the relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on anywhere existent in the universe. Though there can never be a circle, or a triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would forever retain their certainty and evidence.

"Matters of Fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner, nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of a fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality–That the Sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation *that it will rise*. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstrably false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind."[1]

These passages indicate that Hume works with a dichotomy and that the division between propositions is logico–epistemological in character. A study of the above passages shows the following main features of the two kinds of the propositions in question. (1) Statements about relations of ideas are known either through intuition or through demonstration; whereas those about matters of fact are only probable and may be said to be known through sense experience. In the *Inquiry* Hume does not make clear what he means by intuition or demonstration,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

presuming that the words are familiar to the reader. It is not necessary to deal with this question here.

(2) Statements expressing relations of ideas are known by thought alone and are independent of any matter of fact or existence. A statement about a matter of fact is known only through experience. Probably what Hume means is that both the knowledge and the truth of statements about relations of ideas are independent of fact and existence. Hume gives here examples from Geometry and Arithmetic and says that they would be true even if there were nothing in the world corresponding to the words in the statements. Statements of matters of fact, however, are dependent on experience for their being known and also for their truth.

(3) An important characteristic of statements about relations of ideas is that they cannot be denied without self contradiction. The denial of a statement about a matter of fact is not contradictory and is, in that sense, possible.

(4) Finally the contrary (i.e., the denial) of the former kind of statements is not conceivable. Hume says rhat if these statements were demonstrably false, they would involve a contradiction and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. The denial of the latter kind of statement is possible, and is also, therefore conceivable. Some critics of Hume have observed, in view of the conceivability and inconceivability of the negations of the two kinds of the propositions in question, that Hume is using a psychological criterion of necessary truth.

The distinction between the relations of ideas and the matters of fact drawn in the *Inquiry* is not entirely new. In the *Treatise* we find substantially the same distinction drawn, though in different terms, when Hume deals, with knowledge and probability. In part III, sec. I, of the *Treatise, of Knowledge and Probabi-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

lity Hume gives a list of what he calls seven philosophical relations viz. resemblance, identity, relations of time and place, proportion in quantity and number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, and causation. These relations are divided by him into 'constant' and 'inconstant' (i.e., invariable and variable relations). The first kind of relations is such that it 'depends entirely on ideas which we compare' and the second kind of relations is such that it 'may be changed without any change in the ideas.' Of these seven relations, 'only four, which depending solely upon ideas, can be the objects of knowledge and certainty. These four relations are resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number. The relations of *contiguity* and distance between things, however, can be changed by alteration of their place, without making any change in the objects themselves or their ideas.

In a later book of the *Treatise* the dichotomy of the *Inquiry* appears in almost the same words. In Book III, Hume says, 'Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth and falsehood consists in agreement or disagreement either to the *real*, relations of ideas or to *real* existence and matters of fact.' In another passage in the same book he says, '... the operations of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing of ideas, and of inferring of matters of fact,...'

As a matter of fact, this dichotomy is the simplification of a trichotomy mentioned first by Hume in his *Treatise*, though it is also found substantially in the same from in the *Inquiry*. In the *Treatise* Hume says that some people divide all objects of human reason into knowledge and probability, and in the class probability are included all the arguments from experience which depend upon the relation of cause and effect. There are many arguments, however, which though depend upon the causal relation, yet seem to be certain. It is ridiculous, for example, to think that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the statement, 'The Sun will rise tomorrow' is only probable. In order to make room for such propositions, Hume says that propositions have several degress of evidence. And accordingly he proposes a division of propositions into three: those which constitute knowledge, those which constitute proofs, and those which constitute probabilities only. By knowledge, Hume means 'the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas.' By 'Proofs' he means 'those arguments which are derived from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty.' And finally by probability, he means that the 'evidence which is still attended with uncertainty.'[7] But when the trichotomy is reduced to dichotomy, knowledge is placed on the one side, proofs and probabilities on the other.

II.

How is Hume's dichotomy related to some other famous distinctions in logic and epistemology?

I. Let us begin with the distinction between 'truths of reason' and 'truths of fact' drawn by Leibniz. Leibniz called the former necessary and the latter contingent truths. Though Hume nowhere mentions Leibniz' distinction, and though he never uses word contingent in this connection, we can say that Hume's dichotomy coincides exactly with Leibniz' distinction; for the characteristics of both the kinds of propositions appear to be one and the same. According to Hume, statements about the relations of ideas are absolutely independent of what exists in the world. And Leibniz seems to say the same when he says that the trughts of reason are absolutely independent of anything existing in the world and that these thoughts are true in all possible worlds. He says, 'As for the eternal truths it is to be observed that at bottom they are all hypothetical, and say in fact: such a thing being posited, such another thing is'. Both Hume and Leibniz agree that some of the statements can be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

known immediately and that others can be proved by demonstration. In regard to those statements that are not 'express identities,' Leibniz uses a device called 'analysis' in which the *definiens* is substituted for the *definiendum* in order to reduce a given statement to an overt identity so that the necessary character of a proposition is revealed instantly. There is one more and crucial similarity, and it is that both Hume's statements about matters of fact and Leibniz' truths of fact can be denied without contradiction. In this connection Hume says, 'Whatever is, *May* not be,' No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction' '...The non-existence of any being without exception, is as clear and distinct as its existence ' These passages clearly indicate that Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact coincides with Leibniz' distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact.

II. What about the relation of Hume's dichotomy with the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements? Though the Kantian distinction was similar to Locke (as the one between trifling and 'informative' propositions), it had not attained the status of a major philosophical distinction till Kant drew it in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. This distinction has attained even a higher status in recent times since the logical positivists adopted the view that all necessity is analytic. There have been several attempts since then, to see in Hume's division an anticipation of the positivist doctrine. A proposition which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain or a proposition whose denial is contradictory may assume several forms; e.g., subject-predicate form, conditional form etc.. Hume's criterion of statements of relations of ideas does not specify any particular form of propositions. Attempts have been made, however, to show that Hume's division between propositions would correspond to Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judge-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ments. Thus Zabeeh[9] says that if we name the invariable and the variable relations, distinguished by Hume as (A) and (B) relations, then a statement of complex ideas could be called analytic if the terms which express these ideas are joined by an invariable relation; and further if the ideas remain unchanged, i.e. if the ideas are connected by (A) relations. Similarly a statement would be synthetic if the terms expressed by the ideas are connected by means of a variable i e, separable relation, i.e., a (B) relation. According to Bennett if ideas are meanings, then Hume could be distinguishing between analytic and synthetic judgements as follows : (1) The statement that every brother is a male expresses the relation between the ideas of brotherhood and maleness, and this must hold as long as the ideas remain the same. (2) The statement that every brother is intelligent could be true now but later false, though neither the word 'brother' nor the word 'intelligent' have changed their meanings. Thus the truth of (3) does not depend entirely upon the nature of these two ideas. It would, appear, therefore, that Hume's dichotomy coincides with Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. However, though Hume's view that the denial of a statement about relations of ideas is self-contradictory agrees with the characteristic of an analytic proposition, and similarly that a statement about a matter of fact can be denied without self-contradiction agrees with the characteristic of a synthetic propasition, it cannot be said that Hume's division coincides with the analytic/synthetic division between propositions. Passages can be cited which go counter[10] to the suggestion. Hume held that the statements of mathematics are all statements about relations of ideas, and hence that their denial is contradictory. But then it seems improbable that Hume would have disagreed with Kant's view that all mathematical statements are synthetic. Consider, for example, the following passage; Hume

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

says,... "Mathematicians pretend that they give an exact definition of a straight line which they say, *It is the shortest distance between two points*. But ... this is more properly the discovery of one of the properties of a right line than a just definition of it. For I ask any one upon a mention of a right line he thinks not immediately on such a particular appearance and if it is not by an accident only that he considers this property? A right line can be comprehended alone; but this definition is unintelligible without a comparison with other lines, which we conceive to be more extended. In common life it is established as a maxim that the straightest way is always the shortest, which would be an absurd to say the shortest way is the shortest, if our idea of a right line was not different, from that of the shortest distance between the two points".[11] Compare this passage with the following passage of Kant; 'That the *straight* line between two points is the *shortest* is the synthetic proposition. For my concept of straight contains nothing of quality, but only of quantity. The concept of *the shortest* is wholly an addition, and cannot be derived through any process of analysis from the concept of the *straight line!*'[12] There is thus a close similarity between Kant's views on the issue of the syntheticity of mathematical propositions. The only difference is that Hume does not use the word 'synthetic'. If he were to know Kant's distinction, he would have classified the statement of straight lines as synthetic rather than analytic. But then it is difficult to say how he would have reconciled this view with his former view that the statements of mathematics are about relations of ideas, and their denial results in a contradiction.

III. Finally let us compare Hume's dichotomy with that between *a priori* and empirical statements. Speaking about the statements about relations of ideas, Hume says that their truth is independent of any fact or existence in the world, and that it

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is known by the mere operation of thought. This may suggest that these statements can be called a *priori*. The expression a *priori* does occur in Hume's writings, but it had not acquired then the status of the name of a particular kind of propositions. Invariably whenever the phrase is used by Hume, it is found used as a non-technical term (as an adverb) which means 'without appeal to', or 'independently of experience'. His use of the expression, 'a *priori*' can be easily seen from the following examples, (i) 'If we reason *a priori*, anything may appear to produce anything.

(ii) ...'every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, however, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or coception of it, *a priori*, must be entirely arbitrary'.

Nevertheless, Hume's characterization of relations of ideas that they can be known 'by the mere operation of thought' would suggest that this distinction coincides with that between *a priori* and empirical propositions. But it cannot be said that it would coincide with Kant's distinction. In Kant's system a proposition may be a *priori* and yet admit of a denial without any contradiction. This is what is meant by Kant's remark that some propositions are synthetic and yet a *priori*. One cannot, therefore, say that Hume's distinction would coincide with the Kantian distinction between *a priori* and empirical propositions*

Department of Philosophy
Institute of Arts and Social Sciences,
NAGPUR.

B. Y. DESHPANDE

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

* This paper was read in *Logic and Epistemology* Section at the Diamond Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Hyderabad held from 19th Dec., '85 to 23rd Dec. '85.

1. Pap A., *SEMANTICS AND NECESSARY TRUTH* : Preface, Yale (1958).
2. *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Ed. Selby-Bigge) BK. I Sec-I, Part I. pp. 25-26.
3. *Treatise*, p. 69.
4. *Ibid*, p. 70.
5. *Ibid*, Bk. III Part I. p, 458.
6. *Ibid*, p. 463, 413.
7. *Ibid*, p. 124, *Inquiry* p. 56, *Foot notes*.
8. G. V. p. 428, *New Essays* : p. 515.
9. *Hume : Precursor of Modern Empiricism*, Martinus Nijhoff, II Edn., (1973), pp. 73-74.
10. *Locke, Berkeley, Hume : Central Themes*, Oxford, (1971) p. 231.
11. *Treatise* : Bk. I, Sec. ii, pp. 49-60.
12. *Critique of Pure Reason : B. Introduction*, pp. 53-54.

CC-0.In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV. No. 4.
October, 1988

A REJOINDER TO REGINTON RAJAPAKSA

Reginton Rajapaksa[1] contends that my article[2] fails to establish the instructiveness of Hume's arguments on the problem of identity of objects. In this brief note I shall establish that his contention is unwarranted.

It is a mistake to assume, as Rajapaksa does, a strict two-way entailment between the concepts of instructiveness and constructiveness. I take the term instructiveness in a non-specialised sense to mean the power of giving information, and of teaching lesson(s) and thus, in my view, the one does not entail the other. These concepts are, however, related, but not in the way Rajapaksa supposes them to be. This relation, it must be pointed out, is not one of necessity, but of contigency. It follows, therefore, that an instructive account of theory need not only be constructive but could also be destructive.

I have endeavoured to show that valuable lessons could be learnt from Hume's mistakes. This is amply borne out by the following passage quoted from an important article of H. H. Price.

> 'Of scepticism with regard to the senses' is a *total failure* (italics are mine) its depth, scope and disciplined complexity make it one of the most *instructive* (italics are mine) arguments in the modern philosophy.[3]

This passage is self-explanatory and reflects Price's considered opinion that the whole section is instructive inspite of its failure

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to achieve its objective. Being convinced that it is possible to learn and profit from the errors of Hume, I am concerned merely with the lessons that could be learnt from Humean argument, I might also point out that many philosophers consider the mistake of Kant to be more significantly instructive than even the achievements of lesser philosophers.

Rajapaksa is critical of Hume for failing to provide a criterion for identity of objects, He says :

> "If Hume's view is an instructive one, he should provide a criterion for identity of objects, which assumes the possibility of identifying an object existing through a period of time and as the same object although with changing characteristics.".[4]

This criticism is unwarranted, because it is based on Rajapaksa's erroneous view that Hume's theory is constructive.

Rajapaksa commits another error by treating instructiveness and destructiveness as two mutually exclusive concepts. He fails to see that a theory could be both iustructive and destructive at the same time. I am convinced this to be the case with Hume's theory, and I had substantiated this claim in my paper. I reaffirm my position here, and merely offer the following as further support to my thesis.

> His (Hume's) theory being *destructive* (italics are mine) he need not be committed to the 'Even theory of continuance' or any other theory for that matter.[5]

This was with reference to Price's criticism that Hume's analysis of identity goes wrong from the very beginning since Hume recognises merely the monotonous and continuous series of sensously qualified particulars without any qualitative difference ignoring the variegated series with qualititive difference.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I have pointed out explicitly that Hume's analysis of identity is destructive in that he insists no serial-identity statement can be strictly true.[6] Though Rajapaksa agrees with this, he categorically rejects my thesis that the concept of instructiveness and destructivness can go together, because of his dogmatic assertion that these concepts are logically incompatible.

In conclusion, I stand by my claim that Hume's theory is truly instructive not merely to the upholders of 'the doctrine of the traditional empiricist philosophers', but to all students of philosophy.

S. C. DANIEL

Department of Philosophy,
North Eastern Hill University,
SHILLONG 793 014,
Meghalaya (India).

NOTES

1. See. Reginton Rajapaksa : "The Problem of Identity of Objects In Hume's Philosophy", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. XV. No. 2, April, 1988.
2. See S. C. Daniel : "The Problem of Identity of Objects In Hume's Philosophy", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. XII, No. 2, April, 1985
3. H. H. Price : "The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy" *Philosophy*,pt. II vol. 15, 1940.
4. Reginton Rajapaksa, *Ibid*, p. 170.
5. S. C. Daniel, *Ibid*, p. 193.
6. *Ibid*, p. 195.

Discussion of this issue is closed through the medium of this journal.

EDITORS

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharyya's** philosophical thought; and includes his own fina-formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose, P. K. Srivastava (et al).**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation). **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective' Attitudes as Alternatives : A study of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's view of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy : Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy : A Critical Study)- **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattacaryya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, PUNE 411 007.

CC-0.An Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XV No. 4.
October 1988

BOOK-REVIEW

Philosophical Reflections by G. C. Nayak, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1987. pp. VIII + 166; – Rs. 65/–.

The book under review is Prof. Nayak's collection of eighteen philosophical essays on a variety of themes. These essays can thematically be classified into (i) those concerning topics in Indian Philosophy, especially *Advaita Vedānta* and Buddhism and (ii) those concerning problems in religion, ethics and social philosophy. In spite of the diversity of the problems treated in the book, there is an underlying unity of approach in all these essays. This approach can broadly be characterized as the analytic approach which, however, goes "beyond the *strict* purview of the present-day analytic philosophy" (preface, vii).

The essays on *Advaita Vedānta*, notably "Illumination Through Analysis: A study in *Vedāntic* Conception *vis-a-vis Mādhyamika*", "*Māyā*: the Advaitin's Gordian Knot" and "Significance of Knowledge in Śaṅkara and Yājñavalkya," are refreshingly innovative in the interpretation of the central doctrines of the school. The *Advaita* philosophy is sought to be presented in a non-conventional light throwing sufficient focus on the analytic core of the concepts of *jñāna, mokṣa* and *māyā* and other related concepts. Prof. Nayak subscribes to the view that the *Advaita* system belongs to the tradition of "Illumination through Analysis" (pp. 1–8) which is not peculiar to the West alone. The analysis which results in illumination in the *Advaita* context is not necessarily the analysis of ordinary

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

language or any other scientific discourse; it is the analysis of the *Vedāntic* statements which hold the key to the knowledge of *Brahman* (pp. 57-88). Prof. Nayak is aware that such discourse-analysis of the concept of *Brahman* is bound to mislead the beginners into believing that the knowledge of *Brahman* is merely verbal. Therefore, he emphasizes that *brahmānubhava* is not verbal knowledge (pp. 5-7) nor the talk of *mokṣa* a pseudo-talk. The result of analysis is understanding and illumination as regards the nature of Reality, and not a mystic experience at that (pp. 7-8). The resulting *mokṣa* is no other than the *jñāna* itself that vouchsafes for the freedom of the mind from the ignorance of the non-dual character of Reality. Prof. Nayak goes further to show that *Advaita* holds a unique model of freedom in its concept of *mokṣa* which can have richer implications than are usually derived in the tradition. In this context, Prof. Nayak's interpretation of the concept of *māyā* is also noteworthy. He suggests that *māyā* which has received various interpretations in the tradition can be construed as the "ignorance of the non-duality" (p. 51) and "the fact everyone sees multiplicity where there is unity and is deceived by various linguistic forms which have only practical value *(Vyāvahārika)* ..." *(Ibid)*. The merit of the suggestion lies in its implication that the theory of *māyā* is not a theory of creation at all (p. 50).

Prof. Nayak interprets *Mādhyamika* Buddhism also from the analytic point of view with remarkable intensity and clarity. The results have been no less promising. The old controversy whether the *Śūnyatā* of the *Mādhyamika* stands for an Absolute Reality or for a pure emptiness has got a fresh life in the essay "The Philosophy of Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti". Prof. Nayak has clinched the issue by arguing that *Śūnyatā* stands for essencelessness *(niḥsvabhāvatā)* rather than for a transcendental reality. The following passage is worth noting:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> The concept of *śūnyata* in Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti is neither mystical nor religious; it points to the *niḥsvabhāvatā* or essencelesseness which needs to be realized through philosophical analysis *(catuṣkotitarka)* and thus an insight or illumination is gained into the nature of things and concepts which constitutes *nirvāṇa (sarvakalpanā kṣayarūpa)* (p. 25).

The Buddhist zeal for analytic clarity and non-speculative understanding of human life, its sufferings and its aspirations for the ultimate freedom has been delineated by Prof. Nayak with utmost sensitivity.

Whether it be a Buddhist concept or a concept in the *Gītā* or a whole philosophical perspective as that of Śri Aurobindo or Baladeva Vidyābhusana, Prof. Nayak has the instinct for bringing out its analytic best insofar as it is seen not as a dogma, nor as a mystic revelation, nor as an idea of remote speculative interest. His "Rationalism in the *Gītā*" is, for example, a noteworthy attempt at understanding the 'rational attitude' of the *Gītā* as represented in its concept of *buddhi śaraṇāgati* (p. 10). As Prof Nayak presents it, the message of the *Gītā* is to shed all intellectual sloth and gain illumination through reasoning and patient intellectual probing.

The second group of essays, as noted earlier, comprise such an assortment of representative essays as "What is Living and What is Dead in Religion,"? "A Plea for Commonism", "Transcedental Secularism" and "Values: *Dharma* and *Mokṣa*" These essays, though less organized, do represent the author's own thinking on the problems of religion, values and social re-construction. Prof. Nayak warns us against the decadence of religion and points to the last saving grace of the religious mode

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of living, i. e., the concern for the common man. If religion can solidly ground itself in humanism and can promote our feeling for the common man, then, according to the author, there is still the possibility of the survival of religion. Prof. Nayak codifies the humanistic core of religion in his newly-coined 'ism' "Commonism". "A Plea for Commonism" is a programmatic effort to highlight the contemporary man's call for a change of perspective on man, society and culture so that we can reassess our old values and our old-fashioned interpersonal relationships. What we need is the deepening of our links with the "common man" which have been weakened, if not sapped, in our present-day dehumanized culture. We need a revaluation of our values in the light of what we can still discover as of permanent worth in our value-system. What Prof. Nayak calls, though inaptly, "Transcendental Secularism" perhaps is an answer to the demand for the transvaluation of values which can result in conceding that freedom of mind or *mokṣa* is still of the highest importance for the new value-perspective. The freedom that he talks of is such that it unites each individual with the rest of of humanity in the bond of fellowship by the realization of the unity of existence. Such is the 'free man's worship' that Russell glorified and our ancient *ṛṣis* called upon us to practise as the ideal of *Jīvanmukti*.

Throughout the book Prof. Nayak is at pains to suggest that philosophy is not merely a pursuit of linguistic and conceptual clarity but also an awareness and pursuit of the ultimate freedom. On this goal philosophers are one whether they belong to the East or the West. This is a very significant and optimistic note that the author has made about the philosophical endeavour in general. One hardly would disagree with the author on this philosophical perspective. Of course, there can be point of disagreement on the method of doing philosophy as practised by the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

author. But one can hardly miss the philosophical fervour which the author has shown to understand the basic issues concerning man and his destiny. One only wishes that Prof. Nayak had more scope in these pages to probe more thoroughly into those issues which can be considered more urgent from his own print of view. The book, being a serious attempt at doing philosophy, should deserve wider appreciation and critical understanding.

Department of Philosophy
University of Hyderabad.
Hyderabad (A. P.)

R. C. PRADHAN

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
VOLUME XV

No. 1, January, 1988

F. A. SHAMSI : Victor Brochard on Zeno's Arguments Against Motion ...1

J. W. SMITH : Against Christian Prudery ...19

KAI NIELSEN : On Putting Marx on the Philosophical Agenda ...37

R. SUNDARA RAJAN : Reversal and Recognition in Plato ...53

A. HAQUE : Privacy and Private Language ...75

S. C. DANIEL : The Nature and Function of Imagination in Hume and Kant ...85

C. B. OKOLO : The African Person : A Cultural Definition (An Eisay in African Philosophy) ...99

No. 2, April, 1988

V. K. BHARADWAJA : The Concept of Arthāpatti ...113

V. RAJAPAKSE : The Ahiṁsā Precept of the Indian Religious Systems and the Utilitarian Thinking of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill : Notes on Some Points of Contact ...137

REGINTON RAJAPAKSA : The Problem of Identity of Objects in Hume's Philosophy ...169

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE	:	Dharmakirti on the Distinction between Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna	... 177
AJAI R. SINGH & SHAKUNTALA A. SINGH	:	The Comparative and the Creative	... 189
GAYATRI SINHA	:	Gilbert Ryle's Concept of Philosophy	... 209
RAGHUNATH GHOSH	:	Some Reflections on Kalidas Bhattacharya's "The Indian Concept of Freedom"	... 217
P. K. ROY	:	Language and Reality in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upniṣad and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus–Logico–Philosophicus	... 227
G. VEDAPARAYAN	:	J. P. Sartre's Ontology of "Negative Enlightenment"	... 233

No. 3, July, 1988

GEETA MANAKTALA	:	Verifiers and Theory Choice	.. 255
K. SUNDARESAN	:	Kant's Theory of Culture	... 267
V. T. SEBASTIAN	:	The Concept of Self Realization : An Approach to the Upaniṣadic Theory of value	... 279
A. W. J. HARPER	:	Identicalness	.. 295
TUSHAR KANTI SARKAR	:	Sense–Data and Physical Objects : A Systematization of Moore's View	... 303
BIRENDRA KUMAR SINHA	:	Stevenson's Working Models	... 341

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

TANDRA PATNAIK	:	Language, Thought and Communication : An Appraisal of Bhartrhari's Theory of Language	349
AJAI R. & SHAKUNTALA SINGH	:	Appendix to 'The Comparative and the Creative'	369

No. 4, October, 1938

R. PRASAD	:	Utilitarianism : A Conceptual Overview	387
ASHOK K. GANGADEAN	:	Meditation, Metaphor and Meaning	425
A. G. JAVADEKAR	:	Form Humanism to Holism	451
R. K. RAVAL	:	Worringer's Theory of Abstraction and Spetial Form in Turner	471
B. K. AGARWALA	:	The Distribution of Natural Talents	501
S. G KULKARNI	:	Philosophy of Science and Sociology of Science : Towards a Creative Interaction	515
P. P. GOKHALE	:	Karma–Doctrine and Freedom	529
KOYALI GHOSH-DASTAGIR	:	The Fact–Value Dichotomy	545
B. Y. DESHPANDE	:	Hume's Fork Related to Some Logico–Epistemological Distinctions in Philosophy	553
S. C. DANIEL	:	A Rejoinder to Rajapaksa	563

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BOOKS RECEIVED

R. Sundara Rajan; *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reason*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987; pp. 144; Rs 85/–.

Albert W. J. Harper; *Notes on Kant's Theory of Morals*, Phelps Publishing Co., Ontario, pp. 70; $ 4.95 (Canadian)

Subodh Kant Mohanty; *The Concept of Blik*, Anu Books, Meerut, 1988; pp. 280, Rs. 120/–.

Ludo Rocher (ed.); *Studies in Indian Literature and Philosophy : Collected Articles of J. A. B. van Buitenen*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1988, pp. 339; Rs. 150/–.

G. C. Nayak; *Philosophical Reflections*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1987; pp. 166, Rs. 65/–.

Rohit Mehta, *The Secret of Self-Transformation : A Synthesis of Tantra and Yoga*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1987; pp. 174; Rs. 90/–. (Hard cover), Rs. 60/– (Soft cover).

Karan Singh and Daisaku Ikeda; *Humanity at the Crossroads : An Inter-cultural Dialogue*, Oxford University Press, 1988; pp. 132; Rs. 100/–.

Arnold Toynbee and Daisku Ikeda; *Choose Life : A Dialogue*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987; pp. 348; Rs. 125/–.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

MANUSCRITO

An International Journal of Philosophy

Editor : Marcelo Dascal Associate Editor : Michel Ghins

Volume X No. 1 – April 1987

1) Gerard Radnitzky – The 'Economic Approach' Applied to the Philosophy of Science; 2) Klaus Mainzer – What is the Price of Realism in the Quantum World ?; 3) Léon Koj – Two Conceptions of Semantics; 4) Mauricio Beuchot – Las falacias y las paradojas logico-semanticas en la edad media; 5) Roberto Refinetti – Prolegomenos á epistemologia do behaviorismo radical; 6) Ruben Mario Tani – Peirce's Semiotic Pragmatism : on Saying/Doing.

Volume X No. 2 – October 1987

Special Issue : *Granger*

1) Jules Vuillemin – Sur la dualité; 2) Andres R. Raggio – Sobre la inflacion ponlinguistica; 3) David Braybrooke – Economic Thinking in Political Science ; Maximizing on the Way to Tautology; 4) Joelle Proust – Le sourire du chat du Cheshire : A propos des contenus formels; 5) Kuno Lorenz – La rectification de la tradition analytique; 6) José A. Gianotti – Breves considerocoes sobre o metodo de Wittgenstein; 7) Arley P. Moreno – Marcas de um Estilo ?; 8) Sergio Cremaschi – Granger and Science as Network of Models; 9) Ora Gruengard – Granger's Faith in Formal Thought; 10) Elizabeth Schwartz – Style et contenu formel : Le paradigme du travail; 11) Marcelo Dascal – Observacoes sobre o programa epistemologico de Granger; 12) Gilles-Gaston Granger – Contenu formel et dualité.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1078434

Volume XI No.1 – April 1988

1) Martin A. Bertman – The Thrasymachus; 2) L E. Goodman– Ordinary and Extraordinary Language in Medieval Jewish and Islamic Philosophy; 3) Olga L. Larre y J. E. Bolzan–La Teoria de las Causas en la "Summulae in Libros Physicorum" de Guillermo de Ockham; 4) Steven D. French – Models, Pragmatic Voirtues and Limited Scepticism : The Three Pillars of Constructive Empirism; 5) Roberto Refinetti – The Concept of Set Point (Goal Value) in Thermal Physiology; 6) John Bacon – The Meaning of 'Is'; Discussao : Alicia Juarrero Roque – What Did the Agent Know ?

Volume XI No. 2 October 1988

Special Issue : *Ceticismo*

1) Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho – Ceticismo semantico; 2) Rejane Carrion – Depois do ceticismo; 3) Valerio Rohden – Ceticismo versus condicoes de verdade; 4) Gerard Lebrum – Berkeley ou le sceptique malgre lui; 5) Zeljko Loparic – Kant e o ceticisino; 6) Avner Cohen – Scepticism and *Angst* : The Case of Davip Hume; Discussao : Zeljko Loparic – A propos du cartesianisme Gris de Marion; 7) Ezequiel de Olaso – Zetesis; Discussao : Alex Blum and Ralph Carasso – Pain Corrigibility.

MANUSCRITO will publish in the near future one special issue, one devoted to Foucault (Volume XII.2). Authors interested in submitting articles on Foucault should do so no later than October 31, 1988.

MANUSCRITO is published twice yearly by the Centro de Logica, Epistemologia e Historia da Ciencia. Universidade Estadual de Compinas. C. P. 6133. 13018 Campinas, SP.; Brazil.
Annual Subscription for individual is US $ 20,00 (US $ 10,00 for Latin American Countries).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
LIFE MEMBERS (Individuals)

259 Dr. Ajai R. Singh,
14, Shiva Kripa
Opp. St. Mary's Convent,
Nahur, Mulund (W)
BOMBAY 400 080.

260 Dr. V. V. Bedekar,
Dr. Bedekar's Hospital,
" Shiva–Shakti ",
Naupada,
THANE 400 602

261 Prof. Narayanshastri Dravid
" Affection "
474/A, Professors' Colony,
Hanuman Nagar,
NAGPUR 440 009.

262 Smt. Anuradha Singh,
150, Uttara Khand,
New Campus,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
NEW DELHI 110 067.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Compiled
1999-2000

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar